Bronco Entertainment, Inc. v. Hansen Dam Equestrian Center, LLC

(Pasadena Courthouse: Dept. P) September 1, 2026 DEPARTMENT P LAW AND MOTION RULINGS

HANSEN DAM EQUESTRIAN CENTER LLC AND LARRY LANGER'S MOTIONS TO COMPEL THE DEPOSITION OF JAMES V. REISS AND MARK MCKINNISS

I. INTRODUCTION

This case arises from competing claims concerning the right to operate rodeo shows at the Hansen Dam Equestrian Center. Defendant and Cross-Complainant Hansen Dam Equestrian Center, LLC ("HDEC" or "Hansen") possesses rights from the City of Los Angeles to operate rodeo events at the facility. Plaintiff Bronco Entertainment, Inc. ("Bronco") claims a contractual right to operate rodeo shows at the Center. Similar rights are also claimed by Cross-Complainants Golden Bull Entertainment, Inc. ("Golden Bull"), Jose Hernandez ("Hernandez"), Miguel Sahagun ("Sahagun"), and Defendant and Cross-Complainant Lawrence Langer ("Langer").

On August 10, 2026, HDEC filed the instant motions to compel the depositions of Plaintiff's counsel, Mark R. McKinniss, and his paralegal and/or case manager, James V. Reiss. Plaintiff filed a consolidated opposition to both motions on August 20, 2026, and HDEC filed a consolidated reply on August 25, 2026.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Any party may obtain any discovery of information, documents, land, property or electronically stored information so long as the discoverable matter is not privileged, is relevant to the subject matter and can lead one to admissible evidence. (Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 2017.010.)

Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.450 permits a party who has properly noticed a deposition to move for an order compelling the deponent's attendance and testimony where the deponent fails to appear or proceed with the examination. (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 2025.450, subd. (a).)

III. ANALYSIS

HDEC moves the Court to compel the depositions of James V. Reiss, Plaintiff's counsel's paralegal and/or case manager, and Plaintiff's counsel, Mark R. McKinniss. HDEC also requests monetary sanctions in connection with each motion. (Reiss Motion, pp. 2-3; McKinniss Motion, p. 2.)

HDEC argues that the depositions are necessary because Reiss and McKinniss have personal knowledge of relevant, nonprivileged facts concerning a June 2, 2021, meeting at a Starbucks and McKinniss's June 3, 2021, email to Langer. As to Reiss, HDEC contends that he attended the Starbucks meeting, brought documents relating to the proposed transaction, explained those documents to the individuals present, and participated in communications with third parties. (Reiss Motion, pp. 4-5.)

As to McKinniss, HDEC contends that he sent the June 3, 2021, email to Langer concerning the proposed transaction and has personal knowledge regarding that communication and related events. (McKinniss Motion, pp. 4-5.)

Plaintiff opposes both motions, arguing that the depositions seek information protected by the attorney-client privilege. Plaintiff further argues that HDEC has not satisfied the three-prong test set forth in Carehouse Convalescent Hospital v. Superior Court (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1558, 1562-1563, for compelling the deposition of trial counsel or counsel's paralegal. (Opposition, p. 2.) Plaintiff also maintains that the depositions are being sought only to annoy, embarrass, oppress, or cause undue burden and expense. (Id. at p. 3.)

The Court agrees with Plaintiff. Depositions of opposing counsel are presumptively improper, severely restricted, and require "extremely" good cause--a high standard." (Carehouse Convalescent Hospital v. Superior Court (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1558, 1562 (Carehouse).)

"The circumstances under which opposing counsel may be deposed are limited to those where (1) no other means exist to obtain the information than to depose opposing counsel; (2) the information sought is relevant and not privileged; (3) the information is crucial to the preparation of the case." (Spectra-Physics, Inc. v. Superior Court (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 1487, 1496; Carehouse, supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at 1563.)

The failure of any of these three prongs means the attorney cannot be deposed. (Carehouse, supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at 1563.)

