Jane Doe v. Los Angeles Unified School District and Michael Cano

of the economic loss rule. (Robinson Helicopter Co. v. Dana Corp., supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 991.)

The analysis that followed suggested that fraud itself is immune from application of the economic loss rule because fraud is particularly blameworthy and therefore unlike both contract causes of action and products liability causes of action. Although the court suggested that its decision was a narrow one, its explicit limits did not exclude a fraud cause of action such as the one pleaded by plaintiffs.

Here, plaintiffs alleged that defendants' affirmative misrepresentations about the dangers of low-level lead exposure, upon which they justifiably relied, had caused plaintiffs to fail to make timely efforts to prevent and treat low-level lead exposure. The delay in instituting prevention and treatment caused more people to be exposed and increased the cost of treatment for those who had been exposed or continued to be exposed. In addition, plaintiffs, as the owners of numerous buildings containing unremediated lead, continued to expose people to low levels of lead that plaintiffs believed were not harmful due to defendants' misrepresentations.

These people who were exposed to low levels of lead in plaintiffs' buildings may hold plaintiffs liable for the permanent damage to their bodies that no amount of prevention or treatment can now completely remediate. Thus, plaintiffs' potential liability to these people is independent of the economic harm to plaintiffs from the additional costs of prevention and treatment.

Accordingly, we conclude that the economic loss doctrine does not apply to plaintiffs' fraud cause of action, and we proceed to address whether defendants established that plaintiffs' fraud cause of action had accrued more than three years prior to the March 2000 filing of the original complaint. (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 338, subd. (d) [three-year limitations period for fraud].) (County of Santa Clara v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 292, 326-29 [bold emphasis and underlining added].)

The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed that exposure to risk of harm beyond the reasonable contemplation of the parties is an essential element: Therefore, we have reformed the question as follows (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.548(f)(5)): Can a plaintiff assert an independent claim of fraudulent concealment in the performance of a contract? The answer to this question is also yes. A plaintiff may assert a tort claim for fraudulent concealment based on conduct occurring in the course of a contractual relationship, if the elements of the cause of action can be established independently of the parties' contractual rights and obligations and the tortious conduct exposes the plaintiff to a risk of harm beyond the reasonable contemplation of the parties when they entered into the agreemen t. (Rattagan v. Uber Techs., Inc. (2024) 17 Cal.5th 1, 39 [bold emphasis and underlining added].)

This ground is not persuasive. For the reasons set forth earlier above, however, the motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the fifth cause of action is GRANTED with leave to amend. Plaintiff is given 30 days' leave to amend. Case Number: 25STCV35948 Hearing Date: September 3, 2026 Dept: 734

The following tentative ruling is issued pursuant to Rule of Court 3.1308 at DATE \@ "h:mm am/pm" 1:33 PM on DATE \@ "MMMM d, yyyy" September 2, 2026. Rule of Court 3.1308(a)(1) provides that a "tentative ruling will become the ruling of the court if the court has not directed oral argument by its tentative ruling and notice of intent to appear has not been given."

The Court does not desire oral argument on the motion addressed herein. Notice of intent to appear is REQUIRED pursuant to California Rule of Court 3.1308(a)(1). No later than 4:00 p.m. on DATE \@ "MMMM d, yyyy" September 2, 2026, the moving and opposing parties must provide notice to ALL OTHER PARTIES and the staff of Department 734 whether the party intends to (1) appear and argue the motion, or (2) submit to the tentative ruling. Notice to Department 734 should be sent by email to smcdept734@lacourt.org, with opposing parties copied on the email. The high volume of telephone calls to Department 734 may delay the Court's receipt of notice, so telephonic notice to 213-830-0776 should be reserved for situations where parties are unable to give notice by email.

Plaintiff alleges that she was sexually abused as a minor by Defendant Michael Cano who was a tutor at the LAUSD campus where Plaintiff was a student. Defendant Los Angeles Unified School District demurs to the First Amended Complaint.

TENTATIVE RULING

Defendant Los Angeles Unified School District's demurrer to the First Amended Complaint is OVERRULED as to the third, fourth and fifth causes of action. Defendant is ordered to answer the First Amended Complaint within 10 days.

ANALYSIS

Demurrer Meet and Confer

The Declaration of Arbel Illya reflects that Defendant's counsel satisfied the meet and confer requirement set forth in CCP Sec. 430.41.

Discussion

The Court has reviewed the moving, opposing and reply briefs filed by the parties, but only addresses the points which the Court deems to be material to the disposition of this motion. Defendant Los Angeles Unified School District demurs to the First Amended Complaint as follows:

1. Third Cause of Action (Negligent Hiring, Supervision & Retention of an Unfit Employee)

Defendant argues that LAUSD is a public entity and is not subject to common law tort liability. (Gov. Code, Sec. 815.) The Third Cause of Action identifies no statute imposing liability upon LAUSD. However, case law has held that Gov. Code Sec. 815.2 imposes vicarious liability upon a public school district for administrators or supervisors' negligent hiring, supervising and retention of school employees. Within these limits, we conclude a public school district may be vicariously liable under section 815.2 for the negligence of administrators or supervisors in hiring, supervising and retaining a school employee who sexually harasses and abuses a student.

Whether plaintiff in this case can prove the District's administrative or supervisory personnel were actually negligent in this respect is not a question we address in this appeal from dismissal on the sustaining of a demurrer. (C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High Sch. Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 879 [bold emphasis added].)

Defendant also argues that Plaintiff fails to plead facts establishing that Michael Cano was an employee of LAUSD within the meaning of Government Code section 815.2. Plaintiff alleges only that Cano was a "former employee and/or agent of LAUSD and/or TUTOR ME." (FAC P. 5.) However, the allegation that Cano was a former employee of LAUSD is sufficient on demurrer. Plaintiff was 14 years old when she was sexually abused by Defendant Cano. (1AC, P. 5.) Plaintiff is not expected to know whether Cano was employed by LAUSD. Plaintiff is entitled to conduct discovery on this issue.

"The demurrer admits the facts pleaded in the complaint and raises the question whether those facts are sufficient to state a cause of action on any legal theory. . . . 'The function of a demurrer is to test the sufficiency of the complaint alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. [Citation.]' (Citation omitted.)" (Hellum v. Breyer (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1300, 1308-09.)

" Because a demurrer challenges defects on the face of the complaint, it can only refer to matters outside the pleading that are subject to judicial notice." (Arce v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 471, 482.)

" The sole issue raised by a general demurrer is whether the facts pleaded state a valid cause of action, not whether they are true. No matter how unlikely or improbable, plaintiff's allegations must be accepted as true for the purpose of ruling on the demurrer. (Citation omitted.) Furthermore, plaintiff's possible inability or difficulty in proving the allegations of the complaint is of no concern. (Citation omitted.)" (Kerivan v. Title Ins. & Trust Co. (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 225, 229.)

Defendant argues that Plaintiff fails to plead facts establishing that LAUSD had actual or constructive knowledge of any prior misconduct by Cano rendering the alleged abuse foreseeable. However, actual or constructive knowledge of prior misconduct by Cano is not a prerequisite if LAUSD had actual or constructive knowledge of the actual misconduct of which Cano is alleged to have committed.

Plaintiff alleges: 14. Beginning in Fall 2023, MICHAEL CANO began paying special attention to Jane Doe while on campus at HLSLA. CANO complimented Plaintiff on her physical appearance and her intellectual abilities. CANO worked closely with Plaintiff in her math class at HLSLA and sought her out during school hours, and after school. ...

16. The grooming and isolation of Jane Doe by MICHAEL CANO occurred on the HLSLA campus, in front of other HLSLA teachers, staff, and students. ..

21. Prior to and during MICHAEL CANO's abuse of Jane Doe, LAUSD and/or TUTOR ME students, ad ministrators and personnel witnessed inappropriate "red flag" behavior by MICHAEL CANO towards Jane Doe, including but not limited to MICHAEL CANO and Jane Doe spending one on one time alone together on and off the HLSLA campus, CANO driving Plaintiff in his personal vehicle, CANO making improper, harassing statements to Jane Doe on the HLSLA campus, and CANO giving gifts to Jane Doe at HLSLA, during class. Despite witnessing these red flags, LAUSD and/or TUTOR ME, through its employees and personnel, did nothing further to investigate MICHAEL CANO's inappropriate relationship with Jane Doe and MICHAEL CANO was allowed to continue, unhindered, in his predatory conduct directed at Jane Doe. (1AC, P.P. 14, 16, 21 [bold emphasis and underlining added].)

It is a question of fact outside the scope of this demurrer as to how open and obvious Cano's grooming conduct of Plaintiff was on and off campus, and which LAUSD administrators or personnel witnesses or should have monitored such grooming interactions and intervened to prevent further isolated interactions between Cano and Plaintiff.

Defendant also argue that this cause of action is uncertain. This argument is not persuasive because it is clear what is alleged against Defendant on the campus it operated. The details may be ascertained through discovery. Notably, the alleged incidents occurred relatively recently--2023/2024 (1AC, P.P. 13 - 18)--so there is higher likelihood of uncovering evidence and witness testimony than if the abuse occurred decades ago. A demurrer for uncertainty is properly sustained where the complaint is so vague or uncertain that the defendant cannot reasonably respond, i.e., when the defendant cannot determine what issues must be admitted or denied, or what counts are directed against the defendant. (Khoury v.

Maly's of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616; Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial, supra, P. 7:85.) Demurrers for uncertainty are disfavored and strictly construed "because ambiguities can reasonably be clarified under modern rules of discovery." (Lickiss v. Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1125, 1135.) This cause of action is sufficiently pled for purposes of demurrer. The demurrer to the third cause of action is OVERRULED.

2. Fourth Cause of Action (Negligent Failure to Warn, Train or Educate).

Defendant argues that Plaintiff fails to plead facts establishing that Cano was an LAUSD employee whom LAUSD had any duty to train. For the reasons discussed above re: the third cause of action, this argument is not persuasive. Moreover, Plaintiff alleges that, based on a special relationship the LAUSD has with Plaintiff, the LAUSD had harassment posed by staff: 45. Defendants LAUSD, TUTOR ME, and DOES 1 through 30 breached their duty to Plaintiff by failing to warn her of known and knowable dangers posed by its staff, including MICHAEL CANO; by failing to inform and educate her on its sexual harassment policies and the methods to identify, report, and respond to inappropriate sexual harassment by employees and student supervisors; and by failing to train its faculty and staff, including MICHAEL CANO, on sexual harassment policies. (Complaint, P. 45.)

[A] school district and its employees have a special relationship with the district's pupils, a relationship arising from the mandatory character of school attendance and the comprehensive control over students exercised by school personnel, "analogous in many ways to the relationship between parents and their children." (Citations [*870] omitted.) Because of this special relationship, imposing obligations beyond what each person generally owes others under Civil Code section 1714, the duty of care owed by school personnel includes the duty to use reasonable measures to protect students from foreseeable injury at the hands of third parties acting negligently or intentionally. n3 This principle has been applied in cases of employees' alleged negligence resulting in injury to a student by another student (citations omitted) and--on facts remarkably close to the present case--injuries to a student resulting from a teacher's sexual assault (Citation omitted). (C.A. v.

William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 869-70.)

Defendant argues that Plaintiff fails to plead facts establishing that LAUSD knew or should have known of any specific, foreseeable danger posed by Cano giving rise to a duty to warn. For the reasons discussed above re: the third cause of action, this argument is not persuasive. Defendant also argue that this cause action is uncertain. For the reasons discussed above re: the third cause of action, this argument is not persuasive. This cause of action is sufficiently pled for purposes of demurrer. The demurrer to the fourth cause of action is OVERRULED.

3. Fifth Cause of Action (Negligent Supervision of a Minor).

Defendant argues that Plaintiff fails to plead facts identifying any LAUSD employee whose negligent act or omission caused Plaintiff's injuries, as required to state a claim under Government Code section 815.2. Gov. Code Sec. 815.2 provides: (a) A public entity is liable for injury proximately caused by an act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment if the act or omission would, apart from this section, have given rise to a cause of action against that employee or his personal representative. (b) Except as otherwise provided by statute, a public entity is not liable for an injury resulting from an act or omission of an employee of the public entity where the employee is immune from liability. (Gov. Code Sec. 815.2.)

As discussed above re: the third cause of action, case law has held that Gov. Code Sec. 815.2 imposes vicarious liability upon a public school district for administrators or supervisors' negligent hiring, supervising and retention of school employees. (C.A., supra, 53 Cal.4th at 879.) This cause of action is sufficiently pled in that regard, as discussed above re: the third cause of action.

Defendant argues that Plaintiff fails to plead facts establishing that LAUSD had actual or constructive notice of any specific, foreseeable risk of sexual misconduct by Cano prior to the alleged abuse. For the reasons discussed above re: the third cause of action, this argument is not persuasive. Defendant also argue that this cause action is uncertain. For the reasons discussed above re: the third cause of action, this argument is not persuasive. This cause of action is sufficiently pled for purposes of demurrer. The demurrer to the fifth cause of action is OVERRULED. Defendant is to answer the First Amended Complaint within 10 days. | Home -->)" -->