LINDA HARRINGTON ET AL VS. ALEJANDRA GARCIA ET AL
Case Information
Motion(s)
DEMURRER to COMPLAINT
Motion Type Tags
Demurrer
Parties
- Plaintiff: LINDA HARRINGTON
- Defendant: ALEJANDRA GARCIA
- Defendant: MICHAEL IUCHI
Ruling
Matter on the Law & Motion / Discovery calendar for Thursday, September 4, 2025, Line 11 [Part 1 of 2 of the tentative ruling]. DEFENDANT MICHAEL LUCHI's DEMURRER to COMPLAINT.
Defendant Iuchi's demurrer to complaint is sustained in part and overruled in part. The court grants defendant's request for judicial notice per Evidence Code section 452(d) [court records].
The issue on demurrer is upon taking the facts properly pleaded and properly noticed as true, does the challenged cause of action necessarily fail to state a cause for relief. (See Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) In assessing whether the complaint states a cause of action, the court accepts all properly pleaded material facts, but not contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law. (Minton v. Dignity Health (2019), 39 Cal.App.5th 1155, 1161.) "[I]f, on consideration of all facts stated, it appears that plaintiff is entitled to any relief against defendant, the complaint will be held good, though facts may not be clearly stated, or may be intermingled with a statement of other facts irrelevant to cause of action shown, or though plaintiff may demand relief to which he is not entitled under facts alleged." (Augustine v.
Trucco (1954) 124 Cal.App.2d 229, 236, quoting Matteson v. Wagoner (1905) 147 Cal. 739, 742.) The court liberally construes the complaint per California Code of Civil Procedure Section 452.
The demurrer to cause of action one per CCP 527.6 is overruled. CCP 527.6(b)(3) provides: "Harassment" is unlawful violence, a credible threat of violence, or a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the person, and that serves no legitimate purpose. The course of conduct must be that which would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress, and must actually cause substantial emotional distress to the petitioner.
Here, plaintiffs allege conduct that falls within the ambit of CCP 527.6. (Complaint, pars. 12 [noise disturbances]; 13 [threatening emails and texts]; 14 [coordinated effort], 16 [extreme emotional distress].) Defendant raises a factual issue that the court cannot resolve on demurrer. Defendant also argues that plaintiffs cannot obtain damages for a violation of CCP 527.6. This is correct, but Plaintiffs pray for injunctive relief, a remedy under this provision.
The demurrer to cause of action two for intentional infliction of emotional distress is overruled. Based on the above, the complaint sufficiently alleges "outrageous conduct" to support the claim. (CACI 1600, 1602 [defining outrageous conduct].) Plaintiffs are not required to allege the dates of the alleged mistreatment. That too is a factual issue for discovery and a matter that is presumptively within defendant's knowledge. The complaint does not show that Ms. Harrington does not reside in the building or was not present when the alleged misconduct occurred.
The demurrer to cause of action three for abuse of process is sustained with 10 days leave to amend. "To establish a cause of action for abuse of process, a plaintiff must plead two essential elements: that the defendant (1) entertained an ulterior motive in using the process and (2) committed a wilful act in a wrongful manner." (State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Lee (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 34, 40.) The complaint does not allege ultimate facts to support this claim and plaintiffs' oppositions do not clearly address defendant's argument.
[End of part 1 of 2 of the tentative ruling.] =(301/CVA) |