Yadira Escamilla, et al. v. FCA US, LLC, et al.

litigation." (Mot., 9:14-16.)

Defendants' motion also fails under Code of Civil Procedure section 36, subdivision (e) . Although this section does not mandate a specific type of declaration like subdivision (a), all relief under Code of Civil Procedure section 36 requires that "[u]nless the court otherwise orders[,] ... [a] party may file and serve a motion for preference supported by a declaration of the moving party that all essential parties have been served with process or have appeared." (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 36, subd. (c)(1) .)

Defendants' counsel's declaration attached to the instant motion does not attest that all essential parties were served. Accordingly, Defendants' motion is procedurally improper, and the Court denies the motion for trial preference without prejudice.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, Defendants' motion for trial preference and maintaining the trial date of September 23, 2026 is DENIED without prejudice. Defendants are ordered to give notice of this Order. DATED: September 3, 2026 ________________________________ Hon. Teresa A. Beaudet Judge, Los Angeles Superior Court [1] Mr. Nguyen passed away in October 2025.

Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles Department 508 YADIRA ESCAMILLA, et al., Plaintiffs, vs. FCA US, LLC, et al., Defendants. | Case No.: |

| Hearing Date:

| September 3, 2026 | Hearing Time: | 8:30 a.m. | [TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS FCA US LLC AND CHAMPION DODGE LLC DBA CHAMPION CHRYSLER JEEP DODGE RAM FIAT'S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS' FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR FAILURE TO AMEND |

Background

Plaintiffs Yadira Escamilla and Anthony D Escamilla (jointly, "Plaintiffs") filed this lemon law action on March 3, 2025 against Defendants FCA US, LLC ("FCA") and Champion Chrysler Jeep Dodge Ram Fiat.

On August 14, 2025, Plaintiffs filed the operative First Amended Complaint ("FAC") alleging six causes of action for (1) violation of subdivision (d) of Civil Code section 1793.2, (2) violation of subdivision (b) of Civil Code section 1793.2, (3) violation of subdivision (a)(3) of Civil Code section 1793.2, (4) breach of the implied warranty of merchantability, (5) negligent repair, and (6) fraudulent inducement concealment.

On June 15, 2026, the Court ruled on FCA's demurrer to Plaintiffs' FAC as follows: sustained the first and second causes of action without leave to amend, sustained the third and sixth causes of action with leave to amend, and overruled the fourth cause of action. The Court "order[ed] Plaintiffs to file and serve an amended complaint, if any, within 20 days of this Order." (Order 6/15/26, 13:23-24.)

Plaintiffs did not file an amended complaint. Defendants FCA and Champion Dodge LLC dba Champion Chrysler Jeep Dodge Ram Fiat ("Champion"), erroneously sued as Champion Chrysler Jeep Dodge Ram Fiat, (jointly, "Defendants") now move to dismiss the first, second, third, and sixth causes of action in Plaintiffs' FAC, for failure to amend, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 581, subdivision (f)(2) .

Plaintiffs filed an untimely opposition. The opposition was accompanied by a declaration attesting to attorney fault for its untimeliness, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b) . The Court will consider Plaintiffs' opposition. Defendants did not reply.

Discussion

Defendants move to dismiss the FAC, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 581, subdivision (f)(2), which states that "[t] he court may dismiss the complaint as to that defendant when ... after a demurrer to the complaint is sustained with leave to amend, the plaintiff fails to amend it within the time allowed by the court and either party moves for dismissal."

Defendants assert that "[t]he California Court of Appeals has affirmatively held that a trial court may enter a judgment dismissing an action after it has sustained a demurrer to the complaint if the Plaintiffs fails to amend." (Mot., 2:26-28; see Sierra Inv. Corp. v. Sacramento County (1967) 252 Cal.App.2d 339, 346-347 ["It is almost axiomatic that the trial court may enter a judgment of dismissal after it has sustained a demurrer to the complaint if the plaintiff elects to stand on the complaint and fails to amend [citations]."].)

Defendants assert that "[t]he procedural history in this matter is exactly contemplated under Section 581(f)(2) . In June of 2026, FCA US' Demurrer to First Amended Complaint was sustained as to the third, fourth, and fifth causes of action in Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint with thirty days leave to amend. The time to amend has passed and Plaintiffs have failed to amend or otherwise demonstrate any intent to prosecute this matter. As such, the Court should dismiss the matter, with judgement entered in FCA US's favor." (Mot., 3:5-10.)

In opposition, Plaintiffs assert that "Defendants move under Code of Civil Procedure section 581, subdivision (f)(2), to dismiss the first, second, third, and sixth causes of action and to enter judgment in their favor because Plaintiffs did not file a further amended complaint after the June 15, 2026, demurrer ruling. The Motion should be denied in its entirety. This case is not over. The fourth cause of action for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability against FCA survived demurrer, and the fifth cause of action for negligent repair against Champion was never demurred to and has already been answered.

Section 581, subdivision (f)(2) does not authorize dismissal of an entire pleading, and it does not authorize judgment for Defendants, while live claims remain. Nor does it reach the first and second causes of action, which were sustained without leave to amend and are therefore not claims Plaintiffs could have 'failed to amend.'" (Opp., 2:7-16.)

Plaintiffs assert that "[b]eyond these threshold defects, dismissal under Section 581 is a discretionary terminating sanction" (Opp., 2:18-20), and Plaintiffs cite to Stephen Slesinger, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co. (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 736, 764, where the Court of Appeal stated that "dismissal is always a drastic remedy to be employed only in the rarest of circumstances." (Disapproved of by City of Los Angeles v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP (2024) 17 Cal.5th 46 on separate grounds.)

In Plaintiffs' declaration in support, Plaintiffs' counsel attests that "[a]fter evaluating the ruling, Plaintiffs made a considered decision not to file a further amended pleading and instead to stand on the operative First Amended Complaint and proceed on the surviving claims." (Olarenshaw Decl., P. 6.)

Counsel further states that "Plaintiffs intend to prosecute the fourth cause of action against FCA, as to which the Court overruled the demurrer, and the fifth cause of action against Champion, which Champion has answered. Plaintiffs never sought dismissal of, and did not abandon, those claims." (Olarenshaw Decl., P. 7.)

Counsel explains that "Plaintiffs' decision not to further amend the third and sixth causes of action was a deliberate, good-faith litigation choice. It did not result from neglect, inadvertence, or any misconduct by Plaintiffs or their counsel, and it was not intended to delay or obstruct these proceedings." (Olarenshaw Decl., P. 8.)

Based on the foregoing, the Court denies Defendants' motion to dismiss. As Defendants' notice of motion states, they only seek judgment entered in their favor for the first, second, third, and sixth causes of action. However, the statute states that "[t]he court may dismiss the complaint as to that defendant ..." (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 581, subd. (f), emphasis added.)

The plain language of the statute appears to contemplate that a defendant may dismiss the complaint when all causes of action alleged against the defendant are sustained with or without leave to amend, and the plaintiff does not file an amended complaint. Here, however, one cause of action against FCA still stands, and the singular cause of action alleged against Champion was never demurred to. Accordingly, dismissal as to either defendant would be improper.

FCA's motion also does not cite any case law demonstrating that this statute vests the Court with the power to dismiss individual causes of action, rather than the complaint as a whole or as to a specific party. Given this, Defendants' motion to dismiss is denied because Plaintiffs still have a viable cause of action against both FCA and Champion.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, FCA's motion to dismiss is DENIED. Plaintiffs are ordered to give notice of this Order. DATED: September 3, 2026 ________________________________ Hon. Teresa A. Beaudet Judge, Los Angeles Superior Court Case Number: 25STCV08881 Hearing Date: September 3, 2026 Dept: 508 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles Department 508 RHN AUTOMOTIVE INC., dba NISSANI BROS. NISSAN, Plaintiff, vs. LANDMARK AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant. | Case No.: | 25STCV08881 | Hearing Date: