CARISSA FERRERI v. CASA DEL SOL SPIRITS CO., et al.
Motion for assignment order and for order restraining judgment debtor
Motion type
Monetary amounts referenced
Parties
Ruling
indication that the parties met and conferred by telephone or in person. Notwithstanding, the Court cannot overrule a demurrer or deny a motion to strike based on an insufficient meet and confer.
LEGAL STANDARD
"[A] demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the allegations in a complaint." (Lewis v. Safeway, Inc. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 385, 388.) A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (See Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994 (in ruling on a demurrer, a court may not consider declarations, matters not subject to judicial notice, or documents not accepted for the truth of their contents).) For purposes of ruling on a demurrer, all facts pleaded in a complaint are assumed to be true, but the reviewing court does not assume the truth of conclusions of law. (Aubry v. Tri-City Hosp. Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967.)
Further, the court may, upon motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 436, subd. (a).) The court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 436, subd. (b).) The grounds for a motion to strike are that the pleading has irrelevant, false, or improper matter, or has not been drawn or filed in conformity with laws. (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 436.) The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 437.)
Leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (See Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349 (court shall not "sustain a demurrer without leave to amend if there is any reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment"); Kong v. City of Hawaiian Gardens Redevelopment Agency (2002) 108 Cal.App.4th 1028, 1037 ("A demurrer should not be sustained without leave to amend if the complaint, liberally construed, can state a cause of action under any theory or if there is a reasonable possibility the defect can be cured by amendment."); Vaccaro v.
Kaiman (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 761, 768 ("When the defect which justifies striking a complaint is capable of cure, the court should allow leave to amend.").) The burden is on the complainant to show the Court that a pleading can be amended successfully. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.)
DISCUSSION
Before even going into the merits of Jacobs' demurrer and motion to strike, the Court considers the threshold issue of whether the filings are timely. Jacobs was served by publication. Service ¿of the summons by¿ publication ¿was¿ complete ¿on June 12, 2026, the¿ 28th ¿day after the¿ first date ¿of publication. (Sec. 415.50, subd. (c);¿ Gov. Code, Sec. 606 4.) Based on the published summons, Jacobs had 30 days to respond, or by July 12. Because July 12 is a Sunday, Jacobs' time to respond is extended to Monday, July 13. (See C ode Civ.
Proc., Sec. 10 [Sundays are holidays]; Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 12a(a) ¿[" If the last day for the performance of any act provided or required by law to be performed within a specified period of time is a holiday, then that period is hereby extended to and including the next day that is not a holiday "].) Jacobs filed the demurrer and motion to strike on August 4, 2026. There is no indication that Jacobs' time to respond was extended by stipulation or Court order.
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
Based on the foregoing, the Court OVERRULES the demurrer and DENIES the motion to strike. IT IS SO ORDERED. DATED: September 3, 2026 ___________________________ Edward B. Moreton, Jr. Judge of the Superior Court Case Number: 24SMCV00989 Hearing Date: September 3, 2026 Dept: 205 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles - West District Beverly Hills Courthouse / Department 20 5
CARISSA FERRERI, Plaintiff, v. CASA DEL SOL SPIRITS CO., et al., Defendants. | Case No.: 2 4 SMC V 00 989 Hearing Date: September 3, 2026 [TENTATIVE] order RE: plaintiff's motion for assignment order and for order restraining judgment debtor |
BACKGROUND
On May 26, 2026, the Court entered Judgment in favor of Judgment Creditor and against Judgment Debtor in the amount of $129,819.52, together with attorneys' fees and costs in the amount of $7,128.66, for a total Judgment of $136,948.18. (Ex. A to Rapaport Decl.) The Judgment is final, and enforcement of the Judgment has not been stayed. (Rapaport Decl., P. 5.) On June 9, 2026, the Clerk of the Court issued Abstracts of Judgment. On June 18, 2026, Judgment Creditor caused Abstracts of Judgment to be recorded in the official records of Los Angeles County and Santa Barbara County.
