MEJIA vs. BROOKSIDE APARTMENTS, LLC.

3 Creighton vs. Hyundai Motor America

2025-01493450 Demurrer to Complaint Motion to Strike

Hearings vacated. 4 Dale L. Woodward, Trustee of the Woodward Family Trust vs. Canyon Hills Estates Homeowners Association

2026-01545101 Demurrer to Complaint

Hearing vacated. 5 Kiani vs. Masimo Corporation

2026-01546059 Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice (2)

Continued to 11/19/26. 6 MEJIA vs. BROOKSIDE APARTMENTS, LLC.

2026-01551413 Demurrer to Complaint Defendants Casa La Veta Associates, L.P.; Richard Tucker, Jr. and Kathleen A. Tucker, as Trustees of the Richard M. Tucker and Kathleen A. Tucker Family Trust dated February 19, 2004; and Jamboree Management’s Demurrer to the Complaint is OVERRULED in part and SUSTAINED in part.

Defendants did not adequately engage in the meet and confer process. Code of Civil Procedure section 430.41 requires the parties to meet and confer “in person, by telephone, or by video conference.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 430.31, subd. (a).) The declaration of Branden Frankel references only a letter sent to Plaintiffs’ counsel via email. Defendants are advised that any future motions that require a meet and confer, must comply with the Code. Failure to do so may result in denial of the motion.

First Cause of Action - Violation of California Civil Code § 1942.4

Civil Code § 1942.4 prohibits a landlord from demanding or collecting rent if the rental property is substandard and the landlord has failed to make necessary repairs. Such conditions include the following:

(1) The dwelling substantially lacks any of the affirmative standard characteristics listed in Section 1941.1 or violates Section 17920.10 of the Health and Safety Code, or is

deemed and declared substandard as set forth in Section 17920.3 of the Health and Safety Code... (2) A public officer or employee who is responsible for the enforcement of any housing law, after inspecting the premises, has notified the landlord or the landlord’s agent in writing of his or her obligations to abate the nuisance or repair the substandard conditions. (3) The conditions have existed and have not been abated 35 days beyond the date of service of the notice specified in paragraph (2) and the delay is without good cause...

(Civ. Code § 1942.4(a).)

Plaintiffs incorporate an inspection report of the Property prepared by Inspector D. Nguyen of the Orange County Health Care Agency. Defendants argue the report does not indicate that the landlord or the landlord’s agent was notified in writing of an obligation to abate the nuisance or repair the substandard condition. Moreover, the report is limited to an investigation of purported insect infestation, and not any of the characteristics listed in Section 1941.1.

Section 1941.1 states that a dwelling must have plumbing that is maintained in good working order and “electrical lighting, with wiring and electrical equipment” that is maintained in good working order. (Civ. Code § 1941.1, subd. (2) and (5).) Additionally, all areas of the building under control of the landlord are to be kept in every part clean and sanitary. (Civ. Code § 1941.1, subd. (6).)

In opposition, Plaintiffs contend they allege multiple conditions rendering the Property unhabitable, including infestations, mold contamination, defective plumbing and unsafe electrical systems. (Complaint, ¶ 20.) Such allegations are sufficient to state a claim for violation of Section 1942.4.

Accordingly, the demurrer to the FIRST cause of action is OVERRULED.

Second Cause of Action – Breach of the Warranty of Habitability

“A warranty of habitability is implied by law in residential leases. The elements of a cause of action for breach of the implied warranty of habitability are the existence of a material defective condition affecting the premises’ habitability, notice to the landlord of the condition within a reasonable time after the tenant’s

discovery of the condition, the landlord was given a reasonable time to correct the deficiency, and resulting damages.” (Peviani v. Arbors at California Oaks Property Owner, LLC (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 874, 891 [citation modified].)

The Complaint states that “despite notice to management” and “written notices” about the conditions, no repairs to the Property were made. Such allegations are insufficient to demonstrate the landlord had notice of the condition(s) and failed to correct the deficiency within a reasonable time. No information is provided regarding the nature of the notice and when the notice was provided to Defendants.

Accordingly, the demurrer to the SECOND cause of action is SUSTAINED.

