DRUG TAKEBACK SOLUTIONS FOUNDATIONS vs CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF RESOURCES RECYCLING AND RECOVERY, et al.

26WM000096: DRUG TAKEBACK SOLUTIONS FOUNDATIONS vs CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF RESOURCES RECYCLING AND RECOVERY, et al. 09/04/2026 Hearing on Motion for Preliminary Injunction in Department 13A

Tentative Ruling

Consistent with Local Rule 1.06(B), a party requesting oral argument must telephone the Court and all other parties, and/or must email the Court (dept13A@saccourt.ca.gov) and all other parties, by 4:00 p.m. the court day before the hearing. If no party telephones and/or emails the Court and the other parties by 4:00 p.m. the court day before the hearing, no hearing will be held, and the tentative ruling shall become the Court’s order and statement of decision. If a hearing is requested, counsel are encouraged to appear remotely through the Zoom Application.

Counsel may join the Zoom session by video through the following link: https://saccourt-ca-gov.zoomgov.com/j/16180485362 Counsel may join the Zoom session by audio through the following telephone number / ID: (833) 568-8864 / 161 8048 5362 The Zoom Application will not be available to any other interested parties or the general public. Interested parties and the general public are, however, encouraged to attend in person in Department 13A, which will be open to the public. Parties requesting the services of a court reporter will need to arrange for private court reporter services at their own expense, pursuant to Government Code section 68086 and California Rules of Court, rule (CRC) 2.956.

Requirements for requesting a court reporter are listed in the Policy for Official Reporter Pro Tempore available on the Sacramento Superior Court website at https://www.saccourt.ca.gov/court-reporters/docs/crtrp-6a.pdf. Parties may contact Court- Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore by utilizing the list of Court Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore available at https://www.saccourt.ca.gov/court-reporters/docs/crtrp- 13.Pdf A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (Form CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list.

Once the form is signed, it must be filed with the clerk. See further instructions and information at the end of this tentative ruling. *

The demurrer to the First Amended Petition and Complaint (FAP), filed by Respondents and Defendants California Department of Resources Recycling and Recovery, et al. (CalRecycle) and its director, Zoe Heller[1]1 is SUSTAINED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. CalRecycle’s Request for Judicial Notice in support of the Demurrer is GRANTED.

26WM000096: DRUG TAKEBACK SOLUTIONS FOUNDATIONS vs CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF RESOURCES RECYCLING AND RECOVERY, et al. 09/04/2026 Hearing on Motion for Preliminary Injunction in Department 13A

Petitioner and Plaintiff’s (Petitioner) motion for preliminary injunction is DENIED. The third party motions to quash subpoenas filed by nonparties Med-Project, LLC and Pharmaceutical Product Stewardship Work Group (PPSWG) are GRANTED. I.

Background

Petitioner is a non-profit program comprised of pharmaceutical and sharps manufacturers, which support the collection and disposal of pharmaceutical drug waste and sharps waste. (FAP, ¶25.) For the past several years, Petitioner has operated drugs and sharps stewardship programs, and is regulated by CalRecycle.[2]2 In 2018, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill (SB) 212, which requires producers (called “covered entities”) of covered drugs and sharps to create a takeback program for waste generated by covered drugs and home-generated sharps (e.g., needles and syringes). (FAP, ¶ 29; see also Pub.

Resources Code, §§ 42030, et seq.) Under the structure of SB 212, an industry participant may establish one or more non-profit “stewardship organizations” to devise programs for the collection and safe disposal of covered pharmaceutical drugs and sharps waste. (Pub. Resources Code, § 42030, subds. (w)-(y).) A “program operator” of a takeback program, as defined in Public Resources Code section[3]3 42030, subdivision (q), must develop a “stewardship plan” for its program to collect and manage pharmaceutical drug waste and/or sharps waste. (FAP, ¶30; Pub.

Resources Code, § 42030, subds. (e), (g), (q), (x), (y).) CalRecycle approves each stewardship plan. (Id., § 40320, subd. (a), FAP, ¶30.) A program operator must annually submit to CalRecycle a written report describing the stewardship activities during the past year for the covered drugs and sharps programs. (Pub. Resources Code, § 42033.2, subd. (a)(1); FAP, ¶31.) CalRecycle must approve, disapprove, or conditionally approve the annual report. (Id., § 42033.2, subd. (e)(1); FAP, ¶31.) CalRecycle may take other enforcement activity, such as issuing Notices of Violation, and thereafter filing an Accusation seeking to revoke a stewardship plan. (Id., § 42035.2, subd. (a); FAP, ¶31.)

In 2022, CalRecycle approved Petitioner’s separate stewardship plans for drug waste disposal and sharps waste disposal. (FAP, ¶¶41-43, 58-59.) Petitioner’s operation of each of these programs has been subject to enforcement action from CalRecycle, as detailed below. Petitioner’s Sharps Program CalRecycle’s enforcement as to Petitioner’s sharps program arises from whether Petitioner met the “no cost” requirement, as described below.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26WM000096: DRUG TAKEBACK SOLUTIONS FOUNDATIONS vs CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF RESOURCES RECYCLING AND RECOVERY, et al. 09/04/2026 Hearing on Motion for Preliminary Injunction in Department 13A

Section 42032.2, subdivision (d)(1)(F)(i), requires that users be able to dispose of sharps waste at “no cost” to the user. CalRecycle’s regulation implementing this statute requires a stewardship plan to “provide a sharps waste container and mail-back materials to the ultimate user, at the point of sale or prior,” or alternatively, to “arrange, at the point of sale or prior, for a sharps waste container and mail-back materials to be sent to the ultimate user and arrive within five business days at no cost or inconvenience to the ultimate user.” (Cal.

Code Regs., tit. 14, § 18972.1, subd. (a)(10).) Petitioner refers to this requirement as the “no cost” requirement, and contends that CalRecycle’s regulation implementing the enabling statute goes beyond statutory requirements by also requiring “no inconvenience” to the user. Pursuant to the regulatory scheme, Petitioner submitted to CalRecycle an annual report for sharps waste for the year 2022. (FAP, ¶41.) In 2023, CalRecycle issued to Petitioner a Request for Action (RFA) and a Notice of Violation (NOV), as to this report. (FAP, ¶43, FAP, fn. 6.)

CalRecycle alleged that Petitioner did not comply with the “no cost” requirement in Section 42032.2, subdivision (d)(1)(F)(i), or its implementing regulations. (Ibid.) At some point, Petitioner then submitted a revised 2022 annual report. CalRecycle issued another RFA, and in 2025, issued another NOV based on the same violations. (FAP, ¶43.) Petitioner continued to function as a program operator and submitted annual reports for the years 2023 and 2024. (FAP, ¶¶44-45.) In January 2026, Petitioner communicated to CalRecycle that it would no longer be providing its services as a program operator, effective June 30, 2026. (FAP, ¶¶13-14.)

On February 25, 2026, CalRecycle served a combined Accusation for Penalties and Notice of Revocation of Plan Approval for the sharps program administered by Petitioner, and for the drugs program, also administered by Petitioner. The Accusation charges Petitioner with violations related to alleged deficiencies in the 2022 and 2023 annual reports for the sharps program, and drugs program. It alleges that Petitioner failed to meet the “no cost” requirement as to the sharps program, and alleges that Petitioner failed to meet the “convenience standard” for the drugs program, as described further in this ruling. (FAP, ¶¶14, 43, 46, 66.)

Specifically, the Accusation alleges that: (1) Petitioner failed to timely implement its drugs program and sharps program after approval and failed to meet annual reporting requirements (Counts I and II); (2) Petitioner failed to comply with its conditions of conditional approval for the drugs program and sharps program (Counts III and VI); (3) Petitioner failed to operate the drugs and sharps programs in a prudent and responsible manner (Counts V and VI); and, (4) Petitioner failed to timely pay administrative fees for the drugs and sharps programs (Counts VII and VIII).

