SALVA vs VOLKSWAGEN GROUP OF AMERICA INC., A CORPORATION

25CV028758: SALVA vs VOLKSWAGEN GROUP OF AMERICA INC., A CORPORATION 08/31/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 8D

Tentative Ruling

NOTICE: PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that pursuant to “Public Notice – Civil Division – Wednesday Law and Motion Calendar” any oral arguments regarding this tentative ruling will be heard in Department 8D, located at 500 G Street, Sacramento, CA, the Hon. Julie G. Yap presiding. Should argument be requested by either party, the requesting party must call the Law and Motion Oral Argument Request Line at (916) 874-2615, by 4:00 p.m. the Court day before the hearing, request the hearing, and notify the opposing party of the location and time of hearing pursuant to Local Rule 1.06.

At the time of requesting oral argument, the requesting party shall leave a voice mail message: a) identifying themselves as the party requesting oral argument; b) indicating the specific matter/motion for which they are requesting oral argument; and c) confirming that it has notified the opposing party of its intention to appear and that opposing party may appear via Zoom using the Zoom link and Meeting ID indicated below. If no request for oral argument is made, the tentative ruling becomes the final order of the Court.

The Court encourages parties to appear remotely for the hearing on the tentative ruling through the Court’s Zoom Application. But, any party wishing to appear in person may do so, provided that party notifies the Court by 4:00 the Court day before the hearing. The parties may join the Zoom session for hearing on the tentative ruling by audio and/or video through the following link: https://saccourt-ca-gov.zoomgov.com/j/16113421868 SIP Address: 16113421868@sip.zoomgov.com (833) 568-8864 ID: 16113421868 Parties requesting services of a court reporter will need to arrange for private court reporter services at their own expense, pursuant to Government code §68086 and California Rules of Court, Rule 2.956.

Requirements for requesting a court reporter are listed in the Policy for Official Reporter Pro Tempore available on the Sacramento Superior Court website at https://www.saccourt.ca.gov/court-reporters/docs/crtrp-6a.pdf. Parties may contact Court- Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore by utilizing the list of Court Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore available at https://www.saccourt.ca.gov/court-reporters/docs/crtrp- 13.Pdf A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list.

Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with

25CV028758: SALVA vs VOLKSWAGEN GROUP OF AMERICA INC., A CORPORATION 08/31/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 8D

a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will be forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided

TENTATIVE RULING

Defendant Volkswagen Group of America, Inc.’s (“Defendant”) Motion for Summary Judgment of Plaintiff Anatoliy Salva’s (“Plaintiff”) Complaint, or in the alternative, Summary Adjudication of the First and Second Causes of Action is ruled upon as follows.

Defendant’s Notice of Motion does not provide notice of the Court’s tentative ruling system, as required by Local Rule 1.06(D). Defendant’s counsel is directed to contact opposing counsel forthwith to advise counsel of Local Rule 1.06 and the Court’s tentative ruling procedure. If Defendant’s counsel is unable to contact opposing counsel prior to the hearing, Defendant’s counsel shall be available at the hearing, in person or remotely (telephonically or by video conference via Zoom as stated in the introductory notice to today’s tentative rulings), in the event opposing counsel appears without following the procedures set forth in Local Rule 1.06(B).

*** If oral argument is requested, the parties are directed to notify the clerk and opposing counsel at the time of the request which of moving defendant’s 12 Undisputed Material Facts, which of plaintiffs’ 4 Additional Material Facts, and/or which written objections to evidence will be addressed at the hearing. The parties should be prepared to point to specific admissible evidence already in the record which is claimed to show the existence or non-existence of a triable issue of material fact. ***

Moving counsel failed to comply with CRC Rule 3.1350(b) and (h), requiring that each issue presented for summary adjudication be stated in the notice of motion and repeated verbatim in the separate statement. (See, Issue Nos. 1-3 in Notice and Sep. Stm.)

Moving counsel failed to comply with CRC Rule 3.1350(g), requiring a single volume of evidence (including all declarations) with a table of contents when the evidence exceeds 25 pages.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV028758: SALVA vs VOLKSWAGEN GROUP OF AMERICA INC., A CORPORATION 08/31/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 8D

Moving counsel failed to comply with CRC Rule 3.1350(d)(3) requiring citations to supporting and opposing evidence include reference to the exhibit, title, page, and line numbers.

Factual Background

In this action, Plaintiff alleges that he entered into an express warranty contract relating to a 2019 Audi E-Tron (“Vehicle”) on February 6, 2021. (Compl., ¶ 6.) He contends that the Vehicle suffers from various “defects, non-conformities, misadjustments, or malfunctions.” (Id., ¶ 10.) Plaintiff contends that these defects and nonconformities substantially impaired the use, value, and/or safety of the vehicle. (Id., ¶¶ 22, 23.)

