GODINA, et al. vs MERCK & CO., INC., et al.

25CV161701: GODINA, et al. vs MERCK & CO., INC., SUED INDIVIDUALLY, AS ALTER-EGO OF, AND AS SUCCESSOR-IN-INTEREST TO SCHOLL, INC. AND SCHERING-P..., et al. 08/31/2026 Pre-Trial Conference Re: Motions in Limine in Department 512

Tentative Ruling - 08/28/2026 Elizabeth Riles

The Court, having reviewed the moving and opposing papers makes the following tentative rulings. The Court will issue additional tentative rulings on the morning of August 31, 2026. Parties are to Appear.

Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine #1

Motion to Preclude Display of and Reference to Complaint and any Entity’s Former Party Status

Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine to preclude reference to the Complaint and former parties named in the complaint is GRANTED. This motion is addressed in part by Section C.6.a(1) of Judge McKinney’s 04/30/2026 Pretrial order requiring the case caption to be amended to reflect only the remaining defendants.

Defendants are largely unopposed to this motion other than seeking to have the evidence of defendants sued but not present at trial available as relevant to apportionment of fault.

There shall be no mention of former parties named in the Complaint or reference to the Complaint except as altered according to Pretrial Order. This ruling in no way precludes Defendants from presenting evidence, including Plaintiffs’ responses to discovery, to demonstrate the responsibility of other tortfeasors who are not present at this trial for Plaintiffs’ claimed damages or allocation of fault. Evidence of other potential sources of exposure is relevant, and Defendants may present admissible evidence to establish such facts.

Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine #2

Motion to Preclude Reference to “Talc Pleurodesis”

Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine to preclude argument, evidence or reference to “Talc Pleurodesis” is GRANTED.

Plaintiff seeks to preclude any mention of “Talc pleurodesis” at trial because of the risk of confusion, undue consumption of time, and irrelevance. The Court agrees. Talc pleurodesis is a medical procedure where talc is injected directly into the lining of the lungs during surgery to help prevent fluid build-up. The Defendants contend that because Plaintiffs argue that all talc is essentially unsafe, they should be permitted to present evidence of the ongoing use of talc in this medical procedure.

Both parties have presented competing information regarding whether mesothelioma has been found with the use of talc during this procedure or whether it is safe for use in this procedure. (See Allen Dec. Ex. 2; Boisclaire Dec. Ex. 1.) 25CV161701: GODINA, et al. vs MERCK & CO., INC., SUED INDIVIDUALLY, AS ALTER-EGO OF, AND AS SUCCESSOR-IN-INTEREST TO SCHOLL, INC. AND SCHERING-P..., et al. 08/31/2026 Pre-Trial Conference Re: Motions in Limine in Department 512

Here, Ms. Godina did not undergo talc pleurodesis. Defendants argument that this use of talc should be permitted to refute Plaintiffs argument that all talc is dangers will necessarily involve an undue consumption of time presenting evidence and arguments regarding whether cosmetic talc and medical-grade talc are the same or similar (for example, from the same mine during the same time period), comparing the facts of this case to talc pleurodesis patients, whether sufficient time has passed to determine whether talc pleurodesis patients might develop mesothelioma, among other things.

On this basis, the Court finds that the information regarding medical-grade talc is irrelevant under Evidence Code §§ 210 and 350. Even if marginally relevant to Plaintiffs’ diagnosis of mesothelioma, the evidence would be unduly time-consuming without significant probative value as to causation. (Evid. Code § 352.)

Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine #3

Motion to Preclude Reference to Reference to Claims of Alternative Exposure to Erionite

Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine to preclude argument, evidence or reference to alternative exposure to Erionite is DENIED.

Plaintiffs argue that there is no definitive evidence that Ms. Godina was exposed to erionite in Momax, Zacatecas, Mexico, where she lived for the first 19 years of her life. Plaintiffs argue that the Defendants’ experts, Roggli, Miller, Segrave, Alexander, and Vohra are supporting their opinions that Plaintiff was exposed to erionite and/or that her mesothelioma was caused by this exposure is not based on case-specific factual foundation and is completely speculative.

Under Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. Univ. of S. California (2012) 55 Cal.4th 747, the trial court acts as “gatekeeper” and has discretion to “exclude expert opinion testimony that is (1) based on matter of a type on which an expert may not reasonably rely, (2) based on reasons unsupported by the material on which the expert relies, or (3) speculative.” (Id. at 771-72.)

