Butler v. Segura, et al.

24CV091134: BUTLER, AN INDIVIDUAL vs SEGURA, AN INDIVIDUAL, et al. 09/01/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment filed by STATE OF CALIFORNIA - CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL, a public entity (Defendant) CRS# A-91134-001 in Department 517

Tentative Ruling - 08/28/2026 Keith Fong

[JL] CASE NAME and NO.: 24CV091134 Butler v. Segura, et al. MOTION: Defendant CHP’s Motion for Summary Judgment

HEARING DATE: August 27, 2026 DEPT: 517 JUDICIAL OFFICER: Fong

PROPOSED TENTATIVE

Defendants/Cross-Defendants Falck USA, Inc. and Falck Northern California Corp.’s Motion for Summary Judgment is DROPPED. The Falck Defendants filed a notice of taking the motion off calendar on August 11, 2026.

Defendant California Highway Patrol’s Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.

BACKGROUND

This is a personal injury matter. Just before midnight on October 19, 2023, Plaintiff Anthony Butler (“Plaintiff”) was involved in a motor vehicle collision on southbound I-880 in Oakland, California. (Defendant’s Undisputed Material Facts (“DUMF”) 2; Plaintiff’s Undisputed Material Facts (“PUMF”) 3.) Officers from Defendant California Highway Patrol (“CHP”) and a Falck ambulance responded to the collision scene. (DUMF 3, 7; PUMF 4.) The ambulance was staffed by Dante Nieri and Gregory Zanders. (PUMF 6.)

Neither Nieri nor Zanders recall who drove and/or parked the ambulance at the collision scene. (PUMF 7.) The ambulance was parked in the number two lane, closer to the freeway’s center median. (PUMF 4.) Both Nieri and Zanders testified at their respective depositions that a fire truck blocked the incident scene from vehicles traveling southbound. (PUMF 8.) Zanders testified at his deposition that the ambulance was parked between the number one and number two lanes. (Ucros Decl. Exh. 5, pp. 28-29.)

CHP officer Ryan Hardin states that multiple CHP units were assigned to and arrived on the scene of the collision. (Hardin Decl. ¶¶ 5, 8.) Officer Hardin states that his unit began a traffic break, to inform motorists that all lanes of I-880 southbound were blocked due to the collision, and to divert traffic to the 66th Street off-ramp. (Id. ¶ 6.) Officer Hardin further states that when CHP arrived on the scene, a flare pattern was set up to cover all southbound lanes. (Id. ¶ 7.) Officer Hardin further states that multiple vehicles were positioned to direct traffic as visual cues and to provide a physical barrier to protect individuals active within the collision scene. (Id. ¶ 8.) 24CV091134: BUTLER, AN INDIVIDUAL vs SEGURA, AN INDIVIDUAL, et al. 09/01/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment filed by STATE OF CALIFORNIA - CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL, a public entity (Defendant) CRS# A-91134-001 in Department 517 Officer Hardin states that an Oakland Fire Department engine was present on the scene when the ambulance arrived, and it was parked perpendicular to the lanes of travel to block traffic and protect the collision scene. (Id. ¶ 9.)

Plaintiff was placed into the ambulance. (DUMF 9; PUMF 1.) Officer Hardin states that the Oakland Fire engine had left the collision scene before Plaintiff was placed in the ambulance. (Hardin Decl. ¶ 12.) Zanders testified that after the fire engine had left the scene, “[i]t went from a protected scene to an unprotected scene.” (Ucros Decl., Exh. 5, p. 51.) Thereafter, Defendant Ricardo Segura (“Segura”) rear-ended the ambulance just as the ambulance was about to leave the collision to bring Plaintiff to the hospital. (DUMF 11; PUMF 5, 30.)

Segura was arrested for driving under the influence. (DUMF 12.) Officer Hardin states that Segura drove through the established flare pattern and past multiple CHP vehicles with their lights activated before striking the ambulance, and that Segura reported he had been looking at his radio and did not see the flares or emergency vehicles before impact. (Hardin Decl. ¶¶ 15, 19.)