Plaintiff’s complaint brings causes of action for: (1) Violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act and (2) Violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200. This matter has not yet been set for trial.

This matter was previously continued to permit the Court to consider Plaintiff’s untimely opposition, which was filed two days late.

Moving Papers. Defendant now seeks summary judgment of Plaintiff’s complaint on the ground that Defendant did not violate section 2034 of the Magnuson-Moss Act. As support for this contention, Defendant relies on Undisputed Material Fact (“UMF”) Nos. 1-12. (UMF Nos. 1-6 recite the same facts as UMF Nos. 7-12.)

Alternatively, Defendant moves for summary adjudication on the following grounds:

Issue 1 – Plaintiff Anatoliy Salva (“Plaintiff”)’s Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (“Mag- Moss Act”) cause of action (First Cause of Action) fails because VWGoA did not violate Section 2304 of the Mag-Moss Act, as that provision applies only to full warranties, and VWGoA provided only a limited warranty. Second, Plaintiff cannot maintain a standalone Mag-Moss Act claim because the statute merely supplements state law and provides no independent warranty rights; having failed to assert or substantiate any viable state-law warranty claim, Plaintiff’s federal claim necessarily fails as well. Third, even assuming a warranty existed, Plaintiff failed to comply with the statutory prerequisite of exhausting the informal dispute resolution process prior to filing suit. Accordingly, VWGoA is entitled to summary adjudication of Plaintiff’s First Cause of Action in its favor.

Issue 2 – Plaintiff’s Violation of Business & Professions Code section 17200 cause of

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV028758: SALVA vs VOLKSWAGEN GROUP OF AMERICA INC., A CORPORATION 08/31/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 8D

action (Second Cause of Action) fails because it is predicated on Plaintiff’s Mag-Moss Act claim. Since there is no viable Mag-Moss Act claim upon which the Business & Professions Code section 17200 cause of action can be based, VWGoA is entitled to summary adjudication of Plaintiff’s Second Cause of Action in its favor.

(Notice of Motion at p. 2.)

The Court notes that both issues rely on the same six UMFs.

Opposition. Plaintiff opposes, arguing that Defendant’s motion does not establish entitlement to summary judgment or adjudication. In support of the opposition, Plaintiff further relies on Additional Material Facts (“AMF”) Nos. 1-4.

The Court notes that while Plaintiff presents the declaration of Ryan Marden, as well as two exhibits in support of the instant motion, Plaintiff cites to no evidence in support of his disputes of Defendant’s UMFs. California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1350(f)(2) states that an opposition separate statement must describe the evidence which “supports the position that the fact is controverted.” As Plaintiff has presented no evidence in opposition to Defendant’s UMFs, if Defendant meets its initial burden, Plaintiff cannot meet his burden to establish the existence of a triable issue of material fact as to any UMF.

Standards for Summary Judgment/Adjudication

In ruling on a motion for summary judgment/adjudication, the Court engages in a threestep process. First, the issues framed by the pleadings must be identified since the pleadings themselves define the scope of what may be addressed via a motion for summary judgment/adjudication. (FPI Development Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 381-382). The evidence submitted in support of or in opposition to the motion must address the claims and defenses raised in the pleadings. The Court cannot consider an unpleaded issue in ruling on a motion for summary judgment/adjudication. (Roth v. Rhodes (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 530, 541.) The papers filed in response to such a motion may not create triable issues beyond the scope of the pleadings, nor are they a substitute for filing amended pleadings. (Tsemetzin v. Coast Federal Savings & Loan Assn. (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 1334, 1342.)

Next, the Court must determine whether the moving party has met its initial burden of production. A defendant moving for summary judgment “bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that [the defendant] is

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV028758: SALVA vs VOLKSWAGEN GROUP OF AMERICA INC., A CORPORATION 08/31/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 8D

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850; Chavez v. Glock, Inc. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1283, 1301.) This burden may be met by establishing either that one or more elements of a cause of action, even if not separately pleaded, cannot be established or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc. §437c(p)(2).) A defendant cannot successfully shift the burden to a plaintiff by merely suggesting the possibility that the latter cannot prove his/her case but must make “an affirmative showing” in support of its motion. (Addy v.

Bliss & Glennon (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 205, 214.) If a plaintiff pleads several theories of liability against the defendant, then the latter has the burden of demonstrating there are no material facts requiring trial on any of them. A moving defendant whose evidence omits facts as to any theory of liability effectively permits that portion of the complaint to be unchallenged and even where no opposition is presented, a moving defendant must still make a showing sufficient to eliminate all triable issues of fact. (Wright v.

