Tissera vs. Mann

address the threshold question . . . effectively concedes that issue and renders its remaining arguments moot”); Glendale Redevelopment Agency v. Parks (1993) 18 Cal. App. 4th 1409, 1424 (issue is impliedly conceded by failing to address it).)

Case Management Conference is set on December 03, 2026, at 09:00 am in Department C10.

Defendant shall give notice of this ruling.

5 Tissera vs. Mann Defendants Jeff A. Mann and Brian K. Trinidad’s motion to transfer venue to Los Angeles County is GRANTED.

Defective Service of Opposition

As a preliminary matter, the proof of service for Plaintiffs’ Opposition, dated 8/14/26, shows electronic service to Defendant Jeff Mann, in pro per, at Defendant Mann’s address, and to Defendant Brian Trinidad, in pro per, at Defendant Trinidad’s address. (See ROA 52). However, on 7/28/26, Defendant Trinidad filed a substitution of attorney, and is now represented by Michael McCarthy of Nemecek & Cole. (See ROA 45). A copy of this substitution was served to Plaintiff’s counsel on 7/28/26. (See ROA 45). Accordingly, Plaintiffs were required to serve Mr. McCarthy with the Opposition. (See Cal. R. Ct., rule 1.21 [Whenever a document is required to be served on a party, the service must be made on the party's attorney if the party is represented.]).

The court notes that Defendant Mann filed a Reply to the Opposition on 8/17/26, and that Defendant Trinidad (represented by counsel Mr. McCarthy) filed a Notice of Joinder to Defendant Mann’s Reply on 8/20/26. Defendant Trinidad did not raise the issue of improper service in his Notice.

Accordingly, the court will consider Plaintiffs’ Opposition, Defendant Mann’s Reply, and Defendant Trinidad’s Joinder.

Governing Authority

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 396b, subdivision (a), “if an action or proceeding is commenced in a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter thereof, other than the court designated as the proper court for the trial thereof...the action may, notwithstanding, be tried in the court where commenced, unless the defendant...within the time otherwise allowed to respond to the complaint, files with the clerk, a notice of motion for an order transferring the action or proceeding to the proper court...”

“Upon hearing of the motion the court shall, if it appears that the action or proceeding was not commenced in the proper court, order the action or

proceeding transferred to the proper court.” (Code of Civil Procedure section 396b, subd. (a).)

Similarly, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 397, the court may, on motion, change the place for trial “[w]hen the court designated in the complaint is not the proper court” or “[w]hen the convenience of witnesses and the ends of justice would be promoted by the change.” (Code Civ. Proc., §397, subd. (a) and (c).)

Initially, “in the absence of an affirmative showing to the contrary, the presumption is that the county in which the title of the action shows that it is brought is, prima facie, the proper county for the commencement and trial of the action.” (Mission Imports, Inc. v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 921, 928.)

“It is a long-established rule that a motion for change of venue must satisfy two requirements: (1) It must show the action is proper in the county to which the movant seeks transfer; and (2) it must be shown the county in which the action was filed was improper under any applicable theory. [Citation.]” (La Mirada Community Hospital v. Superior Court (1967) 249 Cal.App.2d 39, 42; see also Mosby v. Superior Court (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 219, 228 [stating “Defendants have the burden of showing that venue is proper in the county to which they seek to transfer and also showing that Shasta County is not a proper place for trial under any applicable theory.”]; Fontaine v. Superior Court (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 830, 836 [“[I]t is the moving defendant’s burden to demonstrate that the plaintiff’s venue selection is not proper under any of the statutory grounds.”]).

Proper Venue

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 395, subdivision (a), the “general rule” is that: “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law and subject to the power of the court to transfer actions or proceedings as provided in this title, the superior court in the county where the defendants or some of them reside at the commencement of the action is the proper court for the trial of the action. If the action is for injury to person or personal property or for death from wrongful act or negligence, the superior court in either the county where the injury occurs or the injury causing death occurs or the county where the defendants, or some of them reside at the commencement of the action, is a proper court for the trial of the action...Subject to subdivision (b), if a defendant has contracted to perform an obligation in a particular county, the superior court in the county where the obligation is to be performed, where the contract in fact was entered into, or where the defendant or any defendant resides at the commencement of the action is a proper court for the trial of an action founded on that obligation, and the county where the obligation is incurred is the county where it is to be performed, unless there is a special contract in writing to the contrary. ” (See Code Civ.

Proc. § 395, subd. (a); see also (Fontaine, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at 837.)

“For venue to be proper in a county other than the county in which a defendant resides, the action must fall within a statutory exception.” (Fontaine, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at 837.)

Defendants contend that venue in Orange County is improper because both Defendants reside in Los Angeles County, have resided in Los Angeles County during all relevant times, and their principal place of business is in Los Angeles County. (Decl. of Mann, ¶¶2-3; Decl. of Trinidad, ¶¶ 2-3). Defendants also contend that the legal services at issue in the Complaint were performed primarily in Los Angeles County, and that the retainer agreements were executed in Defendants’ Los Angeles office. (Decl. of Mann, ¶¶ 4-5, Decl. of Trinidad, ¶¶4-5).

Plaintiffs contend that one of the three lawsuits that Defendants litigated, which is the subject of Plaintiffs’ malpractice and other claims, was venued in Orange County and litigated in Orange County (Usman Chowdhry v. Franz Gerald Andre Tissera, Phase9Motorsports, Inc., et al., Orange County Superior Court Case No. 30-2022-01258301-CU-FR-CJC). Plaintiffs also contend that the retainer agreement was signed in Orange County. Plaintiff Franz Tissera submitted a declaration wherein he declared the following: “In or around May 2022, I, together with my co-plaintiffs Frederick Tissera and Angela Chisholm, retained Defendant Jeff A.

Mann to represent us, along with Phase9Motorsports, Inc., in Usman Chowdhry v. Franz Gerald Andre Tissera, Phase9Motorsports, Inc., et al., Orange County Superior Court Case No. 30-2022 01258301-CU-FR-CJC (the “Usman action”).” (Decl. of Tissera, ¶ 4). “I recall receiving a copy of the fee agreement from Mr. Mann and taking it with me to my residence in Anaheim, Orange County, California, so that it could be signed by me and my siblings, Frederick Tissera and Angela Chisholm.” (Decl. of Tissera, ¶ 5). “On or about May 19, 2022, I signed my portion of the fee agreement in Anaheim, Orange County, California.

Frederick Tissera and Angela Chisholm also signed their respective portions of the agreement in Anaheim, Orange County, California, at or around the same time.” (Decl. of Tissera, ¶ 6). “After the agreement had been signed by all three of us, I personally returned the signed copy to Mr. Mann at his law office in Los Angeles.” (Decl. of Tissera, ¶ 7). “I do not presently recall whether Mr. Mann had already signed the fee agreement before he provided it to me or whether he signed it after I returned the executed copy to his office.

I do recall that the client signatures of myself, Frederick Tissera, and Angela Chisholm were placed on the agreement in Orange County before I personally returned the signed agreement to Mr. Mann.” (Decl. of Tissera, ¶ 8). Plaintiffs cite to the portion of Code Civ. Proc. § 395, subd. (a) which provides that if a defendant has contracted to perform an obligation in a particular county, the superior court in the county where the obligation is to be performed, where the contract in fact was entered into, or where the defendant or any defendant resides at the commencement of the action is a proper court for the trial of an action founded on that obligation, and the county where the obligation is incurred is the county where it is to be performed, unless there is a special contract in writing to the contrary.

According to Plaintiffs, Defendants cannot establish that Orange County is an improper venue because the contracts were executed in Orange County and 15

one of the three lawsuits required Defendants’ services to be rendered in Orange County. In response, Defendant cites to Cholakian & Associates v. Superior Court (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 361, where the court held that an action for legal malpractice, bad faith, and breach of contract is personal, transitory, and that the proper county is the county in which the defendants or some of them reside. (Id. at 368). Cholakian, however, does not explicitly address whether a cause of action for legal malpractice is within the scope of the contractual obligation exception. Neither party identifies authority that addresses this issue.

The California Supreme Court in Dawson v. Goff (1954) 43 Cal.2d 310 construed the contractual provision of Code Civ. Proc. § 395 to mean the following: “The section in effect says that ‘* * * all actions arising on contract shall be tried in the county in which the defendant resides, or in which the contract was made, exception as only applying to ‘actions arising on contract.’” (Id. at 314 [emphasis added]).

Plaintiffs do not assert a single cause of action for breach of contract. Plaintiffs’ claims are for legal malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, conversion, declaratory relief, constructive fraud, accounting, money had and received and violation of Penal Code § 496. (See Compl.).

Furthermore, even if Plaintiffs could establish that one or more of their claims were founded on a contract, both parties agree that “[a] defendant entitled to a change of venue as to one count in a multiple count complaint is entitled to the change as to the entire action.” (Mitchell v. Superior Court (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 1040, 1046; see also Gallin v. Superior Court (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 541, 542-544, 546 [proper county for class action complaint “for fraud, negligent misrepresentation, unfair competition ... deceptive consumer ... and breach of contract” was the defendants’ county of residence]).

Not all of Plaintiffs’ claims are founded on the retainer agreement. Plaintiffs allege tort claims against Defendants for constructive fraud and conversion, and violation of Penal Code § 496 on that basis that Defendants “knowingly received, withheld, and retained funds belonging to Franz that were obtained by theft, embezzlement, or other unlawful means, and did so for their own benefit and without lawful authorization. The stolen or unlawfully obtained property included, without limitation, $97,500 in settlement proceeds wrongfully withheld in connection with the Safeco claim and $34,500 in additional funds obtained through unauthorized credit-card and bank charges.” (Compl., ¶ 106).