California Evidence Code §801(b) provides that an expert may provide an opinion “based on matter (including his special knowledge, skill, experience, training and education) perceived by or personally known to the witness or made known to him at or before the hearing, whether or not admissible, that is a type that reasonably may be relied upon by an expert in forming an opinion upon which the subject to which his testimony relates, unless an expert is precluded by law from using such matter as a basis for his opinion.” Evidence Code §802 allows an expert to “state on direct examination the reasons for his opinion and the matter (including, in the case of an expert, his special knowledge, skill, experience, training and education) upon which it is based, unless he is precluded by law from using such reasons or matter as a basis for his opinion.” Case-specific facts asserted in hearsay statements presented by an expert as true are inadmissible, absent a hearsay exception. (People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665, 677, 684- 85.) “The distinction between case-specific facts and background information thus is crucial –

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

25CV161701: GODINA, et al. vs MERCK & CO., INC., SUED INDIVIDUALLY, AS ALTER-EGO OF, AND AS SUCCESSOR-IN-INTEREST TO SCHOLL, INC. AND SCHERING-P..., et al. 08/31/2026 Pre-Trial Conference Re: Motions in Limine in Department 512 the former may be excluded as hearsay, the latter may not.” (People v. Veamatahau (2020) 9 Cal.5th 16, 26.) “It has long been settled that an expert may not simply repeat a third party’s opinion and offer it up as confirmatory of his own.” (Strobel v. Johnson & Johnson (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 796, 821, citing Whitfield v.

Roth (1974) 10 Cal.3d 874, 895 [“doctors can testify as to the basis of their opinion, but this is not intended to be a channel by which testifying doctors can place the opinion of innumerable out-of-court doctors before the jury”].) An “expert may still rely on hearsay in forming an opinion and may tell the jury in general terms that he did so.” (Sanchez, 63 Cal.4th at 685-86.) “What an expert cannot do is relate as true case-specific hearsay asserted in hearsay statements, unless they are independently proven by competent evidence or are covered by a hearsay exception.” (Id. at 686.)

Here, the experts are relying on the case-specific fact that the Plaintiff grew up for the first 19 years of her life in Momax, Zacatecas, Mexico. Dr. Vohra has opined with a reasonable degree of medical certainty that the Plaintiff’s mesothelioma was caused by exposure to erionite in the first 19 years of her life. His opinion is based on the case-specific fact that she lived in that area and on material which may be reasonably relied upon by an expert, specifically peer-reviewed literature that has found: (1) erionite in Zacatecas, Mexico, (2) that erionite causes mesothelioma, and (3) that some people in that have developed mesothelioma from exposure in the region of Zacatecas.

The Plaintiffs’ arguments regarding the number of people reported to have been exposed, the distance from the specific towns where exposure was found, among other things, all go to the weight of the evidence and not its admissibility. Plaintiffs’ experts are well qualified to attack defense opinions and plaintiffs’ counsel is competent to cross-examine these witnesses. It is up to the jury to decide which expert opinion to accept and/or to what extent it will consider the differing expert opinions.

Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine #4

Motion to Preclude Expert Dr. Victor Roggli

Plaintiffs’ Motion to Preclude Expert Dr. Victor Roggli from testifying to an opinion regarding the causation of Plaintiffs’ mesothelioma is GRANTED IN PART.

Plaintiffs’ motion is largely unopposed. Both Plaintiffs’ and Defendants’ presentation of the testimony of Dr. Roggli makes it clear that Dr. Roggli is not offering an opinion regarding the causation of Plaintiffs’ mesothelioma. Dr. Roggli, rather, is a pathologist who has reviewed the slides from Plaintiffs’ lung tissue and offers his opinion that the slides did not contain asbestosis and that Plaintiff Godina did indeed have mesothelioma. These opinions are not based on speculation and are completely within the expertise of a pathologist. Dr. Roggli is precluded from opining as to the cause of Plaintiff Godina’s mesothelioma; however, this order does not preclude Dr. Roggli from opining regarding his pathology findings regarding the slides he was

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

25CV161701: GODINA, et al. vs MERCK & CO., INC., SUED INDIVIDUALLY, AS ALTER-EGO OF, AND AS SUCCESSOR-IN-INTEREST TO SCHOLL, INC. AND SCHERING-P..., et al. 08/31/2026 Pre-Trial Conference Re: Motions in Limine in Department 512 provided.

