Chaudhary vs. Lakeside Maintenance Association

not vulnerable to a general demurrer, the extent of a res judicata bar to claims, and whether certain claims fall within the boundaries of a particular legislative declaration that a validation statute applies. (Citing Gackstetter v. Frawley (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1257, 1274 [Good-faith determination bar]; County of Sonoma v. Superior Court (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1312, 1326 [statute of limitations]; Campbell v. Veith (1953) 121 Cal.App.2d 729, 732 [general demurrer standard]; Owl Drug Co. v. Bryant (1953) 115 Cal.App.2d 296, 302 [res judicata bar]; and Davis v. Fresno Unified Sch. Dist. (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 911, 930 [whether validation statute applies].)

None of these cases directly discuss the burden of a moving party on summary judgment and/or whether or not the moving party can circumvent the initial burden of proof by categorically concluding that each cause of action was a disguised indemnity cause of action without legal analysis of each cause of action alleged and/or offering facts for each cause of action.

In sum, the court finds that moving parties failed to meet their burden and the motion is DENIED.

Cross-Complainants to give notice.

16 Chaudhary vs. Motion for Summary Judgment and/or Adjudication Lakeside Maintenance (Continued from 8/21/26) Association The court DENIES, in its entirety, Defendants LAKESIDE MAINTENANCE ASSOCIATION (“Lakeside”) and MARK WARD’s (“Ward”) motion for summary adjudication on the Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) filed by Plaintiff TARIQ CHAUDHARY.

Evidentiary Objections:

The court SUSTAINS Plaintiff’s objections to Exhibit C in Defendants’ index of documentary evidence and to paragraph 7 of the Mark Ward Declaration (stating “Attached as Exhibit C to the Index of Documentary

Evidence is an email authored by Mr. Tomasyan’s regarding his concerns about the plaintiff’s proposed addition.”) The remainder of Plaintiff’s objections are OVERRULED.

The court OVERRULES Defendants’ evidentiary objections.

The SAC asserts the following causes of action against Lakeside and Ward, the only named defendants:

1. Declaratory judgment 2. Breach of covenants 3. Breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing 4. Violation of the Davis-Stirling Act 5. Violation of the common interest development open meeting act 6. Negligence 7. Breach of fiduciary duty 8. Housing discrimination in violation of FEHA 9. Retaliation in violation of FEHA 10. Injunctive relief

Defendants seek summary adjudication on all causes of action except the first and fifth causes of action. Defendants also seek summary adjudication on Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages.

This action concerns Plaintiff’s condominium unit located at 80 Fairlake in Irvine. (Defendant’s Material Fact (“DMF”) 4.) Defendant Lakeside manages the common interest development. (DMF 6.) From the front of 80 Fairlake, the unit to the right is 78 Fairlake and is owned by Leon Tomasyan and his wife. (DMF 10.) 78 Fairlake is one story and shares a wall with 80 Fairlake. (DMF 11.) From the front of 80 Fairlake, the condominium to the left is 82 Fairlake and is owned by Defendant Mark Ward, who is Lakeside’s current president. (DMF 12.)

In November 2023, Plaintiff submitted a Home Improvement Application with drawings of improvements he proposed. (DMF 13; Plaintiff’s Material Fact (“PMF”) 47.) Plaintiff is seeking to expand his dwelling in the front,

side, and rear. (DMF 16-31 and Plaintiff’s response thereto.)

2nd C/A (breach of CC&Rs)

The second cause of action (for breach of the CC&Rs) is directed at Defendant Lakeside only. The SAC alleges Lakeside breached the CC&Rs by refusing to approve Plaintiff’s current Home Improvement Application, improperly seeking to undertake its own architectural review, and seeking to impose additional requirements that are not provided for in the CC&Rs, the WVA Architectural Standards, or the New Lakeside Architectural Standards. (SAC, ¶ 135.)

Lakeside argues that it is entitled to summary adjudication on this cause of action because the CC&Rs forbid Lakeside from allowing Plaintiff to build into the common areas and the yard.

The governing CC&Rs contain several important definitions:

Section 1.10 of the Lakeside CC&Rs defines “Common Area” as “all portions of the Project or Projects except the Units and, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, specifically including all structural projections within a Unit which are required for the support of a Condominium Building, gas, water, waste pipes, all sewers, all ducts, chutes, conduits, wires, and other utility installations of the structures wherever located (except the outlets thereof when located within the Units), the land upon which the structures are located, the air space above these structures, all bearing walls, columns, floors, the roof, the slab foundation, common stairways, window glass and the like.

Common Area shall specifically exclude all garage door opening systems and all air conditioning equipment notwithstanding that the foregoing are located in the Common Area.” (Pl’s Exh. B-1, emphasis supplied [ROA 191].)

Section 1.14 of the Lakeside CC&Rs defines “Condominium Building” as a “separate building containing one or more Unit or elements of a Unit.” (PMF 6.)

Defendants read Sections 1.10-1.14 as defining the exterior walls of the unit as a “common area” and as such, arguing that Plaintiff is prohibited from moving the exterior walls. Defendants also argue that these sections prohibit Plaintiff from adding a second level or moving the roof because the “roof” is a common area.

Section 1.37 defines “Unit” as the elements of a condominium not owned in common with the Owners of other condominiums in a Project and shall consist of a Residential Element together with one or more other Unit Elements set forth in this Article. (Emphasis supplied.)

Section 1.38 defines “Unit Elements” as (1) Garage; (2) Residential Element, which is defined as that portion of a Unit designed for use as a residence and shall consist of the interior undecorated surfaces perimeter walls, floors, ceilings, windows and doors or each Residential Element and the space encompassed thereby and (3) Yard, which is defined as that portion of a Unit designed for use as a yard, recreational, gardening and/or landscaping areas. (Emphasis supplied.)

Defendants read Sections 1.37 and 1.38 as defining Plaintiff’s separate property interest as extending from the paint line into the unit and defining the yard as only for recreational, gardening, or landscaping purposes and not for living and thus prohibiting Plaintiff from moving the common area walls and building into the yard.

Section 10.04 states,

An owner shall have the right to expand or otherwise modify any of his Unit Elements as long as any such Improvements (i) are confined within the boundaries of his Unit; (ii) have been approved by the Architectural Committee; and (iii) have been approved by the Board. If approved by the Architectural Committee and the Board, such Owner shall be permitted to puncture a Condominium Building wall to create an entryway to any such Improvement or to raze and relocate a Condominium Building wall in order to expand the size of an existing room. In addition to any other

requirement of this Article, the Board may require, as a condition of approval, additional documents to include, without limitations, the following:

(a) a certificate of a structural engineer licensed by the State of California and approved by the Board stating that the proposed improvements will not adversely affect the structural support of the Condominium Building or any other part of the Project; (b) building and other governmental permits required for the proposed Improvement; (c) a certificate by electrical and plumbing contractors licensed by the State of California setting forth in detail the effect the proposed improvement would have on any Common Area plumbing and wiring.

Lakeside argues that it is entitled to summary judgment because it “cannot permit the plaintiff to build a residential structure into the common areas and the yard.” (Mov. Pts. & Auth. at p. 18, lines 23-24.) Lakeside’s proffered evidence however does not show that the proposed improvements are not permitted. Rather, it appears that the CC&Rs expressly allow an owner to expand or modify any of the Unit Elements (e.g., garage, residential element, or yard) under certain conditions.

