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24NNCV04195·la·Civil·Employment / FEHA Discrimination & Retaliation
Hearing in 3 daysDENIED

Nicholas Glover v. The Oncology Institute of Hope and Innovation Patient Safety Organization, LLC

MOTION TO VACATE AND SET ASIDE CLERK'S ENTRY OF DEFAULT ON CROSS-COMPLAINT

Hearing date
Sep 8, 2026
Department
V
Prevailing
Defendant

Motion type

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Causes of action

Parties

PlaintiffNicholas Glover
DefendantThe Oncology Institute of Hope and Innovation Patient Safety Organization, LLC

Ruling

tort, not contract. (FAC, P.P. 30-31, 36.)

Therefore, the Court finds that Civil Code section 1717 does not apply and whether Defendant possesses a right to attorneys' fees is a matter of contractual intent. (Hom, supra, at p. 470.)

Here, the attorneys' fees provision applies to "necessary" actions "for the purpose of enforcing the terms of [the Agreement]." (Campbell Decl., Exh. A.) The plain language is a more limiting, narrowly drawn attorneys' fees provision.

California courts have declined to award attorneys' fees incurred by the prevailing party in cases involving tort claims where the attorneys' fees provision expressly limited recovery to fees incurred in seeking "to enforce" an agreement. (See Casella v. SouthWest Dealer Services, Inc. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1127, 1162.)

In contrast, where contracting parties utilize broad language that extends beyond mere enforcement of the contract, California courts will enforce the agreement under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021 to award fees to the prevailing party on tort claims. (See Moallem v. Coldwell Banker Com. Group, Inc. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1827, 1831-1832 [holding that an attorneys' fees provision extending to any "legal action ... relating to" the contract is drafted broadly enough to encompass tort claims]; Xuereb v. Marcus & Millichap, Inc. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1338, 1342-1343 [holding that an attorneys' fees provision applicable to any "lawsuit or other legal proceeding" to which "this Agreement gives rise" did not limit attorneys' fees to contract actions].)

Because the Agreement's attorneys' fees provision applies only "for the purpose of enforcing the terms," the Court finds that the Agreement's attorneys' fees provision is not triggered by Plaintiff's conversion cause of action based in tort.

Accordingly, the Court denies Defendant's motion to recover attorneys' fees.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court DENIES Defendant Lisa C.L. Campbell's motion to recover attorneys' fees. Moving party is ordered to give notice of this ruling. IT IS SO ORDERED. DATED: September 8, 2026 _____________________________ Sarah J. Heidel Judge of the Superior Court

County of Los Angeles - NORTHEAST District Department V NICHOLAS GLOVER, an individual, Plaintiff, vs. THE ONCOLOGY INSTITUTE OF HOPE AND INNOVATION PATIENT SAFETY ORGANIZATION, LLC, a California corporation; and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, Defendants. | Case No.: |

| | | Hearing Date: | September 8, 2026 | | | Time: | 8:30 a.m. | | | [Tentative] Order RE: MOTION TO VACATE AND SET ASIDE CLERK'S ENTRY OF DEFAULT ON CROSS-COMPLAINT | MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff Nicholas Glover RESPONDING PARTY: Defendant The Oncology Institute of Hope and Innovation Patient Safety Organization, LLC

The Court considered the moving papers, opposition and reply filed in connection with the instant motion.

BACKGROUND

On September 11, 2024, Plaintiff Nicholas Glover ("Plaintiff") filed a complaint against Defendant The Oncology Institute of Hope and Innovation Patient Safety Organization, LLC ("Defendant"), alleging causes of action for (1) retaliation in violation of California government code section 12945.2, (2) retaliation in violation of California government code section 12940, subdivision (h), (3) race discrimination in violation of FEHA, (4) discrimination in violation of California government code section 12940, subdivision (a), (5) harassment in violation of California government code section 12940, subdivision (j), (6) failure to prevent discrimination, harassment, and retaliation of FEHA, (7) retaliation in violation of labor code section 1102.5, (8) wrongful termination, (9) intentional infliction of emotional distress, and (10) negligent infliction of emotional distress.

These causes of action arise from Plaintiff's time as an employee with employer Defendant and Plaintiff's alleged wrongful termination.

On November 4, 2024, Defendant filed an answer to Plaintiff's complaint.

On July 1, 2026, the Court found the instant case and Toi Management, LLC, A California Company vs. Nicholas Glover, Los Angeles Superior Court no. 25NNCV05743 (the "Related Case"), related within the meaning of California Rules of Court, rule 3.300(a). The Court determined that the instant case is the lead case.

On July 14, 2026, the Court entered default in favor of Toi Management, LLC, now known as Starling Oncology Management, LLC ("Toi"), against Plaintiff in the Related Case.

On August 17, 2026, Plaintiff filed the instant motion to vacate and set aside entry of default.

On August 18, 2026, Plaintiff filed a first amended motion to vacate and set aside entry of default.

On August 25, 2026, Defendant filed an opposition.

On August 28, 2026, Plaintiff filed a reply.

LEGAL STANDARD

Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b) states:¿"The court may, upon any terms as may be just, relieve a party or his or her legal representative from a judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceeding taken against him or her through his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. Application for this relief ... shall be made within a reasonable time, in no case exceeding six months, after the judgment, dismissal, order, or proceeding was taken. ... Notwithstanding any other requirements of this section, the court shall, whenever an application for relief is made no more than six months after entry of judgment, is in proper form, and is accompanied by an attorney's sworn affidavit attesting to his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect, vacate any ... dismissal entered against his or her client, unless the court¿finds that the default or dismissal was not in fact caused by the attorney's mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect.

The court shall, whenever relief is granted based on an attorney's¿affidavit¿of fault, direct the attorney to pay reasonable compensatory legal fees and costs to opposing counsel or parties."¿

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff moves for an order vacating and setting aside the entry of default entered on July 14, 2026 in the Related Case pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b).

Preliminarily, the Court notes that Plaintiff incorrectly filed the instant motion under the docket for instant case, case no. 24NNCV04195, and not the Related Case.

Likewise, Plaintiff incorrectly claims that the Court "consolidated" the instant case and the Related Case. (Glover Decl., P. 2.) Plaintiff believed that the Court's order meant the cross-complaint in the Related Case was automatically absorbed into the instant action. (Glover Decl., P. 2.)

However, in its July 1, 2026 Minute Order, the Court stated that it found the cases to be related within the meaning of California Rules of Court, rule 3.300(a). The Court did not "consolidate" the matters and their respective dockets into one action.

The Related Case involves Plaintiff and Toi, a separate entity who is not a party to the instant action. In the Related Case, the Court entered judgment in favor of Toi against Plaintiff.

Plaintiff filed proof of service on Defendant, but Plaintiff has not filed proof of service on Toi. Defendant notes in opposition that it responds to the instant motion solely because Plaintiff filed it in this action, but states that it is not a party to the Related Case. (Opp., 2:11-19.)

Toi has yet to be properly served with notice of the instant motion. Therefore, the party who obtained default remains unserved without notice of the motion.

Accordingly, the Court denies the instant motion and directs Plaintiff to file the motion in the proper action and properly serve the correct party to give them notice and opportunity to respond before it is considered on its merits.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court DENIES Plaintiff Nicholas Glover's motion to vacate and set aside entry of default. Moving party is ordered to give notice of this ruling. IT IS SO ORDERED. DATED: September 8, 2026 _____________________________ Sarah J. Heidel Judge of the Superior Court Case Number: 25NNCV01590 Hearing Date: September 8, 2026 Dept: V Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles - NORTHEAST District Department V Christopher Siraganian, Caroline McLoughlin, Plaintiffs, vs. Stillwater Insurance Co. and DOES 1 through 10, Defendants. |

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