Pichika vs. Provident Trust Group, LLC

Although again not argued by Defendant, the arguments Plaintiff made under the ends of justice issue support bifurcation as the arguments indicate Plaintiff hopes to appeal to juror emotion on the determination of liability. Avoidance of the emotional issue is why Defendant sees to bifurcate the matter. There is also likely no delay or need to empanel a new jury if liability on Defendant’s part is found as the same jury can be used in the damages phase.

Regarding economy and efficiency of litigation, if liability is not found then the issue of damages will not need to be presented saving all time. If Defendant is found liable, then it may promote settlement. (Foreman & Clark Corp. v. Fallon (1971) 3 Cal. 3d 875, 888 FN. 8.)

As noted, the bifurcation would assist in avoiding prejudice as the jurors would not be privy to Plaintiff’s injuries and would instead determine liability based upon the law.

As more of the factors support bifurcation that do not, and as Plaintiff has not identified any real valid prejudice, the Motion is GRANTED.

Defendant to give notice. 2 Bui v. Elliot Cont. 3 Alois v. O/C Volkswagen A.G. 4 Romero v. Plaintiff Sofia E. Romero’s unopposed motion to set aside and vacate Melalma the order voiding the complaint is GRANTED. Apartments, LLC Government Code section 88634 provides that if an application for a fee waiver is denied, the applicant must pay the filing fees within 10 days after the clerk gives notice of the denial, unless the applicant submits a new application or requests a hearing. If the applicant does not pay on time, the clerk must void the papers that were filed without payment. (Gov. Code, § 68634, subd. (g).) Plaintiff produced some evidence she did not receive the clerk’s notice of the order denying the fee waiver. (Declaration of Sofia E. Romero ¶ 6; Declaration of Les V. Amponsah ¶ 5.)

Defendant did not oppose the motion, thereby conceding the merits. (Glendale Redevelopment Agency v. Parks (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 1409, 1424; Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 243, 288.)

The motion is therefore GRANTED and the Complaint filed on March 6, 2026 shall be reinstated as of the date of its original filing upon Plaintiff’s payment of the filing fee. 5 Pichika vs. A) Demurrer Provident Trust Group, Defendant Provident Trust Group FBO Ira J. Boren, I.R.A.’s LLC (“Defendant” for this ruling) demurrer to plaintiff Jayalakshmi Pichika’s (“Plaintiff”) Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”) is SUSTAINED without leave to amend.

The court first notes Defendant combined two separate motions which seek two separate forms of relief, however Defendant only paid one filing fee. Defendant is ordered to pay the additional $60 filing fee prior to the hearing.

The court also notes plaintiff did not file a proof of service of the opposition. Presumably the opposition was served as Defendant was able to file a timely reply brief. The court will consider the opposition at this time; Plaintiff is cautioned to file a proper proof of service in the future or risk her pleadings not being considered by the court.

Finally, the court notes Plaintiff improperly filed a very late sur-reply without prior permission, which does not afford Defendant the opportunity to respond. The court will disregard that filing. (CA ST CIVIL RULES Rule 3.1113(d))

As the court noted in its ruling on Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”), with the exception of Defendant, Plaintiff omitted all previously identified defendants from the SAC and has been deemed to have dismissed them without prejudice. (Kuperman v. Great Republic Life Ins. Co. (1987) 195 Cal. App. 3d 943, 947.) Plaintiff did not move to add the previously dismissed parties and therefore only Defendant remains.

A demurrer challenges the defects appearing on the face of the pleading or from other matters properly subject to judicial notice. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) The issue is the sufficiency of the pleading, not the truth of the facts alleged. Thus, no matter how unlikely or improbable, the allegations made must be accepted as true for the purpose of ruling on the demurrer. (Del E. Webb Corporation v. Structural Materials Co. (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 593, 604.) Absent court orders or other items subject to judicial notice, or items attached as exhibits to the complaint, the court may not consider the contents of pleadings or other exhibits when ruling on a demurrer. (Day v.

Sharp (1975) 50 Cal.3d 904, 914; Sosinsky v. Grant (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1746, 1749.) “In our examination of the complaint we are guided by the well settled principles governing the testing of its sufficiency by demurrer: A demurrer admits all material and issuable facts properly pleaded. [Citations omitted.] However, it does not admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law alleged therein. [Citations omitted.]” (Daar v. Yellow Cab Co. (1967) 67 Cal.2d 666, 672.)

Defendant demurs to the second, third, and fourth causes of action (“COA”) on the basis that they fail to state sufficient facts. (Civ. Proc. Code § 430.10(e).)

1) COA No. 2 – Declaratory Relief Re: Violation Of California Usury Law By Unlicensed, Nevada Lender

“A loan is exempt from the usury law if the loan is “made or arranged by any person licensed as a real estate broker by the State of California and secured in whole or in part by liens on real property....” (Cal. Const., art. XV, § 1.) Broker “made” loans are those in which the broker acts as a principal by lending the broker's own money. [Citation.] Broker “arranged” loans are those in which the broker acts as an intermediary and causes a loan to be obtained or procured as by structuring the loan as the agent for the lender, setting the interest rate and points to be paid, reviewing the loan and forbearance documents, conducting title searches, or drafting the terms of the loan.” (Creative Ventures, LLC v. Jim Ward & Assocs. (2011) 195 Cal. App. 4th 1430, 1441–42.)

