Shimon Rahimi, Victor Ariel Herrera Aguilar, and Vicente Tuxpan v. Cambridge Farms Kosher, Inc.

fairness hearing, the settlement administrator must submit a declaration attesting to the total costs incurred and anticipated to be incurred to finalize the settlement for approval by the Court. /// ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS California Rules of Court, rule 3.769(b) states: "Any agreement, express or implied, that has been entered into with respect to the payment of attorney fees or the submission of an application for the approval of attorney fees must be set forth in full in any application for approval of the dismissal or settlement of an action that has been certified as a class action."

Ultimately, the award of attorney fees is made by the Court at the fairness hearing, using the lodestar method with a multiplier, if appropriate. (PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095-1096; Ramos v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 615, 625-626; Ketchum III v. Moses (2000) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132-1136.) In common fund cases, the Court may utilize the percentage method, cross-checked by the lodestar. (Laffitte v. Robert Half Int'l, Inc. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 480, 503.)

Despite any agreement by the parties to the contrary, "the court has an independent right and responsibility to review the attorney fee provision of the settlement agreement and award only so much as it determined reasonable." (Garabedian v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Company (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 123, 128.) The question of whether class counsel is entitled to $26,140.50 (33.3%) in fees will be addressed at the fairness hearing when class counsel brings a noticed motion for attorney fees. Counsel should also be prepared to justify any costs sought (capped at $30,000) by detailing how such costs were incurred.

PROPOSED SCHEDULE OF SETTLEMENT PROCEEDINGS The following schedule is proposed by the Court: Preliminary Approval Hearing - _____ Deadline for Serving Notices to Class Members - _____ (___ calendar days from preliminary approval) Deadline for Requests for Exclusion and Objections - _____ (60 calendar days from initial mailing) Deadline for Class Counsel to File Motion for Final Approval of Settlement and Motion for Attorney Fees and Response to any Objections - _____ (__ court days prior to hearing) Final Fairness Hearing and Final Approval - _____

Tentative Ruling Re: Motion for Relief Date: 8/27/26 Time: 11:00 am Moving Party: Shimon Rahimi, Victor Ariel Herrera Aguilar, and Vicente Tuxpan (collectively "Plaintiffs") Opposing Party: Cambridge Farms Kosher, Inc. ("Defendant") Department: 11 Judge: Bruce G. Iwasaki ________________________________________________________________________ TENTATIVE RULING Plaintiffs' motion for relief is moot. BACKGROUND This is a wage-and-hour action. On May 22, 2026, the Court heard Defendant's motions to compel depositions.

Plaintiffs filed late oppositions. The Court granted the motions to compel in part, ordering Plaintiffs Shimon Rahimi and Victor Ariel Herrera Aguilar to appear for depositions, and deferred the decision on Defendant's requests for monetary sanctions. (See 5/22/26 Minute Order, pp. 1-2.) Here, Plaintiffs move for relief, asking the Court to read the late oppositions and to continue the May 22 nd hearing. The motion is brought pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 473(b). DISCUSSION Arguments Plaintiffs Plaintiffs contend relief is warranted because the failure to file oppositions on time was caused by a calendaring error by Plaintiffs' counsel: Plaintiff Rahimi filed this action on December 17, 2021.

Declaration of Hayley M. Davis ("Davis Decl.") at P.

4. Defendant filed its Motions on March 17, 2026 and set them for hearing for May 22, 2026. Davis Decl. at P.P. 5-6. Upon receipt of the Motions, counsel mistakenly calendared the opposition due date as if it were a reply brief. Id. at P.

8. Instead of calendaring the deadline for nine court days before the hearing (May 11, 2026), counsel erroneously calendared the deadline for five court days before the hearing (May 15, 2026). Id. Plaintiff's counsel discovered her error on May 13, 2026 while preparing Plaintiffs' Opposition papers. Id. at P.

9. Plaintiffs' Opposition papers are being filed concurrently with the instant motion for relief under Section 473(b). Id. at P.

10. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' Opposition papers will be filed a total of

three days late. *** The California Supreme Court has "found it obvious that entering the wrong date in an attorney's calendar [i]s sufficient to warrant relief under Code of Civil Procedure section 473." Comunidad en Accion, 219 Cal.App.4th at 1135 (citing Haviland v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 172 Cal. 601, 605 (1916)). In general, the rule is that "[w]hile not every mistake of an attorney constitutes excusable neglect [citation], calendar errors by an attorney or a member of his staff are, under appropriate circumstances, excusable."

Flores v. Board of Supervisors, 13 Cal.App.3d 480, 483-484 (1970) (collecting cases). A single calendaring error is "a mistake 'anyone could have made'" and warrants relief. Comunidad en Accion, 219 Cal.App.4th at 1135. Ms. Davis's declaration satisfies the relief provision of section 473. Her mistaken calendaring of Plaintiff's Opposition deadline as if it were a reply brief is a mistake "anyone could have made" and is thus excusable. Id. at 1132; see also Cal. Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 1005(b)("All papers opposing a motion so noticed shall be filed with the court and a copy served on each party at least nine court days, and all reply papers at least five court days before the hearing.").

