LA FOODS, LLC VS IMPERIAL VALLEY FOODS INC.

knowledge that Lambirth was unfit or incompetent to drive or that he was reasonably likely to cause an automobile accident. Lyft presents evidence that he was a licensed California Driver, he had no disqualifying violations on his driving record, and his criminal background check revealed no disqualifying violations. (UMF 3, 5.)

In opposition, Plaintiff argues Lyft has not met its initial burden and even assuming it did, Business and Professions Code 7459 mandates Lyft provide safety training to its drivers. However, Lyft does nothing to ensure that the drivers actually undergo the training or have learned from them. Moreover, Lyft was aware of a prior accident that involved Defendant Lambirth before this collision. (AUMF 47.) As a result, a triable issue of material fact exists.

The court finds Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden. As noted above, Lyft has established Defendant Lambirth as an independent contractor and claims for negligent hiring, retention, and supervision depend on the existence of an employer-employee relationship. (See Camargo v. Tjaarda Dairy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1235, 1239.) Regardless, Lyft presents evidence it complied with its statutory obligations in providing safety training to Lambirth as Section 7459 requires. (UMF 11.) Moreover, Plaintiff provides no evidence that the prior accident would cause Lyft to know or should have known that Defendant Lambirth was unfit to operate a motor vehicle. Based on the foregoing, the motion for summary judgment as to the negligent hiring, retention, and supervision theory is GRANTED.

VALLEY FOODS INC. MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE Date of Hearing: September 3, 2026 Trial Date: None set. Department: 529 Case No.: 26STCV01673 Moving Party: Defendant Imperial Valley Foods, Inc. Responding Party: Plaintiff LA Foods LLC

BACKGROUND

On January 16, 2026, Plaintiff LA Foods, LLC filed a complaint against Defendant Imperial Valley Foods Inc. dba Fruvemex for breach of contract. Plaintiff alleges it placed an order with Fruvemex for 40,320 lbs. of IQF ("Individually Quick Frozen") broccoli florets, which order was to be delivered directly to Plaintiff's customer, Real Good Food Company ("RGF"). Plaintiff paid $43,336.00 to Defendant for the order and Defendant delivered the Product directly to RGF. Plaintiff alleges, however, Defendant delivered the Product in an adulterated state, containing an unacceptably high level of larvae.

[TENTATIVE] RULING

Defendant Imperial Valley Foods, Inc.'s Motion to Transfer Venue is GRANTED.

DISCUSSION

Defendant Imperial Valley Foods, Inc. moves this court to transfer the venue to Imperial County from Los Angeles County on the grounds the contract was made and performed in Imperial County, the obligations arose in Imperial County, the alleged breach occurred in Imperial County, and Defendant's principal place of business is, and always has been, in Imperial County.

A corporation may be sued in the county where the contract is made or is to be performed; where the obligation or liability arises or the breach occurs; or in the county where the principal place of business is situated. (CCP Sec. 395.5.) "For purposes of venue, a corporation has been deemed bound by its designation of a principal place of business in corporate documents filed with the Secretary of State." (Rosas v. Superior Court (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 671, 673-674.)

Defendant argues when Plaintiff placed the order by e-mail, Defendant received the e-mail at its principal place of business in Calexico, California (Imperial County).As Defendant's acceptance of the order was the last act necessary for making the contract, the contract was made in Calexico, California. Moreover, Defendant's performance was entirely in Imperial County. Plaintiff contracted for the Product to be delivered to Plaintiff's transportation carrier in Calexico, California. With Defendant's principal place being in Imperial County, the contract being entered into Imperial County, and the contract being performed in Imperial County, Defendant argues the court should change venues.

In opposition, Plaintiff argues under established California law, a contract is made where the last act necessary to form it occurs--and, here, that "last act" is undisputably the communication of acceptance to the offeror Plaintiff--not the dispatch by the offeree, Defendant. Moreover, the declaration of Defendant's present, Fernando Caballero, undermines Defendant's motion as he states the email order at issue here "was received by IVF at its principal place of business in Calexico, California, or perhaps at a different remote location." (Caballero Decl. P.6.) Having failed to establish with certainty where acceptance was dispatched, Defendant has not established Imperial County is proper.

The court finds Defendant has sufficiently demonstrated that Los Angeles is not the proper venue for this action and the proper venue is Imperial County. Plaintiff misreads Civil Code section 1583. Section 1583 expressly deems consent fully communicated as soon as the accepting party puts the acceptance in the course of transmission. In other words, the last act is the offeree's dispatch, not the offeror's acceptance. Mr. Caballero's declaration where he received the e-mail does not affect the analysis as for electronic communications, it is where Defendant accepted the e-mail. Based on the foregoing, the motion to transfer venue is GRANTED. | Home -->)" -->