“[T]he exemption for making a loan applies even if the broker is not acting in a licensed capacity as when the broker is lending his or her own money. [Citation.] Thus, a loan by a broker at 250 percent interest was held exempt from the interest rate ceiling. (Garcia v. Wetzel, supra, 159 Cal.App.3d 1093, 1097-1098; see also In re Lara, supra, 731 F.2d 1455, 1458-1462 [loan by broker at over 15 percent interest exempt].) Presumably, the regulatory control over brokers is considered sufficient to deter and protect against the evils of usury and fraudulent, dishonest, or unfair practices by the lending broker.” (Del Mar v. Caspe (1990) 222 Cal. App. 3d 1316, 1326– 27.)

It should be noted that Plaintiff failed to include this COA in her SAC and the former demurrer to the SAC was proper. Plaintiff has now re-pled COA no. 2 with the same facts as in the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). The COA fails again as no new facts have been pled.

Plaintiff alleged Defendant acted as an unlicensed lender in California in violation of Financial Code § 22750(b). (TAC p. 22:15- 18; 24:12-14.) Despite notice from Plaintiff’s (former) counsel and tender of funds, Defendant continued to demand unauthorized default interest, compounding interest, inflated fees, and other charges not authorized under the loan Note, Deed of Trust, or California law. (TAC p. 22:24-27.) Between January and December 2024, Plaintiff made six good-faith attempts to tender payment on the loan, but Defendant refused to provide payoff statements, issued inflated payoff demands, and obstructed refinancing and foreclosure avoidance efforts. (TAC p. 23:5-9.)

As of 12/18/24, Plaintiff’s alleged loan balance was $615,000, but Defendant issued a credit bid of $910,051.04 at foreclosure. (TAC p. 23:1-4.) Plaintiff alleges former defendant Provident Trust Group, LLC acted as an unlicensed lender in California and that defendants have forfeited all rights to collect on it. (TAC p. 24:17-19.)

Defendants have produced the real estate broker license of Ira Jay Boren showing license No. 00479781, which was initially issued on 02/14/86 and is set to expire 02/13/26. (RTJN, Ex. H.) The court may take judicial notice of official acts of any state administrative department including licenses issued by the state. (C.R. v. Tenet Healthcare Corp. (2009) 169 Cal. App. 4th 1094, 1102–03.) Because the money loaned ultimately belonged to Boren, the transaction is exempt from the usury laws.

The demurrer is SUSTAINED without leave to amend as the court previously notified Plaintiff she only had one additional chance to amend to sufficiently plead these COA.

2) COA No. 3 – Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

“There is no obligation to deal fairly or in good faith absent an existing contract. [Citation.] If there exists a contractual relationship between the parties. . . the implied covenant is limited to assuring compliance with the express terms of the contract, and cannot be extended to create obligations not contemplated in the contract.” (Racine & Laramie, Ltd. v. Dep't of Parks & Recreation (1992)11 Cal. App. 4th 1026, 1032.) “If the allegations do not go beyond the statement of a mere contract breach and, relying on the same alleged acts, simply seek the same damages or other relief already claimed in a companion contract cause of action, they may be disregarded as superfluous as no additional claim is actually stated.

Thus, absent those limited cases where a breach of a consensual contract term is not claimed or alleged, the only justification for asserting a separate cause of action for breach of the implied covenant is to obtain a tort recovery.” (Careau & Co. v. Sec. Pac. Bus. Credit, Inc. (1990) 222 Cal. App. 3d 1371, 1395.)

Plaintiff alleged breached the covenant by Issuing successive, mathematically impossible payoff demands, applying 24% default interest across the full principal and unauthorized compounding, creating over $179,000 in fraudulent charges. (TAC p. 25:15-17.) Defendants also allegedly frustrated refinance and sales attempts by withholding accurate payoff statements and blocking tenders. (TAC p. 25:20-23.)

Plaintiff did not allege she fulfilled her obligations under the contract, did not allege she had a new lender for refinancing or who that was, did not allege any new lender required a pay-off statement, did not allege why Defendants were required to provide a “pay-off statement,” did not allege she was attempting to sell the property and/or had actual buyers or why the buyers did not proceed, she did not allege she had the funds to cure the defaulted loan, and the facts regarding payoff demands/statements contradict themselves in the facts section.

Plaintiff has failed to plead sufficient facts to support this COA. (Civ. Proc. Code § 430.10(e).) The demurrer is SUSTAINED without leave to amend.

3) COA No. 4 – Unfair Competition (Violation of Bus. and Prof. Code § 17200 et. seq.)

“The California Unfair Competition Law [“UCL”] ([Bus. & Prof. Code] § 17200 et seq.) defines ‘“unfair competition” as “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising.”’” (Graham v. Bank of America, N.A. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 594, 609.)

