Debra Chimet vs. William Hall

34-2022-00320281-CU-OR-GDS: Debra Chimet vs. William Hall 08/14/2025 Court Trial DAY 3 in Department 39

Tentative Ruling

The Court issues the following tentative ruling on "Plaintiff's Motion to Amend according to proof," in advance of the Court trial date set for August 14, 2025, at 9:00am in department 39.

Ruling on motion to amend to conform to proof Plaintiff has filed a Motion to Amend the Complaint to Conform to Proof during trial. The initial pleading, filed on May 19, 2022, contains one cause of action for a partition relating to the property located at 4829 Dry Creek Road, Sacramento, California, 95828. Plaintiff seeks to file an amended complaint with five causes of action: (1) Partition; (2) Restitution; (3) Money Had and Received; (4) Account Stated; (5) Reformation of Deed; and (6) Equitable Eoppel. “The cases on amending pleadings during trial suggest trial courts should be guided by two general principles: (1) whether facts or legal theories are being changed and (2) whether the opposing party will be prejudiced by the proposed amendment.” (Garcia v.

Roberts (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 900, 910 [93 Cal.Rptr.3d 286].) “[The] amended pleading must be based upon the same general set of facts as those upon which the cause of action or defense as originally pleaded was grounded.” (City of Stanton v. Cox (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1557, 1563.) The Court noted at a prior hearing that the motion for leave to amend only contained a cursory legal analysis and gave Plaintiff a chance to file a supplemental brief on this issue. No supplemental brief was filed. The Court rules on the motion as follows.

Partition The first cause of action in the proposed amended complaint is for partition. This claim was the lone cause of action in the initial pleading and is not subject to the motion for leave to amend. Unjust Enrichment The second cause of action in the proposed amended complaint is for unjust enrichment. Defendant Hall argues “Unjust enrichment is not a cause of action” relying on McBride v. Boughton (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 379. (Opposition, p. 8:17.) While there are some cases that have reached this holding, “[t]he point is largely academic because this district has long taken the position that, even if unjust enrichment does not describe an actual cause of action, the term is “synonymous with restitution,” which can be a theory of recovery.” (O'Grady v.

Merchant Exchange Productions, Inc. (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 771, 791.) For example, McBride, upon which Hall relies, goes on to allow the unjust enrichment claim to proceed on a different legal theory: “we construe McBride's purported cause of action for unjust enrichment as an attempt to plead a cause of action giving rise to a right to restitution.” (McBride v. Boughton (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 379, 388.) Thus, whether characterized as “unjust enrichment” or “restitution,” the Court will address the claim on the merits.

34-2022-00320281-CU-OR-GDS: Debra Chimet vs. William Hall 08/14/2025 Court Trial DAY 3 in Department 39

“An individual is required to make restitution if he or she is unjustly enriched at the expense of another. [] A person is enriched if the person receives a benefit at another's expense. [] Benefit means any type of advantage.” (First Nationwide Savings v. Perry (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1657, 1662.) “The fact that one person benefits another is not, by itself, sufficient to require restitution. The person receiving the benefit is required to make restitution only if the circumstances are such that, as between the two individuals, it is unjust for the person to retain it.” (Id. at p. 1663.)

This cause of action collapses into the partition cause of action. The entire point of the partition cause of action is to determine what is just for each party to take from the house. Moreover, the partition cause of action has been specifically written by legislature to address equitable distribution from the sale of jointly owned property. Given this situation, the Court denies leave to amend to include this cause of action as it is superfluous and, to the extent money is sought relating to the property, it is preempted by the partition cause of action which has a comprehensive statutory scheme to address these issues. (K.C.

Multimedia, Inc. v. Bank of America Technology & Operations, Inc. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 939, 958 [“In sum, we agree with the federal cases applying California law, which hold that section 3426.7, subdivision (b), preempts common law claims that are “based on the same nucleus of facts as the misappropriation of trade secrets claim for relief.”].) Moreover, the testimony at trial did not demonstrate that Chiment contributed more financially than Hall to the parties living expenses so that equity would require Hall to pay money back to Chiment.

