Jane Doe v. Clovis Unified School District

(03) Tentative Ruling

Re: Jane Doe v. Clovis Unified School District Case No. 22CECG03712

Hearing Date: September 3, 2026 (Dept. 502)

Motion: Defendant Clovis Unified School District’s Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the Alternative, Summary Adjudication

Tentative Ruling:

To deny defendant Clovis Unified School District’s motion for summary judgment, and the alternative motion for summary adjudication. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c.)

Explanation:

Defendant’s primary argument is that plaintiff never reported the alleged sexual abuse by her teacher, Jon Randy Powell, to the District, the police, her family, or her friends, and that no one else witnessed the abuse. The District claims that there was nothing in Powell’s personnel file that indicated that he might have a propensity to molest his students. By the time Powell’s abuse of other students became known, he was no longer abusing plaintiff. Therefore, the District argues that it had no actual or constructive notice of the abuse, and thus had no duty to take any steps to investigate or prevent further abuse. (ZV. v.

County of Riverside (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 889, 903.) In addition, the District argues that it cannot be held vicariously liable for the intentional actions of Powell, as his sexual abuse of students was not in the course and scope of his duties as a teacher. (John R. v. Oakland Unified School Dist. (1989) 48 Cal.3d 438.) In addition, the District argues that most of abuse occurred off school property, and that it is statutorily immune from liability for its teacher’s misconduct that occurred off campus. (Education Code, § 44808.)

Therefore, the District concludes that it is entitled to summary judgment or adjudication of the negligence causes of action. “The elements of a cause of action for negligence are well established. They are '(a) a legal duty to use due care; (b) a breach of such legal duty; [and] (c) the breach as the proximate or legal cause of the resulting injury.' ” (Evan F. v. Hughson United Methodist Church (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 828, 834, italics in original.) “[A] negligent supervision claim depends, in part, on a showing that the risk of harm was reasonably foreseeable. ‘Foreseeability is determined in light of all the circumstances and does not require prior identical events or injuries.’ ‘ “It is not necessary to prove that the very injury which occurred must have been foreseeable by the school authorities. ...

Their negligence is established if a reasonably prudent person would foresee that injuries of the same general type would be likely to happen in the absence of [adequate] safeguards.’” (D.Z. v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 210, 229, citations omitted.) “As such, to support her negligent supervision claim, appellant had to prove both that Shelburne posed a risk of harm to students and that the risk of harm was reasonably foreseeable, i.e., that LAUSD knew or should have known of the risk.” (Id. at p. 230, citation omitted, italics in original.) 22

A public entity is not, as a matter of law, vicariously liable under a respondeat superior theory for intentional torts committed by its employees. However, it may be held directly liable for its own negligence in hiring or supervising the employee, who then commits intentional torts outside the scope of the employment relationship. (Z.V. v. County of Riverside (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 889, 902.) “To establish negligent supervision, a plaintiff must show that a person in a supervisorial position over the actor had prior knowledge of the actor's propensity to do the bad act.” (Ibid, citations omitted.)

Thus, in order for the plaintiff to prevail on her negligence claims, she must point to some evidence that the District had actual or constructive knowledge of Powell’s propensity to molest his students. (Ibid.) However, it is not necessary for plaintiff to show that the District had actual knowledge of the abuse allegedly committed by Powell. Plaintiff only needs to show that the District knew or should have known of Powell’s propensity to sexually abuse students. (C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 869-870.)

Even if the District did not have actual knowledge of Powell’s tendencies, it may still be held liable if it should have known of his tendencies based on the facts available to it. (Doe v. Lawndale Elementary School Dist. (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 113, 119, 129-130.) “As the Supreme Court held in C.A., ‘a public school district may be vicariously liable under section 815.2 for the negligence of administrators or supervisors in hiring, supervising and retaining a school employee who sexually harasses and abuses a student.’ The Supreme Court explained that a school district is liable for the negligence of supervisory employees who ‘knew or should have known of [a school employee's] dangerous propensities, but nevertheless hired, retained and failed to properly supervise’ the employee.

A school district's administrators and other supervisory employees are responsible for ‘taking reasonable measures to guard pupils against harassment and abuse from foreseeable sources, including any teachers or counselors they know or have reason to know are prone to such abuse.’” (Roe v. Hesperia Unified School District (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 13, 25, citations omitted.) “Knowledge may be shown by circumstantial evidence ‘which is nothing more than one or more inferences which may be said to arise reasonably from a series of proven facts.’” (Ortega v.

Kmart Corp. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1200, 1206–1207, citation omitted.) Here, while Clovis Unified argues that it had no actual or constructive knowledge of Powell’s propensity to molest his students and thus it had no duty to protect plaintiff from him, plaintiff has presented evidence that raises a triable issue of material fact with regard to whether the District had actual or constructive knowledge of his tendencies. Plaintiff’s evidence indicates that Powell made frequent comments to her about her physical appearance and body during class. (Perkins decl., ¶ 4, Exhibit B, J.H. depo., pp. 52:18-21; 57:12-20.)

He made similar comments about other girls in the class. (J.H. depo., pp. 52:14-53:2.) He would have plaintiff and other girls in the class bend over and then he would rub himself against them. (Id. at p. 54:3-8.) He joked in front of the class that he had “popped [plaintiff’s] cherry.” (Id. at pp. 82:232 – 83:24.) He put plaintiff’s and other girls’ hands on his pants and say “look what you’re doing to me.” (Id. at p. 89:1- 25.) Powell often kept the door open to his classroom, so his conduct was visible to anyone who might walk by. (Id. at p. 55:2-12; Exhibit C to Perkins decl., Powell depo., p. 50:6-14.)