Fourth Cause of Action – Violation of Bus. & Prof Code § 17200

The Unfair Competition Law (UCL), Business and Professions Code section 17200 et seq., prohibits unfair competition, including unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business acts. (Cel-Tech Comm., Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Tele. Co. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 163, 180.) “A UCL action is an equitable action by means of which a plaintiff may recover money or property obtained from the plaintiff or persons represented by the plaintiff through unfair or unlawful business practices. It is not an all-purpose substitute for a tort or contract action.” (Cortez v. Purolator Air Filtration Products Co. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 163, 173.)

Plaintiffs have properly pled an unfair business practice by alleging a violation of Section 1941.1. Accordingly, the demurrer to the FOURTH cause of action is OVERRULED.

Seventh Cause of Action – IIED

To state a cause of action for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (“IIED”), the plaintiff must allege: (1) outrageous conduct by the defendant; (2) the defendant’s intention of causing or reckless disregard of the probability of causing emotional distress; (3) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (4) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous conduct. (Yau v. Santa Margarita Ford, Inc. (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 144, 161.) For conduct to be outrageous for purposes of IIED, the conduct must be so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized society. (Id.) In addition, “[the defendant's] conduct [must be]

directed at the plaintiff, or occur in the presence of a plaintiff of whom the defendant is aware.” (Christensen v. Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 868, 903.)

Here, the only conduct alleged by Defendants is entering their unit without notice, photographing personal belongings without consent, offering inadequate relocation incentives, and dismissing or minimizing their complaints rather than correcting the hazardous conditions. (Complaint, ¶ 143.) While such conduct might be negligent in nature, it does not arise to conduct so extreme it exceeds all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized society.

Accordingly, the demurrer to the SEVENTH cause of action is SUSTAINED.

Eighth Cause of Action – Negligence Per Se

The negligence per se doctrine, as statutorily codified, creates a presumption of negligence if four elements are established: (1) the defendant violated a statute, ordinance, or regulation of a public entity; (2) the violation proximately caused death or injury to person or property; (3) the death or injury resulted from an occurrence of the nature of which the statute, ordinance, or regulation was designed to protect; and (4) the person suffering the death or the injury to his person or property was one of the class of persons for whose protection the statute, ordinance, or regulation was adopted.” (Spates v. Dameron Hospital Assn. (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 208, 218; Evid. Code § 669.) The first two elements are questions of fact, while the latter two are questions of law. (Ibid.)

California does not recognize an independent cause of action for negligence per se; rather, it is an evidentiary presumption used to establish one of the several elements necessary to prove negligence. [citation] As such, ‘an underlying claim of ordinary negligence must be viable before the presumption of negligence [per se] of evidence Code section 669 can be employed.’ [citation]” (Quinn v. Coulton (2026) 121 Cal.App.5th 1124, 346 Cal.Rptr.3d 320, 329.)

Because negligence per se is not an independent cause of action, but an evidentiary presumption, the demurrer to the EIGHTH cause of action is SUSTAINED without leave to amend.

Ninth Cause of Action – Violation of Consumer Remedies Act

A person has standing to bring a claim under the unfair competition law, the false advertising law, or the CLRA only if she establishes that (1) she “has suffered” “economic injury” or “damage,” and (2) this injury or damage “was the result of, i.e., caused by,” the unfair business practice, false advertising or the CLRA violation “that is the gravamen of [her] claim. [citation] To prove the second element of causation, the plaintiff must show that she ‘actual[ly] reli[ed]’ on the ‘allegedly deceptive or misleading statements’ and that it ‘was an immediate cause’ of her injury. [citation]...a particular statement may be ‘fraudulent’ to a ‘reasonable consumer’ without ‘individualized proof of deception, reliance and injury,’ ‘the showing of actual reliance necessary to establish a plaintiff’s standing is different and, more to the point, more demanding.’” (Shaeffer v. Califia Farms, LLC (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 1125, 1137.)

Plaintiffs cite three actionable provisions of Civil Code section 1770(a): “(7) Representing that goods or services are of a particular standard, quality, or grade ... if they are of another... (16) Representing that the subject of a transaction has been supplied in accordance with a previous representation when it has not... (19) Inserting an unconscionable provision in the contract.” (Complaint, ¶ 165.)