Stang Manufacturing Co. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1218, 1228; see also, Juarez v. Boy Scouts of America, Inc. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 377, 397.)

A plaintiff opposing summary judgment/adjudication has no evidentiary burden unless the moving defendant has first met its initial burden. (Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 840; see also Rubenstein v. Rubenstein (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1131, 1151-1152; Thatcher v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1081, 1085-1086.) If a moving defendant has met its initial burden, the burden then shifts to the opposing party to show the existence of a material factual issue as to the cause of action alleged or the defense to it. (Code Civ.

Proc. §437c(p)(2); see also, Bush v. Parents Without Partners (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 322, 326-327.) Only where the moving defendant makes the requisite initial showing does a court need to examine the opposition papers to determine if the latter demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of material fact. (Salazar v. Southern Cal. Gas Co. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1370, 1376; Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 840.) The opposing party must present admissible evidence and may not rely upon the allegations or denials of its pleading. (Id.)

In ruling on the motion, a court must construe the evidence of the opposing party liberally and that of the moving party strictly, resolving any doubts in the opposing party’s favor. (Miller v. Bechtel Corp. (1983) 33 Cal.3d 868, 874; Cortez v. Vogt (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 917, 925-926; see also, Salazar v. Southern Cal. Gas Co. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1370, 1376; Brown v. FSR Brokerage, Inc. (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 766, 773.)

While a summary adjudication motion is treated largely the same as one for summary judgment, there are a few important differences. One of these differences is cited above: CRC Rule 3.1350(b) mandates that issues presented for summary adjudication

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV028758: SALVA vs VOLKSWAGEN GROUP OF AMERICA INC., A CORPORATION 08/31/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 8D

be stated in the notice of motion and repeated verbatim in the separate statement. Another difference is that summary adjudication cannot be granted unless it “completely disposes” of a cause of action, affirmative defense, claim for punitive damages, or question of duty. Code of Civil Procedure §437c(f)(1) provides in its entirety:

A party may move for summary adjudication as to one or more causes of action within an action, one or more affirmative defenses, one or more claims for [punitive] damages, or one or more issues of duty, if that party contends that the cause of action has no merit or that there is no affirmative defense thereto, or that there is no merit to an affirmative defense as to any cause of action, or both, or that there is no merit to a claim for damages, as specified in Section 3294 of the Civil Code, or that one or more defendants either owed or did not owe a duty to the plaintiff or plaintiffs. A motion for summary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for [punitive] damages, or an issue of duty.

(Underline added for emphasis.)

Finally, in Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 243, the Court of Appeal explained that a moving party’s inclusion of facts in its separate statement effectively concedes each fact’s “materiality,” whether intended or not, and if there is a triable dispute relating to any one, the motion must be denied. (Nazir, at 252 (citing Weil & Brown, Civil Procedure Before Trial, Ch.10:95.1).)

Guided by these principles, the Court will now consider the merits of the present motion and the specific contentions advanced therein.

Objections to Evidence

Defendant’s objections are overruled.

Discussion

Defendant relies on the following six UMFs in support of the motion:

1. The Subject Vehicle was originally sold by an authorized VWGoA dealership, Audi Palo Alto, to a third-party purchaser — not Plaintiff Anatoliy Salva — in May 2020.

2. In connection with that original May 2020 sale, VWGoA issued a New Vehicle

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV028758: SALVA vs VOLKSWAGEN GROUP OF AMERICA INC., A CORPORATION 08/31/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 8D

Limited Warranty.

3. Around nine (9) months later on or about February 6, 2021, Plaintiff purchased the Subject Vehicle used.

4. VWGoA did not issue or extend any warranties on the Subject Vehicle in connection with Plaintiff’s purchase of the Subject Vehicle.

5. VWGoA participates in the Better Business Bureau (“BBB”) Autoline Program, which is a qualified third-party informal dispute resolution process available to consumers.

6. Prior to filing this lawsuit, Plaintiff did not participate in the BBB Autoline Program regarding his concerns with the Subject Vehicle.

Issue 1 – Plaintiff’s First Cause of Action for the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act

Defendant argues that it is entitled to summary judgment of the entire action because, inter alia, Plaintiff’s claim under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (“Magnuson-Moss”) was not exhausted through the informal dispute resolution process.

