Hudson v. General Motors, LLC

Hudson v. General Motors, LLC, 25CVP-0170

Hearing: Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs

Date: September 1, 2026

Haley Hudson filed this lemon law action against General Motors LLC (GM) on April 30, 2025, under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (the Act).

The parties settled on November 12, 2025. Plaintiff agreed to dismiss the action and return the subject vehicle to Defendant GM in exchange for a total of $98,656.00— inclusive of the outstanding loan balance—plus Plaintiff’s reasonable attorney’s fees, costs, and expenses. The settlement agreement provides that “[r]easonable attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses pursuant to subdivision (d) of Section 1794 of the Civil Code shall be determined by the court by way of a noticed motion,” and that “Plaintiff is the prevailing party for purposes of said fee motion.” (Dillavou Decl., Ex. 1, ¶ 1.d.)

Plaintiff now moves for an award of $25,067.00 in attorney’s fees, $941.95 in costs and expenses, for a total of $26,008.95. Plaintiff’s motion is supported by the declaration of counsel and billing records, amongst other exhibits. (See Dillavou Decl.; Ex. 4.)

GM does not dispute Plaintiff’s entitlement to fees or the amount of Plaintiff’s costs and expenses. However, the GM contends that the amount of the fee award sought is excessive and unreasonable, and that Plaintiff should be awarded no more than $4,438.92 in total fees. 1

I.

Legal Standard

The Act provides that a prevailing buyer “shall” be awarded a “sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.” (Civ. Code, § 1794(d).)

The remedial purpose of this section is readily apparent. By permitting prevailing buyers to recover their attorney fees in addition to costs and expenses, our Legislature has provided injured consumers strong encouragement to seek legal redress in a situation in which a lawsuit might

1 Plaintiff’s counsel declares that during mediation, counsel for Defendant informed the mediator that GM requires a formal fee motion for any request exceeding $5,000, regardless of the circumstances or time expended. Plaintiff’s counsel declares that he made a good-faith effort to resolve the issue by offering to accept $10,000 in attorney’s fees to avoid motion practice and additional burden on the Court, but GM would not negotiate. Thus, Plaintiff brought the present motion. (Dillavou Decl., ¶ 7.) 1

not otherwise have been economically feasible. [Citation.] (Robertson v. Fleetwood Travel Trailers of California, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 785, 817.)

“[T]the trial court has broad authority to determine the amount of a reasonable fee.” (PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095 (PLCM); EnPalm, LLC v. Teitler (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 770, 774 [trial court has broad discretion in determining the amount of a reasonable fee and is governed by equitable principles.]) “The experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his court.” (PLCM, supra, at p. 1095.)

Moving party has the burden of proof in establishing its fees. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, subd. (c)(5).) However, “[i]n challenging attorney fees as excessive because too many hours of work are claimed, it is the burden of the challenging party to point to the specific items challenged, with a sufficient argument and citations to the evidence. General arguments that fees claimed are excessive, duplicative, or unrelated do not suffice.” (Premier Medical Management Systems, Inc. v. California Ins. Guarantee Assn. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 550, 564.)

“[T]he fee setting inquiry in California ordinarily begins with the ‘lodestar,’ i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate. California courts have consistently held that a computation of time spent on a case and the reasonable value of that time is fundamental to a determination of an appropriate attorneys’ fee award. [Citation.] The reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar work. [Citation.] The lodestar figure may then be adjusted, based on consideration of factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided. [Citation.]” (PLCM, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1095.)

II.

Discussion

As an initial matter, the Court notes that twice in its opposition, GM challenges a multiplier purportedly sought by Plaintiff. However, no multiplier is sought; Plaintiff solely seeks lodestar fees.

Plaintiff’s counsel Nicolas Dillavou currently bills at the rate of $745 per hour, and requests that the Court apply this rate to all compensable time incurred in this matter to account for the delay in receiving payment due to the contingent nature of the case. (Robles v. Employment Development Dept. (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 191, 205 [awarding current prevailing hourly rate to account for delay in obtaining a fee award].) Counsel was admitted to the bar in 2019 and declares that prior to assuming his current role as partner, courts in Los Angeles and San Diego. approved his requested hourly rates from $550 to $650 per hour work in consumer warranty litigation. (Divallou Decl., ¶ 12.)

