Tran vs. City of Fountain Valley

treatment of an occupational accident and deemed medically necessary. This coverage does not address tort liability. It does not compensate for pain and suffering, emotional distress, lost wages, or any other category of general or non-medical special damages. It is a medical- expense reimbursement benefit, bounded by the policy’s own definitions of ‘reasonable charges,’ ‘medically necessary,’ and ‘occupational accident.’ The scope of an arbitration under this policy would therefore be confined to whether medical charges satisfy the policy’s internal criteria for reimbursement, an inquiry that has nothing to do with the tort-based liability and damages questions at the heart of the Mobilitas arbitration.” (Opp. at p. 4, lines 22 to p. 5, line 3.)

Unfortunately, much like the moving papers, the opposition does not cite the court to the arbitration provision or the other relevant terms of the policy.

In the reply, Petitioner argues the issues under US Fire’s policy whether the charges for the treatments received are reasonable and medically necessary overlap with the medical causation, treatment necessity, and damages determinations to be made in the uninsured motorist arbitration. (Reply at p. 3, lines 19-23.) The reply, however, goes on to argue the definitions of medically necessary in US Fire’s policy inappropriately reserved that determination to its own standards and medical personnel. Indeed, the reply argues consolidation should be ordered to “prevent [US Fire] from relying upon unilateral determinations of medical necessity and reasonableness to fragment or delay adjudication.” That is not an appropriate basis for determining whether the common issue condition is satisfied.

Petitioner simply has not shown either the liability issues or the damages issues in the two arbitrations are the same or otherwise give rise to a rise of conflicting rulings. Whether the uninsured driver is liable is different than whether Petitioner was injured in an occupational accident. Moreover, the issues regarding the tort damages potentially recoverable in the uninsured motorist arbitration do not appear to be the same as the much narrower damages issues presented in the arbitration under US Fire’s policy.

Based on the foregoing, the motion is DENIED.

US Fire’s counsel is ordered to give notice of this ruling.

7. Tran vs. City of Before the court is the petition by petitioner James Tran Fountain Valley (Petitioner) for relief from the government claims

presentation requirement. As more fully set forth below, the petition is DENIED.

Initially, the court notes there is no valid proof of service showing the petition was served on respondents City of Fountain Valley and Fountain Valley Police Department (collectively, Respondents). The proof of service filed May 11, 2026 (ROA 6) fails to identify what, if any documents were served, and the proof of service is not signed. Further, Petitioner failed to file any notice of hearing regarding the petition, and therefore also presumably failed to serve any such notice. The proof of service attached to Petitioner’s “Trial Brief” does not cure these deficiencies because it does not identify the petition as being served or any notice of hearing.

Regardless of any service deficiencies, the petition fails to satisfy the statutory requirements of Government Code section 946.6, subdivision (b). That statute requires any petition submitted to the court seeking relief from an untimely claim under the Government Claims Act must show “(1) That application was made to the board under Section 911.4 and was denied or deemed denied. [¶] (2) The reason for failure to present the claim within the time limit specified in Section 911.2. [¶] (3) The information required by Section 910.”

Government Code section 910 states as follows: \

“A claim shall be presented by the claimant or by a person acting on his or her behalf and shall show all of the following:

“(a) The name and post office address of the claimant.

“(b) The post office address to which the person presenting the claim desires notices to be sent.

“(c) The date, place and other circumstances of the occurrence or transaction which gave rise to the claim asserted.

“(d) A general description of the indebtedness, obligation, injury, damage or loss incurred so far as it may be known at the time of presentation of the claim.

“(e) The name or names of the public employee or employees causing the injury, damage, or loss, if known.

“(f) The amount claimed if it totals less than ten thousand dollars ($10,000) as of the date of presentation of the

claim, including the estimated amount of any prospective injury, damage, or loss, insofar as it may be known at the time of the presentation of the claim, together with the basis of computation of the amount claimed. If the amount claimed exceeds ten thousand dollars ($10,000), no dollar amount shall be included in the claim. However, it shall indicate whether the claim would be a limited civil case.”

Here, Petitioner fails to provide much of this information. Petitioner does not provide a copy of the claim submitted to Respondents and the petition does not clearly describe the “damage or loss incurred so far as it may be known at the time of presentation of the claim.” The petition also does not identify the persons involved or whether such is known. Further, the petition does not address damages, if known, or whether this would be a limited civil case.

Moreover, Petitioner has failed to submit sufficient evidence establishing mistake or excusable neglect. Government Code section 946.6(c) provides, “The court shall relieve the petitioner from the requirements of Section 945.4 if the court finds that the application to the board under Section 911.4 was made within a reasonable time not to exceed that specified in subdivision (b) of Section 911.4 and was denied or deemed denied pursuant to Section 911.6 and that one or more of the following is applicable: (1) The failure to present the claim was through mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect unless the public entity establishes that it would be prejudiced in the defense of the claim if the court relieves the petitioner from the requirements of Section 945.4.”

“The showing required of a petitioner seeking relief under the authority of Government Code, section 946.6 on the grounds of mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect is the same as required under section 473 of the Code of Civil Procedure for relieving a party from a default judgment.” (Flores v. Bd. of Supervisors (1970) 13 Cal.App.3d 480, 483.)

The purported “mistake” made by Petitioner is that he was not sure when his claim accrued. (Petition ¶¶18-23.) Lack of knowledge of the law is not a sufficient basis for relief. Litigants who choose to represent themselves must be treated in the same manner as represented parties and must follow the correct rules of procedure. (Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 984-985; Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246-1247.) A selfrepresented litigant is not entitled to any greater consideration than other litigants and attorneys.

(Petrosyan v. Prince Corp. (2013) 223 Cal.App.4th 587, 594 [self-represented litigants are entitled to same treatment as represented parties].)

A cause of action accrues when the injury occurs. Petitioner asserts in his petition that he believed the cause of action arising from the seizing of his dog on September 16, 2025, did not accrue on the day the dog was seized because there were “continuing administrative hearings.” (Petition at p. 3, line 9.) But he concedes his injuries began on that day and any injuries relating to the administrative proceedings were “additional” injuries. (Petition at p. 2, line 14.) Petitioner also concedes the administrative proceedings were conducted by Orange County Animal Care, not Respondents.

Government Code section 901 states, “For the purpose of computing the time limits prescribed by Sections 911.2, 911.4, 945.6, and 946.6, the date of the accrual of a cause of action to which a claim relates is the date upon which the cause of action would be deemed to have accrued within the meaning of the statute of limitations which would be applicable thereto if there were no requirement that a claim be presented to and be acted upon by the public entity before an action could be commenced thereon.”

“For purposes of calculating these time limits, the date on which an action accrues is the date upon which it would be deemed to have accrued under the applicable statute of limitations. (Gov. Code, § 901.) As a general rule, the date of accrual is the date the plaintiff incurred injury as a result of the defendant’s alleged wrongful act or omission. (Loehr v. Ventura Cnty. Cmty. Coll. Dist. (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 1071, 1078.) As Petitioner alleges he was harmed on the day his dog was seized, the claims arising therefrom occurred on the day the dog was seized. As a result, Tran’s claim accrued on September 26, 2025. He therefore did not timely present the claim to the respondents and he has not established the failure to timely present the claim was through mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect.

Based on the foregoing, the petition is DENIED.

Respondents’ counsel is ordered to give notice of this ruling.

8. Emerald Bay Before the court is the motion to enforce settlement Community pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6 filed by Association vs. intervenor Igor Olenicoff as Trustee of the Olenicoff Kinstler Personal Residence Trust (Olenicoff). Olenicoff seeks to