As to the request to preclude any other opinions that Dr. Roggli might offer at trial that are beyond those he identified in deposition, the Court DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDCE. Asbestos. This request is not directed at a “particular, identifiable body of evidence.” (Boston v. Penny Lane Centers, Inc. (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 936, 950; Kelly v. New West Federal Savings (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 659, 670-671). The Court will follow the requirements of Kennemur v. State of California (1982) 133 Cal.App.3d 907 such that opinions not identified in the expert disclosure and not testified to as deposition will be excluded; however, the Court will not make any pre-determinations as to those opinions in the abstract.

Rather, the parties may raise any objection at trial to opinions offered by experts beyond those previously identified or testified to at deposition, and the Court will address those objections at trial.

Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine #5

Motion to Preclude Reference or Suggestion that Plaintiff was Exposed to Asbestos from Any Cement Plant, Cement Product, or Automotive Friction Product

Plaintiffs’ Motion to Preclude Reference or Suggestion that Plaintiff was Exposed to Asbestos from Any Cement Plant, Cement Product, or Automotive Friction Product is GRANTED IN PART.

Both Plaintiffs’ and Defendants’ argument and evidence demonstrate that none of Defendants’ experts have stated an opinion that Plaintiffs’ mesothelioma was caused to a reasonable degree of medical certainty by her husband’s work at the cement plant, or cement products, or by exposure to automotive friction products. To this extent only, the Plaintiffs’ motion is GRANTED. Kennemur v. State of California (1982) 133 Cal.App.3d 907, 919 would preclude any such opinions at trial.

In all other respects, the Motion is DENIED. California Evidence Code §801.1 permits experts to testify “that a matter cannot meet a reasonable degree of probability in the applicable field” and provide a basis for that opinion. Specifically, Defendants’ experts contradict the Plaintiffs’ experts’ conclusions regarding the causation of Plaintiffs’ mesothelioma by opining that the Plaintiffs’ level of certainty is suspect given other evidence. Similarly, Defendants are free to cross-examine the Plaintiffs’ experts regarding what other factors were or were not considered.

Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine #6

Motion to Preclude Testimony of Dr. Matthew Sanchez and Alan Segrave

PARTIES TO APPEAR

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

25CV161701: GODINA, et al. vs MERCK & CO., INC., SUED INDIVIDUALLY, AS ALTER-EGO OF, AND AS SUCCESSOR-IN-INTEREST TO SCHOLL, INC. AND SCHERING-P..., et al. 08/31/2026 Pre-Trial Conference Re: Motions in Limine in Department 512 Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine #8

Motion to Preclude Argument that Plaintiffs’ Mesothelioma was Genetically Caused, Spontaneous, or Naturally Occurring

Plaintiffs’ Motion to Preclude Argument that Plaintiffs’ Mesothelioma was Genetically Caused, Spontaneous, or Naturally Occurring is GRANTED IN PART.

Both Plaintiffs’ and Defendants’ argument and evidence demonstrate that none of Defendants’ experts have stated an opinion that Plaintiffs’ mesothelioma was caused to a reasonable degree of medical certainty by her genetics or spontaneously. To this extent only, the Plaintiffs’ motion is GRANTED. Kennemur v. State of California (1982) 133 Cal.App.3d 907, 919 would preclude any such opinions at trial.

In all other respects, the Motion is DENIED. California Evidence Code §801.1 permits experts to testify “that a matter cannot meet a reasonable degree of probability in the applicable field” and provide a basis for that opinion. Specifically, Defendants’ experts contradict the Plaintiffs’ experts’ conclusions regarding the causation of Plaintiffs’ mesothelioma by opining that the Plaintiffs’ level of certainty is suspect given other evidence. Similarly, Defendants are free to cross-examine the Plaintiffs’ experts regarding what other factors were or were not considered.

Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine #9

Motion to Exclude Reference to the 2009-2010 Testing Performed by an FDA Contractor on a Bottle of CVS Brand Baby Powder

Plaintiffs’ Motion to Exclude Reference to the 2009-2010 Testing Performed by an FDA Contractor is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

Plaintiff seeks to exclude any reference to the report of the 2009-2010 testing of the CVS Brand Baby Powder bottle as inadmissible hearsay and prejudicial. Defendants argue that the record satisfies the official record hearsay exception, that it can be admitted for a non-hearsay purpose, specifically as notice to CVS, among other things.

The Court is not convinced by the Plaintiffs’ argument that Defendants cannot establish the official records hearsay exception under California Evidence Code §1280. Though Plaintiffs argue that McNeal v. Whittaker, Clark & Daniels (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 853, 882-883 precludes admission because the record is essentially an opinion as opposed to facts, the Court disagrees. In McNeal the Court found it an abuse of discretion to admit the “personal opinion of a public employee which does not report firsthand observations of facts.” (McNeal, 80 Cal.App.5th at 884.) The report from the FDA contractor is not a personal opinion but is rather a lab report based on personal observations. Neither is the Court persuaded that because the report was done

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

25CV161701: GODINA, et al. vs MERCK & CO., INC., SUED INDIVIDUALLY, AS ALTER-EGO OF, AND AS SUCCESSOR-IN-INTEREST TO SCHOLL, INC. AND SCHERING-P..., et al. 08/31/2026 Pre-Trial Conference Re: Motions in Limine in Department 512 by a contractor of the FDA, as opposed to the FDA itself, it does not come within §1280. It seems apparent to the Court the FDA Contractor was an agent of the FDA and acting within the scope of that agency. (See Bhatt v. State of Dept. of Health Services (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 923, 929-930.) The Court believes that Defendants may be able to present sufficient evidence to show through judicial notice or other evidence that this “record or report was prepared in such a manner as to assure its trustworthiness.” (Id. at 929.)

Further, the Plaintiffs’ have not convinced the Court that the Defendants would be unable to demonstrate “notice” such that the record would be admissible for a non-hearsay purpose. As such, the Court denies this motion without prejudice. Plaintiffs’ may make these objections to the admissibility of this record should Defendants fail to lay the necessary foundation for its admissibility at trial.

Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine #10

Motion to Exclude Reference to the 1986 Letter from FDA Official Swanson to Concerned Citizen Douillet

Plaintiffs’ Motion to Exclude Reference to the 1986 Letter from FDA Official Swanson to Concerned Citizen Douillet is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

Plaintiff seeks to exclude any reference to the 1986 Letter as inadmissible hearsay and prejudicial. Defendants argue that the record satisfies the official record hearsay exception, the ancient document exception, that it can be admitted for a non-hearsay purpose, specifically as notice, among other things.

The Court is not convinced by the Plaintiffs’ argument that Defendants cannot establish the official records hearsay exception under California Evidence Code §1280. Though Plaintiffs argue that McNeal v. Whitaker, Clark & Daniels (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 853, 882-883 precludes admission because the record is essentially an opinion as opposed to facts, the Court disagrees. In McNeal the Court found it an abuse of discretion to admit the “personal opinion of a public employee which does not report firsthand observations of facts.” (McNeal, 80 Cal.Appp.5th at 884.) The letter, unlike the report in McNeal, does not reflect the personal opinion of Swanson. The letter demonstrates enough indicial to demonstrate that it was prepared in the official capacity of the Acting Associate Commissioner for Regulatory Affairs of the FDA.

Further, the Plaintiffs’ have not convinced the Court that the Defendants would be unable to demonstrate “notice” such that the record would be admissible for a non-hearsay purpose. As such, the Court denies this motion without prejudice. Plaintiffs’ may make these objections to the admissibility of this record should Defendants fail to lay the necessary foundation for its admissibility at trial.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

25CV161701: GODINA, et al. vs MERCK & CO., INC., SUED INDIVIDUALLY, AS ALTER-EGO OF, AND AS SUCCESSOR-IN-INTEREST TO SCHOLL, INC. AND SCHERING-P..., et al. 08/31/2026 Pre-Trial Conference Re: Motions in Limine in Department 512 Joint Defense Motion in Limine #1

Motion to Exclude Evidence of Other Alleged Defects, Diseases, including Ovarian Cancer

Defendants’ Motion to Exclude Evidence of Other Alleged Defects, Diseases, including Ovarian Cancer is GRANTED IN PART.

Defendants seek to exclude any reference to any other alleged defects or diseases caused by talc, including ovarian cancer as irrelevant and prejudicial. Plaintiffs argue that the information regarding the other alleged diseases is relevant to negligence (notice), strict liability, and punitive damages. Plaintiffs further argue that evidence of other alleged minerals in Defendants’ products is relevant to refute Defendants’ argument that its talc products were “safe” and “pure”.

Plaintiff Godina has not been diagnosed with ovarian cancer, and the jury is not being asked to determine whether talc causes ovarian cancer. As such, the Plaintiff is precluded from presenting evidence that talc causes ovarian cancer. Further, the Plaintiff is not an infant suffering from asphyxiation or aspiration from talc, nor has she been diagnosed with any other heavy metal poisoning from talc. The Plaintiff is precluded from presenting evidence asphyxiation/aspiration caused by talc or other minerals found in talc, except as otherwise provided in this order.

At the same time, Plaintiff may offer evidence that bears on whether Defendants’ products contain asbestos, or the history of testing and investigation of those issues, or cross-examination of Defendants’ witnesses who historically investigated ovarian cancer. Because of the potential prejudicial nature of any such evidence, Plaintiff should notify the Court and opposing counsel before they introduce any evidence that touches on the issue of ovarian cancer.

Further, should Defendants argue that talc is “pure” or “safe”, Plaintiffs may rebut that evidence with evidence concerning other minerals (toxins).

Joint Defense Motion in Limine #2

Motion to Exclude All Evidence, Argument or Reference to the IWGACP, MoCRA, the FDA Talc Panel and Now Withdrawn FDA Proposed Testing Methods

Defendants’ Motion in Limine to exclude all evidence, argument or reference to IWGACP, MoCRA, the FDA Talc Panel, and Now Withdrawn FDA Proposed Testing Methods is GRANTED IN PART.

Plaintiffs first argue that the motion does not challenge any particular items of evidence. The Court disagrees. The IWGACP was formed in 2018, and its December 2021 white paper, preliminary recommendations, minutes, press releases, and related documents are inadmissible

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

25CV161701: GODINA, et al. vs MERCK & CO., INC., SUED INDIVIDUALLY, AS ALTER-EGO OF, AND AS SUCCESSOR-IN-INTEREST TO SCHOLL, INC. AND SCHERING-P..., et al. 08/31/2026 Pre-Trial Conference Re: Motions in Limine in Department 512 hearsay absent a recognized exception. Similarly, the press releases and related documents from the FDA Talc Panel and the FDA proposed MoCRA rule are also inadmissible hearsay, absent a recognized exception. Plaintiffs do not address the now withdrawn FDA Proposed Testing Methods in any way. No hearsay exceptions are presented for the documents identified by Defendants in their motion and the motion is GRANTED as to those documents.

Plaintiffs instead argue that their experts, specifically Dr. Longo and Defendant’s expert Dr. Segrave, may testify about their participation in the IWGACP. Plaintiffs also argue that they should be permitted to cross-examine Defendants’ experts about their work with the IWGACP. The motion is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE as to this evidence, and accordingly the court will not preclude any reference to the IWGACP consistent with this ruling.

However, it remains unclear how Plaintiffs intend to use the IWGACP material and cautions that the probative value of the IWGACP and its work—particularly any findings that are not final— appears to be limited and any value is substantially outweighed by the potential for an undue consumption of time or misleading the jury under Evidence Code section 352.

Joint Defense Motion in Limine #3

Motion to Preclude Improper “Reptile Theory” Tactics

Defendant’s motion to preclude “Reptile Theory” tactics is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

First, this is not a proper motion in limine as it is not directed at a “particular, identifiable, body of evidence.” (Boston v. Penny Lane Centers, Inc. (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 936, 950; Kelly v. New West Federal Savings (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 659, 670-671.)

The Court recognizes and acknowledges that “golden rule” arguments and “reptile theory” arguments are improper and should not be made. (See Regalado v. Callaghan (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 582, 598-599; Allen v. Patel (2025) 117 Cal.App.5th 432.) Therefore, any such arguments are improper, and the Court will entertain any objections to such arguments when, and if, they occur.

Joint Defense Motion in Limine #4

Motion to Preclude Reference to or Reliance on the Papers Entitled “Mesothelioma Associated with the Use of Cosmetic Talc” and “Exposure to Cosmetic Talc and Mesothelioma” (“The Moline Papers”)

Defendants’ Motion in Limine to preclude reference to or reliance on the Moline Papers is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

25CV161701: GODINA, et al. vs MERCK & CO., INC., SUED INDIVIDUALLY, AS ALTER-EGO OF, AND AS SUCCESSOR-IN-INTEREST TO SCHOLL, INC. AND SCHERING-P..., et al. 08/31/2026 Pre-Trial Conference Re: Motions in Limine in Department 512 Defendants seek to exclude reference to or reliance on the “Moline Papers” arguing that they are precluded from cross-examination regarding the validity of the studies because the author refuses to identify the subjects of the articles. These objections are not well-founded.

Should Plaintiffs’ experts rely on the Moline papers as the basis for an opinion, the articles will not be admissible absent laying the appropriate foundation for their admissibility. The experts may rely on and relate the general nature of the article. The Defendant may bring out any and all deficiencies in the articles on cross-examination of Plaintiffs’ experts.