The Accusation seeks $1,682,375.00 in civil penalties for violations related to Petitioner’s administration of the drugs program, and $1,687,750.00 in civil penalties for violations related to

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26WM000096: DRUG TAKEBACK SOLUTIONS FOUNDATIONS vs CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF RESOURCES RECYCLING AND RECOVERY, et al. 09/04/2026 Hearing on Motion for Preliminary Injunction in Department 13A

Petitioner’s administration of the sharps program. The Accusation also seeks to revoke approval of both the drugs and sharps programs. (FAP, ¶14; RJN, Exh. A at 1.) Petitioner’s Drugs Program CalRecycle’s enforcement as to the Petitioner’s drugs program is based on whether Petitioner met the “convenience standard,” as described below. Section 42032.2 governs requirements for a program operator’s stewardship plan for drug waste. (Pub. Resources Code, § 42032.2.) Pursuant to this statute, CalRecycle issued a regulation requiring a stewardship plan to describe “[h]ow [the] convenience standards pursuant to [the language in section 42032.2, subdivision (a)(1)(F)] will be met for each county.” (Cal.

Code Regs., tit. 14, § 18973.2, subd. (g)(2).) Petitioner alleges that this regulation (also referred to as “the convenience standard”) is inconsistent with the requirements of section 42032.2, subdivision (a)(1)(F), and is invalid and an improper basis for CalRecycle’s enforcement actions. For example, Petitioner alleges that CalRecycle has taken the position that, if two stewardship organizations both operate in a county, each must independently satisfy the requirement in Public Resources Code section 42032.2, subdivision (a)(1)(F)(i) to have a requisite number of authorized collection sites and to achieve a reasonable geographic spread of these sites. (FAP, ¶¶51-52.)

In March 2023, Petitioner submitted to CalRecycle its annual report for its drugs program for the 2022 year. (FAP, ¶59.) CalRecycle found that Petitioner did not meet the above “convenience standard.” (FAP, ¶60.) CalRecycle disapproved of the 2022 report and issued a RFA and NOV. (FAP, ¶61.) Petitioner then submitted a revised 2022 report for which CalRecycle ultimately issued a NOV. (Ibid.) In March 2024, Petitioner again submitted its annual report for its drugs program for the year 2023. (FAP, ¶62.)

CalRecycle disapproved the 2023 annual report, issued an RFA and a supplement to the RFA, and again found that Petitioner failed to meet the “convenience standard.” (Ibid.) Petitioner submitted a revised 2023 annual report. (Ibid.) CalRecycle again disapproved of the revised 2023 annual report and issued an RFA, and then, a NOV. (FAP, ¶63, fn. 18.) In March 2025, Petitioner then submitted an annual report for its drugs program for the year 2024. (FAP, ¶64.) CalRecycle disapproved this annual report and issued an RFA, again, finding that Petitioner failed to meet the “convenience standard.” (FAP, ¶65.)

On February 25, 2026, CalRecycle served the Accusation for the combined violations of the sharps and drugs programs, discussed earlier in this ruling. Procedural History after Filing the Accusation On April 3, 2026, Petitioner filed its initial Verified Petition for Writ of Mandamus and Complaint for Declaratory Relief (Initial Petition) in this Court. The Initial Petition challenged

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26WM000096: DRUG TAKEBACK SOLUTIONS FOUNDATIONS vs CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF RESOURCES RECYCLING AND RECOVERY, et al. 09/04/2026 Hearing on Motion for Preliminary Injunction in Department 13A

as unlawful the statutes and regulations that are the basis for the Accusation and raised all of the causes of action in the FAP, save the First and Second Cause of Action regarding CalRecycle Hearing Officer Wall’s order on conduct of the administrative proceedings, which were added in the FAP. On April 18, 2026, Petitioner filed a written opposition to CalRecycle’s Accusation. (RJN, Exh. B.) In this opposition, Petitioner raised several defenses, including challenges to CalRecycle’s regulations, and claimed that CalRecycle treated it unfairly relative to the other stewardship organization providing services in California, MED-Project, USA.[4]4 (Id., at Exh.

B.) On April 20, 2026, Petitioner served discovery requests upon CalRecycle, MED-Project, LLC, and PPSWG.[5]5 On May 13, 2026, CalRecycle’s Hearing Officer, Jessica Wall, ruled that the hearing on the Accusation would proceed according to the rules of Chapter 4.5 of the Government Code, the portion of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) governing informal hearings, rather than those of Chapter 5 of the Government Code, the portion of the APA governing formal hearings. (RJN, Exh. C.) The hearing on the Accusation was scheduled for September 21-23, 2026 (RJN, Exh.