Magnuson-Moss creates a private right of action for any “consumer who is damaged by the failure of a supplier, warrantor, or service contractor to comply with any obligation under [the statute], or under a written warranty, implied warranty, or service contract.” (15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(1).) “Magnuson-Moss 'calls for the application of state written and implied warranty law, not the creation of additional federal law, except in specific instances in which it expressly prescribes a regulating rule.'” (Daugherty v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (2006) 144 Cal. App. 4th 824, 832-833 [citing Walsh v. Ford Motor Co. (D.C. Cir. 1986) 807 F.2d 1000, 1012.]) “Magnuson-Moss supplements California law of warranty and establishes a cause of action under the federal act for breach of written warranty.” (Orichian v. BMW of North America, LLC (2014) 226 Cal. App. 4th 1322, 1332.)

Magnuson-Moss also sets forth a process through which “one or more warrantors may establish an informal dispute resolution procedure,” namely that (1) “a warrantor establishes such a procedure”; (2) “such procedure, and its implementation, meets the requirements of such rules”; and (3) “he incorporates in a written warranty a requirement that the consumer resort to such a procedure before pursuing any legal remedy under this section respecting such warranty.” (15 U.S.C. § 2310(a)(3).) Where such an informal dispute resolution procedure has been established, “the consumer may not commence a civil action . . . under subsection(d) of this section unless he initially resorts to such a procedure.” (15 U.S.C. § 2310(a)(3)(C).)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV028758: SALVA vs VOLKSWAGEN GROUP OF AMERICA INC., A CORPORATION 08/31/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 8D

Defendant presents evidence that it participates in the Better Business Bureau Autoline Program, which is a qualified third-party informal dispute resolution process available to consumers. (UMF No. 5; Weir Decl. ¶¶ 3-4.) The supporting declaration shows that the following language appears on the first page of the “Warranty” section of the “USA Warranty & Maintenance” document:

You are required to use the BBB AUTO LINE program before asserting in court any presumption set forth in California Civil Code Section 1793.22, and before pursuing any legal remedy under 15 U.S.C. 2310(d) with respect to the New Vehicle Limited Warranty.

(Exh. B to Weir Decl.; see also 16 C.F.R. sections 703.1(h), 703.2(b)(3).)

Defendant also presents evidence that, prior to filing this lawsuit, Plaintiff did not participate in the BBB Autoline Program regarding his concerns with the Vehicle. (UMF No. 6.)

Plaintiff does not dispute these facts this with any evidence. Nor does Plaintiffs proffer any authority to support his argument that Plaintiff can satisfy the Magnuson-Moss exhaustion requirement by notifying Defendant through its authorized service and repair facilities.

As a result, judgment in favor of Defendant on this cause of action is warranted.

Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication is GRANTED as to Issue 1. As such, the Court need not consider Defendant’s other grounds for summary adjudication as to Plaintiff’s first cause of action.

Issue 2 – Plaintiff’s Second Cause of Action for Violation of Business and Professions Code Section 17200

Defendant next argues that Plaintiff’s second cause of action fails because Plaintiff cannot establish that Defendant has committed an unlawful act, engaged in fraud, or engaged in an unfair business practice.

As noted above, Defendant relies on UMFs which establish that Plaintiff purchased his vehicle from a third party, did not receive a new warranty, and that Defendant participates in a BBB program. The Court is not persuaded that UMFs establish that

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV028758: SALVA vs VOLKSWAGEN GROUP OF AMERICA INC., A CORPORATION 08/31/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 8D

Defendant has not engaged in any unlawful, fraudulent, or unfair business practices. Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that defendant knew of defects in its vehicles and intentionally sold such defective vehicles to the general public, failed to comply with warranty requirements, and made misrepresentations to Plaintiff that he was receiving a warranty as part of his purchase. (Compl., ¶¶ 31, 34, 41, 42.)

Defendant’s motion for summary judgment must be denied because Defendant has failed to meet its initial burden. As indicated earlier, on summary judgment or summary adjudication, a moving party must meet its initial burden regardless of whether the opposing party disputes any issues of material fact. (See Thatcher v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1081, 1087 [moving party on summary judgment must meet his initial burden even if the motion is unopposed].) The Court is not persuaded that Defendant has established that it has not engaged in any unlawful, fraudulent, or unfair conduct covered by Business and Professions Code section 17200. Thus, Defendant has failed to satisfy its initial burden on its motion for summary judgment.

The Court notes that while Defendant’s notice of motion indicates that issue 2 is brought, in part, on the ground that Plaintiff’s second cause of action fails because it is predicated on his first cause of action, this is not consistent with the allegations of the complaint, which provides separate grounds for second cause of action.

Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication is DENIED as to Issue 2.

Disposition

Based on the foregoing, Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication is GRANTED as to Issue 1 and DENIED as to Issue 2. Accordingly, as Defendant has failed to obtain adjudication as to each cause of action, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED.

This minute order is effective immediately. Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312, Defendant shall prepare an appropriate order which conforms to Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subd. (g).