The Court also notes that the cause of action is also a bit vague and overstated. While many of the items alleged in paragraph 29 were mentioned at trial, not all were and Plaintiff did not provide monetary amounts for many of the items mentioned in the proposed amended complaint. The amended complaint also uses adjectives like “all” and “overwhelming majority” which are stronger than Chiment’s trial testimony on her level of participation. Moreover, Chiment testified she gave Hall cash or checks for a flat amount to be applied to all living expenses in general (without itemization).

This adds further to the reasons it is unnecessary and unsupported to add this cause of action. Money had and Received “The only essential allegations of a common count are '(1) the statement of indebtedness in a certain sum, (2) the consideration, i.e., goods sold, work done, etc., and (3) nonpayment.' (4 Witkin, op. cit. supra, § 508, at p. 543.) A cause of action for money had and received is stated if it is alleged the defendant 'is indebted to the plaintiff in a certain sum 'for money had and received by the defendant for the use of the plaintiff.' '” (Farmers Ins.

Exchange v. Zerin (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 445, 460 [61 Cal.Rptr.2d 707].) Plaintiff Chiment testified she gave money to Defendant Hall. The money was to cover living expenses. She also paid for upgrades to the house. However, the money was paid for the purpose of living expenses and to upgrade the house. The evidence at trial was the money was used for the purpose it was given. Plaintiff was able to live in the house and use the utilities and whatever other conveniences for which she gave money to Hall.

This was not a situation in

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2022-00320281-CU-OR-GDS: Debra Chimet vs. William Hall 08/14/2025 Court Trial DAY 3 in Department 39

which Hall accepted the money but refused to let Chiment live in the home or deprived her of enjoyment of the fruits of the money paid. Moreover, in regards to the property, Hall gave Chiment 50% of the property via a deed. Thus, Chiment did receive something for the time and effort she put in the house and the relationship. Further, the evidence was that she put in less than 50% of the money that went to pay for the house, including taxes and insurance. “An action for money had and received lies wherever one person has received money which belongs to another, and which in equity and good conscience should be paid over to the latter.” (Weiss v.

Marcus (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 590, 599.) “[E]quity and good conscience” is being considered in the partition cause of action. The evidence at trial does not support an independent cause of action for money had or received and, even if it did, such a cause of action would be superfluous and the “statutory preemption of common law” from the partition cause of action applied. (See K.C. Multimedia, Inc. v. Bank of America Technology & Operations, Inc. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 939, 958.) Accounts Stated The proposed fourth cause of action is a common count for “accounts stated.” “An account stated is an agreement, based on prior transactions between the parties, that the items of an account are true and that the balance struck is due and owing. [Citation.]

To be an account stated, ‘it must appear that at the time of the statement an indebtedness from one party to the other existed, that a balance was then struck and agreed to be the correct sum owing from the debtor to the creditor, and that the debtor expressly or impliedly promised to pay to the creditor the amount thus determined to be owing.’ [Citation.]” (Maggio, Inc. v. Neal (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 745, 752–753 [241 Cal. Rptr. 883].) “The essential elements of an account stated are: (1) previous transactions between the parties establishing the relationship of debtor and creditor; (2) an agreement between the parties, express or implied, on the amount due from the debtor to the creditor; (3) a promise by the debtor, express or implied, to pay the amount due. [Citations.]” (Leighton v.

Forster (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 467, 491 [213 Cal.Rptr.3d 899].) The facts at trial did not support a cause of action for accounts stated. There was no “agreement between the parties, express or implied, on the amount due from the debtor to the creditor,” in that the evidence at trial did not indicate that Defendant Hall promised to pay Plaintiff Chiment a debt, much less that the parties agreed on a specific sum for such a debt. Chiment testified that Hall promised to put her on the property deed.