Lakeside also argues that the breach of contract cause of action is negated by the California Solar Rights Act. Lakeside contends that Leon Tomasyan, Plaintiff’s other nextdoor neighbor, has objected to plaintiff’s proposed expansion, primarily because the second story expansion would block the sun from his first story solar panels. (DMF No. 39.) This argument relies on an email attached as Exhibit C to the declaration of Mark Ward. The email is from Mr. Tomasyan to “dcwpms@aol.com.” (Ward Decl., Exh. C.) Ward does not lay a sufficient foundation for this email. At any rate, in December 2023, Plaintiff apparently revised the plans to address the concerns with Mr. Tomasyan’s solar panels. (PMF 180.)

Further, Lakeside cites Sections 714 and 4746 of the Civil Code, and Section 25982 of the Public Resources Code in support of its argument that Plaintiff’s contract claim fails due to solar panel concerns.

Section 714 that states that any covenant, restriction, or condition that “effectively prohibits or restricts the installation or use of a solar energy system is void and unenforceable.” (Civ. Code, § 714.) Section 714 does not appear to apply to this matter, as it does not appear to be a prohibition against a homeowner (as opposed to a homeowners association).

Section 4746 relates to a request to install solar panels “on a multifamily common area roof shared by more than one homeowner pursuant to Sections 714 and 714.1” and thus also does not appear to apply to this matter. (Civ. Code, § 4746.)

Public Resources Code section 25982 provides that a person “owning or in control of another property shall not allow a tree or shrub to be placed or, if placed, to grow on that property so as to cast a shadow greater than 10 percent of the collector absorption area upon that solar collector surface at any one time between the hours of 10 a.m. and 2 p.m., local standard time.” (Pub. Resources Code, § 25982.) This provision also does not appear to apply to this matter.

The motion is therefore DENIED as to the second cause of action.

3rd C/A (breach of implied covenant)

“‘Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement.’” (Foley v. Interactive Data Corp. (1988) 47 Cal.3d 654, 683.) A “breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing involves something beyond breach of the contractual duty itself.” (Chateau Chamberay Homeowners Assn. v. Associated International Ins. Co. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 335, 345, internal quotation marks omitted.) “It is a settled rule of law that homeowners' associations must exercise their authority to approve or disapprove an individual homeowner's construction or improvement plans in conformity with the declaration of covenants and restrictions, and in good faith.” (Cohen v. Kite Hill Community Assn. (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 642, 650.)

Lakeside argues that the third cause of action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is duplicative of the second cause of action for breach of the CC&Rs. Lakeside concludes that, because it did not violate the CC&Rs, the implied covenant claim has no merit. (Mov. Pts. & Auth. at p.20, lines 12-19.)

The SAC alleges Lakeside breached the implied covenant “by unfairly interfering with Plaintiff’s rights to his own Property, including by improperly refusing to approve, and unreasonably delaying, his application for reasons outside of its delegated authority.” (SAC, ¶ 140; see also SAC, ¶¶ 141-149.) As discussed previously, Lakeside has not met its initial burden of establishing that Plaintiff cannot establish any particular element of the breach of contract claim. Lakeside has also not established that the implied covenant necessarily fails.

The motion is therefore DENIED as to the third cause of action.

4th C/A (violation of the Davis-Stirling Act)

The Davis–Stirling Act set forth in sections 1350 et seq. of the Civil Code provides general rules for the governance of condominium associations.

The SAC alleges Lakeside violated the Davis-Stirling Act in multiple ways. For instance, the SAC alleges Lakeside “violated California Civil Code § 4360(a) by failing to provide Plaintiff with a copy of the revised New Lakeside Architectural Standards that it adopted on January 16, 2024, at least 28 days in advance of such adoption.” (SAC, ¶ 158.) The SAC also alleges Lakeside violated Civil Code section 4765(a)(2) by refusing to approve Plaintiff’s HIA in an unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious manner. (SAC, ¶¶ 161-162.) The SAC also alleges Lakeside violated Civil Code § 4765(a)(3) because its decision on Plaintiff’s HIA violates the Fair Employment and Housing Act. (SAC, ¶¶ 165-166.)

