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23NWCV03125·la·Civil·Sexual Assault
Hearing todayDENIED

K. L. G. v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, et al.

Plaintiff's Motion in Limine No. 1; Plaintiff's Motion in Limine No. 2; Plaintiff's Motion in Limine No. 3

Hearing date
Aug 31, 2026
Department
C
Judge
Prevailing
Plaintiff

Motion type

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Parties

PlaintiffK. L. G.
DefendantCOUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
DefendantJuan Sanchez Medina

Ruling

(Norwalk Courthouse: Dept. C) August 31, 2026 DEPARTMENT C LAW AND MOTION RULINGS

ANGELES, et al., Case No. 23NWCV03125 On August 26, 2026, the Court invited supplemental briefing on the following issue: was the Court's ruling in Plaintiff's Motion in Limine No. 3 in error in light of Teitelbaum Furs, Inc. v. Dominion Ins. Co. (1962) 58 Cal.2d 601? In Teitelbaum, the Court held that collateral estoppel does not preclude a defendant who enters a plea of guilty in a criminal action from litigating his cause for the first time in a civil action. (Id., at pp. 605-06.) The parties submitted supplemental briefing on August 27, 2026.

In Plaintiff's Motion in Limine No. 3, the Court ruled that Defendants may not assert that Plaintiff consented to the sexual act or was comparatively negligent. Until further order of the Court, Defendants shall not refer to Plaintiff's consent or comparative negligence during trial. The Court's ruling does not restrict Defendants from exploring the facts and circumstances of the sexual assault.

The supplemental briefing filed by Defendants asks the Court reconsider its rulings in Plaintiff's Motions in Limine Nos. One, Two and Three to the extent they prohibit Defendants from challenging consent. More specifically, Defendants argue: 1) Juan Sanchez Medina's no contest plea in the criminal case has no preclusive effect in this civil trial; and 2) entry of default against Medina does not preclude him from testifying that Plaintiff gave consent.

The supplemental briefing filed by Plaintiff argues: 1) the language in Teitelbaum cited by the Court in its invitation for supplemental briefing is dicta; 2) Teitelbaum does not apply to this civil action because default has been entered against Medina; 3) Medina's criminal conviction cannot be relitigated because Medina's counsel in the criminal case stipulated to a factual basis for Medina's no contest plea; and 4) independent grounds exist to sustain the Court's ruling in Plaintiff's Motion in Limine No.

3.

Upon further review, the Court determines that Medina's criminal conviction for a felony violation of Penal Code Sec. 289, subd. (a), precludes evidence of Plaintiff's consent in the civil trial because such evidence would have been inadmissible in a criminal trial. Evidence of consent by a person confined in a detention facility to sexual activity with jail staff is not a defense to a criminal prosecution. (Penal Code Sec. 289.6, subd. (e).) A jail staff person who engages in sexual activity with a confined person in a detention facility is guilty of a public offense. (Penal Code Sec. 289.6, subd. (a)(2).)

Those guilty of a public offense include an "employee or officer of a public entity detention facility" and a "volunteer of a private or public entity detention facility." (Id.) "Sexual activity" includes sexual penetration as defined in subdivision (k) of Penal Code section 289. (Penal Code Sec. 289.6, subd. (d).) Thus, the issue of consent was necessarily decided against Medina by virtue of his no contest plea, and collateral estoppel bars evidence of consent in the civil trial.

The legislative history behind the enactment of Penal Code Sec. 289.6 recognizes that "sexual activity between correctional officers and inmates in detention facilities 'is analogous to statutory rape ... . Both types of offenses--statutory rape and sex between a correctional employee and a detained person--arguably are rooted in a policy aimed at an imbalance of power between the parties so significant as to vitiate any purported consent.'" (People v. Bojorquez (2010) 183 Cal.App.4 th 407, 420.) These concerns apply with equal force in the civil trial.

Accordingly, the Court's ruling in Plaintiff's Motion in Limine No. 3 STANDS for the reasons set forth above. Defendants' request for reconsideration of Plaintiff's Motions in Limine Nos. One, Two and Three is DENIED.

Case Number: 24NWCV00256 Hearing Date: August 31, 2026 Dept: C DYNAPRO, INC., et al. vs CGM INTERMODAL SHIPPERS INC., et al., Case No. 24NWCV00256

Plaintiffs Dynapro, Inc., Mario Scaturchio, and Joseph Scaturchio apply ex parte for the issuance of an Order to Show Cause directing Defendants CGM Intermodal Shippers, Inc., Paola Mata, and Eddie Gomez (aka Edward Gomez) to appear and show cause why they should not be adjudged in contempt for violating the Court's March 20, 2026, Order.

On March 20, 2026, upon motion by Plaintiffs, the Court appointed the Honorable Chad W. Firetag (Ret.) to serve as a discovery referee pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Sec.638 to hear and determine all discovery disputes arising out of the Court's October 2025 discovery orders, including disputes concerning the production of CGM's financial records, bank statements, and QuickBooks files, data, and records. (3/20/26 Minute Order, P.1.) The costs and fees of the Discovery Referee shall be shared equally by the parties, unless otherwise ordered by the Court. (Id., P.4.) Within thirty (30) days of the Order, CGM shall provide to the Discovery Referee a complete native copy of its QuickBooks data on a flash drive or USB drive (id., P.5) and a complete copy of its bank statements for the period of January 1, 2024, through December 31, 2024, for purposes of in camera review (Id., P.6).

In this ex parte application, Plaintiffs contend that Defendants have refused to pay their court-ordered share of the Discovery Referee's $10,600 supplemental retainer. (Ferris Decl., P.26.) Defendants told the Discovery Referee that Eddie Gomez cannot pay the supplemental retainer fee, so they will either ask Plaintiffs to cover the entire fee or seek Court Intervention for the Referee to be relieved. (Discovery Referee Report No. 2.) Plaintiffs decline to pay the entire fee, and no request to modify the Court's March 20 Order has been filed by Defendants.

Plaintiffs' request for the issuance of an Order to Show Cause re Contempt is DENIED. In the alternative, Defendants are Ordered to Show Cause on October 2, 2026 at 9:30 a.m. in Dept. SE-C why sanctions should not be imposed under CCP Sec.177.5 for failure to pay their one-half share of the Discovery Referee's supplemental fee.

Additionally, the Court sets an evidentiary hearing re Defendants' present ability to pay their one-half their share of the supplemental fee for October 2, 2026 at 9:30 a.m. in Dept. SE-C. Defendants Paola Mata and Eddie Gomez are ordered to appear in person.

Furthermore, Defendants CGM Intermodal Shippers, Inc., Paola Mata, and Eddie Gomez (aka Edward Gomez) are ordered to file and serve financial documentation establishing their separate ability or inability to pay Defendants' collective one-half share of the supplemental fee by September 17, 2026. Defendants may file the documentation under seal, but Plaintiffs shall be provided complete copies. Plaintiffs may file a response by

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