Ms. Davis discovered her error on May 13, 2025 and filed the Opposition papers the following day. Davis Decl. P.P. 9-10. That Plaintiffs served their Opposition papers just three days late further supports the conclusion that Plaintiffs' counsel has been diligent and the late filing was truly an inadvertent and unfortunate mistake. Id. at P. 10. (Motion, pp. 4-5, 6.) Defendant Defendant claims the motion for relief is moot: Plaintiffs' Motion for Relief under Code of Civil Procedure Section 473 is moot.

The Court has already considered Plaintiffs' late-filed opposition papers, granted in part Defendant's Motions compelling the deposition examinations of Plaintiffs Shimon Rahimi and Victor Ariel Herrera Aguilar on a date certain and continued Defendant's requests for attorneys' fees to the hearing set for August 27, 2026. Plaintiffs' Motion for Relief requested the Court to: (1) accept Plaintiffs untimely filed opposition brief to Defendant's Motions to Compel the Deposition Attendance of Plaintiffs on Dates Certain and Awards for Attorneys' Fees; and (2) to briefly continue the May 22, 2026 hearing.

The Court has granted both of Plaintiffs' requests and effectively rendered their Motion for Relief under Code of Civil Procedure section 473 moot. Since Plaintiffs' Motion for Relief does not address Defendant's requests for attorneys' fees nothing remains on Plaintiffs' Motion for Relief for the Court to decide. (Opposition, p. 2; see also id. at p. 3 ["Plaintiffs filed their Motion for Relief on May 14, 2026, The Court effectively granted Plaintiffs their requested relief on May 22, 2026, when it considered Plaintiffs' late opposition brief and ordered a continuation of the issue of

Defendant's awards for attorneys' fees to August 27, 2026. The relief requested by Plaintiff has been effectively granted by the Court's May 22, 2026 order. The matter of awarding attorneys' fees' therefore remains pending on Defendant's Motions, not on Plaintiffs' Motion for Relief. Plaintiffs' Motion for Relief is effectively moot."].) Reply Plaintiffs state: * During the May 22 nd hearing, the Court did not consider the late oppositions. (See Reply, pp. 3-4.) * Defendant's requests for monetary sanctions are "outrageous an unsupported[.]" (Id. at p. 4.)

Analysis

Section 473(b) contains a mandatory provision and a discretionary provision. "Mandatory relief may be sought only from defaults, default judgments and dismissals[.]" (Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civ. Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2025) P. 5:290.) "Discretionary relief applies 'in connection with any order' and may be granted for" "mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect[.]" (Ibid.) Plaintiffs' counsel submitted a declaration of fault. (See Davis Decl., P.P. 3-9.) In some situations, an attorney's declaration of fault renders relief mandatory. (See, e.g., Weil & Brown, supra, at P.P. 5:292, 5:294, 11:114 [requiring mandatory relief from defaults, default judgments, and equivalent dismissals when attorneys file declarations of fault]; see also Cal.

Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 473, subd. (b) [similar].) Plaintiffs' situation is not one of those situations. Being ordered to sit for depositions after failing to file timely oppositions does not qualify as a default, default judgment, or dismissal akin to a default. The question is whether discretionary relief should be granted. The answer is no. Plaintiffs' moving brief "requests that the Court (1) accept Plaintiffs' late filing of their Opposition papers and (2) briefly continue, by at least three court days, the May 22, 2026 hearing on Defendant's Motions to allow Defendant to file timely replies." (Motion, p. 6; see also id. at p. 4 ["Plaintiffs request that the Court grant relief from the late filing of the Oppositions, continue the May 22, 2026 hearing date for Defendant's Motions, and reset the briefing schedule to enable Defendant to file timely replies on the merits."].)

As Defendant points out, the Court continued the May 22 nd hearing and granted a continuance as to Defendant's requests for monetary sanctions. The oppositions and replies have been read. In essence, Plaintiffs have already received the relief that they seek, so discretionary

relief is unneeded, and the motion for relief is moot. [1] [1] The sanctions requests will be addressed at the August 27 th hearing. Case Number: 25STCV36223 Hearing Date: August 27, 2026 Dept: 11 Rose (25STCV36223) Tentative Ruling Re: Demurrer Date: 8/27/26 Time: 11:00 am Moving Party: Google LLC ("Google" or "Defendant") Opposing Party: Devin Rose ("Plaintiff") Department: 11 Judge: Bruce G. Iwasaki ________________________________________________________________________ TENTATIVE RULING Defendant's request for judicial notice is granted.

Exhibit 1 is a magazine article. Exhibit 2 is a webpage from Google's website. Plaintiff references the exhibits in the complaint. (See Defendant's Request for Judicial Notice, p. 3.) The Court will judicially notice the exhibits' existence. Defendant's demurrer is sustained with leave to amend in part and overruled in part. BACKGROUND This is a putative class action. Plaintiff claims he purchased a Google Drive ("Drive") subscription. (See Complaint, 5.) He alleges that "his Drive files were deleted" unexpectedly and that Google "could not provide any solution to restore the deleted files." (Ibid.)

He contends Google has "consistently failed to inform the public" and subscribers "that their Drive files can be deleted without warning." (Id. at P. 1.) Here, Google demurs to the first cause of action for violation of Civil Code section 1750, the Consumer Legal Remedies Act ("CLRA"), and the second cause of action for violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200, the Unfair Competition Law ("UCL"). APPLICABLE LAW Demurrer When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context, and "treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law." (Serrano v.

Priest (1971) 5 Cal.3d 584,