"Attorney depositions are disruptive, and add to the length and expense of litigation. Rather than preparing the clients' case for trial, counsel must be prepared (often by retaining additional counsel) to place himself or herself in the witness box, being a responsive witness while remaining a partisan advocate. ...The parties get sidetracked into endless collateral disputes about which attorney statements are protected and which are not, and it increases the possibility that the lawyer may be called as a witness at trial." (Id. at 1562-3.)

Here, HDEC has not demonstrated the "'extremely' good cause" required under Carehouse. (Carehouse, supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at p. 1562.) HDEC principally asserts that McKinniss and Reiss possess personal knowledge concerning the June 2, 2021, Starbucks meeting, documents relating to the proposed transaction, and McKinniss's June 3, 2021, communication to Langer. (McKinniss Motion, pp. 4, 7; Reiss Motion, pp. 4, 6-7.)

Although HDEC explains why it believes this information is relevant and nonprivileged, it does not establish that no other means exist to obtain the information or that the testimony of McKinniss and Reiss is crucial to the preparation of its case

The record reflects that other percipient witnesses were present at the June 2 meeting, namely Jose Hernandez and his wife, and HDEC acknowledges that it has already deposed Hernandez concerning the transaction and documents discussed at the meeting. HDEC does not sufficiently explain why testimony from those witnesses, or other available discovery cannot provide the factual non-privileged information it seeks. Carehouse requires showing that the information sought is crucial, not simply relevant or potentially useful. Thus, HDEC has not satisfied the requirements under Carehouse.

Therefore, the Court DENIES to compel the deposition of McKinniss and Reiss. The Court also DENIES request for monetary sanctions.

IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

The DENIES to compel the deposition of McKinniss and Reiss. The Court also DENIES request for monetary sanctions. HDEC is to give notice.

Dated: September 1, 2026

JARED D. MOSES JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT

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[TENTATIVE] ORDER DENYING BRONCO ENTERTAINMENT INC'S MOTION TO SEVER

I. INTRODUCTION

This case arises from competing claims concerning the right to operate rodeo shows at the Hansen Dam Equestrian Center. Defendant and Cross-Complainant Hansen Dam Equestrian Center, LLC ("HDEC") possesses rights from the City of Los Angeles to operate rodeo events at the facility. Plaintiff Bronco Entertainment, Inc. ("Bronco") claims a contractual right to operate rodeo shows at the Center. Similar rights are also claimed by Cross-Complainants Golden Bull Entertainment, Inc. ("Golden Bull"), Jose Hernandez ("Hernandez"), Miguel Sahagun ("Sahagun"), and Defendant and Cross-Complainant Lawrence Langer ("Langer").

On August 10, 2026, Bronco filed the instant motion to sever the cross-complaints from the main action. On August 17, 2026, HDEC and Langer filed an opposition. No reply has been filed

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Code of Civil Procedure Section 1048(b) provides: "The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when separate trials will be conducive to expedition and economy, may order a separate trial of any cause of action, including a cause of action asserted in a cross-complaint, or of any separate issue or of any number of causes of action or issues, preserving the right of trial by jury required by the Constitution or a statute of this state or of the United States." (Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 1048(b).)

III. ANALYSIS

Bronco moves the Court for an order to sever the cross-complaints from the main action and proceed first with trial of its affirmative claims. Bronco argues that severance will streamline the trial by reducing the number of witnesses and exhibits and will make it easier for the jury to follow the breach of contract and conversion causes of action. Bronco further contends that the main action can be completed in five days. (Motion, p. 2.)

HDEC opposes, arguing that the Court should deny the motion because the cross-claims arise from the same underlying contractual and factual dispute concerning the parties' rights to the Hansen Dam Equestrian Center. HDEC further argues that severance would require substantially overlapping evidence to be presented in successive trials, increase litigation costs, consume additional judicial resources, and create a risk of inconsistent