Judgment Creditor thereafter sought a Writ of Execution to enforce the Judgment. Despite entry of the Judgment and Judgment Creditor's enforcement efforts, no payments whatsoever have been received from Judgment Debtor or from any other person or entity on its behalf, and no amounts have been applied toward satisfaction of the Judgment. As of August 3, 2026, the amount due and owing is $139,349.46, including accrued interest and post - judgment costs. (Rapaport Decl., P. 4.)
Judgment Creditor " is informed and believes " that Judgment Debtor conducts business with, and has rights to receive payments from, Southern Glazer's Wine & Spirits, LLC; Southern Glazer's Wine & Spirits of California; BevMo! Inc.; Total Wine & More; Retail Services & Systems, Inc.; Target Corporation; Whole Foods Market California, Inc.; and Whole Foods, including payments arising from accounts receivable, contract receivables, and other rights to payment. (Exhibit B attached to Rapaport Decl., P. 6.)
Judgment Debtor's products are also listed for sale on the websites of several of the companies identified above. (Exhibit C attached to Rapaport Decl., P. 7.) Based on these product listings, Judgment Creditor believes that Judgment Debtor maintains ongoing commercial relationships with those entities and has rights to receive payments arising from the sale and distribution of its products.
This hearing is on Judgment Creditor's motion for an assignment and restraining order. Ferreri seeks to assign to herself amounts owed to Judgment Debtor, including by: (1) Southern Glazer's Wine & Spirits, LLC, (2) Southern Glazer's Wine & Spirit's of California, (3) Bevmo! Inc., (4) Total Wine & More, (5) Retail Services & Systems, (6) Target Corporation, (7) Whole Foods Market California, Inc., (8) Whole Foods. Ferreri also moves for an order restraining the Judgment Debtor and any persons acting on its behalf from encumbering, assigning, disposing or spending Judgment Debtor's interest in various accounts receivable payments.
LEGAL STANDARD
Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 708.510(a) ¿states, in relevant part: " (a) Except as otherwise provided by law, upon application of the judgment creditor on noticed motion, the court may order the judgment debtor to assign to the judgment creditor or to¿a receiver appointed pursuant to Article 7 (commencing with Section 708.610) all or part of a right to payment due or to become due, whether or not the right is conditioned on future developments, including but not limited to the following types of payments: (1) Wages due from the federal government that are not subject to withholding under an earnings withholding order. (2) Rents. (3) Commissions. (4) Royalties. (5) Payments due from a patent or copyright. (6) Insurance policy loan value. "
I n determining whether to order an assignmen t, the court may take into consideration all relevant factors, including the following: " (1) The reasonable requirements of a judgment debtor who is a natural person and of persons supported in whole or in part by the judgment debtor. (2) Payments the judgment debtor is required to make or that are deducted in satisfaction of other judgments and wage assignments, including earnings assignment orders for support. (3) The amount remaining due on the money judgment. (4) The amount being¿or to be received in satisfaction of the right to payment that may be assigned. " (Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 708.510(c) .)¿
Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 708.520 ¿provides that "[w]hen an application is made pursuant to¿ Section¿708.510 ¿or thereafter, the judgment creditor may apply to the court for an order restraining the judgment debtor from assigning or otherwise disposing of the right to payment that is sought to be assigned." (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 708.520(a) .) "The court may issue an order pursuant to this section upon a showing of need for the order. The court, in its discretion, may require the judgment creditor to provide an¿undertaking. " (Id.,¿ Sec. 708.520(b) .) " [T]here is a relatively low threshold " for " an adequate showing of need for purposes of obtaining a restraining order. " (Legal Additions LLC v. Kowalski (C.D. Cal. July 26, 2011) 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81179 at * 7.)
DISCUSSION
Although " detailed¿evidentiary support " that a judgment debtor holds a right to payment from a third party is not required, the judgment creditor must provide " some¿evidentiary support "; " some degree of concreteness to the expected payment is required. " ¿ (Legal Additions LLC v. Kowalski, No. C-08-2754 EMC, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81179, 2011 WL 3156724, at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 26, 2011) .) " Certainly, there needs to be more than just speculation before the remedy of an assignment order can be provided. " ¿ (Id.)¿ In addition, the judgment creditor is required to " describe [the sources of the right to payment] with sufficient detail so that [d] efendants can file a claim of exemption or other opposition. " ¿ (Icho v.