In reply he declares that recently, a court in Los Angeles have approved his $745 rate, and a court in Riverside approved his colleagues $795 rate. (Supp. Dillavou Decl., ¶¶ 4-5, Exs. 6-7.) Counsel declares that these rates are consistent with those awarded to attorneys of similar experience and specialization in consumer protection and warranty litigation

across California. (Divallou Decl., ¶ 13.)

Other attorneys working on the matter on behalf of Plaintiff include Jon Jacobs, admitted to the bar in 1999, at a rate of $945 per hour, Christine Morano, admitted to the bar in 2024, at a rate of $495 per hour, and paralegal time at a rate of $250 per hour. (Divallou Decl., ¶¶ 20-22.)

GM contends that the hourly rate is unreasonable, and that the Court should rely on the rates listed in the publication by Wolters & Kluwer called “2021 Real Rate Report: The Industry’s Leading Analysis of Law Firm Rates, Trends, and Practices” (2021 Real Rate Report). (Swett Decl. ¶ 8; Exhibit A.) GM cites a list of federal district court opinions awarding fees using the Real Rate Report. (Opp., p. 4, l. 11-p. 5, l. 11.) Based on the Real Rate Report, GM contends that the Court should set counsel’s rate at $252 for partners and $231 for associates, claiming that is the prevailing rate in the Los Angeles market.

As set forth above, the reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar work. The Court also finds that the rates put forward by GM are five years old, and unreasonably low compared to the current prevailing rates in the community. Nonetheless, the rates requested by Plaintiff’s counsel are higher than those typically charged or awarded in San Luis Obispo, even on contingency cases. The Court shall reduce the rates across the board by 20% to more closely align with the prevailing rate in this County.

GM next objects that 22 hours of time were billed for clerical and administrative tasks that is typically the responsibility of secretaries, and that the Court should exclude those hours, amounting to $7,551.50 for purportedly administrative work and $2,428 for duplicative entries.

Plaintiff responds that GM has not met its burden of showing improper time entries and that the numbers cited by GM do not add up. Plaintiff’s counsel also declares that he reviewed the records for administrative, duplicative and clerical time, and that ten hours of billed time was excluded from the motion as the result of this review. (Dillavou Decl., ¶ 17.)

As set forth above, “it is the burden of the challenging party to point to the specific items challenged, with a sufficient argument and citations to the evidence. General arguments that fees claimed are excessive, duplicative, or unrelated do not suffice.” (Premier Medical Management Systems, Inc., supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at p. 564.)

GM identifies two.2 entries on July 2 and July 8, described as “Emailed AC re filed docs” and “Emailed AC re D’ email.” Otherwise, GM does not specifically identify the entries which it challenges, apparently leaving the Court to identify them and determine how GM reached the $7,551.50 it contends was improperly billed. The Court finds that the noted entries regarding emails were reasonably incurred and the total time requested is reasonable.

Finally, GM challenges the request for five hours of additional attorney time in the total amount of $3,725 to conclude the matter, including reviewing the opposition, preparing a reply, attending the hearing, confirmation of payment and file closure. (Dillavou Decl., ¶ 24.) The Court finds this time to be reasonable. (Serrano v. Unruh (1982) 32 Cal.3d 621, 639 [hours reasonably spent include those necessary to establish and defend the fee claim]; Fox v. Vice (2011) 563 U.S. 826, 838 [“The essential goal in shifting fees (to either party) is to do rough justice, not to achieve auditing perfection.”])

ORDER (PROPOSED)

Plaintiff’s motion for fees and costs is granted in part. Plaintiff is awarded fees in the total amount of $20,053.60 (representing a 20% reduction from $25,067) plus $941.95 in costs and expenses.

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