KHALID LATEEF WARREN v. GENERAL MOTORS LLC, et al.

suppression of a material fact; (2) by a defendant with a duty to disclose the fact; (3) the defendant intended to defraud the plaintiff by intentionally concealing or suppressing the fact; (4) the plaintiff was unaware of the fact and would have acted differently if the concealed or suppressed fact was known; and (5) the plaintiff sustained damage as a result of the concealment or suppression of the material fact." (Rattagan v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2024) 17 Cal.5th 1, 40.)

Defendants argue Plaintiff's fraud claims fail as a matter of law because Plaintiff cannot demonstrate damages. (Motion SAC, pgs. 13-20.)

Defendants submitted undisputed evidence that Plaintiff concedes its $6,000,000 calculation of fees owed for "pre-development work" were not owed under the 2012 Agreement. (D-USSF No. 23.)

Defendants submitted evidence that prior to the 2021 Agreement, in the 2012 Agreement itself, Plaintiff had already agreed to subordinate its rights to Sunset LP's lenders and to waive any lien rights. (D-USSF No. 33.)

Defendants met their burden to demonstrate Plaintiff's cause of action fails on the basis of damages, shifting the burden to Plaintiff to raise a triable issue of material fact.

Plaintiff met its burden to demonstrate a triable issue of material fact exists as to damages on the fraud causes of action.

Plaintiff submitted evidence that in reliance on Defendants' promises of a genuine opportunity to acquire the Project, Plaintiff agreed to accept a discounted Management Services Fee of $50,000 per month under the 2021 Agreement even though the market rate for such services is much greater than that, and this rate differential is recoverable as a component of Townscape's out-of-pocket loss. (P-AMF No. 86.)

Further, Plaintiff submitted evidence that unpaid work was not within the scope of written agreements. (P-AMF Nos. 65, 67, 68, 69, 70.)

Plaintiff met its burden to raise a triable issue of material fact as to damages on the fraud causes of action.

Accordingly, Defendants' motion for summary adjudication of the 2nd and 3rd causes of action is denied.

Conclusion

Defendants' motion for summary judgment is denied. Defendant's motion in the alternative for summary adjudication of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd causes of action is denied. Moving Party to give notice. Dated: September _____, 2026 | Hon. Daniel M. Crowley | Judge of the Superior Court |

County of Los Angeles DEPARTMENT 729

TENTATIVE RULING KHALID LATEEF WARREN, vs. GENERAL MOTORS LLC, et al. | Case No.:

Hearing Date: September 3, 2026 | Defendant General Motors LLC's motion to tax Plaintiff Khalid Lateef Warren's memorandum of costs is denied.

Defendant General Motors LLC ("GM") ("Defendant") moves to tax costs requested by Plaintiff Khaled Lateef Warren ("Warren") ("Plaintiff") in his May 14, 2026, Memorandum of Costs. (Notice Motion, pg. ii; CRC, Rule 3.1700(b).)

Procedural Background

This is a lemon law action brought under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act ("Song-Beverly").

February 20, 2026, Plaintiff accepted Defendant's settlement offer, which resolved entire lawsuit by paying Plaintiff $100,000.00, plus pre-judgment interest and reasonably incurred attorney fees and costs by motion. (Decl. of Bowton P.5.)

On May 14, 2026, Plaintiff filed his memorandum of costs.

On May 28, 2026, Defendant filed the instant motion.

On August 21, 2026, Plaintiff filed his opposition.

On August 27, 2026, Defendant filed its reply.

Motion to Tax Costs

CRC, Rule 3.1700(b)(1) provides that a party may file a motion to strike or tax costs sought via a Memorandum of Costs by filing a motion within 15 days after service of the cost memorandum (with the period to be extended in Code of Civil Procedure section 1010.6(a)(3).) (CRC, Rule 3.1700(b)(1).)

First, Defendant moves to tax $582.77 in filing and motion fees on the basis that the costs are inflated by using unnecessary third-party filing services (i.e., "One Legal") and for moving for filing costs on an "anticipated" motion for attorneys' fees. (Motion, pg. 4.)

Defendant's arguments are not well taken.

Plaintiffs are entitled to recover all expenses incurred in conjunction with such filing as it is mandatory that one of the appointed filing services be used.

Further, Plaintiff's costs for the motion for attorneys' fees was not actually anticipated because Plaintiff did in fact file the motion and reply.

Defendant's request to tax filing and motion fees is denied.

Second, Defendant moves to tax $179.25 for jury fees because the case never went to trial. (Motion, pg. 4.)

Defendant cites no legal case, statute, or treatise in support of its assertion that Plaintiff cannot recover these costs; C.C.P. Sec.1033.5(a)(1) specifically allows for the recovery of these fees.

This Court requires parties to pay a jury fee at the beginning of this case to preserve a party's right to a jury.

Defendant's request to tax jury fees is denied.

Third, Defendant moves to tax $150.00 in process server fees associated with discovery. (Motion, pg. 4.)

Defendant argues that these costs involved service of process on GM and the named dealer defendant for depositions, and the depositions were not taken and not necessary for advancing the case.

Defendant does not provide any legal citation that interprets C.C.P. Sec.1033.5(a) to disallow the recovery of Service of Process fees.

C.C.P. Sec.1033.5(a)(4) plainly states "[s]ervice of process by a public officer, registered process server, or other means" is an allowable costs item.

Further, Plaintiff provided the costs were actually incurred and were necessary to advance the case. (See Decl. of Urner P.4, Exh A.)

Defendant's request to tax service of process fees is denied.

Fourth, Defendant moves to tax $355.20 in fees for electronic filing or service on the basis that Plaintiff does not attach supporting invoices or itemized breakdowns justifying the expense. (Motion, pg. 4.)

There is no requirement that copies of bills, invoices, statements, or any other such documents be attached to the memorandum. (Jones v. Dumrichob (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1258, 1261.)

Electronic filing fees were necessarily incurred to file documents with the Court and are allowable under C.C.P. Sec.1033.5(a)(14).

Defendant provides no legal support for its contention that such ordinary fees are not recoverable.

Defendant's request to tax costs for electronic filing or service fees is denied.

Finally, Defendant moves to tax $253.87 in "other" costs on the basis that Plaintiff has not demonstrated that these costs were even incurred or required to advance the case. (Motion, pg. 4.)

Defendant also challenges $16.99 in costs for a Carfax, which it argues is an overhead expense. (Motion, pg. 4.)

Defendant's argument is not well taken.

Plaintiff provided the costs were actually incurred and were necessary to advance the case. (See Decl. of Urner P.4, Exh A.)

Defendant's request to tax costs for electronic filing or service fees is denied.

Conclusion

Defendant's motion to tax Plaintiff's Memorandum of Costs is denied. Moving party to give notice. Dated: September _____, 2026 | Hon. Daniel M. Crowley | Judge of the Superior Court | | Home -->)" -->