PacketSwitch.com, Inc., No. CV 01-20858-LHK (PSG), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135602, 2012 WL 4343834, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 2012) ¿(alterations in original) (quoting¿ Blue Grass Mfg. Co. of Lexington, Inc. v. Beyond A Blade, Flush-Cut, & Paws Off Tools, LLC, No. MC 10-80248 WHA, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70556, at *7 (N.D. Cal. May 5, 2011).)
Here, Judgment Creditor has submitted a list of companies in Exhibit A to her counsel's declaration. But counsel does not specify how the list was prepared or what sources he used to compile the list. The motion only states that the list is based on Judgment Creditor's information and belief. Judgment Creditor never says the bases for her belief. To be sure, counsel also provides pages from websites which show that Casa Del Sol Spirits products are being sold on Target, BevMo! and Total Wine and More sites. Setting aside the fact that the webpages are not authenticated, the fact that Judgment Debtor's products are being sold on the sites does not necessarily mean that the sales amounts are owed to Casa Del Sol. Judgment Creditor does not indicate whether these products could only be obtained through Casa Del Sol or whether there could be indirect sellers of the products.
Based on this thin showing, the Court cannot grant Judgment Creditor's motion for assignment order. Because the Court declines to issue an assignment order for payments owed or to be owed by the companies listed in Exhibit A to counsel's declaration, the Court also declines to issue a restraining order.¿ (See Garden City Boxing Club, Inc. v. Briano, No. CIV-F-06-1270 AWI GSA, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95086, 2007 WL 4463264, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 13, 2007) ¿(declining to issue a restraining order upon denying a request for assignment).)
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's motion for an assignment and restraining order. DATED: September 3, 2026 ___________________________ Edward B. Moreton, Jr. Judge of the Superior Court Case Number: 25SMCV05405 Hearing Date: September 3, 2026 Dept: 205 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles - West District Beverly Hills Courthouse / Department 20 5 KEITH MUENZE, individually and derivatively on behalf of KIXIE ONLINE, INC., Plaintiff, v. COOLEY LLP, et al., Defendant s. | Case No.: 2 5 SMCV0 5405 Hearing Date: September 3, 2026 [TENTATIVE] order RE: defendant s' MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION AND STAY PROCEEDINGS |
BACKGROUND
This is a legal malpractice case. Defendant Cooley LLP served as Plaintiff Kixie Online, Inc. 's corporate counsel for more than a decade (from 2013 to 2025) . (Compl. paragraph 11.) Defendant Joshua Seidenfeld was the assigned attorney on the Kixie engagement. Cooley helped form the company, draft its bylaws, prepare its financing instruments, and advise its founders. (Id.)
Plaintiff claims that in 2024, at the behest of one founder, Jeff Kuei, Cooley advised and assisted actions to remove the other founder, Plaintiff Keith Muenze, from the Board of Directors, even though Kixie's bylaws, which were drafted by Cooley expressly prohibited such action. (Paragraph 12.) Plaintiff claims these actions by Cooley violated the California General Corporation Law, Delaware General Corporation Law, and Cooley's fiduciary duties to its clien t. (Paragraph 13.) Plaintiff further alleges that Cooley's conduct destabilized the company, triggered shareholder litigation, and caused Kixie to incur substantial financial and reputational harm. (Paragraph 14.)
The operative complaint alleges claims for (1) legal malpractice, (2) breach of fiduciary duty, (3) fraud and concealment, and (4) aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty. The original complaint was filed by Kixie, but the first amended complaint is filed by Muenze individually and derivatively on behalf of Kixie. Cooley's engagement agreement with Kixie provides that " should a dispute arise between us which cannot be resolved " through communication, ' then to the extent permitted by law, we and the Company agree to be bound by the Arbitration Provision attached hereto as Schedule B and incorporated herein. " (Ex. A to Tanoury Decl.,
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