She produced a deed signed by Hall at trial making her a joint tenant on the property. That promise was fulfilled. “The key element in every context is agreement on the final balance due.” (Maggio, Inc. v. Neal (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 745, 753.) There was no evidence that the parties agreed on any monetary debt from Hall to Chiment so an accounts stated cause of action is not proper. Reformation The fifth proposed cause of action is for reformation of the deed. Code of Civil Procedure § 3399 provides:

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2022-00320281-CU-OR-GDS: Debra Chimet vs. William Hall 08/14/2025 Court Trial DAY 3 in Department 39

“When, through fraud or a mutual mistake of the parties, or a mistake of one party, which the other at the time knew or suspected, a written contract does not truly express the intention of the parties, it may be revised on the application of a party aggrieved, so as to express that intention, so far as it can be done without prejudice to rights acquired by third persons, in good faith and for value.” (Civ. Code, § 3399.) Plaintiff Chiment seeks to add a cause of action for reformation. It is not clear how Chiment has a cause of action for reformation.

Reformation must be based on “fraud or a mutual mistake of the parties.” The proposed amended complaint suggest that this cause of action is based on Chiment conveying her interest in the property to a trust which dissolved the joint tenancy. No evidence was presented that this was based on any type of fraud. In terms of a mistake, “the court may only reform the writing to conform with the mutual understanding of the parties at the time they entered into it, if such an understanding exists.” (Hess v.

Ford Motor Co. (2002) 27 Cal.4th 516, 524, emphasis added; Williams v. Puccinelli (1965) 236 Cal.App.2d 512, 515 Mistake must be one “as to a basic fact which induced respondent to enter into the lease.”].) However, this cause of action is not based on a mistake made at the time the parties wrote the deed. The mistake was Chiment, much later in time, unilaterally conveying her interest to a trust: “In or around March 2021, the Plaintiff transferred her fifty-percent interest in the Property to the Debra S.

Chiment evocable Trust 2021, dated March 1, 2021, thereby severing the joint tenancy.” (Proposed Amended Complaint, para. 51.) This after-the-fact unilateral action is not the type of mistake that triggers the doctrine of mutual mistake. Moreover, the law and motion department ruled that Chiment is a 50% owner as a tenant in common. This motion to amend seems to be a disguised motion for reconsideration of that order which is a further reason to deny the motion. (Branner v. Regents of University of California (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1043, 1048 [a motion for reconsideration that does not meet the statutory requirements of CCP§ 1008 is not a “valid” motion to reconsider].)

The Court denies leave to amend the complaint to add a reformation cause of action. Equitable Estoppel ' ' 'Four elements must ordinarily be proved to establish an equitable estoppel: (1) The party to be estopped must know the facts; (2) he must intend that his conduct shall be acted upon, or must so act that the party asserting the estoppel had the right to believe that it was so intended; (3) the party asserting the estoppel must be ignorant of the true state of facts; and (4) he must rely upon the conduct to his injury.' ' (Migliore v.

Mid-Century Ins. Co. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 592, 606 [118 Cal.Rptr.2d 548].) “'[E]stoppel is applicable where the conduct of one side has induced the other to take such a position that it would be injured if the first should be permitted to repudiate its acts.” (DRG/Beverly Hills, Ltd. v. Chopstix Dim Sum Cafe & Takeout III, Ltd. (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 54, 59 [35 Cal.Rptr.2d 515].) The proposed amended complaint alleges: “During the time the Parties cohabitated, and based on upon the Defendant’s representations and course of conduct, the Plaintiff reasonably

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2022-00320281-CU-OR-GDS: Debra Chimet vs. William Hall 08/14/2025 Court Trial DAY 3 in Department 39

believed the Party’s respective payments were equalized, and that the Defendant would not seek reimbursement for the Parties’ individual expenses.” (Proposed Amended Complaint, para. 56.) First, there is no cause of action for equitable estoppel: “As estoppel in pais cannot be stated as an independent cause of action in California, the trial court was correct in sustaining defendant's demurrer to this allegation in the original complaint.” (Moncada v. West Coast Quartz Corp. (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 768, 782; Behnke v.

State Farm General Ins. Co. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1443, 1463 [“ a stand-alone cause of action for equitable estoppel will not lie as a matter of law.”].) Even if such a claim could be made “offensively,” the trial testimony did not suggest Defendant Hall is seeking reimbursement for “individual expenses.” Hall is seeking reimbursement for money he paid towards the property as opposed to general life individualized expenses. The partition cause of action specifically permits Hall to do this. (See Code Civ.

Proc., § 872.140 [“The court may, in all cases, order allowance, accounting, contribution, or other compensatory adjustment among the parties according to the principles of equity.”].) Thus, an “offensive” cause of action for estoppel cannot lie against Hall for seeking to recover expenses the Code of Civil Procedure specifically permits him to recover in a partition cause of action. Any objection to Hall’s requests for reimbursements should be made by Chiment in the partition cause of action, including under § 872.140.

This cause of action is superfluous and preempted to the extent it is based on Hall’s request for credit towards the sale of the subject property. Additionally, while the evidence demonstrated the parties agreed to some cost sharing of daily living expenses, the evidence did not show it was “equalized.” There were months where Chiment testified she paid $150 or $300, which is clearly less than half the monthly expenses to run a household. Thus, this is a further reason the cause of action is not supported by the trial testimony.

Statute of Limitations Defendant argues that the claims sought to be added via amendment are all untimely. Based on the trial testimony, it appears Plaintiff Chiment vacated the property in 2022. Plaintiff seeks to amend the complaint in mid-2025. Code of Civil Procedure 339 which provides a two-year statute of limitations for: “An action upon a contract, obligation or liability not founded upon an instrument of writing.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 339(1); also see Newport Harbor Ventures, LLC v. Morris Cerullo World Evangelism (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 1207, 1221 [“The statute of limitations for quantum meruit claims is two years.”].)

This amendment has been filed more than two years since the relevant events occurred. Of course, if the claims to be added are based on the same nucleus of operative facts (to borrow a phrase from the federal realm) as the partition action, there is an argument that they “relate back” to the filing of the partition action in 2022. (Newport Harbor Ventures, LLC v. Morris Cerullo World Evangelism (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 1207, 1221 [“An amended complaint is considered a new action for purposes of the statute of limitations only if the claims do not “‘relate back’” to an earlier timely filed complaint.”].)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2022-00320281-CU-OR-GDS: Debra Chimet vs. William Hall 08/14/2025 Court Trial DAY 3 in Department 39

However, these payments started a long time ago. The parties appear to have moved in together at the subject property in October 1998. It is not clear that even if there were timely claims to add, that Chiment would be able to recover money for more than two years from the date the partition action was filed, May 19, 2020. This is based on the relation back date of May 19, 2022 (when the civil action was filed). Plaintiff testified that from 2019 to 2022, she paid $300 cash a month total. Assuming Chiment gets “full credit” for that money for two years, that would total $7,200. (See Corato v.

Estate of Corato (1927) 201 Cal. 155, 161 [“We are of the opinion that under the facts in the present case the plaintiff was entitled to reasonable compensation from month to month as the services were performed, and that the statute of limitations has foreclosed a recovery for any period except during the two years immediately preceding the death of the deceased.”].) At this point, the Court will not rule on the statute of limitations since the above rulings fully dispose of the motion.

Conclusion

The Court denies the motion for leave to amend to conform to proof. The evidence at trial did not support the causes of action sought to be added and they also contain legal defects. Moreover, Plaintiff’s motion did not provide a sufficient offer of proof or analysis that these causes of action are appropriate subjects for an amendment to conform to proof.