“In contrast to its limited remedies, the unfair competition law's scope is broad. The unfair competition law's scope is broad. Unlike the Unfair Practices Act, it does not proscribe specific practices. Rather, as relevant here, it defines “unfair competition” to include “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.” [Citation.] Its coverage is “sweeping, embracing ' ”anything that can properly be called a business practice and that at the same time is forbidden by law.“ ' ” [Citations.]

It governs “anti-competitive business practices” as well as injuries to consumers, and has as a major purpose “the preservation of fair business competition.” [Citations.] By proscribing “any unlawful” business practice, “section 17200 'borrows' violations of other laws and treats them as unlawful practices” that the unfair competition law makes independently actionable. [Citations.] [¶] However, the law does more than just borrow. The statutory language referring to “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent” practice (italics added) makes clear that a practice may be deemed unfair even if not specifically proscribed by some other law. “Because Business and Professions Code section 17200 is written in the disjunctive, it establishes three varieties of unfair competition-acts or practices which are unlawful, or unfair, or fraudulent. 'In other words, a practice is prohibited as ”unfair“ or ”deceptive“ even if not ” unlawful“ and vice versa.'” (Cel- Tech Commc'ns, Inc. v.

Los Angeles Cellular Tel. Co. (1999) 20 Cal. 4th 163, 180.)

Plaintiff cited to eight or so code sections which she contends Defendant violated, but provided no specific facts to support violations of any specific code section. Plaintiff also appears to improperly be seeking damages on behalf of her son and husband for actions Defendant allegedly took. Plaintiff states dependent abuse and forcible removal of her son with severe mental illness, despite Plaintiff alleging her son only became permanently disabled following the alleged lockout. Plaintiff contends Defendant unfairly demanded over $179,000 in fraudulent interest and fees despite elsewhere stating she owed $110,000 in interest alone, which based upon the $4,995.83 monthly payment she was required to make, suggest she did not make loan payments for almost two years, which would include late fees of some sort.

Plaintiff claims Defendant fraudulently induced Plaintiff to dismiss active litigation and refrain from seeking injunctive relief, despite this case being ongoing and Plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction which was denied. (ROA 75.) To the extent Plaintiff meant different litigation or injunction, Plaintiff has not identified either. Plaintiff also improperly made legal conclusions without supporting them with facts, or providing contradictory or incomplete facts throughout the TAC.

The demurrer is SUSTAINED without leave to amend.

A) Motion to Strike

Defendant moves to strike the fraud elements (TAC p. 21:5-10) in the first COA on the basis that the court did not grant Plaintiff leave to amend to add fraud. (Civ. Proc. Code § 436(b).) The court noted that Plaintiff completely left out COA no. 1 from the SAC and permitted a final leave to amend to re-include it with the TAC. (ROA 236.) In doing so, the court did not grant Plaintiff leave to add fraud.

The motion is GRANTED without leave to amend.

Defendant to give notice. 6 Au v. Dlliot Cont. 7 Stroud v. Before the Court is a special motion to strike pursuant to Code of Hurd-Russell Civil Procedure section 425.16 filed by defendants Kendal Hurd- Russell and Kyle Hurd (Defendants) as to the complaint filed by plaintiff Brian Stroud (Plaintiff). For the reasons set forth below, the motion is GRANTED as to paragraphs 12, 13, 21, 22, 24, 26-28, 33, 34, 36, 37, 41-43, 45, 50, 52 of the Complaint, the 1st cause of action and the 2nd causes of action; the motion is DENIED as to paragraphs 23, 35, 49, 51, 53, the 3rd cause of action and 4th cause of action.

Plaintiff’s evidentiary objection is OVERRULED as to no.

16. The Court declines to rule on all other evidentiary objections because the evidence was not material to the Court’s analysis. The Court also declines to rule on Defendant’s evidentiary objections for the same reason.

In ruling on a special motion to strike under Section 425.16, the court must follow a two-step process. (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 384-385.) First, the court determines if the party moving to strike a cause of action has shown that the cause of action arises from an act in furtherance of the moving party’s right of petition or free speech. (Ibid.) If the moving party makes the showing required in the first step, the court then determines whether the non-moving party has demonstrated a probability of prevailing on the claim. (Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 88.)

“[T]he moving defendant bears the burden of identifying all allegations of protected activity, and the claims for relief supported by them. When relief is sought based on allegations of both protected and unprotected activity, the unprotected activity is disregarded at this stage. If the court determines that relief is sought based on allegations arising from activity protected by the statute, the second step is reached. There, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate that each challenged claim based on protected activity is legally sufficient and factually substantiated.

The court, without resolving evidentiary conflicts, must determine whether the plaintiff's showing, if accepted by the trier of fact, would be sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment. If not, the claim is stricken. Allegations of protected activity supporting the stricken claim are eliminated from the complaint, unless they also support a distinct claim on which the plaintiff has shown a probability of prevailing." (Baral v. Schnitt, supra, 1 Cal.5th 376 at p. 396.)

1. Protected Activity Defendants met their burden the allegations regarding the complaint to the Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST),