Not Specified v. Honda

(Governor George Deukmejian Courthouse: Dept. S28) August 27, 2026 DEPARTMENT S28 LAW AND MOTION RULINGS Preliminary Matters Request for Judicial Notice Defendant asks the Court to take judicial notice of the Complaint, which is a Court record. It is not necessary for the Court to take judicial notice of the Complaint as it is already part of this Court's record. Nevertheless, this request is GRANTED.

Analysis

Plaintiff's Song-Beverly Act Claims (First through Fourth causes of action) Plaintiff's first four causes of action arise under the Song-Beverly Act. "The Song-Beverly Act is a remedial statute designed to protect consumers who have purchased products covered by an express warranty."¿ (Robertson v. Fleetwood Travel Trailers of California, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 785, 798.)¿ The Song-Beverly Act requires that "[e]very manufacturer of consumer goods sold in this state and for which the manufacturer has made an express warranty shall: [P.] (1)(A) Maintain in this state sufficient service and repair facilities reasonably close to all areas where its consumer goods are sold to carry out the terms of those warranties or designate and authorize in this state as service and repair facilities independent repair or service facilities reasonably close to all areas where its consumer goods are sold to carry out the terms of the warranties."¿ (Civ.

Code, Sec. 1793.2(a).)¿¿¿ For motor vehicles specifically, "[i]f the manufacturer or its representative in this state is unable to service or repair a new motor vehicle, as that term is defined in paragraph (2) of subdivision (e) of Section 1793.22, to conform to the applicable express warranties after a reasonable number of attempts, the manufacturer shall either promptly replace the new motor vehicle in accordance with subparagraph (A) or promptly make restitution to the buyer in accordance with subparagraph (B)."¿(Civ.

Code, Sec. 1793.2(d)(2).) A single repair attempt for an express warranty vehicle does not trigger the Song-Beverly Act. (Silvio v. Ford Motor Co. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1205, 1207-1209 (Silvio).) i. COA 1: Whether Plaintiff's Express Warranty Claim is Properly Plead

Defendant argues that Plaintiff does not sufficiently plead the failure to repair element of the express warranty claim as she does not allege that she brought her Vehicle in for the repair of any problem more than once. (Mot., p. 6.) Defendant contends that Plaintiff merely parrots the failure to repair element with no facts, pleading that Honda and "its representatives in this state have been unable to service or repair the Vehicle to conform to the applicable express warranties after a reasonable number of opportunities" (Compl.

P. 27). In opposition, Plaintiff argues that the express warranty claim is adequately plead because Plaintiff has alleged ultimate facts that she is a buyer of consumer goods (a Honda Pilot), Honda provided a warranty, and then failed to honor that warranty. (Opp., p. 3.) Plaintiff argues that "[d]ealerships need to submit repair information to Honda to be reimbursed for their work. Honda keeps records of all the warranty repairs done to this Vehicle. The Vehicle Identification Number alone is sufficient to allow Honda to review its records and prepare its defense." (Ibid.)

In reply, Defendant contends that Plaintiff is applying the incorrect notice pleading standard, and that Plaintiff is in the best position to know the factual basis for her claims--the issues involve her vehicle; the problems she experienced while driving; the date(s) she brought it to a dealership for repairs; the number of times she did so; whether those issues continued afterward; and whether she paid any money out-of-pocket versus covered by warranty. (Reply, pp. 2-3.) Here, Plaintiff fails to sufficiently allege her express warranty claim.

The Court agrees with Defendant that Plaintiff fails to allege the specific defect or nonconformity at issue (referring only to " transmission defects, engine defects, electrical defects") and fails to allege that she presented her vehicle to an authorized dealership for specific nonconformities on at least two occasions during the warranty period, or that the dealership failed to repair it after those attempts. Plaintiff's opposition refers to compliance with the bare "notice pleading standards" whereby a complaint "will be upheld [against pleading attack] so long as the pleading gives notice of the issues sufficient to enable preparation of a defense." (Opp., p. 3.)

The Court cannot agree with Plaintiff that "the Vehicle Identification Number alone is sufficient to allow Honda to review its records and prepare its defense," as the legislature would have set such a bare requirement for lemon law pleadings if it

intended to do so. The Complaint does not even make an effort to identify repair dates or any other basic information required to sustain these claims. "[A] plaintiff is required only to set forth the essential facts of his case with reasonable precision and with particularity sufficient to acquaint a defendant with the nature, source and extent of his cause of action." (Youngman v. Nevada Irrigation District (1969) 70 Cal.2d 240, 245 (Youngman); see also Doheny Park Terrace Homeowners Assn., Inc. v.

Truck Ins. Exchange (2005) 132 Cal.App.4 th 1076, 1099 (Doheny Park Terrace).) While Plaintiff claims that Defendant is in a superior position to possess information on repairs, Defendant is not the party bringing this action and it is not Defendant's burden to allege facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. Plaintiff is on equal footing to at least have knowledge of when and for what reason she presented the Vehicle to Defendant for repairs. Further, while Plaintiff asserts that "the Legislature recently amended the Code of Civil Procedure to impose on manufacturers a duty to provide Plaintiff with the exact information Honda claims is lacking in the Complaint," Plaintiff concedes that Honda did not opt-in to these procedures, and it is thus unclear how those procedures are relevant here. (Opp., p. 3.)

Plaintiff makes only a conclusory statement that "[r]easonableness and sufficiency are not matters that can be resolved at the pleading stage--they require decision by the finder of fact," putting forth no legal authority that would prevent the Court from granting the instant Motion on the insufficient facts plead. (Opp., p. 4.) Therefore, the motion for judgment on the pleadings is GRANTED as to the first cause of action for breach of express warranty. The Court discusses leave to amend below. ii.

COA 2: Whether Plaintiff's 1793.2(b) Claim is Properly Plead Section 1793.2, subd. (b) of the SBA provides manufacturers must commence service and repair "within a reasonable time," and "the goods shall be serviced or repaired so as to conform to the applicable warranties within 30 days." (Cal. Civ. Code

Sec. 1793.2, subd. (b).) Defendant argues that Plaintiff does not sufficiently plead facts for her section 1793.2(b) claim about the length of any single repair or that any repair was not performed within thirty days or "commenced within a reasonable time." (Mot., p. 6.) In opposition, Plaintiff does not address this cause of action. In reply, Defendant points out that Plaintiff failed to oppose the motion insofar as it challenges the Section 1793.2(b) claim. (Reply, p. 2.) Here, Plaintiff does not sufficiently plead facts for her section 1793.2(b) claim.

Plaintiff makes conclusory allegations that "Defendant and its representative failed to commence the service or repairs within a reasonable time and failed to service or repair the Vehicle to conform to the applicable warranties within 30 days. (Complaint, P. 33.) Plaintiff fails to allege any facts such as the length of any single repair or that any repair was not performed within thirty days. Therefore, the motion for judgment on the pleadings is GRANTED as to the second cause of action for violation of 1793.2(b).

The Court discusses leave to amend below. iii. COA 3: Whether Plaintiff's 1793.2(a)(3) Claim is Properly Plead A cause of action for violation of subdivision (a)(3) of Civil Code section 1793.2 requires a showing that the manufacturer failed to "[m]ake available to authorized service and repair facilities sufficient literature and replacement parts to effect repairs during the express warranty period." (Civ. Code, Sec. 1793.2.) Defendant argues that the FAC does not identify whether Honda allegedly failed to provide service literature and/or replacement parts for their section 1793.2(a)(3) claim. (Mot., p. 7.)

In opposition, Plaintiff does not address this cause of action. In reply, Defendant argues that Plaintiff's opposition is silent on this issue, so

they have thereby conceded any arguments in opposition. (Reply, p. 2.) Here, Plaintiff does not sufficiently plead facts for her section 1793.2(a)(3) claim. Plaintiff makes conclusory allegations that "Defendant failed to make available to its authorized service and repair facilities sufficient service literature and replacement parts to effect repairs during the express warranty period." (Complaint, P. 38.) Plaintiff fails to allege any specific facts such as what the literature Honda failed to provide should have pertained to or the parts at issue.

Therefore, the motion for judgment on the pleadings is GRANTED as to the third cause of action for violation of 1793.2(a)(3). The Court discusses leave to amend below. iv. COA 4: Whether Plaintiff's Implied Warranty Claim is Properly Plead Defendant argues that Plaintiff's implied warranty claim fails because she does not identify the issue she alleges rendered her Vehicle not merchantable, and she has not pleaded any issue impacting the Vehicle's quality and fitness that arose during the one-year implied warranty duration s. (Mot. p. 8.)

In opposition, Plaintiff invokes the latent-defect doctrine under Mexia v. Rinker Boat Co. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1297, arguing that a latent defect which is not discovered until after the duration of the implied warranty may still show a breach of the implied warranty, and it is not necessary that the Vehicle was undriveable during that period. (Opp., p. 4.) In reply, Defendant contends that Plaintiff fails to respond to the first argument regarding their failure to allege what rendered their Vehicle not merchantable, thereby conceding it. (Reply, p. 5.)

As to the second argument, Defendant challenges Plaintiff's invocation of the latent-defect doctrine under Mexia. (Ibid.) Defendant argues that for the latent-defect doctrine to apply, Plaintiff must adequately allege what the latent defect is, and she has not done so, nor has she alleged what rendered her vehicle unmerchantable. (Ibid.) Here, Plaintiff does not sufficiently plead facts for her implied warranty claim. Plaintiff makes conclusory allegations that "[a]t the time of sale, the subject Vehicle contained one or more latent defect(s) set forth above.

The existence

of the said defect(s) constitutes a breach of the implied warranty because the Vehicle (1) does not pass without objection in the trade under the contract description, (2) is not fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used, (3) is not adequately contained, packaged, and labelled, and (4) does not conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the container or label." (Complaint, P. 43.) Plaintiff fails to allege any specific facts such as what the latent defect was, or what exactly rendered their vehicle unmerchantable.

Therefore, the motion for judgment on the pleadings is GRANTED as to the fourth cause of action for violation of implied warranty. The Court discusses leave to amend below. COA 5: Fraudulent Concealment Fraud based on concealment requires that "(1) the defendant must have concealed or suppressed a material fact, (2) the defendant must have been under a duty to disclose the fact to the plaintiff, (3) the defendant must have intentionally concealed or suppressed the fact with the intent to defraud the plaintiff, (4) the plaintiff must have been unaware of the fact and would not have acted as he did if he had known of the concealed or suppressed fact, and (5) as a result of the concealment or suppression of the fact, the plaintiff must have sustained damage." (Bigler-Engler v.

Breg, Inc. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 276, 310-311 (Bigler-Engler).) "Even under the strict rules of common law pleading, one of the canons was that less particularity is required when the facts lie more in the knowledge of the opposite party." (Alfaro v. Community Housing Improvement System & Planning Assn., Inc. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1256, 1384.) An essential element of intentional concealment includes the duty to disclose, which must be based upon a transaction, or a special relationship, between plaintiff and defendant. (Id. at p. 314.) "There are 'four circumstances in which nondisclosure or concealment may constitute actionable fraud: (1) when the defendant is in a fiduciary relationship with the plaintiff; (2) when the defendant had exclusive knowledge of material facts not known to the plaintiff; (3) when the defendant actively conceals a material fact from the plaintiff; and (4) when the defendant makes partial representations but also suppresses some material facts.'" (Id. at p. 311.) "[O]ther than the first instance, in which there must be a fiduciary relationship between the parties, 'the other three circumstances in which nondisclosure may be

actionable presuppose[] the existence of some other relationship between the plaintiff and defendant in which a duty to disclose can arise. . . . "[W]here material facts are known to one party and not to the other, failure to disclose them is not actionable fraud unless there is some relationship between the parties which gives rise to a duty to disclose such known facts." [Citation.]' [Citation.]" (Hoffman v. 162 North Wolfe LLC (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 1178, 1187 (Hoffman).) "Such a transaction must necessarily arise from direct dealings between the plaintiff and the defendant; it cannot arise between the defendant and the public at large." (Bigler-Engler, supra, 7 Cal.App.5th at p. 312.)

Economic Loss Rule The¿economic¿loss rule provides that¿"[i]n general, there is no recovery in tort for negligently inflicted¿'purely¿economic¿losses,'¿meaning financial harm unaccompanied by physical or property damage."¿(Sheen v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 905, 922 (quoting,¿ Southern California Gas Leak Cases¿ (2019) 7 Cal.5th 391, 400).) Furthermore, it¿"requires a [contractual party] to recover in contract for purely¿economic¿loss due to disappointed expectations, unless he can demonstrate harm above and beyond a broken contractual promise."¿(Robinson Helicopter Co., Inc. ¿ v.

Dana Corp. ¿(2004) 34 Cal.4th 979, 988 (Robinson).) In¿ Robinson, supra,¿ 34 Cal.4th at p. 988, the court explained the¿economic¿loss rule's application to an intentional tort, specifically fraudulent misrepresentation, in the performance of a¿contract. The¿court found that a parts supplier who falsely certified the parts were manufactured according to contract specifications was liable in tort as well as breach of contract.¿(Robinson, supra, 34 Cal.4th at ¿ p. 991.) However, the court declined to address the¿issue of fraudulent concealment and only¿decided¿the matter¿of affirmative misrepresentation.¿(Ibid.)¿("Because [the supplier]'s affirmative intentional misrepresentations of fact (i.e., the issuance of the false certificates of conformance) are dispositive fraudulent conduct related to the performance of the contract, we need not address the issue of whether [the supplier]'s intentional concealment constitutes an independent tort.")¿ This issue is controlled by¿ Dhital, where¿the court held,¿"plaintiffs'¿claim for fraudulent inducement by concealment is not subject to demurrer on the ground it is barred by the¿economic¿loss rule."¿(Dhital¿v.

Nissan North America, Inc. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 828, 840 (Dhital) (review

dismissed December 18, 2024.) The California Supreme Court granted review of¿ Dhital ¿and deferred further action¿"pending consideration and disposition of a related issue in [Rattagan¿v. Uber Technologies, Inc. ¿(2024) 17 Cal.5th 1 (Rattagan)]."¿(Dhital v. Nissan North America, Inc. (2023) 304 Cal.Rptr.3d 82.) Following publication of¿ Rattagan, ¿ the California Supreme Court dismissed review of¿ Dhital.¿(Dhital v. Nissan North America, Inc. (2024) 327 Cal.Rptr.3d 898.) In¿ Rattagan, ¿the court held,¿"a plaintiff may assert a cause of action for fraudulent concealment based on conduct occurring¿ in the course of a contractual relationship, if the elements of the claim can be established independently of the parties'¿contractual rights and obligations and the tortious conduct exposes the plaintiff to a risk of harm beyond the reasonable contemplation of the parties when they entered into the contract."¿(Rattagan, supra, ¿Cal.5th 1, at p. 54.)

However, the¿ Rattagan ¿court expressly did not consider the application of the¿economic¿loss doctrine to fraudulent¿inducement by concealment.¿(Rattagan¿supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 41 fn. 12 ["[Plaintiff's] tort claims are, of course, based on alleged conduct committed during the contractual relationship but¿purportedly outside¿the parties'¿chosen rights and obligations. This court has granted review in two other cases --¿ Dhital v. Nissan North America, Inc. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 828, 300 Cal.Rptr.3d 715, review granted Feb. 1, 2023, S277568 and¿ Kia America v.

Superior Court ¿(Feb. 3, 2022, D079858) [nonpub.opn.], review granted Apr. 20, 2022, S273170 -- both of which involve claims of fraudulent inducement by concealment claims as well¿as the potential interplay with remedies available under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (Civ. Code, Sec. 1791 et seq.). We do not address these issues here."].)¿¿ Because the California Supreme Court did not address this issue in¿ Rattagan ¿and¿subsequently¿dismissed review,¿ Dhital¿ remains¿binding authority.¿(See ¿Cal Rules of Court, Rule 8.528 (3) ["An order dismissing review does not affect the publication status of the Court of Appeal opinion unless the Supreme Court orders otherwise."];¿ Dhital v.

Nissan North America, Inc. (2023) 304 Cal.Rptr.3d 82, 83 ["The request for an order directing¿depublication¿of the opinion is denied."];¿ see also ¿Advisory Committee Comment, subd. (b), to Cal. Rules of Court, 8.528 [noting "after the [California Supreme C]ourt¿decides a 'lead' case, its current practice is to dismiss review in¿any pending companion case (i.e., a 'grant and hold' matter under rule 8.512(c)) that appears correctly decided in light of the lead case and presents no additional issue requiring resolution by the Supreme Court or the Court of

Appeal."].)¿ Defendant first argues that Plaintiff's fraudulent concealment claim is barred by the California Supreme Court's ruling in Rattagan, supra, 17 Cal.5th 1. (Mot. pp. 8-9.) Specifically, Defendant contends that the fraudulent concealment claim fails because the elements of the claim cannot be established independent of the parties' contractual rights and obligations and because the alleged tortious conduct did not expose Plaintiff to a risk of harm beyond the reasonable contemplation of the parties when she entered into the contract. (Id. at p. 9.)

Defendant contends that "Plaintiff brought this lawsuit based on the alleged breach of express warranties--the original manufacturer warranties--provided with the Subject Vehicle. (Compl. P. 7 & Ex. A.) The express warranty covered the Pilot's transmission. (See Compl. Ex. A at 9.) And the harms Plaintiff alleges for her fraudulent concealment claim stem from the condition of the transmission. (Compl. P. 46.) Honda's warranty acknowledges the potential for defects and explains the warranty's purpose is to 'repair or replace any part that is defective in material or workmanship under normal use.' (Compl.

Ex. A at 10.)." (Id. at p. 11.) In opposition, Plaintiff argues that Honda ignores the critical distinction between fraudulent inducement, as in Dhital, and fraud-in-the-performance, as in Rattagan and Robinson. (Opp., p. 7.) Plaintiff puts forth that the Rattagan test is inappropriate here, as the alleged fraudulent inducement is inherently an independent tort occurring prior to the sale. (Ibid.) Plaintiff further contends that "Honda's argument is functionally the equivalent of saying the warranty contract, and the availability of damages through statutory causes of action, categorically exempts Honda from any possible fraud claim.

This argument--that the warranty contract releases Honda from tort liability--'threaten[s] to undermine our tort system's goal of maintaining community standards of conduct and ensuring wrongdoers compensate those they harm. [Citation.] Section 1668 prevents parties 'from granting themselves licenses to commit future aggravated wrongs.' (New England Country Foods, LLC v. VanLaw Food Products, Inc. (2025) 17 Cal.5th 703, 709-10.)" (Opp., p. 8.) In reply, Defendant contends that Dhital involved direct dealings between a plaintiff and defendant, and affirmative statements that were misleading, while Plaintiff here alleges only a nondisclosure of a defect at the time of sale--conduct squarely within the scope of the parties'

contractual expectations. (Reply, p. 7.) Here, Dhital ¿controls, and there is no merit to Defendant's¿economic¿loss rule argument. "[T]ort damages have been¿permitted¿in contract cases . . . where the contract was fraudulently induced." (Robinson Helicopter Co., Inc. v. Dana Corp.¿ (2004) 34 Cal.4th 979, 990.) As Plaintiffs allege that their contract for purchase of the vehicle was the product of fraudulent concealment, the¿economic¿loss¿rule does not apply. Thus, Defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings of the fifth cause of action for Fraudulent Inducement is DENIED on this ground.

Pleading Fraud with Specificity Next, Defendant argues that Plaintiff does not allege facts supporting the fraudulent concealment claim with the requisite specificity. (Mot., p. 13.) Defendant contends that Plaintiff does not sufficiently allege omitted facts; Plaintiff does not sufficiently allege Honda's awareness of materiality; Plaintiff does not sufficiently allege active concealment; and Plaintiff fails to allege any facts regarding her own purchase and reliance. (Mot., pp. 12-15.) In opposition, Plaintiff contends that the Complaint sufficiently alleges the following: "P laintiff entered into a warranty relationship with Honda around July 21, 2024 (Complaint, P. 6); Plaintiff identified the material facts Honda knew prior to her acquisition of the Subject Vehicle that Honda withheld from Plaintiff (Id., P.P. 48-53); Plaintiff alleged that Defendant had superior knowledge of the facts (Id., P. 53); the safety risks posed by the Transmission Defect (Id., P.P. 12, 47-49, 51, 53, 56, 58); the materiality of that information (Id., P.P. 54-56); Plaintiff's reliance on the non-disclosure (Id., P.P. 51, 55, 58); and damages." (Opp., p. 10.)

In reply, Defendant argues that these allegations are so general that it is impossible to know what Honda allegedly failed to disclose to Plaintiff, let alone what non-disclosure allegedly gives rise to liability in this case. (Reply, p. 6.) Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant knew about the Transmission Defect before she purchased the vehicle. (Complaint P.P. 48, 49, 53 [listing defects].) Plaintiff alleges that she did not know about these defects and problems, and Defendant, who had superior knowledge of the defect, did not disclose the defects when

Plaintiff purchased the vehicle. (E.g., Complaint P.P. 49-55.) These allegations are specific enough to allege the information that was concealed, and the danger posed. (See Jones v. ConocoPhillips Co. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1187, 1199-1200 ["it is harder to apply [the requirement of specificity] to a case of simple nondisclosure. 'How does one show "how" and "by what means" something didn't happen, or "when" it never happened, or "where" it never happened?' . . .Even under the strict rules of common law pleading, one of the canons was that less particularity is required when the facts lie more in the knowledge of the opposite party' "].)

Further, while there is authority for the proposition that fraud claims against a corporation must¿identify¿the individuals who made the representations and their position in the company (Tarmann v. State Farm Mut.¿ Auto. Ins. Co. ¿(1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 153, 157), Plaintiff's claim is¿in the nature of a¿concealment claim, in which it would be impracticable to allege the identity of the persons¿who did not¿disclose¿the defect. Finally, a duty to disclose arising from direct dealings is also sufficiently plead here.

Defendant essentially asks the Court to adjudicate whether Plaintiff actually had direct dealings with AHM, but it is enough at the pleading stage that Plaintiff alleges that she entered into a warranty contract with AHM. (Complaint P. 6.) The allegations must be taken as true and no additional allegations on this point are needed at the demurrer stage. In addition to alleging direct dealings that give rise to a duty to disclose, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant had exclusive knowledge of the transmission defect through various sources not available to consumers, such as testing and warranty data. (Complaint P. 50.)

This is sufficient. (Dhital, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at 834 [plaintiff adequately pleaded Nissan's exclusive knowledge of the defect where "plaintiffs alleged in part that Nissan 'knew or should have known about the safety hazard posed by the defective transmissions before the sale of CVT-equipped vehicles from premarket testing, consumer complaints to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration ('NHTSA'), consumer complaints made directly to Nissan and its dealers, and other sources which drove Nissan to issue Technical Service Bulletins acknowledging the transmission's defect."].)

While Defendant argues that these sources were equally available to Plaintiff, the FAC alleges that these sources were not available to

consumers, and no additional allegations on this point are needed at this stage. Therefore, the motion for judgment on the pleadings is DENIED as to the fifth cause of action. Leave to Amend Leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.) The burden is on the complainant to show the Court that a pleading can be amended successfully. (Ibid.) Where a pleading is successfully challenged on demurrer, "[t]he plaintiff has the burden of proving that an amendment would cure the defect." (Schifando v.

City of Los Angeles (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1074, 1081.) Plaintiff requests leave to amend but provides no specifics. (Opp., p. 11.) As leave to amend should be granted whenever there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment, the Court is prepared to grant it. However, at the hearing, Plaintiff must be prepared to explain in further detail what additional facts she will plead and exactly how she can amend to remedy the deficiencies in the Complaint without making it a sham pleading. The Court will decide at the hearing whether to grant leave to file a First Amended Complaint.

Conference Before Amended Pleading or Motion for Judgment on Amended Pleading "If a court grants a motion for judgment on the pleadings and grants leave to amend, the court may order a conference of the parties before an amended pleading, or a motion for judgment on an amended pleading, may be filed. If the conference is held, the court shall not preclude a party from filing a motion for judgment on the pleadings and the time to file a motion for judgment on the pleadings shall not begin until after the conference has concluded." (CCP Sec. 439, subd. (c)(1).)

The Court, if it chooses to grant leave to amend, may also order the parties to confer before filing another motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the first-amended complaint. CONCLUSION Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is GRANTED as to the first, second, third, and fourth causes of