G [Motion for Prelim. Injunction], p. 9), and has since been continued to October 28-30, 2026. (Opposition to Motion for Preliminary Injunction, p. 10:11.) On May 20 and 28, 2026, Med-Project, LLC and PPSWG filed motions to quash the subpoenas. Petitioner filed the FAP on June 15, 2026. The FAP also challenges CalRecycle Hearing Officer Wall’s decision that the matter will be heard under the informal procedures of Chapter 4.5 of the Government Code. The FAP contains ten causes of action.  The First Cause of Action seeks a declaration that CalRecycle’s Regulations, which provide for an informal hearing under Chapter 4.5 of the Government Code, exceed CalRecycle’s authority and must be vacated.  The Second Cause of Action seeks a writ of mandate directing CalRecycle to cease adjudicating the Accusation in an informal hearing under Chapter 4.5 of the Government Code.  The Third Cause of Action seeks a declaration that CalRecycle’s regulation, 14 California Code of Regulations section 18972.1, subdivision (a)(1) (relating to the “no cost” requirement of Section 42032.2, subd. (d)(1)(F)(i)), is invalid.  The Fourth Cause of Action seeks a declaration that CalRecycle’s conduct in enforcing the “no cost” requirement in its regulation exceeds CalRecycle’s statutory authority, and is unenforceable.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26WM000096: DRUG TAKEBACK SOLUTIONS FOUNDATIONS vs CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF RESOURCES RECYCLING AND RECOVERY, et al. 09/04/2026 Hearing on Motion for Preliminary Injunction in Department 13A

 The Fifth Cause of Action seeks declaratory relief that CalRecycle has applied the statutes and regulations governing drug and sharps programs in a discriminatory manner against Petitioner in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution.  The Sixth Cause of Action seeks declaratory relief that CalRecycle has applied the statutes and regulations governing drug and sharps programs in a discriminatory manner against Petitioner in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the California Constitution.  The Seventh Cause of Action seeks a writ of mandate ordering CalRecycle to withdraw the Accusation against Petitioner, and all RFA’s and NOV’s, on the basis that CalRecycle has acted arbitrarily and capriciously by selectively enforcing the law against Petitioner.  The Eighth Cause of Action seeks a writ of mandate ordering CalRecycle to withdraw the Accusation against Petitioner, and all RFA’s and NOV’s pertaining to Petitioner’s annual reports for drug waste.  The Ninth Cause of Action seeks a declaration that the “[s]tatute and sharps Regulations are both unconstitutionally vague under the Due Process Clause of the United States and California Constitution.”  The Tenth Cause of Action alleges that CalRecycle charges MED-Project, USA “far less” for the administration of similar programs administered by Petitioner, and seeks a writ of mandate ordering CalRecycle to charge Petitioner only the “actual and reasonable cost” that CalRecycle incurs in implementing and enforcing the drug and sharps program.

On June 17, 2026, Petitioner filed a motion for a preliminary injunction, seeking to enjoin the ongoing administrative proceeding and for an order directing that the hearing be conducted as a formal APA hearing. On July 6, 2026, Respondents CalRecycle and its director, Zoe Heller, filed this demurrer. The Court considers all motions in this ruling. II. Discussion

a. Demurrer

i.

Legal Standard

A petition for writ of mandate is subject to a demurrer on the same grounds as a civil complaint. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1109; Hilton v. Board of Supervisors of Santa Barbara County (1970) 7 Cal.App.3d 708, 713.) In reviewing a demurrer, the trial court considers the properly pleaded material facts, and matters that may be judicially noticed, and tests their sufficiency. (Cedar Fair, L.P. v. County of Santa Clara (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1150, 1158-1159.) A demurrer is properly sustained without leave to amend when there is no reasonable possibility that the

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26WM000096: DRUG TAKEBACK SOLUTIONS FOUNDATIONS vs CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF RESOURCES RECYCLING AND RECOVERY, et al. 09/04/2026 Hearing on Motion for Preliminary Injunction in Department 13A

defects in the complaint may be cured by amendment. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Alliance for the Protec. of the Auburn Cmty. Envt. v. County of Placer (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 25, 29.) The burden of proving such reasonable possibility of amendment rests with the plaintiff. (Blank v. Kirwan, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 318.) Demurrer is appropriate when “[t]he court has no jurisdiction of the subject cause of action alleged in the pleading.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (a).) One instance in which courts lack jurisdiction is when a party has failed to exhaust its administrative remedies. (Coachella Valley Mosquito & Vector Control Dist. v.