Here, Plaintiffs’ allegations are sufficiently vague regarding the deceptive or misleading statements they relied upon in deciding to rent the Property. The Complaint states “Plaintiffs identified an advertisement for the Subject Property, which on information and belief implied that the Property was in a condition fit for human occupancy.” (Complaint, ¶ 168.) Such allegations are insufficient to demonstrate a deceptive or misleading statement. Plaintiffs also do not allege they relied on such advertising statements.

Moreover, the Complaint fails to identify what provision of the lease are unconscionable.

Furthermore, to be entitled to damages under the Consumer Legal Remedies Act, thirty days or more prior to the commencement of this action, Plaintiffs must have notified Defendants of the alleged violation in writing by certified or registered mail, return receipt requested and demanded the correction of the violation. [Emphasis added.] (Civ. Code § 1782, subd. (a).) Plaintiffs have not alleged compliance with Section 1782. Therefore, they cannot maintain an action for damages under the CLRA..

For the foregoing reasons, the demurrer to the NINTH cause of action is SUSTAINED.

Tenth Cause of Action – Trespassing

The elements of trespass are: (1) the plaintiff’s ownership or control of the property; (2) the defendant’s intentional, reckless, or negligent entry onto the property; (3) lack of permission for the entry or acts in excess of permission; (4) harm; and (5) the defendant’s conduct was a substantial factor in causing the harm.” (Ralphs Grocery Co. v. Victory Consultants, Inc. (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 245, 262.)

The Complaint alleges that Defendants “would frequently enter the Subject Premises, without the Plaintiffs’ permission, or consent.” (Complaint, ¶ 178.) No harm is alleged from such conduct. Again, these allegations are insufficient to satisfy the elements necessary to state a cause of action for trespass.

Accordingly, the demurrer to the TENTH cause of action is SUSTAINED.

Eleventh Cause of Action – Intentional Influence to Vacate

Civil Code section 1940.2 makes it unlawful for a landlord to commit certain specified acts such as engaging in conduct that violates Penal Code sections 484 (larceny) and 518 (extortion) or “threaten to use, force, willful threats, or menacing conduct “for the purpose of influencing a tenant to vacate a dwelling.”

The Complaint alleges that “Defendants engaged in a pattern and practice of dismissing repair requests, ignoring complaints about dangerous living conditions, and issuing retaliatory threats of eviction, with the intention and effect of interfering with Plaintiffs’ quiet enjoyment of the premises.” (Complaint, ¶ 188.)

Dismissing repair requests and threats of eviction, without more, do not constitute a violation of Section 1940.2. Accordingly, the demurrer to the ELEVENTH cause of action is SUSTAINED.

Twelfth Cause of Action – Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress

The negligent causing of emotional distress is not an independent tort, but the tort of negligence to which the traditional elements of duty, breach of duty, causation, and damages apply.. (Burgess v.

Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1064, 1072.) NIED claims arise in two contexts: direct victim and bystander. “Bystander” claims involve emotional distress caused by witnessing injury to close family members. (Klein v. Children’s Hospital Medical Center (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 889, 894.) “Direct victim” claims will lie where duty from preexisting relationship is negligently breached. (Ibid.)

“[T]he negligent infliction of emotional distress-anxiety, worry, discomfort-is compensable without physical injury in cases involving the tortious interference with property rights.” (Erlach v. Sierra Asset Servicing, LLC (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1299.) “Thus, if [defendant’s] failure to repair the premises constitutes a tort grounded on negligence, [plaintiff] is entitled to prove his damages for emotional distress because the failure to repair must be deemed to constitute an injury to his tenancy interest (right to habitable premises), which is a species of property.” (Ibid.)

Here, the Complaint does not allege a bystander claim, but a direct victim action. Plaintiffs contend Defendants’ conduct in allowing “persistent infestations, mold contamination, plumbing and electrical defects, structural deterioration, inadequate security and unauthorized entries” caused Plaintiffs’ severe emotional distress. (Complaint, ¶ 194.)

