Unknown v. Unknown

such reasons. The permissible basis for reduction is the objective finding that the party's conduct rendered the fees unnecessary. d.

Analysis

While this case is not as egregious as EnPalm, the Court finds the same logic applies. Plaintiff provided substantial evidence that Defendants knew they home they were attempting to foreclose upon was Plaintiff's primary home, such that foreclosure was not an available option to satisfy their judgment. Defendants did not meaningfully dispute or attempt to dispute that showing. All fees incurred in connection with the attempts to sell the home, therefore, were objectively unreasonably incurred, and are not awarded.

The Court will not conduct a line-item review of fees to determine which fees were incurred in connection with the attempts to sell the home and which were not. The parties must meet and confer in this regard in an attempt to resolve the issues. The time spent meeting and conferring will not be compensated, as Defendants created the situation themselves and therefore it would not be reasonable to require Plaintiff to pay for the time spent to unravel the situation.

The hearing on the motion is continued for two months, to Tuesday, 11/03/26 at 8:30 a.m. in Department S27. If the parties resolve all issues, they must use the online reservation management system to take the matter off calendar. If the parties fail to do so, they must file a joint statement of items in dispute at least two weeks prior to the continued hearing date. The joint statement must be one document jointly submitted by both parties. It must include an indication of each billing entry that has not been resolved and each party's statement of reasons why the entry should or should not be allowed. Defendants are ordered to give notice.

1. Motion for Attorneys' Fees a.

Procedural History

Plaintiff accepted Defendant's Sec.998 offer on 12/28/23. Plaintiff filed a Notice of Settlement of Entire Case on 12/29/23; the notice indicates the settlement is conditional, with all payments to be made by 3/28/24.

On 4/16/24, the Court held an OSC re: Dismissal (Settlement). Plaintiff appeared at the hearing; Defendant did not. The Court noted that no dismissal had been filed. The Court ordered the case dismissed without prejudice and retained jurisdiction to enforce any and all terms of the settlement per CCP Sec.664.6.

b. Timeliness of Motion for Attorneys' Fees

Plaintiff filed this motion for attorneys' fees on 2/17/26. The parties discuss the cases of Hatlevig v. General Motors LLC (2026) 118 Cal.App.5 th 644 and Madrigal v. Hyundai Motor America (2025) 17 Cal.5 th 592 in connection with the issue.

In Hatlevig, the parties notified the trial court that they had settled the case. The trial court took all pending matters off calendar and ordered the parties to file a dismissal within 45 days. A little more than a month thereafter, the trial court generated a Notice of Dismissal by Court that stated the case would be dismissed without prejudice, effective approximately a month thereafter, unless either party appeared and showed good cause not to dismiss the case. No party appeared or did so.

The plaintiff moved for attorneys' fees, but did not serve the motion until more than 180 days after the date the trial court indicated the matter would be dismissed if no party contested the dismissal. Notably, the trial court did not actually issue a minute order dismissing the case until AFTER the attorneys' fees motion was filed and served, but the trial court found this was of no help to the plaintiff, and the court of appeals agreed. The court of appeals noted that the mere filing of the motion implicitly concedes the case has been dismissed, as a motion for fees does not lie until after entry of judgment.

Plaintiff argues Hatlevig is not on point, because the dismissal in this case expressly retains jurisdiction to enforce the parties' settlement per Sec.664.6. He also argues Madrigal establishes that, under the circumstances, his motion is timely. The Court has read Madrigal, and finds the issue in the case was whether Sec.998's cost-shifting analysis applied or not; timeliness was neither argued nor discussed.

This case is on all fours with Hatlevig. The fact that the trial court retained jurisdiction to enforce the settlement pursuant to Sec.664.6 does not assist Plaintiff in his argument; indeed, retention of jurisdiction under Sec.664.6 can only happen if there is a dismissal, as there is otherwise no need to retain jurisdiction, which would be ongoing. The Court therefore finds the motion is not timely.

Plaintiff argues, in the alternative, that the Court should find good cause under CRC 3.1702(d) to permit the untimely motion. 3.1702(d) permits the trial court, in its discretion, to extend the time for filing a motion for fees in the absence of a stipulation or for a longer period than allowed by stipulation. The Court does not find good cause.

The Court notes that the parties' settlement contemplated all payments being made by March of 2024, but this motion was not filed until February of 2025, almost a year later. Plaintiff has neither argued nor shown that payments were not made as contemplated in the parties' agreement. Even if the Court were to consider the last payment under the settlement to be the triggering event, this motion was filed more than 180 days thereafter. Notably, the trial court expressly set the OSC re: dismissal for a date AFTER the last payment was to be made, and it appears the settlement was final by the time the Court dismissed the case.

Notably, Plaintiff argues his moving papers were filed on or about the same day Hatlevig was decided, and appears to contend this constitutes "good cause" to extend the time for filing the moving papers. The Hatlevig Court, however, did not extend the time for that motion to be filed in light of the "new law" it developed, and did not make any indication that it intended its analysis to apply only on a prospective basis. On the alternative, the Hatlevig Court was merely construing the law as it already existed, and clearly intended the holding to apply to all cases, whether already pending or in the future.

The motion is denied due to failure to file and serve the moving papers within 180 days after dismissal of the action. Plaintiff is ordered to give notice.

Case Number: 23LBCV00537 Hearing Date: September 3, 2026 Dept: S27

Defense Counsel moves to be relieved from representation of Defendant, Sehee Corp. on the ground that Sehee has filed for bankruptcy and has indicated to Counsel that it has not assets and does not wish to be further represented in this action. Counsel declares he confirmed Sehee's address by conversation and has filed proof of service of the moving papers on Sehee and Plaintiff. The motion is unopposed and granted. Relief is effective upon filing proof of service of the final order on Sehee.

The Court notes that Defense Counsel declares he has advised Plaintiff that Sehee is in bankruptcy but Plaintiff has indicated an intent to proceed against Sehee despite the bankruptcy proceedings. The case is set for trial on 10/05/26, with the Final Status Conference scheduled for 10/02/26. The Court sets an OSC re: continued prosecution against Sehee in light of the automatic stay for 10/02/26, to be heard concurrently with the FSC. If Plaintiff wishes to proceed against Sehee, Plaintiff must brief its right to do so in light of the automatic stay at least one week prior to the FSC and must appear at the FSC and articulate a legal basis for proceeding despite the stay. Defense Counsel is ordered to give notice.

Case Number: 24LBCV01223 Hearing Date: September 3, 2026 Dept: S27

1. Standard on Motion to Tax Costs

The parties disagree concerning who has the burden on a motion to tax costs. Plaintiff argues the memorandum itself meets the initial burden, and the party challenging the costs has the burden to show they are unreasonable. Defendant argues the memorandum constitutes only prima facie evidence that the costs were incurred, but once the moving party challenges the costs, the burden shifts to the opposing party to show they were both actually AND reasonably incurred.

If the items on their face appear to be proper charges, the verified memorandum of costs is prima facie evidence of their propriety, and the burden is on the party seeking to tax costs to show they were not reasonable or necessary. Ladas v. California State Auto. Ass'n (1993) 19 CA4th 761, 774-776. On the other hand, items that are properly objected to are put in issue, and the burden of proof is on the party claiming them as costs. Id. at 774-776.

As a practical matter, this means items the trial court can readily verify, such as filing fees, are sufficiently established merely by placing them on the costs bill. Items that the trial court cannot readily verify, such as travel expenses, once challenged, must be justified by the