California Pub. Emp. Rels. Bd. (Coachella) (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1072, 1080; Contractors’ State License Bd. v. Superior Court (CSLB) (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 771, 778.) “[T]o withstand a demurrer for failure to allege exhaustion of available administrative remedies, the plaintiff must allege facts showing that he did exhaust administrative remedies or facts showing that he was not required to do so.” (Tejon Real Estate, LLC, (2024) 223 Cal.App.4th 149, 156.) ii. Exhaustion The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that where a remedy before an administrative agency is provided by statute, regulation, or ordinance, (such as an administrative proceeding in which a final decision is rendered) relief must be sought by exhausting this remedy before the court will act. (Kaiser Found.

Hosp. v. Superior Court (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 85, 99-100.) Exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a matter of discretion. It is a jurisdictional prerequisite before a party may seek relief in court. (Campbell v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 311, 321; CSLB, supra, 28 Cal.App.5th at p. 779.) “When seeking relief under traditional mandamus, the exhaustion requirement speaks to whether there exists an adequate legal remedy. If an administrative remedy is available and has not yet been exhausted, an adequate remedy exists and the petitioner is not entitled to extraordinary relief.” (Unnamed Physician v.

Board of Tr. of Saint Agnes Med. Ctr. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 607, 620.) Accordingly, a party must exhaust its administrative remedies and obtain a final administrative decision before seeking judicial relief, unless excused therefrom. “The exhaustion doctrine precludes review of an intermediate or interlocutory action of an administrative agency. [Citation.] A party must proceed through the full administrative process to a final decision on the merits. [Citation.]” (Alta Loma Sch. Distr. v. San Bernardino Co.

Comm. on Sch. Distr. Reorganization (Alta Loma) (1981) 124 Cal.App.3d 542, 554 [citations and quotations omitted].) Thus, “[j]udicial intervention is premature until the administrative agency has rendered a final decision on the merits.” (Bleeck v. State Bd. of Optometry (1971) 18 Cal.App.3d 415, 432.)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26WM000096: DRUG TAKEBACK SOLUTIONS FOUNDATIONS vs CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF RESOURCES RECYCLING AND RECOVERY, et al. 09/04/2026 Hearing on Motion for Preliminary Injunction in Department 13A

A party may not circumvent this doctrine by bringing an action for declaratory or injunctive relief. (CSLB, supra, 28 Cal.App.5th at p. 781; Bleeck v. State Bd. of Optometry, supra, 18 Cal.App.3d at p. 432.) iii. All Causes of Action Must be Exhausted The Legislature has created an administrative remedy for stewardship programs, such as Petitioner, which are subject to discipline and contest CalRecycle’s enforcement action. (Gov. Code, §§ 11425.10, et seq.; RJN, Exh. C [CalRecycle Hearing Officer Wall’s determination that informal procedures of Chapter 4.5 govern].)

The causes of action in the FAP seek to circumvent that administrative remedy.[6]6 The ongoing administrative proceedings concern the same issues raised by the FAP. (Compare, e.g., FAP, ¶46 [alleging that CalRecycle’s Accusation asserts that Petitioner “failed to meet” the sharps regulation’s “unlawful . . . ‘no inconvenience’ requirement,”] with FAP, ¶133 [asking court to strike down sharps regulation “because, by additionally requiring ‘no inconvenience’ . . . the Regulations improperly enlarge the scope of the Statute”]; compare also FAP, ¶66 [alleging that the Accusation asserts that “[Petitioner] failed to meet the authorized collection sites and geographic spread components of the [drug plan] “convenience standard,”] with FAP, ¶144 [alleging that CalRecycle’s regulations “do not require each program operator to independently achieve the ‘convenience standard’ and satisfy reasonable geographic spread”].)

Petitioner contends that in its briefing on the demurrer, CalRecycle is inappropriately grouping the causes of action together, and such causes of action must be considered separately. The Court disagrees. The causes of action all seek to intervene in an ongoing enforcement proceeding, and Petitioner has “tied those proceedings into this action for the purpose of shortcutting those proceedings.” (Walker v. Munro (1960) 178 Cal.App.2d 67, 72 [superseded on other grounds].)

