BELTRAN vs CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION, et al.

23CV003281: BELTRAN vs CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION, et al. 12/19/2024 Hearing on Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings in Department 53

Tentative Ruling

NOTICE: Consistent with Local Rule 1.06(B), any party requesting oral argument on any matter on this calendar must comply with the following procedure: To request limited oral argument, on any matter on this calendar, you must call the Law and Motion Oral Argument Request Line at (916) 874-2615 by 4:00 p.m. the court day before the hearing and advise opposing counsel. At the time of requesting oral argument, the requesting party shall leave a voice mail message: a) identifying themselves as the party requesting oral argument; b) indicating the specific matter/motion for which they are requesting oral argument; and c) confirming that it has notified the opposing party of its intention to appear and that opposing party may appear via Zoom using the Zoom link and Meeting ID indicated below.

If no request for oral argument is made, the tentative ruling becomes the final order of the Court. Unless ordered to appear in person by the Court, parties may appear remotely either telephonically or by video conference via the Zoom video/audio conference platform with notice to the Court and all other parties in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure §367.75. Although remote participation is not required, the Court will presume all parties are appearing remotely for non-evidentiary civil hearings.

The Department 53/54 Zoom Link is https://saccourt-ca-gov.zoomgov.com/my/sscdept53.54 and the Zoom Meeting ID is 161 4650 6749. To appear on Zoom telephonically, call (833) 568-8864 and enter the Zoom Meeting ID referenced above. NO COURTCALL APPEARANCES WILL BE ACCEPTED. Parties requesting services of a court reporter will need to arrange for private court reporter services at their own expense, pursuant to Government code §68086 and California Rules of Court, Rule 2.956. Requirements for requesting a court reporter are listed in the Policy for Official Reporter Pro Tempore available on the Sacramento Superior Court website at https://www.saccourt.ca.gov/courtreporters/docs/crtrp-6a.pdf.

Parties may contact Court- Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore by utilizing the list of Court Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore available at https://www.saccourt.ca.gov/court-reporters/docs/crtrp-13.Pdf. A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list, Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk.

If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will be forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided. TENTATIVE RULING: *** The Court finds in its file no proof of service demonstrating moving party’s service of the Notice of Disclosure issued on 11/25/2024, despite being directed to serve all other parties with the Notice of Disclosure “forthwith.” Moving party is directed to serve the Notice of Disclosure on all other parties forthwith and to file proof of service within five (5) court days. ***

Defendant California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation’s (“CDCR”) motion

23CV003281: BELTRAN vs CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION, et al. 12/19/2024 Hearing on Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings in Department 53

for judgment on the pleadings as to the complaint filed by plaintiff Beltan is ruled upon as follows.

*** If oral argument is requested, the parties must at the time oral argument is requested notify the clerk and opposing counsel of the specific causes of action that will be addressed at the hearing. Counsel are also reminded that pursuant to local rules, only limited oral argument is permitted on law and motion matters. ***

Both moving and opposing counsel failed to comply with CRC Rule 3.1110(b)(4).

Defendant’s service of the moving papers by mail on 11/22/2024 for a hearing on 12/19/2024 did not give 16 court days plus an additional five (5) calendar days’ notice as required by Code of Civil Procedure §1005(b), since 11/28-29/2024 (Thanksgiving) were court holidays. (Code Civ. Proc. §12c, Barefield v. Washington Mutual Bank (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 299, 303.) Ordinarily, such defective service of notice would deprive the Court of jurisdiction to consider this matter (see, e.g., Lee v. Placer Title Co. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 503, 509-511) but this jurisdictional defect is deemed waived by plaintiff by virtue of her failure to timely object to this motion based on insufficient notice.

The Court adds that contrary to the statements found in the meet-and-confer declaration filed in support of this motion, a stipulation to file a first amended complaint is not required provided that it is filed in conformity with the deadline set forth Code of Civil Procedure §472(a). Had the parties here known this, finite judicial resources expended on this matter could have been preserved.

Factual Background

This action was commenced in June 2023 and arises from plaintiff’s employment with CDCR. The complaint purports to assert six (6) statutory causes of action, most of which are brought under the Fair Employment & Housing Act (“FEHA”) but one alleges “Retaliation in Violation of Gov’t [sic] Code §1102.5,” the latter of which is presumably an inaccurate reference to Labor Code §1102.5. Trial is currently set for June 2025.

Defendant now contends that the second and sixth causes of action for “Retaliation in Violation of Gov’t [sic] Code §1102.5” and for “Hostile Work Environment,” respectively, are each defective for various reasons discussed below. Plaintiff opposes in part.

Legal Standards for Judgment on the Pleadings

A motion for judgment on the pleadings functions like a general demurrer and may only challenge defects on the face of the complaint or from matters that are judicially

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV003281: BELTRAN vs CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION, et al. 12/19/2024 Hearing on Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings in Department 53

noticeable. (Anmaco, Inc. v. Bohlken (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 891, 900; Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) Consideration of extrinsic facts asserted in the memorandum supporting a demurrer, or supporting a motion for judgment on the pleadings, is improper. (Ion Equipment Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 881.) However, the face of the complaint is deemed include facts contained in exhibits attached to the complaint. (Frantz v. Blackwell (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 91, 94.)

A demurrer may be sustained, and thus a motion for judgment on the pleadings may be granted, only if the complaint lacks any sufficient allegations to entitle the plaintiff to relief. (Financial Corp. of America v. Wilburn (1987) 189 Cal. App. 3d 764, 778.) 'Plaintiff need only plead facts showing that he may be entitled to some relief, we are not concerned with plaintiff's possible inability or difficulty in proving the allegations of the complaint.' (Highlanders, Inc. v. Olsan (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 690, 696-697.) '[Courts] are required to construe the complaint liberally to determine whether a cause of action has been stated, given the assumed truth of the facts pleaded.' (Picton v.

