Ticey vs. JPMorgan Chase Bank N. A.

Ct., rule 3.1700, subd. (b)(1)). Accordingly, Plaintiff is awarded the total cost amount of $6,638.55.

Plaintiff shall give notice.

3 Ticey vs. JPMorgan The Motion for Preliminary Injunction brought by Plaintiffs Troy Ticey and Chase Bank N. A. Cynthia Ticey is DENIED.

An injunction may be granted “[w]hen it appears by the complaint that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded, and the relief, or any part thereof, consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act complained of...” (Code Civ. Proc., § 526, subd. (a)(1).)

“In deciding whether to issue a preliminary injunction, a court must weigh two ‘interrelated’ factors: (1) the likelihood that the moving party will ultimately prevail on the merits and (2) the relative interim harm to the parties from issuance or nonissuance of the injunction.” (Butt v. State of California (1992) 4 Cal.4th 668, 677-678.)

“The trial court’s determination must be guided by a ‘mix’ of the potential- merit and interim-harm factors; the greater the plaintiff’s showing on one, the less must be shown on the other to support an injunction.” (Butt v. State of California (1992) 4 Cal.4th 668, 678.) “Of course, ‘[t]he scope of available preliminary relief is necessarily limited by the scope of the relief likely to be obtained at trial on the merits.” (Ibid.) “A trial court may not grant a preliminary injunction, regardless of the balance of interim harm, unless there is some possibility that the plaintiff would ultimately prevail on the merits of the claim.” (Ibid.)

The burden is on Plaintiffs, as the parties seeking injunctive relief, “to show all elements necessary to support issuance of a preliminary injunction.” (O’Connell v. Superior Court (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1452, 1481.)

Primarily, in seeking a preliminary injunction, Plaintiffs assert the Deed of trust is defective and void. Plaintiffs offer the Declaration of Mrs. Cynthia Ticey, wherein she states that she “never executed or signed the Promissory Note for the WaMu Mortgage PlusTM loan,” that “[t]he Deed of Trust (Exhibit 23-28) misidentifies me as ‘Cynthia L. Di Meo,’” and that “the notarization is fraudulent.” (See ¶2-¶3 of Cynthia Ticey Declaration [ROA No. 142].)

Plaintiffs dispute the validity of the Deed of Trust, given the use of Mrs. Ticey’s maiden name; however, Plaintiffs nonetheless concede that Mrs. Ticey signed the document. (See Motion: 3:26-28 [ROA No. 142] [“Cynthia L. Ticey, who signed only the Deed of Trust and not the Note...”].)

Plaintiffs offer no authority which indicates the use of Mrs. Ticey’s maiden name is material where, as here, she concedes having executed the document.

Thereafter, Plaintiffs suggest, without authority, that Mrs. Ticey’s exclusion from the Note renders the Deed of Trust void.

“A note and deed of trust are separate instruments and need not contain all of the terms of the agreement between the parties.” (Kerivan v. Title Ins. & Trust Co. (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 225, 230.) “A note and deed of trust, although two instruments, form parts of one transaction and must be read and construed together.” (Ibid.)

While it is true that “[a] security interest cannot exist without an underlying obligation” (Alliance Mortgage Co. v. Rothwell (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1226, 1235), it is undisputed an underlying obligation exists, purportedly signed by Mr. Ticey. Absent authority which indicates a property owner cannot validly secure the debt of another, Plaintiffs have failed to meet their moving burden, as to this portion of the motion.

“Every brief should contain a legal argument with citation to authorities on the points made. If none is furnished on a particular point, the court may treat it as waived, and pass it without consideration.” (People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 793.)

Moreover, the circumstances described by Plaintiffs suggest Mrs. Ticey guaranteed the debt: “The distinction between sureties and guarantors is hereby abolished...A surety or guarantor is one who promises to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of another, or hypothecates property as security therefor.” (Civ. Code, § 2787; See also Mead v. Sanwa Bank California (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 561, 567-568.)

Plaintiffs have not established that status as a surety or guarantor, prevents enforcement of the Deed of Trust. Consequently, they have not shown entitlement to an injunction on this basis.

In addition to the above, any claim that the Deed of Trust was fraudulently obtained, appears barred by the applicable statute of limitations: “To prevail on a claim to cancel an instrument, a plaintiff must allege and prove (1) the instrument is void or voidable; and (2) he or she has a reasonable apprehension of serious injury including pecuniary loss or the prejudicial alteration of their position.” (Lauckhart v. El Macero Homeowners Assn. (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 889, 900.) “An instrument may be void or voidable due to fraud in its enactment.” (Ibid.)

Applying the three-year statute of limitations for fraud (Code Civ. Proc., § 338), as Plaintiffs obtained the mortgage in 2007 (¶2 of SAC [ROA No.254 at 3:13-14]), the statute of limitations expired in 2010.

While “[t]he discovery rule delays accrual until the plaintiff has, or should have had, notice of facts sufficient to put a prudent person on inquiry regarding his or her claim...[P]laintiffs are required to conduct a reasonable investigation after becoming aware of an injury, and are charged with knowledge of the information that would have been revealed by such an investigation.” (Lauckhart v. El Macero Homeowners Assn. (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 889, 900-901.)

Plaintiffs offer no evidence which supports delayed discovery herein.

Moreover, “a recorded written instrument that affects title to real property provides constructive notice of its contents.” (Lauckhart v. El Macero Homeowners Assn. (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 889, 901.) Had Plaintiffs investigated the title of their property, they would have discovered the Deed of Trust and, necessarily, would have known if any signature or notarization was fraudulent.

Further, as previously noted by the Court, the claims arising from conduct by Washington Mutual are barred by the Financial Institutions Reform, Recover, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (“FIREA”).

While Plaintiffs now assert they initiated compliance with FIRREA in 2021 (See Reply: 2:6-10 [ROA No. 276]), “[t]he FDIC published notices informing creditors that claims against WaMu had to be submitted to the FDIC by the end of December 2008.” (Saffer v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., supra, 225 Cal.App.4th at p. 1243.)

“[C]laims filed after the date specified in the notice published...shall be disallowed and such disallowance shall be final.” (12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(5)(C)(i).)

While courts have found this rule is not jurisdictional, it nonetheless establishes a bar herein: “[T]he time limits for submitting claims to the FDIC are ‘claims processing rules’ that are not jurisdictional, and thus may be subject to waiver, estoppel, or tolling.” (Saffer v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., supra, 225 Cal.App.4th at p. 1261 [internal quotations cleaned up.]) Plaintiffs have not established that waiver, estoppel or tolling apply.

Next, Plaintiffs assert Defendant Chase mislabeled their loan, thereby causing significant damage to their credit. (Motion: 2:25-3:1 [ROA No. 142].) Plaintiffs assert this constitutes a violation of Civil Code section 1770 (“CLRA”). (Motion: 4:7-10 [ROA No. 142]); however, neither a claim based on Civil Code section 1770 or the “CLRA” more generally, could be located within the Second Amended Complaint.

Necessarily, Plaintiffs cannot establish a probability of prevailing on a claim that is not alleged. “[O]rdinarily, a preliminary injunction may be sought only when the underlying cause of action on which the provisional remedy rests is presented for decision through the pleadings.” (Department of Fair Employment & Housing v. Superior Court (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 356, 384.) 7

Additionally, Plaintiffs did not offer clear evidence of the identified violation. To support this theory, Troy Ticey declares: “Chase’s mischaracterization of the loan as a HELOC, when WaMu never used that term, is demonstrated in the correspondence attached as (Exhibit 1-20)” (¶2 of Troy Ticey Declaration [ROA No. 142]); however, no exhibits were attached to the moving papers.

While Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Lodging on May 7, 2026, which referenced several exhibits, no exhibits were attached thereto. (See ROA No. 272.) A similar Notice of Lodging was filed on May 12, 2026, which purports to include exhibits therein; however, none are authenticated. (See ROA No. 279.) These same defects exist in the documents filed on August 28, 2026. (See ROA Nos. 286, 288, 292, 294 and 290.)

Thereafter, to demonstrate the loan has been mislabeled, Plaintiff Troy Ticey offers a screenshot of his “Experian credit-monitoring portal” which references a ‘$541,249 credit card balance.” (¶3-¶4 of Troy Ticey Declaration [ROA No. 146].) Plaintiff declares, essentially, that the above must be the result of Chase mislabeling the claim. (Id.) Thereafter, Plaintiff generally declares that his credit has been negatively affected. (¶5 of Troy Ticey Declaration [ROA No. 146].)

The above is insufficient to demonstrate Defendant Chase has engaged in misconduct, sufficient to support injunctive relief.

Next, Plaintiffs assert Defendant Chase failed to comply with a statutory 15- Day Demand which required “immediate validation of the debt and cessation of all collection activities due to the non-signer status and void lien.” (Motion: 2:3-5 [ROA No. 142].) Per Plaintiffs “Chase’s failure to produce the mandatory loan documents within the statutory 15-day period, as required by law, is a self-proving violation that justifies a finding of non-compliance and supports rescission and damages.” (Motion: 10:7-10 [ROA No. 142].)

The Motion does not identify the relevant statute; however, an attached exhibit indicates Plaintiffs are referring to Civil Code section 1788.52. (See Exhibit “15 Day 1” in ROA No. 141.) With respect to the same, the Declarations of Troy Ticey offered herein do not establish a clear violation of the cited provision. While Mr. Ticey declares: “I have never received disclosures, loan terms, or any explanation of the alleged debt.” (¶5 of Troy Ticey Declaration [ROA No. 142]), the above statement is vague and does not line up with the requirements of Civil Code section 1788.52.

Additionally, the Second Amended Complaint does not allege a violation of Civil Code section 1788.52.

Plaintiffs put forth several additional arguments, which the Court will not examine at length, given they are not pled in the Second Amended Complaint. Included within this category are assertions Defendant violated the Federal Credit Reporting Act (15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b)), as well as Civil Code sections 2932.5, 2923.5, 2924.17 or 2923.6. 8

Moreover, briefly, the Court notes that the portion of the FCRA cited and relied on by Plaintiffs offers damages, which does not demonstrate a threat of irreparable harm, such as to justify a preliminary injunction. (See Pinson v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association (11th Cir. 2019) 942 F.3d 1200, 1212.)

Additionally, the Court notes that “[s]ection 2932.5 is inapplicable to deeds of trust.” (Orcilla v. Big Sur, Inc. (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 982, 1003.)

Finally, neither the California Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies Act (“CCRAA”) nor specifically Civil Code section 1785.25 is referenced within the initial motion. (See ROA No. 142.) However, passing references are included within the Supplemental Motion. (See ROA No. 139 at 4:14-16 and 7:19-21.)

Per the California Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies Act (“CCRAA”), “[a] person shall not furnish information on a specific transaction or experience to any consumer credit reporting agency if the person knows or should know the information is incomplete or inaccurate.” (Civ. Code, § 1785.25, subd. (a).)

Plaintiff Troy Ticey declares that, beginning on or around October of 2025, Chase misreported the account status as “past due” despite his having made full and timely payments. (¶5 of Ticey Declaration [ROA No. 146] and ¶7 of Ticey Declaration [ROA No. 141].) More specifically, citing 30, 60 and 120-day delinquencies included within an Experian Credit Report, Plaintiff asserts these reports were made “despite full and timely payments.” (¶5 of Ticey Declaration [ROA No. 146] and ¶7 of Ticey Declaration [ROA No. 141].) The same attached report lists payments in the amount of $3,226 and $3,268, in October and November of 2025. (¶7 of Ticey Declaration and “ON TIME” attachment thereto [ROA No. 141].)

While Plaintiff declares that “full” payments were made, the same is unclear, as the Experian reports includes multiple payment amounts, ranging between $3,010 and $3,868. (¶7 of Ticey Declaration and “ON TIME” attachment thereto [ROA No. 141].)

Of note, within the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs allege Defendant misrepresented that “Plaintiffs could ‘adjust to fixed anytime.’” (See SAC 42:10 [ROA No. 254].) This allegation suggests the relevant loan has an adjustable interest rate.

Absent evidence concerning the amounts owed between October and December of 2025, it is not clear that “full” payments were made, such as to render the identified delinquencies inaccurate. Consequently, it is not clear Plaintiffs have established a violation of the CCRAA.

Additionally, regardless, the CCRAA assumes violations can be measured in monetary damages. (See, e.g., Civ. Code, § 1785.31.)

While the CCRAA allows for injunctive relief (See Civ. Code, § 1785.31, subd. (b)), it is not clear what injunctive relief could be issued, at this time: Plaintiffs request the Court issue an order enjoining Defendant from “[r]etaining or disseminating any derogatory credit information relating to Plaintiffs....” (Motion: 11:11-13 [ROA No. 142].) However, this language is overbroad as it would prevent Defendant from reporting future delinquencies.

Moreover, as indicated above, it is not clear that Plaintiffs are fully current on the loan. At best, Plaintiffs declare that payments were made in October through December of 2025.

Based on the above, Plaintiffs’ request for an order enjoining Defendant from “[i]nitiating, recording, or pursuing any foreclosure activity,” is likewise overbroad. (Motion: 11:11-13 [ROA No. 142].) Further, there has been no showing that a foreclosure has commenced.

In addition to seeking a preliminary injunction, Plaintiffs request multiple forms of additional relief, including: (1) An order cancelling or removing the Deed of Trusts, pursuant to Civil Code sections 3412 and 3413, as to Plaintiff Cynthia L. Ticey. (Motion: 3:18-22 [ROA No. 142]); (2) Financial Elder Abuse remedies under Welfare & Institutions Code sections 15610.30 and 15657.5 (Motion: 6:26-27 [ROA No. 142]); and (3) Punitive damages. (Motion: 6:28 [ROA No. 142]; See also “Prayer for Relief” at 10:22-12:3 [ROA No. 142].)

Plaintiffs have cited no authority that allows for any such relief, provisionally.

The Case Management Conference is continued to December 03, 2026, at 09:00 am in Department C10.

Moving Party to give notice.

4 G. vs. Los Alamitos This case is part of the pilot Dedicated Discovery Department Program. As Unified School set forth below, all pending discovery motions are set for an Informal District Discovery Conference (IDC) before Judge Andre De La Cruz.

To the extent the discovery motions are not resolved through the IDC process, the motions are assigned to and will be heard by Judge De La Cruz at the Costa Mesa Justice Complex in Department CM02. The case otherwise shall remain assigned to the presently assigned judicial officer for all purposes, including trial.

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