Mark Prebe v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company

legal staff must be so performed, even if it would cost more than having an outside vendor perform the services. Plaintiff's attorney's declaration is silent concerning the legal services charges. The Court finds Plaintiff failed to meet her burden to show these charges were reasonably necessary, as opposed to merely convenient or beneficial. Once Defendant so challenged the costs, it was Plaintiff's burden to provide evidence, as opposed to argument, to support her position. She failed to do so. Notably, the invoices themselves do not speak to the necessity (as opposed to convenience) of the claimed fees. This is in contrast to the expert invoice, which clearly details exactly what services the expert performed, which the Court can conclude were reasonable by their mere description. The motion to tax these costs is granted.

b. Court Reporter Fees Plaintiff seeks to recover $18,284.60 for court reporter fees to have a reporter present at various hearings and trial. The Court finds court reporter costs are not merely convenient or beneficial as a matter of law; they are reasonably necessary because they preserve the record for appeal. The motion to tax these costs is denied.

c. Attorney Travel Expenses Plaintiff seeks to recover $2568.24 in attorney travel expenses. Defendant establishes Plaintiff's attorneys' firm is based in Los Angeles. The Court finds it was not reasonable for Plaintiff's attorney to travel from Phoenix to Los Angeles to personally appear at hearings. The Court permits (and indeed encourages, on every one of its posted tentative rulings) online appearances. Plaintiff's firm is free to send someone in person from out of state, even though the firm itself is located in Los Angeles, but cannot reasonably expect the other side to pay for the expenses. The motion to tax these costs is granted.

4.

Conclusion

The motion to tax costs is granted in part and denied in part as set forth fully above. The Court notes that Plaintiff has a motion for attorneys' fees on calendar on 11/10/26. The Court asks Counsel to meet and confer in good faith prior to the hearing in an attempt to resolve the issues. The parties must provide meet and confer declarations, with specific details concerning the attempts, with the opposition and reply papers if the hearing on the motion goes forward. Defendant is ordered to give notice.

1.

Background

Facts

Plaintiff, Mark Prebe filed this action against Defendant, Deutsche Bank National Trust Company on 5/23/25. Plaintiff's commencing document is a petition, and his operative pleading is his First Amended Petition, which he filed on 8/07/25. Plaintiff's FAP includes causes of action for violations of the Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, violation of Regulation F, Cancellation of Void Instruments, and Declaratory Relief. The crux of the FAP is that Defendant is wrongfully asserting it is the trust with a beneficial interest in his mortgage, when it is not.

2. 1/22/26 Hearing on Defendant's Demurrer The Court heard Defendant's demurrer to the FAP on 1/22/26. The Court found all causes of action in the FAP except the debt collection charges were barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The Court found the debt collection claims were barred because a trust deed beneficiary is not a debt collector for purposes of the FDCPA or Regulation F.

3. Post-Demurrer Proceedings The Court, on 1/22/26, ordered Defendant to submit a proposed judgment for processing by 1/28/26 and indicated it would hold the proposed judgment for five days pending objections. On 1/30/26, the Court processed the proposed order Defendant lodged with its demurrer. The order is captioned "ORDER SUSTAINING DEFENDANT...'S DEMURRER...AND ENTRY OF JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL." The order includes a statement that "IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that judgment of dismissal is hereby entered in favor of DBNTC and against Plaintiff."

4. Motion to Vacate Judgment

a. Parties' Positions Plaintiff moves to vacate the judgment of dismissal entered against him. He moves pursuant to CCP Sec.663, contending the action is a petition and not a complaint and therefore the Court should not have considered a demurrer to it in the first instance. He argues the ruling erroneously made fact-based determinations not solely on the pleadings. He argues res judicata does not apply and debt collector status cannot be determined on demurrer. Defendant opposes. It argues there is no judgment to set aside in the first instance, and Sec.663 is not the proper vehicle to attack a demurrer ruling. It argues the complaint clearly seeks the type of relief contemplated by a complaint, not a petition. It argues the ruling re: both res judicata and debt collector status was correct and need not be vacated.

b. Petition vs. Complaint On 12/04/25, the Court heard and denied Defendant's motion to declare Plaintiff a vexatious litigant. The Court discussed, at length, the distinction between a complaint and a petition, and clarified that Plaintiff herein has attempted to style his request for relief as a petition, but in substance, it is a complaint. The Court incorporates its 12/04/25 analysis into this ruling by reference.

c. Judgment Defendant argues no judgment has been entered, and therefore this motion is procedurally improper. Defendant was ordered to submit a proposed judgment of dismissal by 1/28/26. It has not, to date, done so. However, as noted above, on 1/30/26, the Court processed Defendant's proposed order sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend, which expressly indicated "judgment" was entered in Defendant's favor. The Court therefore finds the 1/30/26 order operates as a judgment of dismissal, such that the lack of a judgment does not preclude consideration of this motion to vacate judgment.

d. Propriety of Using Sec.663 to Attack a Demurrer Ruling Defendant argues Sec.663 is not the proper vehicle to attack a ruling on demurrer, citing Payne v. Radar (2008) 167 Cal.App.4 th 1569 in support of its position. The Court has read Payne, specifically page 1575, and it clearly holds that a Sec.663 motion does not lie after a ruling sustaining a demurrer without leave to amend. The motion is therefore summarily denied as there is no authority presented for the relief sought.

e. Notice Defendant is ordered to give notice.

Case Number: 25LBCV01828 Hearing Date: September 3, 2026 Dept: S27

On 8/06/26, the Court heard Defendant's motion to compel responses to RPDs, FROGs, and SROGs. The Court deemed the motion moot, imposed sanctions, and provided the parties advice about this hearing as follows: The Court notes that Defendant has a motion to deem RFAs admitted scheduled for 9/03/26. Plaintiff's opposition addressed this motion also, though it is not before the Court at this time. The Court asks the parties to work together to resolve the issues relating to the motion without the need for a hearing.

Plaintiff is admonished that, per Sec.2033.280(c), sanctions are ABSOLUTELY mandatory in connection with a motion to deem RFAs admitted, and there is no good cause or substantial justification carve-out in the statute. Any opposition to this motion was due on or before 8/21/26. Plaintiff's attorney filed an untimely declaration in opposition to the motion on 8/25/26. To the extent the Court is considering the grossly untimely opposition declaration, it does not change the analysis. Sanctions are absolutely mandatory.

There is no provision permitting an exception when Counsel ceases communicating with Client, especially if Counsel has not communicated that breakdown to the other party