Plaintiff disputes that any Oakland Fire Department engine was ever present at the scene. Plaintiff testified that he does not recall a fire truck or fire engine at the incident scene (Butler Depo., p. 52; p. 134), and CHP’s PMQ, Sgt. Shore, testified that the computer-aided dispatch logs showed no indication of a fire truck’s arrival or departure (Shore Depo., pp. 120-124). Plaintiff also contends the traffic collision report makes no mention of any fire department vehicle. (PUMF 15, 40, 41; Pl. Resp. to DUMF 4, 5, 7, 9, 10, 13.)

Sergeant Christopher Shore sat for deposition as CHP’s Person Most Qualified (“PMQ”) on July 15, 2026. (Ucros Decl. Exh. 6.) Sgt. Shore testified that the fire truck on the scene acted as both a visual blockade and a physical barrier to vehicles from entering the collision scene, protecting CHP officers, other emergency personnel, and civilians. (Id. pp. 38-39.) Sgt. Shore further testified that CHP policies and procedures permit “officers on the scene to make decisions for what’s working on any particular emergency traffic incident” regarding road closures or to reorganize vehicles to create physical barriers. (Id. pp. 45-46.)

Officer Richard Bonansea, one of the CHP officers who was present at the incident, sat for deposition on June 23, 2026. (Ucros Decl. Exh. 9.) Bonansea testified that he moved his CHP vehicle to assist the tow trucks after the fire engine had left the scene, but before Segura crashed into the ambulance. (Id. pp. 30-31, 78-80.)

Plaintiff initiated this action on September 11, 2024. The operative First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) alleges a single claim of negligence against the CHP. (DUMF 1.) Plaintiff alleges that CHP failed to exercise reasonable care in the protection and control of the collision scene; failed to follow procedures and protocols to protect the safety of Plaintiff and others; failed to select a proper, safe location to evaluate Plaintiff; and caused or contributed to the collision that caused Plaintiff’s injuries. (FAC ¶ 22.)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

24CV091134: BUTLER, AN INDIVIDUAL vs SEGURA, AN INDIVIDUAL, et al. 09/01/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment filed by STATE OF CALIFORNIA - CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL, a public entity (Defendant) CRS# A-91134-001 in Department 517 LEGAL STANDARD

“[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Aguilar v. Atl. Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal. 4th 826, 850.) “That is because of the general principle that a party who seeks a court’s action in his favor bears the burden of persuasion thereon.” (Id.) Further, “the party moving for summary judgment bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact; if he carries his burden of production, he causes a shift, and the opposing party is then subjected to a burden of production of his own to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact.” (Id.) “There is a triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof.” (Id.)

A defendant moving for summary judgment may demonstrate that the plaintiff’s cause of action has no merit by showing that one or more elements of the cause of action cannot be established. (McKenna v. Beesley (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 552, 564.) On a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view the evidence, and all inferences reasonably drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to the opposing party. (Jacqueline R. v. Household of Faith Family Church, Inc. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 198, 203.)

“A public entity is liable for injury proximately caused by an act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment if the act or omission would, apart from this section, have given rise to a cause of action against that employee or his personal representative.” (Govt. Code § 815.2(a).)

PROCEDURAL ISSUES

As an initial matter, Plaintiff submitted a separate statement of additional undisputed material facts with his opposition papers, and CHP did not file a response to that statement. While a moving party is not required to respond to an opposing party’s statement of additional material facts, the Court has independently reviewed Plaintiff’s additional facts and the supporting evidence, and treats them as undisputed for purposes of this motion only to the extent they are supported by admissible evidence and are not controverted by CHP’s own evidence. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (b); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1350.)

DISCUSSION

CHP moves for summary judgment of Plaintiff’s negligence claim on the following grounds: (1) Plaintiff cannot demonstrate a special relationship between himself and CHP such that CHP owed a duty to Plaintiff; (2) CHP did not breach any duty if any owed to Plaintiff; (3) any breach by CHP did not cause Plaintiff’s harm, as Segura was a superseding intervening cause, when

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

24CV091134: BUTLER, AN INDIVIDUAL vs SEGURA, AN INDIVIDUAL, et al. 09/01/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment filed by STATE OF CALIFORNIA - CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL, a public entity (Defendant) CRS# A-91134-001 in Department 517 combined with the conduct of non-party Oakland Fire Department; and (4) neither Falck Ambulance or Oakland Fire Department was an independent contractor for CHP for purposes of CHP’s liability under Government Code section 815.4.