Lakeside contends that the cause of action for violation of the Davis-Stirling Act necessarily fails because the Davis- Stirling Act prohibits Lakeside from allowing Plaintiff to

build into the common area. Lakeside cites Civil Code sections 4095 and 4185, which define common area as the entire common interest development “except the separate interests” and “separate interest” as a separately owned unit.

However, as set forth in the CC&Rs, Plaintiff’s Unit includes the residential dwelling, yard and garage. (PMF 208.) Further, the CC&Rs permit Plaintiff to “expand or otherwise modify any of his Unit Elements” – i.e., his dwelling, yard, or garage – provided certain conditions are met. Lakeside has not met its initial burden that there is no triable issue of material fact as to this cause of action.

The motion is therefore DENIED as to the fourth cause of action.

6th C/A (negligence)

The elements to a cause of action for negligence are: (1) the existence of a duty, (2) breach, (3) causation, and (4) damages. (Pellegrini v. Weiss (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 515, 524.)

Defendants briefly address the sixth cause of action for negligence. For instance, Defendants argue that “[t]he plaintiff alleges that LAKESIDE is negligent because it has refused to approve the plaintiff’s current Home Improvement Application.” (Mov. Pts. & Auth. at p. 22, lines 7-9.) That is partially true, but the SAC alleges that Lakeside was also negligent in other ways. See paragraph 186 [e.g., breach by failing to provide a fair, reasonable and expeditious procedure for making its home improvement decision; by seeking to impose additional requirements that are not provided for in the CC&Rs, the WVA Architectural Standards, or the New Lakeside Architectural Standards] and paragraph 187 [breach by failing to comply with its own Bylaws and other applicable laws, including by failing to provide the required 4-day notice of its meetings, by failing to appoint officers, etc].

The negligence cause of action in the SAC in some ways combines Plaintiff’s other causes of action, including the fifth cause action for violation of the Common Interest

Development Open Meeting Act – which is not challenged by Defendants’ summary adjudication motion. Lakeside thus has not established its initial burden of showing that Plaintiff cannot prevail on his negligence cause of action.

The motion is therefore DENIED as to the sixth cause of action.

7th C/A (breach of fiduciary duty)

The SAC alleges Defendants breached their fiduciary duties to Plaintiff by unfairly interfering with Plaintiff’s rights to his own Property, by seeking to impose additional architectural requirements, by seeking to impose other arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable requirements, and by failing to comply with Lakeside’s Bylaws. (SAC, ¶¶ 193- 194.)

Directors of a homeowners association owe a fiduciary duty to HOA members. (Coley v. Eskaton (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 943, 958 [“The directors of a nonprofit mutual benefit corporation, like the Association here, are fiduciaries who must act for the benefit of the corporation and its members.”]; see also Ritter & Ritter, Inc. Pension & Profit Plan v. The Churchill Condominium Assn. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 103, 127.)

Lakeside argues that Plaintiff’s breach of fiduciary duty claim necessarily fails because Lakeside cannot allow Plaintiff to build a residential structure into the common areas and into the yard. (Mov. Pts. & Auth. at p.23, lines 1- 3.) As discussed above, Lakeside has not met its initial burden of establishing that Plaintiff cannot expand or modify his residential element within the confines of his unit.

Defendants also argue that the fiduciary duty cause of action necessarily fails as to Defendant Ward because, as a homeowner, Ward is “is entitled to have an opinion about the plaintiff’s proposal to build into the common areas and yard in violation of the CC&Rs and Davis-Stirling Act that would be to the detriment to him and his neighbors. Having an opinion as a homeowner regarding the project does not support a cause of action for Breach of Fiduciary

Duty.” (Mov. Pts. & Auth. at p. 23, lines 6-10.) The breach of fiduciary duty cause of action however does not exclusively target Defendant Ward’s conduct in having an opinion. Instead, after Defendant Ward purportedly recused himself from Lakeside’s decision on Plaintiff’s HIA, Mr. Ward wrote “OPPOSED” on Plaintiff’s revised application so other board members were aware of his opposition. (PMF 491-492.) Board member Becky Skelton confirmed that Ward was involved in the decision on Plaintiff’s HIA despite purporting to recuse himself during the board meetings. (PMF 88, 493.)

Defendants have not met their initial burden with respect to the breach of fiduciary duty cause of action.

The motion is therefore DENIED as to the seventh cause of action.

8th C/A (housing discrimination in violation of FEHA) and 9th C/A (retaliation in violation of FEHA)

The SAC alleges that Plaintiff is a racial minority and that Lakeside and Ward’s conduct relating to his home improvement application violates his right to be free from discrimination in land-use practices, decisions, and authorizations. (SAC, ¶38, 203.) The SAC also alleges that Lakeside has retaliated against Plaintiff for attempting to protect his rights. (SAC, ¶ 209.) The eighth cause of action is directed against both Defendants while the ninth cause of action is directed only at Defendant Lakeside.

Defendants argue that the undisputed facts shsow that the reason Plaintiff’s HIA has not been approved is because Plaintiff intends to build into the common area and into the yard element in violation of the CC&Rs and the Davis- Stirling Act. (Mov. Pts. & Auth. at p.23, lines 20-23.) But as discussed above, Lakeside has not met its initial burden of establishing that Plaintiff cannot expand or modify his residential element within the confines of his unit.

Even if they had met their initial burden, Plaintiff provides sufficient evidence to meet his shifted burden with respect to these causes of action.

Defendants acknowledge that Ward made a statement at a meeting that, in reference to an ongoing construction project, the complex resembled a war zone in Beirut. (DMF 251.) Defendants argue that Plaintiff “agrees this comment was not directed at the plaintiff or his property,” though the deposition testimony cited by Defendants does not show that Plaintiff was asked whether Ward’s comment was directed toward Plaintiff personally. (DMF 251 and Plaintiff’s response.) Although the reference to Beirut may be ambiguous, “the task of disambiguating ambiguous utterances is for trial, not for summary judgment.” (Reid v. Google, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 512, 540-541.)

The motion is therefore DENIED as to the eighth and ninth causes of action.

10th C/A (injunctive relief)

The SAC seeks to enjoin Defendants from withholding approval of Plaintiffs HIA. (SAC, ¶¶ 215-217.) Defendants argue that injunctive relief is a remedy and not a cause of action.

Authority exists for the proposition that injunctive relief is a remedy and not a cause of action. (See, e.g., Ortiz v. Dameron Hospital Assn. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 568, 572, fn. 2 [“While denominated a ‘cause of action’ in the complaint, injunctive relief is a remedy, not a cause of action.”]; Allen v. City of Sacramento (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 41, 65 [“Injunctive relief is a remedy, not a cause of action.”]; Shell Oil Co. v. Richter (1942) 52 Cal.App.2d 164, 168 [“Injunctive relief is a remedy and not, in itself, a cause of action”].)

However, such is not necessarily a proper basis for summary judgment/adjudication. For example, in Ortiz v. Dameron Hospital Assn, 37 Cal.App.5th 568, the court of appeal determined that granting summary adjudication on an injunctive relief claim was not proper, as the claim was derivative of other claims that remain.

Similarly here, other claims remain and summary adjudication would not be proper.

The motion is therefore DENIED as to the tenth cause of action.

Punitive Damages

To recover punitive damages, a plaintiff must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. (Civ. Code, § 3294(a).) “[P]unitive damages cannot be awarded against a corporation for conduct of an employee unless a corporate officer, director, or managing agent had knowledge of the employee’s unfitness and disregarded the rights of others (or authorized/ratified the conduct or committed the act of oppression).” (Myers v. Trendwest Resorts, Inc. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1436; Civ. Code, § 3294(b).)

The SAC seeks punitive damages in connection with the sixth cause of action for negligence against Lakeside, the seventh cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty against Lakeside and Ward, the eighth cause of action for housing discrimination against Lakeside and Ward, and the ninth cause of action for retaliation in violation of FEHA against Lakeside. The SAC alleges that Lakeside and Ward’s conduct was conscious, deliberate, and/or undertaken in bad faith, and constitutes oppression, fraud, and/or malice, and is therefore also seeking any available punitive and exemplary damages.

A conscious disregard of the safety of others may constitute malice within the meaning of section 3294 of the Civil Code. In order to justify an award of punitive damages on this basis, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant was aware of the probable dangerous consequences of his conduct, and that he willfully and deliberately failed to avoid those consequences. (Taylor v. Superior Court, 24 Cal.3d at 893.)

To establish, “willful and conscious disregard,” plaintiff must establish that defendant: (1) was aware of the probable dangerous consequences of his or her conduct; and (2) willfully and deliberately failed to avoid those consequences. (Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 895-896.) Usually, “despicable conduct” refers to

circumstances that are vile, base, or contemptible that it would be looked down on and despised by reasonable people. (College Hospital, Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 725.) “Consequently, to establish malice, ‘it is not sufficient to show only that the defendant's conduct was negligent, grossly negligent or even reckless.’ (Flyer’s Body Shop Profit Sharing Plan v. Ticor Title Ins. Co. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 1149, 1155.)” (Bell v. Sharp Cabrillo Hospital (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 1034, 1044.) “The mere carelessness or ignorance of the defendant does not justify the imposition of punitive damages.... Punitive damages are proper only when the tortious conduct rises to levels of extreme indifference to the plaintiff's rights, a level which decent citizens should not have to tolerate.” (Lackner v. North (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1188, 1210, citations and quotation marks omitted.)

Civil Code section 3294 was amended to add the requirement of "despicable conduct" to the malice and oppression prongs. Conduct carried on with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others, but that is not “despicable,” will not support an award of punitive damages. (College Hospital Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 725.)

“Despicable conduct” is conduct that is so “vile, base, contemptible, miserable, wretched or loathsome that it would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people.” (Scott v. Phoenix Schools, Inc. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 702, 715.) Such conduct has been described as “having the character of outrage frequently associated with crime.” (Id.)

“In the usual case, the question of whether the defendant's conduct will support an award of punitive damages is for the trier of fact, ‘since the degree of punishment depends on the peculiar circumstances of each case.’ [Citations.] [¶] But the issue may be resolved on summary judgment, giving due regard to the higher proof standard. While ‘the “clear and convincing” evidentiary standard is a stringent one, it does not impose on a plaintiff the obligation to “prove” a case for punitive damages at summary judgment.’ (American Airlines, Inc. v. Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton [(2002)] 96 Cal.App.4th [1017] at p.

1049 [117 Cal.Rptr.2d 685].) ‘However, where the plaintiff's ultimate burden of proof will be by clear and convincing evidence, the higher standard of proof must be taken into account in ruling on a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication, since if a plaintiff is to prevail on a claim for punitive damages, it will be necessary that the evidence presented meet the higher evidentiary standard.’ (Ibid.; [citations].) ... [S]ummary judgment ‘on the issue of punitive damages is proper’ only ‘when no reasonable jury could find the plaintiff's evidence to be clear and convincing proof of malice, fraud or oppression.’ (Hoch v. Allied–Signal, Inc., [(1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 48] at pp. 60-61 [29 Cal.Rptr.2d 615].)” (Johnson & Johnson v. Superior Court (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 757, 762, quoting Spinks v. Equity Residential Briarwood Apartments (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1004, 1053.)

Here, Plaintiff has produced evidence showing a triable issue of material fact as to whether Defendants consciously disregarded Plaintiff’s rights, such as by approving Ward’s own HIA to expand his residential dwelling while refusing to approve Plaintiff’s HIA. (PMF 697-707.)

Summary adjudication on Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages is therefore denied.

Plaintiff to give notice.

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