Anderson Union High School Dist. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 726, 733, citation omitted.) A demurrer, as well as a motion for judgment on the pleadings, effectively admits the truth of all material facts properly pled and the sole issue raised by either is whether the facts pled state a valid cause of action - not whether they are true. (Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5 Cal.3d 584, 591.)

Like a demurrer, a motion for judgment on the pleadings, must completely dispose of the cause of action (Fire Insurance Exchange v. Superior Court (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 446, 452; Fremont Indemn. Co. v. Fremont Gen. Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 119) and thus, the mere fact a cause of action may contain one or more improper or superfluous allegations does not automatically make it subject to demurrer or judgment on the pleadings.

Request for Judicial Notice

Defendant CDCR’s request for judicial notice of the Department of General Services’ “Declaration [of No Records]” is granted but only for the limited purposes appropriate for judicial notice. (Evid. Code §451, subd. (a); §452, sub. (b)-(d); see also, Johnson & Johnson v. Superior Court (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 757, 768 [court may take judicial notice of the existence of court documents but not the truth of the statements contained therein].)

Discussion

Second Cause of Action. As noted above, this cause of action is labelled as one for

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV003281: BELTRAN vs CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION, et al. 12/19/2024 Hearing on Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings in Department 53

“Retaliation in Violation of Gov’t [sic] Code §1102.5,” presumably an erroneous reference to Labor Code §1102.5. Defendant CDCR contends this cause of action is improperly alleged here because (1) there is no allegation that plaintiff complied with “the Government Tort [sic] Claims Act” (presumably an inaccurate reference to “the Government Claims Act” found at Government Code §810 et seq. (see, Gov. Code §810(b)) and (2) it is barred by the applicable one-year statute of limitations found in Code of Civil Procedure §340(a).

Since the opposition expressly concedes this retaliation claim under §1102.5 is barred by both the statute of limitations (Oppos., p.2:11-12) and plaintiff’s failure to comply with “the Government Tort [sic] Claims Act” (Id., at p.3:19-21), this motion shall be GRANTED as to the second cause of action.

Sixth Cause of Action. This cause of action is labelled as one for “Hostile Work Environment” in violation of “Gov. Code §12940 et seq.” and it generally alleges plaintiff was subjected to offensive conduct which constituted harassment due to his race, national origin and “use of leave under FMLA,” thereby creating a hostile work environment. (Compl., ¶¶67-70.) Defendant now objects to this sixth cause of action on the grounds (1) there is no separate cause of action for “hostile work environment” and (2) it is otherwise duplicative of the fifth cause of action for “Harassment due to Race.”

The opposition argues the fifth cause of action for “Harassment” is separate and distinct from the sixth cause of action for “Hostile Work Environment” and further, defendant’s discriminatory actions created a hostile work environment. (Oppos., p.3:23-p.5:21.)

According to the Judicial Council of California’s Civil Jury Instructions, there are several forms of “work environment harassment” which is actionable under the FEHA and 1 CACI 2521A, which itself is derived from controlling California authority, sets forth the elements for “work environment harassment” which is directed at the plaintiff. These elements include “severe or pervasive conduct” motivated by a protected characteristic (e.g., gender, race, age, religion, etc.) which plaintiff did consider, and a reasonable person would consider, to be a hostile, offensive, intimidating, abusive or oppressive work environment. (1 CACI 2521A.)

As such, the Court rejects the opposition’s suggestion that a “harassment” theory of liability is “separate and distinct” from a “hostile work environment” theory of liability but for the reasons cited below, defendant’s challenge to the sixth cause of action on the ground it is “duplicative” of the fifth cause of action for “Harassment due to Race” does not withstand scrutiny.

As noted above, the fifth cause of action purports to assert a claim for “Harassment due to Race” while the sixth cause of action essentially asserts a second claim for “harassment” but based on plaintiff’s “national origin” and “use of leave under FMLA,” in

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV003281: BELTRAN vs CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION, et al. 12/19/2024 Hearing on Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings in Department 53

addition to his race. (Compl., ¶67.) In other words, the sixth cause of action for harassment based on plaintiff’s race, “national origin” and “use of leave under FMLA” is by its own terms substantially broader in scope than the fifth cause of action, which is by its own terms limited to harassment based solely on plaintiff’s race. (The Court here expresses no opinion about whether plaintiff’s alleged “use of leave under FMLA” may constitute a valid basis for a claim of harassment under the FEHA.) Thus, the sixth cause of action cannot be fairly characterized as being “duplicative” of the fifth cause of action and defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings is therefore DENIED as to the sixth cause of action.

The Court acknowledges that based on the foregoing analysis, it could be argued that the fifth cause of action is subject to challenge for being “duplicative” of the sixth cause of action but this question need not be addressed or resolved here since the present motion for judgment on the pleadings is not directed at the fifth cause of action for “Harassment due to Race.” (See, Not. of Mot., p.2:14-p.3:9.)

Disposition

For the reasons explained above, defendant CDCR’s motion for judgment on the pleadings is GRANTED but only as to the second cause of action for “Retaliation in Violation of Gov’t [sic] Code §1102.5.”

Since the opposition expressly concedes the second cause of action for “Retaliation in Violation of Gov’t [sic] Code §1102.5” is barred by the statute of limitations (Oppos., p.2:11-12) and by plaintiff’s failure to comply with “the Government Tort [sic] Claims Act” (Id., at p.3:19-21), leave to amend this second cause of action is DENIED.

This minute order is effective immediately. No formal order or other notice is required. (Code Civ. Proc. §1019.5; CRC Rule 3.1312.)