Duty and Special Relationship

Whether a duty of care exists in a given circumstance is a question of law to be determined on a case-by-case basis. (See Parsons v. Crown Disposal Co. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 456, 465.)

To determine if a duty exists, the court must first determine whether there exists a special relationship between Plaintiff and the CHP, or some other circumstance that gives rise to an affirmative duty to protect. (Brown v. USA Taekwondo (2021) 11 Cal.5th 204, 209.) “A special relationship between the defendant and the victim is one that ‘gives the victim a right to expect’ protection from the defendant, while a special relationship between the defendant and the dangerous third party is one that ‘entails an ability to control [the third party’s] conduct.’” (Id. at p. 216, citing Regents of University of California v. Superior Court (2018) 4 Cal.5th 607, 619.)

Law enforcement officers owe no general duty to come to the aid of, warn, or protect the traveling public; responding to a scene, activating warning lights, or directing traffic does not, without more, create a special relationship. (Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Department of California Highway Patrol (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 1129, 1136; Foremost Dairies, Inc. v. State of California (1986) 190 Cal.App.3d 361, 365-366 [Vehicle Code section 2410 is permissive and imposes no duty]; Camp v. State of California (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 967, 976-978.) A duty arises only where an officer’s affirmative conduct increases the risk of harm beyond what would have existed absent the officer’s involvement, or induces the plaintiff’s detrimental reliance. (Williams v. State of California (1983) 34 Cal.3d 18, 24-27; Zelig v. County of Los Angeles (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1112, 1129.)

Applying that standard, CHP’s contention that Plaintiff cannot establish duty appears to have substantial force. Most of what the officers did (i.e., running a traffic break, setting a flare pattern, positioning patrol vehicles as barriers, and directing traffic (Hardin Decl. ¶¶ 6-9)), was ordinary scene response that would not, without more, create a duty owed specifically to Plaintiff.

Plaintiff relies principally on Mann v. State of California (1977) 70 Cal.App.3d 773, 779-780, where officers came to the aid of stranded motorists, withdrew their protection without warning, and were held to have increased the risk and induced the motorists’ reliance. But Mann has been repeatedly narrowed and criticized. Indeed, one court called it “a legal derelict that exists solely to confuse” (Minch v. Department of California Highway Patrol (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 895, 902-905). The surviving rule from Mann, as independently recognized by our Supreme Court, is narrow: an officer who affirmatively undertakes to protect specific persons, and then withdraws that protection, may owe a duty of reasonable care. (Williams, supra, 34 Cal.3d at pp. 25-27.)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

24CV091134: BUTLER, AN INDIVIDUAL vs SEGURA, AN INDIVIDUAL, et al. 09/01/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment filed by STATE OF CALIFORNIA - CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL, a public entity (Defendant) CRS# A-91134-001 in Department 517

Plaintiff’s theory of liability, however, does not rest on CHP’s mere presence or its ordinary scene response. Rather, Plaintiff contends that CHP took affirmative control of traffic and scene protection and then, after the fire engine departed, moved the patrol vehicle in the number four lane that had been directing motorists off the freeway, without filling the resulting gap. (PUMF 43; Bonansea Depo., pp. 30-31, 76-80.)

CHP responds that its officers remained on scene throughout and that any inference of increased risk or reliance is weak. That criticism, however, goes to the persuasiveness of Plaintiff’s claim, not to CHP’s entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. The case law limiting Mann does not defeat duty, because that surviving principle rests on Williams, not Mann alone, and supplies a legally sufficient basis for a duty where the facts support it. Whether the facts support it turns on a question the Court may not resolve on this motion.

The salient question is not whether CHP’s intervention left Plaintiff worse off than no response at all, but whether, having established traffic control and induced reliance on it, CHP increased the risk or lulled Plaintiff into reliance by moving the number four lane patrol vehicle and leaving the resulting gap unfilled. On summary judgment the Court must draw every reasonable inference in Plaintiff’s favor, and may neither weigh the evidence nor choose between competing inferences.

The record would permit a reasonable trier of fact to find that CHP’s officers, having undertaken to protect those at the scene, withdrew that protection in a manner that increased the risk to Plaintiff or induced his reliance. Because the existence of a duty turns on those disputed facts, the Court cannot resolve the duty question on this motion; the factual predicate is for the trier of fact, and the legal question of duty may be determined once those facts are found. Summary judgment cannot be granted on the ground that CHP owed no duty. The Court expresses no view on whether Plaintiff’s theory will ultimately succeed.

In view of the above, the Court need not reach the second step of the duty analysis. That step asks whether the policy factors identified in Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108, 112- 113, counsel against recognizing a duty. (Brown v. USA Taekwondo, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 209.) CHP does not argue that the Rowland factors negate a duty here.

Breach

Breach of duty is generally a question of fact that may be determined as a question of law if reasonable jurors following the law may only draw one conclusion from the evidence. (Thompson v. Sacramento City Unified School Dist. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1352, 1366.)

The evidence before the Court on the instant motion shows that there remain disputed issues of fact as to whether CHP breached its duty to Plaintiff. CHP presents evidence, including deposition testimony, a sworn statement by Sgt. Shore, to establish that no breach occurred. Plaintiff similarly presents the CHP’s policies and procedures and deposition testimony from

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

24CV091134: BUTLER, AN INDIVIDUAL vs SEGURA, AN INDIVIDUAL, et al. 09/01/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment filed by STATE OF CALIFORNIA - CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL, a public entity (Defendant) CRS# A-91134-001 in Department 517 responding officials and Plaintiff which support a reasonable inference as to whether CHP breached its duty to Plaintiff.

Several factual disputes preclude judgment as a matter of law. Whether CHP should have used a readily available means to protect Plaintiff by moving a patrol vehicle to block the ambulance once the fire truck left, or directing the ambulance to a more protected location is disputed, as is whether the officers followed CHP policy requiring reflective vests, cones in addition to flares, and active hand direction of traffic, none of which Plaintiff contends they did. (PUMF 33, 34; Shore Depo., pp. 69-71, 79-83, 129-133; Nieri Depo., p. 166.)

CHP’s showing is nonetheless substantial: Sgt. Shore’s expert opinion that the officers acted reasonably and consistent with Department policy is largely unrebutted, and Plaintiff offers no competing expert. The triable issue is therefore narrow, confined chiefly to the officers’ alleged departures from their own written protocols and the movement of the number four lane patrol vehicle.

Based upon the record before the Court, there are disputed issues of fact as to whether CHP breached its duty to Plaintiff.

Causation

CHP separately contends that any breach did not cause Plaintiff’s injuries because Segura’s intoxicated driving was the sole, or a superseding, cause of the collision. Because CHP raised causation as an independent ground for summary judgment, the Court addresses it in this ruling.

California applies the substantial-factor test for causation, which is ordinarily a question of fact. It may be resolved on summary judgment only where, under undisputed facts, there is no room for a reasonable difference of opinion. (Lawrence v. La Jolla Beach & Tennis Club, Inc. (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 11, 33.)

Segura’s intoxication and inattention do not establish a superseding cause as a matter of law. Where the risk that the defendant’s conduct allegedly failed to guard against is the very risk that came to pass, a third party’s negligence does not supersede the defendant’s liability. (Lugtu v. California Highway Patrol (2001) 26 Cal.4th 703, 725-726.) The risk that an inattentive or intoxicated motorist would enter an inadequately protected collision scene is precisely the risk against which CHP’s alleged scene-protection duty was directed. Such conduct is a foreseeable intervening cause rather than a superseding one, unless it produced harm of a kind and degree beyond what CHP should reasonably have foreseen. (Ibid.)

The Court agrees that Plaintiff’s cause-in-fact theory is attenuated, and CHP’s contrary showing is comparatively compelling. It is undisputed that, for roughly 30 to 40 minutes, every other motorist recognized the flare pattern and safely exited the freeway, and that only Segura, who was intoxicated and, by his own account, looking at his radio, drove through it. (Hardin Decl. ¶¶ 15, 19, 20.) Plaintiff’s contention that the movement of a single patrol vehicle led Segura to

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

24CV091134: BUTLER, AN INDIVIDUAL vs SEGURA, AN INDIVIDUAL, et al. 09/01/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment filed by STATE OF CALIFORNIA - CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL, a public entity (Defendant) CRS# A-91134-001 in Department 517 proceed through the flare pattern rests largely on inference and is far from compelling.

Nevertheless, the undisputed facts are not susceptible to only one reasonable conclusion. Viewing the record in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, though doubtful, a trier of fact could find that CHP’s moving of the number four lane patrol vehicle, its failure to fill the gap left by the departing fire engine, and its alleged departures from scene-protection protocols were substantial factors in bringing about the collision. That CHP’s evidence may ultimately prove the more persuasive is a matter of weight for the trier of fact, not a basis for judgment as a matter of law. Causation therefore presents a triable issue, albeit a close one.

Statutory Immunity

In its reply brief, CHP argues for the first time that it and its officers are immune under Government Code sections 820.2, 820.25, and 815.2, subdivision (b), for the officers’ discretionary decisions in positioning and moving their vehicles. This argument does not appear in CHP’s moving papers, which addressed only duty, breach, causation, and CHP’s vicarious liability under Government Code section 815.4.

A court ordinarily need not consider a ground raised for the first time in a reply, because the opposing party has had no opportunity to respond, and considering such matter without allowing a response raises fairness and due process concerns. (Jay v. Mahaffey (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1522, 1537-1538; San Diego Watercrafts, Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 308, 313-316; American Indian Model Schools v. Oakland Unified School Dist. (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 258, 275-276.) Because CHP raised statutory immunity only in reply, and Plaintiff has not had an opportunity to address it, the Court declines to reach the argument on this motion.

CHP’s Liability for Falck Ambulance and Oakland Fire (Government Code Section 815.4)

CHP’s final ground contends that neither Falck Ambulance nor the Oakland Fire Department was CHP’s independent contractor, so CHP cannot be held vicariously liable for their conduct under Government Code section 815.4. Plaintiff’s opposition does not address this ground. Nevertheless, assuming CHP is correct, the argument does not support summary judgment of the entire negligence claim.

Plaintiff’s negligence claim rests principally on the alleged negligence of CHP’s own officers in protecting and controlling the collision scene. This is a theory of direct liability under Government Code section 815.2, subdivision (a), that is separate and independent of any vicarious liability for Falck or Oakland Fire. Resolving the section 815.4 theory in CHP’s favor thus would not dispose of the negligence cause of action, and summary judgment remains unwarranted on that basis.

In sum, the Court denies CHP’s motion because the summary judgment standard requires that all

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

24CV091134: BUTLER, AN INDIVIDUAL vs SEGURA, AN INDIVIDUAL, et al. 09/01/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment filed by STATE OF CALIFORNIA - CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL, a public entity (Defendant) CRS# A-91134-001 in Department 517 inferences be drawn in Plaintiff’s favor and forbids the weighing of evidence or the resolution of credibility on this motion. Nothing in this ruling should be understood as a determination that Plaintiff’s negligence claim is likely to prevail. To the contrary, on the present record Plaintiff’s theories of duty, breach, and causation are modest, and Plaintiff will bear a substantial burden at trial to establish that CHP’s conduct, as opposed to the intoxicated and inattentive driving of Segura, was a legal cause of his injuries. The Court holds only that these are questions for the trier of fact.

CONCLUSION

Defendant California Highway Patrol’s Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.

Defendants/Cross-Defendants Falck USA, Inc. and Falck Northern California Corp.’s Motion for Summary Judgment is DROPPED.

Any challenge to the tentative ruling requires an in person appearance at the motion hearing.