1. The First and Second Causes of Action The First and Second Causes of Action contest CalRecycle Hearing Officer Wall’s order declaring that administrative proceedings on the Accusation will be governed by the informal procedures of Government Code, Chapter 4.5, rather than the formal procedures of Government Code, Chapter 5. Petitioner claims that it is excused from exhausting its administrative remedies as to these causes of action, because the proffered administrative remedy (resolving the Accusation by CalRecycle’s informal procedures, rather than a formal APA hearing) is the source of the injury, and that CalRecycle Hearing Officer Wall cannot provide relief and invalidate the regulations challenged, requiring an informal hearing, and that the Hearing Officer (as opposed to CalRecycle) “lacks jurisdiction.”

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26WM000096: DRUG TAKEBACK SOLUTIONS FOUNDATIONS vs CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF RESOURCES RECYCLING AND RECOVERY, et al. 09/04/2026 Hearing on Motion for Preliminary Injunction in Department 13A

CalRecycle frames the First and Second Causes of Action as an interlocutory challenge to an administrative decision with which Petitioner is dissatisfied. CalRecycle argues that were a party able to challenge a decision at each step of the administrative proceedings, as Petitioner seeks to do, it would eviscerate the exhaustion doctrine. CalRecycle has the better argument. As discussed below, the remainder of the causes of action in the Petition seek to intervene in or enjoin ongoing administrative proceedings in which CalRecycle unquestionably has jurisdiction.[7]7 (Pub.

Resources Code, § 40501 [CalRecycle “may hold any hearings and conduct any investigations in any part of the state necessary to carry out its powers and duties.”].) Further, “[a]n administrative agency has the power to determine in the first instance, and before any judicial relief may be obtained, whether a given controversy falls within its statutory grant of jurisdiction.” (Board of Police Comm’rs v. Superior Court (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 420, 431 [emphasis in original]; see also Alta Loma, supra, 124 Cal.App.3d at p. 556 [“It lies within the power of the administrative agency to determine in the first instance and before judicial relief may be obtained whether a given controversy falls within its granted jurisdiction”].)

Petitioner must exhaust its administrative remedies as to these claims. Petitioner may not avoid the exhaustion doctrine by challenging CalRecycle Hearing Officer Wall’s decision governing how the administrative proceedings must proceed. “Certainly, each step in the administrative proceeding cannot be reviewed separately, any more than each ruling in the trial of a civil action may be separately reviewed by a separate appeal.” (Alta Loma, supra, 124 Cal.App.3d at p. 555.)

2. The Third through Tenth Causes of Action The Third through Tenth Causes of Action seek various forms of declaratory and writ relief to intervene in or enjoin ongoing administrative proceedings. Petitioner brings declaratory relief challenges to CalRecycle’s interpretation of statutory and regulatory terms, and alternatively alleges that some of those terms are unconstitutionally vague. (See Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Ninth Causes of Action.) Such claims must be exhausted. (CSLB, supra, 28 Cal.App.5th at p. 782.)

Petitioner argues that the Third, Fourth, Seventh, and Eighth and Tenth Causes of Action (alleging ultra vires actions and selective enforcement by CalRecycle) are not subject to exhaustion. This is because: (1) Petitioner is bringing challenges to statutes and regulations and is thus challenging a “policy” for which only judicial declarations can provide “prospective systematic relief”; (2) the CSLB case is distinguishable, because Petitioner is challenging CalRecycle’s jurisdiction; and (3) CalRecycle Hearing Officer Wall cannot provide relief as to the selective enforcement claims, here, because Petitioner is alleging a pattern of arbitrary

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26WM000096: DRUG TAKEBACK SOLUTIONS FOUNDATIONS vs CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF RESOURCES RECYCLING AND RECOVERY, et al. 09/04/2026 Hearing on Motion for Preliminary Injunction in Department 13A

enforcement and the CalRecycle Hearing Officer Wall cannot decide if CalRecycle engaged in a pattern of arbitrary enforcement by, among other things, improperly bringing the Accusation. Finally, Petitioner claims that the CalRecycle Hearing Officer Wall will not address fee methodology (the Tenth Cause of Action). Petitioner cites Californians for Native Salmon, etc. v. Department of Forestry (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 1419, for the proposition that declaratory relief is proper to challenge an agency’s policy.

The Court understands that a declaratory relief action may be appropriate to challenge a policy of an administrative agency. (Public Employees’ Ret. Syst. v. Santa Clara Valley Transp. Auth. (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 1040, 1046; Walker v. Munro, supra, 178 Cal.App.2d at p. 72.) However, in this case, there is an ongoing enforcement proceeding. This fact precludes Petitioner’s declaratory relief claims. Petitioner does not seek a “general declaration divorced from its application of a specific case under consideration.” (Public Employees’ Ret.

Syst., supra, 23 Cal.App.5th at p. 1046.) “Were there no administrative proceedings pending, there can be no question but that [Petitioner] would be entitled to bring a declaratory relief action to test the applicability of the statute and the regulations involved. But there are such proceedings pending and [Petitioner has] tied those proceedings into this action for the purpose of short-cutting those proceedings.” (Walker v. Munro, supra, 178 Cal.App.2d at pp. 743-744.) Petitioner “seeks in the present case to have the judicial branch intrude into the formulation of administrative policy, and issue a ruling to be applied in ongoing administrative proceedings before [CalRecycle].

Declaratory relief is accordingly not appropriate.” (Public Employees’ Ret. Syst., supra, 23 Cal.App.5th at p. 1046.) This principle is true regardless of the fact that Petitioner’s pattern and policy arguments allege that CalRecycle has engaged in disparate treatment disparate treatment of Petitioner and MED- Project, USA (see the Fifth and Sixth Causes of Action). (CSLB, supra, 28 Cal.App.5th at p. 784, fn.6 [exhaustion of administrative remedy required in disciplinary proceeding despite claim that agency “knowingly and intentionally” was discriminating against regulated entity]; United Ins.

Co. of Chicago, Ill. v. Maloney (1954) 127 Cal.App.2d 155, 157 [company had to exhaust claim of selective enforcement that agency “knowingly and intentionally was discriminating against respondents, thereby depriving them of due process and equal protection of the law”]; see also Subriar v. City of Bakersfield (1976) 59 Cal.App.3d 175, 193 [“The mere fact that a statute is challenged on constitutional grounds does not excuse a failure to exhaust administrative remedies”].) This principle is also true, notwithstanding California Constitution, Article III, section 3.5, which provides that an administrative agency is powerless to declare a statute unconstitutional, or refuse to enforce it on such grounds, unless an appellate court has determined the statute to be unconstitutional.

Petitioner contends that the Ninth Cause of Action (alleging statues and regulation are unconstitutionally vague) is a facial challenge and not subject to exhaustion. However, facial claims that could be rendered moot by the administrative

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26WM000096: DRUG TAKEBACK SOLUTIONS FOUNDATIONS vs CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF RESOURCES RECYCLING AND RECOVERY, et al. 09/04/2026 Hearing on Motion for Preliminary Injunction in Department 13A

proceedings, such as the Ninth Cause of Action, are not excepted from the exhaustion doctrine. (PegaStaff v. Public Util. Comm’n (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 274, 388 [noting that “even if [the plaintiff] could not have obtained all of the relief it seeks at the administrative level, ‘it would still be required to exhaust administrative remedies prior to making the constitutional challenge,’” as the agency remained “free to interpret the existing law in the course of discharging its statutory duties”].)

Accordingly, Petitioner was required to exhaust its administrative remedies for all causes of action, unless excused. a. No Exceptions Apply There are exceptions to the rule of exhaustion, such as when the administrative remedy is inadequate or unavailable (McAllister v. County of Monterey (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 253, 275) or if an agency lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute (Coachella Valley Mosquito and Vector Ctrl. Distr. v. California Pub. Rel. Bd., supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1083). Petitioner asserts that it need not exhaust administrative remedies because CalRecycle lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate the instant dispute.

As noted earlier, this claim is meritless. As an administrative remedy exists, Petitioner was required to exhaust this administrative remedy. No exception to the rule of exhaustion exists. Accordingly, the Court lacks jurisdiction as to all causes of action in the FAP. Petitioner cannot show that the FAP is capable of amendment in this regard. Thus, the demurrer to all causes of action is SUSTAINED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. b. Preliminary Injunction Petitioner moves for a preliminary injunction enjoining the administrative proceedings that are proceeding “informally” before CalRecycle Hearing Officer Wall, and directing that the administrative proceedings be conducted pursuant to the hearing procedures in Chapter 5 of the Government Code.

Petitioner’s motion for a preliminary injunction is DENIED. The Court has sustained CalRecycle’s demurrer to the Petition without leave to amend on the basis that Petitioner has not exhausted its administrative remedies, and is not excused from doing so. Accordingly, the matter may be dismissed. (Code Civ. Proc., § 581, subd. (f)(1).) As the FAP will no longer exist, it cannot form the basis for a preliminary injunction. c. Motions to Quash Subpoenas The Motions to Quash the Third-Party Subpoenas are also granted.

The basis for such Motions / / / /

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26WM000096: DRUG TAKEBACK SOLUTIONS FOUNDATIONS vs CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF RESOURCES RECYCLING AND RECOVERY, et al. 09/04/2026 Hearing on Motion for Preliminary Injunction in Department 13A

to Quash was the Petition, which will no longer exist, as the Court has sustained the demurrer without leave to amend.

III.

Disposition

The demurrer to the FAP is SUSTAINED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.

Petitioner’s motion for preliminary injunction is DENIED.

The third-party Motions to Quash are GRANTED.

The Court will sign the orders furnished by MED-Project, LLC and PPSWG.

Counsel for CalRecycle is directed to prepare a formal order, and a separate judgment of dismissal, each incorporating the Court’s ruling as an exhibit thereto, submit them to counsel for approval as to form, and thereafter submit them to the Court for signature, in accordance with California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312. The Judgment of dismissal shall contain the language required by Local Rule 2.15.

** Parties appearing remotely through Zoom are encouraged to use headsets. Experience has shown that the use of headsets improves sound quality. Technological issues sometimes arise during hearings conducted remotely. Most such issues are quickly resolved. Any party having trouble informing the Court about a technological problem during oral argument should immediately telephone or email the Department 13A Clerk, who will relay the information to the judge. The Department 13A Clerk may be reached at (916) 874- 5682 and dept13A@saccourt.ca.gov.**

[1] CalRecycle Hearing Officer Jessica Wall is also named as a Respondent. She is represented separately, and has filed a notice of non-participation in this proceeding. [2] Pursuant to the Legislature’s direction, CalRecycle promulgated implementing regulations and, in

January 2021, CalRecycle’s regulations became effective. (Pub. Resources Code, § 42031.2; see generally Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, §§ 18972.1–18975.2.) Petitioner alleges that when CalRecycle enacted such regulations, CalRecycle did not contemplate more than one program operator in the state, and created regulations that favored the first program operator it approved, MED-Project, LLC, which also operates a stewardship program in California. (FAP, ¶¶3, 9.) [3] Unless otherwise specified, all statutory references shall be to the Public Resources Code.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26WM000096: DRUG TAKEBACK SOLUTIONS FOUNDATIONS vs CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF RESOURCES RECYCLING AND RECOVERY, et al. 09/04/2026 Hearing on Motion for Preliminary Injunction in Department 13A [4] MED-Project, LLC, the party upon which Petitioner served the discovery subpoena, is a subsidiary of

MED-Project, USA, the other stewardship organization providing services in California. (MED-Project, LLC’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in support of Motion to Quash, p. 2, fn. 1; see also PPWSG’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in support of Motion to Quash, p. 7:1-2.) [5] PPSWG describes itself as a membership association for producers of pharmaceutical products and

sharps. (PPWSG’s May 26, 2026 Motion to Quash, p. 6:17-18.) Med-Project, USA is a member of PPSWG. [6] The Causes of Action in the FAP may be broken into two groups: (1) those addressing CalRecycle’s

enforcement action culminating in the filing of the Accusation, (the Third through Tenth Causes of Action) and (2) those addressing CalRecycle Hearing Officer Wall’s May 13, 2026 order that the administrative hearing on the Accusation would proceed under the informal procedures in Chapter 4.5 of the APA (the First and Second Causes of Action). [7] Petitioner claims that CalRecycle Hearing Officer Wall, who is conducting the administrative

proceedings, does not have jurisdiction. The issue is not whether the Hearing Officer has jurisdiction, but whether CalRecycle does.