Plaintiffs cite to Hale v. Bohannon (1952) 38 Cal.2d 458 in support of their contention that Orange County is a proper venue for these claims because the court in Hale held that “a debt is payable at the place where the creditor resides.” (Id. at 467). However, the cause of action at issue in Hale was breach of contract. (See id. at 466). Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate all of their claims are subject to the contractual obligation provision within Code Civ. Proc. § 395 (a). Accordingly, because at least one or more of the claims against

Defendants require the action to be tried in Defendants’ county of residence, the court GRANTS the motion to transfer to Los Angeles County.

Case Management Conference is continued to December 03, 2026, at 09:00 am in Department C10, if all applicable fees have been paid and case transferred – hearing will be vacated.

Defendants shall give notice.

6 Doe K.N. vs. The demurrers by Defendants Cristina Alba, Charidan Jackson, Orangewood and Southeastern California Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists dba Academy Orangewood Academy (“SCC”) are OVERRULED as to the third cause of action for intentional infliction of emotion distress of the second amended complaint by Plaintiff Jane Doe K.N.

The demurrer by SCC to the fifth cause of action for negligent hiring, retention, and supervision of the second amended complaint is SUSTAINED with 20 days leave to amend.

DEMURRER

The elements of a cause of action for IIED are: “(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff suffered severe emotional distress; and (3) the defendant’s extreme and outrageous conduct was the actual and proximate cause of the severe emotional distress. [Citation.] [¶] A defendant’s conduct is considered to be outrageous if it is so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community. [Citations.]” (Crouch v. Trinity Christian Center of Santa Ana, Inc. (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 995, 1007.)

Defendant argues that Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently plead severe emotional distress. Plaintiff details the alleged conduct that caused Plaintiff IIED by each moving defendant:

• “32. DEFENDANT CRISTINA M. ALBA’s choice to give plaintiff a failing grade despite plaintiff acing her final examination, refusing to change the grade despite plaintiff and her parents raising such concerns to Defendant ALBA, interfering with Plaintiff’s college scholarship eligibility were all retaliatory acts taken against plaintiff for reporting DEFENDANT MORGAN, calling minor plaintiff a liar to third parties after disclosing the sexual assault and battery done by school principal DEFENDANT MORGAN, and stating ORANGEWOOD ACADEMY would not do anything about her reports of sexual assault and battery was extreme and outrageous conduct. It is the totality of this defendant’s actions that arise to extreme and outrageous conduct, to protect Defendant Morgan by using their limited power in the classroom to retaliate against plaintiff.” (SAC, ¶ 32). 17

• “33. DEFENDANT CHARIDAN JACKSON’s choice to give plaintiff a failing grade despite plaintiff acing her final examination, refusing to change the grade despite plaintiff and her parents raising such concerns to Defendant JACKSON, interfering with Plaintiff’s college scholarship eligibility were all retaliatory acts taken against plaintiff for reporting DEFENDANT MORGAN, calling minor plaintiff a liar to third parties after disclosing the sexual assault and battery done by school principal DEFENDANT MORGAN, shaking her head in disagreement and rolling her eyes during Jane Doe’s statement at the board meeting, in addition to not submitting the final grade that Jane Doe earned, was extreme and outrageous conduct.

It is the totality of this defendant’s actions that arise to extreme and outrageous conduct, to protect Defendant Morgan by using their limited power in the classroom to retaliate against plaintiff.” (SAC, ¶ 33).

• “36. Defendant DOE 1’s refusal to intervene and take action after Plaintiff reported Defendant MORGAN’s conduct constitutes as extreme and outrageous conduct, including but not limited to failing to comply with its mandatory reporter obligations and reporting Defendant MORGAN to law enforcement.” (SAC, ¶ 36).

• “37. Defendant DOE 1’s to intervene and take action after Plaintiff reported Defendant ALBA and JACKSON’s conduct constitutes as extreme and outrageous conduct.” (SAC, ¶ 37).

As to the conduct of the Individual Defendants, the court finds that Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to allege a cause of action for IIED. “Behavior may be considered outrageous if a defendant (1) abuses a relation or position which gives him power to damage the plaintiff's interest; (2) knows the plaintiff is susceptible to injuries through mental distress; or (3) acts intentionally or unreasonably with the recognition that the acts are likely to result in illness through mental distress.” (McDaniel v.

Gile (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 363, 372). Here, Plaintiff alleges that Plaintiff reported that the school's principal had sexually assaulted her, Alba and Jackson retaliated by falsifying Plaintiff's grade despite Plaintiff having earned an A on her final exam but entering a zero, refused to correct the false grade even after Plaintiff and her parents raised the discrepancy directly with her. Plaintiff also alleges that this action deliberately interfered with Plaintiff's merit-based college scholarship eligibility.

Defendant Jackson then told other faculty members Plaintiff was a liar and created social isolation for Plaintiff at school. A trier of fact could reasonably infer that such conduct was an abuse of Alba and Jackson’s position, used to damage Plaintiff’s interest, that Plaintiff was susceptible to mental distress and that social isolation and the loss of a merit-based college scholarship would cause mental distress to a teenager.

18