Plaintiff has also alleged in her deposition that Powell would place her hand on his genitals, press himself against her, and grab her rear end while they were in the cafeteria and other public areas of the school when other students and staff were present. (J.H. depo., pp. 55:16 - 56:3, 57:21 - 58:11.) He also placed her hand under his shorts and on his penis during class. (Id. at pp. 74:1 - 75:9.) Plaintiff believed that “everyone” knew about Powell’s behavior because it was so open and “he never hid it.” (Id. at p. 147:1- 20.)

Plaintiff also regularly left school property with Powell during lunch, walking with him to his car and riding to his house. (Id. at pp. 155:3 – 156:8.) They would walk to his car in full view of other classrooms, which were occupied by students and faculty members. (Id. at pp. 154:3 – 155:2.) One of the other teachers, Ms. Flynn, saw plaintiff and Powell leaving campus together and expressed her concern with plaintiff and Powell about the trips. (Id. at pp. 161:9 – 162:5.) Powell would allegedly sexually abuse plaintiff during the lunch visits to his home. (Id. at pp. 157:1 - 158:3.)

Powell would provide plaintiff with alcohol during the trips, and she would sometimes return to school drunk. (Id. at pp. 159:8 – 160:9.) Powel would then write her a hall pass to give to other teachers so that she would not have to go to other classes that day. (Id. at p. 159:12-22.) Powell admitted that he once wrote hall passes for two other female students who got drunk at his house, although he claimed that they stole alcohol from him without his knowledge and that he was just trying to avoid having to report them. (Powell depo., pp. 110:6 – 111:6.)

One of Powell’s other female students also requested to be removed from his class after he commented on her appearance, although Powell claims that she simply wanted to be with her best friend, who was in a different classroom. (Powell depo., p. 129:2-11.) Powell also allegedly sexually assaulted plaintiff at his plant nursery business. (J.H. depo., pp. 70:24 – 71:4.) There were other District employees at the nursery when plaintiff was there with Powell. (Id. at p. 80:5-9.) Thus, plaintiff has submitted sufficient evidence to raise a triable issue of material fact with regard to whether the District had actual or constructive knowledge that Powell had a propensity for molesting students, including plaintiff.

A reasonable jury could infer that the District knew or should have known that Powell presented a danger of harassment and sexual assault to his female students based on his alleged pattern of openly commenting about plaintiff and other female students’ bodies and appearances, inappropriately touching plaintiff and other students in view of others, and making sexually suggestive comments about plaintiff in front of the class. Powell kept the door to his classroom open, so anyone could have seen his behavior.

He also walked with plaintiff to his car at lunch in full view of other classrooms with students and staff present, and at least one teacher saw him and expressed her concern about the trips. 1 He also allegedly sexually assaulted plaintiff at his plant nursery, which was frequented by other staff members of the District. He also wrote notes for plaintiff and other female

1 Defendant has objected to plaintiff’s evidence regarding Ms. Flynn’s statements as hearsay and

speculation, as well as Powell’s deposition testimony regarding the unidentified student who requested to be removed from his classroom. The court intends to overrule all of the objections.

Plaintiff has also objected to the declaration of Susan Rutledge in support of the summary judgment motion. The court intends to overrule plaintiff’s objections. 24

students, whom he allegedly got drunk during trips to his house. This pattern of behavior was allegedly open and obvious for anyone to see and hear, so a reasonable fact finder could conclude that the District knew or should have known about it and taken steps to investigate Powell and protect plaintiff from him. Therefore, the court will not grant summary judgment or adjudication based on the alleged fact that the District had no notice of Powell’s behavior and the danger he posed to plaintiff and other students.

The District has also argued that most of Powell’s alleged abuse of plaintiff took place off school property, so it is statutorily immune from liability for his actions. (Education Code, § 44808.) However, at least some of Powell’s alleged sexual harassment and assaults occurred while plaintiff was on campus, including his inappropriate touching of her in class and in the cafeteria, his placing her hand on his penis in class, and his sexual comments to her in front of the class. Therefore, even assuming that the District is immune from liability for Powell’s conduct that occurred off campus, the District may still be liable for his actions on school property.

The District also argues that it is not liable for Powell’s intentional acts of sexually harassing and abusing plaintiff. (John R. v. Oakland Unified School Dist. (1989) 48 Cal.3d 438; see also, C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High Sch. Dist., supra, 53 Cal. 4th at p. 879.) Yet, while the District is not liable for Powell’s intentional torts that fall outside of the employment relationship, it may be held liable for negligently hiring and failing to supervise Powell if it had actual or constructive knowledge that he posed a danger to his students. (C.A., supra, at p. 870.)

Here, as discussed above, there is evidence that raises a triable issue of fact with regard to whether the District knew or should have known that Powell had a propensity to molest his female students. Therefore, the District has not shown that it is entitled to summary judgment or adjudication of the negligence causes of action.

Finally, while plaintiff does not oppose the motion for summary adjudication of the tenth cause of action, the motion as to the tenth cause of action is moot since plaintiff has already dismissed her tenth cause of action. (See Request for Dismissal filed May 8, 2023.) Therefore, the court intends to deny the motion for summary adjudication as to the tenth cause of action as well. In summary, the court intends to deny defendant’s motion for summary judgment, and the alternative motion for summary adjudication of the separate causes of action.

Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), and Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5, subdivision (a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will serve as the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Tentative Ruling

Issued By: lmg on 9-2-26. (Judge’s initials) (Date)

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