Defendants argue that California courts have not found that the landlord/tenant relationship is one which imposes upon Defendants a heightened duty to Plaintiffs. However, Defendants cite to no case law that supports such a proposition. To the contrary, Erlach, surpa, held that a tenant could allege a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Thus, based on Plaintiffs’ allegations of negligence for failure to repair the Property, they can state a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress.

Accordingly, the demurrer to the TWELFTH cause of action should be OVERRULED.

Thirteenth Cause of Action – Fraud and Deceit

The Complaint alleges Defendants engaged in fraudulent deceit as defined by Civil Code sections 1709 and 1710.

Section 1709 provides as follows: “One who willfully deceives another with intent to induce him to alter his position to his injury or risk, is liable for any damage which he thereby suffers.”

Section 1710 provides that: “A deceit, within the meaning of the last section, is either:

1. The suggestion, as a fact, of that which is not true, by one who does not believe it to be true; 2. The assertion, as a fact, of that which is not true, by one who has no reasonable ground for believing it to be true; 3. The suppression of a fact, by one who is bound to disclose it, or who gives information of other facts which are likely to mislead for want of communication of that fact; or, 4. A promise, made without any intention of performing it.

“In California, fraud must be pled specifically; general and conclusory allegations do not suffice.” (Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 645.) “This particularity requirement necessitates pleading facts which show how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations were tendered.” (Ibid. [cleaned-up].)

The Complaint alleges that Defendants failed to disclose a severe and persistent bed bug infestation, falsely represented that certain repairs needed to be performed, and failed to advise the Plaintiffs that their Property had no health and safety concerns. (Complaint, ¶¶ 198-200.) However, the Complaint lacks specificity regarding how, when, where, to whom and by what means the representations were made. Thus, Plaintiffs have failed to adequately plead a claim for fraud.

Accordingly, the demurrer to the THIRTEENTH cause of action is SUSTAINED.

Plaintiffs have 20 days leave to amend the Complaint.

Motion To Strike

Defendants Casa La Veta Associates, L.P.; Richard Tucker, Jr. and Kathleen A. Tucker, as Trustees of the Richard M. Tucker and Kathleen A. Tucker Family Trust dated February 19, 2004; and Jamboree Management’s Motion to Strike is DENIED.

Defendants move to strike 51 items from the Complaint on the ground they consist of improper claims for punitive damages, statutory damages, restitution, and attorney fees:

Code of Civil Procedure section 436 provides, “The court may, upon a motion made pursuant to Section 435, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper: (a) Strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading, (b) Strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court.”

Defendants seek to strike certain portions of the Complaint without identifying which statutory ground applies (irrelevant, false, or improper matter under § 436(a), or non-conformity with law or court order under § 436(b)) to each paragraph or item sought to be struck. Rather, Defendants simply identify the paragraphs and items to be stricken, then provide legal arguments without stating what legal arguments apply to which paragraphs or items. Thus, Defendants fail to give the court or opposing party adequate notice of the basis for the challenge.

Accordingly, the motion is DENIED.

Case Management Conference continued to February 26, 2027 at 8:30 a.m. in Department C44.

Clerk to give notice.

7 Telfer-Radzat vs. Sycamore Creek Community Charter School

2026-01541439 Motion to Strike - Anti SLAPP

Defendant Sycamore Creek Community Charter School’s special motion to strike the complaint of Kimberly Telfer Radzat is DENIED. Sycamore has not met its initial burden showing the subject of the alleged defamatory comment arises from a protected activity.

The termination letter does not arise from any act of Sycamore in furtherance it’s right of petition or free speech in connection with a public issue rendering it subject to a special motion to strike. (Cal. Civ. Pro., Section 425.16.) Therefore, Sycamore has not met its burden on the first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis.

In Bishop v. The Bishop’s School (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 893, the court held that a letter terminating a teacher’s employment was not entitled to protection under the anti-SLAPP statute. In that case, the school argued that its termination letter, which concerned a teacher’s inappropriate communications with a student, implicated the public interest of protecting children. While the court agreed that the subject matter touched on a public interest, it