Carole E. Gordon v. ALTICOR INC., et al.

public entities are required to satisfy the express language of the Government Claims Act, reasoning that the Act's intent was not to expand the rights of plaintiffs against government entities but to "'confine potential governmental liability to rigidly delineated circumstances.'" (Lowry, supra, 56 Cal.App.5th at p. 220, quoting DiCampli, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 991.) The Court of Appeal held that Lowry's claim was prematurely filed and denied leave to amend, explaining that "the lawsuit is precluded because it was not preceded by rejection of a claim.

Lowry's noncompliance with the Act cannot be cured by amending the complaint to allege he complied." (Id. at p. 221.) Here, as in Lowry, Plaintiff's proposed first amended complaint would not cure Plaintiff's noncompliance with Government Code section 945.4. Additionally, the facts presented here do not fit the narrow exception carved out in Malear because this is not a situation where a defendant was served with an amended complaint alleging compliance with the claims presentation requirement for the first time after the 45-day waiting period had already passed.

Plaintiff here has already served District with the complaint and caused District to incur litigation expenses, defeating the statutory objectives of the claim presentation requirements. Plaintiff's premature filing therefore precludes Plaintiff's claims against District. Leave to amend is denied. The court declines to reach District's arguments regarding sovereign immunity and sufficiency.

2. Motion to Strike District moves to strike Plaintiff's demand for punitive damages. However, Plaintiff filed a non-opposition to the motion to strike. Accordingly, the motion is granted without leave to amend. III.

Conclusion

District's demurrer is sustained without leave to amend. The motion to strike is granted without leave to amend. Plaintiff's action against Defendant Moulton Niguel Water district is dismissed. District to give notice.

STATE OF CALIFORNIA¿ ¿ FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES DEPARTMENT 14 ¿ ¿ CAROLE E. GORDON, Plaintiff,¿ v. ALTICOR INC., et al., ¿ Defendants.¿¿ |

Case No. 26STCV17591 ¿¿¿¿ Hearing Date: August 26, 2026 Time: 9:00 a.m. ¿ [TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: ¿ SPECIALLY APPEARING DEFENDANT IMI FABI, LLC'S, IMI FABI (DIANA), LLC'S, & IMI FABI (USA), INC.'S MOTIONS TO QUASH PLAINTIFF'S SERVICE OF SUMMONS & COMPLAINT FOR LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION | I.

Background

On June 4, 2026, Plaintiff Carole E. Gordon filed her complaint for personal injury alleging she developed malignant mesothelioma (with sarcomatoid features) from non-occupational exposure to asbestos and asbestos-containing cosmetic products. On July 30, 2026, Defendants IMI Fabi, LLC ("Fabi LLC"), IMI Fabi (Diana), LLC (Fabi Diana), and IMI Fabi (USA), LLC ("Fabi USA") (collectively "Defendants" or "the Fabi entities") filed the operative motions to quash Ms. Gordon's service of summons and complaint, arguing that the court lacks personal jurisdiction over the Fabi entities because Defendants did not purposefully avail themselves of California and Ms.

Gordon failed to establish that the allegations in her complaint arise out of or relate to Defendants' contacts with the state. On August 13, 2026, Ms. Gordon opposed, arguing that the Fabi entities purposefully availed themselves of California's benefits by conducting business in the state supplying talcum powder for cosmetics (i.e. Merle Norman sheer face power) they knew would be distributed on a national scale. Ms. Gordon further argues that Defendants failed to address the reasonableness prong.

In the alternative, Ms. Gordon requests leave to conduct jurisdictional discovery. On August 19, 2026, the Fabi entities replied. Ms. Gordon did not provide sufficient evidence to show that Defendants are subject to the personal¿jurisdiction¿of this court. However, Ms. Gordon presents sufficient evidence to entitle her to targeted and focused jurisdictional discovery as to Defendants' connections to the California market. Therefore,¿Defendants'¿motions to¿quash service of¿summons¿and complaint are continued¿to¿October 23, 2026¿at 9 a.m. in Department 14 at the Spring Street Courthouse.

Ms. Gordon's¿supplemental opposition to the motion to¿quash¿shall be served and filed on or before October 9, 2026. Defendants' supplemental reply shall be served and filed on or before October 16, 2026.¿ Ms. Gordon is ordered to give notice.¿¿ II. Evidentiary Objections Defendants' objections:

Sustained: 8. Horowitz Declaration Ex. 4 - Deposition of Ronald Grexa taken in Mokhtarian, et al. v. Alfred Dunhill Americas, LLC, et al., JCCP Case No. 4674, in the Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Los Angeles, taken on December 8, 2022 and Exhibits: The deposition testimony is inadmissible hearsay. This deposition testimony is an out of court statement introduced for the truth of the matters¿asserted and¿therefore is hearsay.¿As the proponent of the evidence, the burden¿is on plaintiff to¿establish¿an applicable hearsay exception.

Ms. Gordon¿provides no evidence to support the application of a hearsay exception¿especially as the deposition appears to be a discovery deposition.¿(Berroteran v. Superior Court ¿(2022) 12 Cal.5th 867, 895 ["The party urging admission of deposition testimony bears the burden of rebutting the general rule by submitting appropriate information justifying the admission of designated deposition testimony."].)

11. Horowitz Declaration Ex. 10 - June 10, 2002, CSI Purchase Order, Bates Stamp IMI Fabi Elmer (NJ) 0002471: This document is an out of court statement introduced for the truth of the matter asserted therein. Ms. Gordon does not present any evidence to support the application of a hearsay exception. Moreover, there is no evidence that supports that this document is what Ms. Gordon purports it to be. Accordingly, the document is unauthenticated, inadmissible hearsay.

12. Horowitz Declaration Ex. 11 - Cosmetic Specialties, Inc.'s Verified Responses to Plaintiffs' Special Interrogatories served in Fowler, et al. v. Merle Norman Cosmetics, Inc., et al., Case No. 21STCV23555, in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, dated September 5, 2024: The interrogatories are inadmissible hearsay. The interrogatories are an out of court statement introduced for the truth of the matters asserted and therefore hearsay.¿As the proponent of the evidence, the burden¿is on plaintiff to¿establish¿an applicable hearsay exception.

Ms. Gordon does not present any evidence to support the application of a hearsay exception¿especially as the interrogatory responses are provided by CSI, not the Fabi entities. Thus, the objection is sustained. Objections 9-10, and 13 are sustained for the same reasons as objection number 8. Overruled: 1. Horowitz Declaration, Ex. 3 - Elizabeth Marian Gahagan's Declaration, dated August 11, 2026: The Fabi entities object to Ms. Gahagan's statements that Fabi LLC supplied talc to Merle Norman on the grounds that they are misleading and untrue because the Fabi entities only supplied CSI with talc.

However, Defendant's objection speaks to a dispute of fact rather than admissibility. Thus, the court overrules the objection.

3. Horowitz Declaration, Ex. 3 - Elizabeth Marian Gahagan's Declaration, dated August 11, 2026 - para. 6(A) and Documents MNC-Gordon000001 - 000002: The Fabi entities object to the identified paragraph and documents on the grounds that they lack foundation and are hearsay. The Fabi entities also cite to Ramirez v.

Avon Products (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 939, in support of their objection that because Ms. Gahagan did not work for Merle Norman in 1991, she does not have the requisite personal knowledge or foundation. However, paragraph 9 of Ms. Gahagan's declaration sets forth the foundation for a business records exception under Evidence Code section 1271. In addition, paragraph 1 lays a foundation for her knowledge of the company's record keeping practices. Accordingly, the court overrules the objection. Objection number 2 is overruled for the same reasons as objection number 1. Objections 4-7 are overruled for the same reasons as objections number 1 and 3. III.

Discussion

A.

Legal Standard

A defendant may move to quash service of summons on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the court over them. (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 418.10, subd. (a)(1).) The court may dismiss without prejudice the complaint in whole, or as to that defendant, when dismissal is made pursuant to Section 418.10. (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 581, subd. (h).)¿ "A court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United States." (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 410.10.) "The Due Process Clause protects an individual's liberty interest in not being subject to the binding judgments of a forum with which he has established no meaningful 'contacts, ties, or relations."' (Burger King Corp. v.

Rudzewicz (1985) 471 U.S. 462, 471 - 472.) A state court may not exercise personal jurisdiction over a party under circumstances that would offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." (Asahi Metal Industry Co., Ltd., v. Superior Court of California, Solano County (1987) 480 U.S. 102, 113.)¿ When a defendant moves to quash service of process on jurisdictional grounds, the plaintiff has the initial burden of demonstrating facts justifying the exercise of jurisdiction. (Jayone Foods, Inc. v.

Aekyung Industrial Co. Ltd. (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 543, 553.) Once facts showing minimum contacts with the forum state are established, the defendant has the burden to demonstrate the exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable. (Ibid.) "The plaintiff must provide specific evidentiary facts, through affidavits and other authenticated documents, sufficient to allow the court to independently conclude whether jurisdiction is appropriate. [Citation.] The plaintiff cannot rely on allegations in an unverified complaint or vague and conclusory assertions of ultimate facts. [Citation.]" (Strasner, supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at p. 222.)¿ A defendant is subject to a state's general¿jurisdiction¿if its contacts "are so continuous¿and systematic as to render [it] essentially at home in the forum State." (Daimler AG v.

Bauman¿ (2014) 571 U.S. 117, 127.)

A nonresident defendant may be subject to the specific¿jurisdiction¿of the forum "if the defendant has purposefully availed himself or herself of forum benefits [citation], and the 'controversy is related to or "arises out of' a defendant's contacts with the forum.' [Citations.]" (Vons Companies, Inc. v.¿Seabest¿Foods, Inc.¿ (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 446.) This test does not require a "causal relationship between the defendant's in-state activity and the litigation." (Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court¿ (2021)¿592 U.S. 351,¿362) The "arise out" of standard "asks about causation," but "relate to" does not.¿ (Ibid.)¿ "[W]hen a corporation has 'continuously and deliberately exploited [a State's] market, it must reasonably anticipate being¿hauled¿into [that State's] court[s]'¿to defend actions 'based on' products causing injury there."¿(Id.¿ at p.¿364.)¿ B.

Should the Fabi Entities be considered one intermingled entity for purposes of Personal Jurisdiction? Ms. Gordon's argument that this Court should attribute the contacts of Fabi LLC and Fabi Diana to Fabi USA under the alter-ego doctrine is unavailing. California case law recognizes two distinct theories to disregard corporate forms in establishing personal jurisdiction: alter ego and agency. For the alter ego rule to apply,¿there must be¿(1)¿"such a unity of interest and ownership between the corporation and its equitable owner that the separate personalities of the corporation and the shareholder do not in reality exist";¿(2)¿"an inequitable result if the acts in question are treated as those of the corporation alone." (Sonora Diamond¿Corp. v.

Superior Court ¿(2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 523, 538.) For agency rule to apply, "the nature and extent of the control exercised over the subsidiary by the parent" must be¿"so pervasive and continual that the subsidiary may be considered nothing more than an agent or instrumentality of the parent" such that¿"notwithstanding the maintenance of separate corporate formalities, jurisdiction over the parent may be grounded in the acts of the subsidiary/agent." (Id.¿ at p. 541.) In such circumstances, jurisdiction over the parent is general. (Ibid.)

Here, Ms. Gordon argues that Fabi LLC's and Fabi Diana's contacts with California can be imputed to Fabi USA because "Fabi USA sits atop and controls the very operating companies that deliberately served California's cosmetic-talc market, respecting its separate form would let the enterprise reap the benefits of that market while placing the entity that owns and directs it beyond the reach of California's courts, which is an inequitable result the doctrine exists to prevent." (Opp., at p. 17.) In support of this argument, Ms.

Gordon points to deposition testimony that indicated that Corrado Fabi serves as president for both Fabi USA and Fabi LLC and that Fabi USA "controls" LLC as a holding company. (Opp., at pp. 16-17; Horowitz Decl., Exhs. 5, Fabi Dep., at 9:13-17 and 12, Fabi Dep., at 82:5-10.) Ms. Gordon also emphasizes that because Fabi USA is a non-operational holding company that exists "solely to hold Fabi LLC's interest" to "shield the operating company from liability" (Opp., at p. 17; Horowitz Decl., Exhs. 12, Fabi Dep., at 79:1-8 and 13, Zuppini Dep., at 34:5-36:1.); and that the Fabi entities share the same accountant (Opp., at p. 17; Horowitz Decl., Exh. 12, Fabi Dep., at 18:12-21.).

However, while Ms. Gordon's evidence supports her contention that there was a unity of interest and ownership in the Fabi entities, there is no evidence supporting the claim that recognizing the separate corporate form as to Fabi USA will produce an inequitable result. Beyond a bare assertion of injustice in the opposition papers, Ms. Gordon provides no facts to support the contention that Fabi USA's corporate form must be pierced to prevent injustice. Accordingly, the Court declines to treat the Fabi entities as one intermingled entity.¿ C.

General Jurisdiction General jurisdiction is not at issue here. Ms. Gordon does not dispute that the court lacks general jurisdiction over the Fabi entities. [1] D. Specific Jurisdiction A court may exercise specific jurisdiction over a plaintiff when three elements are satisfied: "(1) 'the defendant has purposefully availed himself or herself of forum benefits' [citation]; (2) 'the controversy is related to or "arises out of" [the] defendant's contacts with the forum' [citation]; and (3) "'"the assertion of personal jurisdiction would comport with 'fair play and substantial justice'" [citation.]" (Pavlovich v.

Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 262, 269.) Here, the Fabi entities argue that there is no factual basis to establish specific jurisdiction because Defendant has not purposefully availed itself of doing business in California and the controversies at issue are not related to Defendant's forum-related contacts. (Motion at p. 11 ["No where in the Complaint, its exhibits, or the Preliminary Fact Sheet are there any alleged facts which would even begin to establish that Fabi LLC has purposely availed itself of the benefits of doing business in California, that any such activities are related to the controversy addressed in this action or that it would be both fair and comport with due process principles for this Court to exercise jurisdiction over this foreign corporation.

In addition, the declaration of Fabi LLC's current president Corrado Fabi, clearly indicates that there are no facts which would support this Court's exercise of general or specific personal jurisdiction over this defendant. At best, Fabi LLC's customer sold or distributed to a customer who then ultimately made a product that ended up in California. That is not Fabi LLC's activities. That is not Fabi LLC's connection to California."].)

1. Purposeful Availment Purposeful availment "focuses on the defendant's intentionality. This prong is satisfied when the defendant purposefully and voluntarily directs his activities toward the forum so that he should expect, by virtue of the benefit he receives, to be subject to the court's jurisdiction based on his contacts with the forum." (Pavlovich, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 269.) Here, the Fabi entities argue

that there is no evidence that they ever manufactured, sold, supplied, distributed, or delivered any products to California. Corrado Fabi, president of Fabi LLC and Fabi USA, declares that Fabi USA is a Delaware corporation that has never been licensed to do business, had a registered agent, engaged in business, had a mailing address, operated in, paid taxes or received tax benefits, owned property, franchised, initiated lawsuits, entered into contracts, or had employees in California. (Fabi USA Motion, Exh. 2 at P.P. 3-15.)

Mr. Fabi makes similar claims to Fabi LLC. (Fabi LLC Motion, Exh. 2 at P.P. 10-19.) Fabi LLC has only sold industrial grade talc for use in cosmetics, food, or pharmaceuticals to a single customer, CSI, since 2005. (Id., at P. 6.) "Except for a period from November 2018 to July 2022, all sales to Cosmetic Specialties, Inc., were delivered EXW or FOB, Freight Collect, West Virginia. In every instance, Cosmetic Specialties, Inc., made all the arrangements¿for the shipment of the products off Fabi LLC's premises." (Id., at P. 7.)

Michael Brown, former plant manager for Fabi Diana, declares that Fabi Diana ceased manufacturing talc in December 2004 and makes similar claims regarding Fabi Diana's lack of presence in California. (Fabi Diana Motion, Exh. 2 at P.P. 4-31.) Brown further declares that Fabi Diana also sold its products exclusively to CSI on an FOB basis. (Id., at P.P. 19-20.) In opposition, Ms. Gordon argues that the Fabi entities "did far more than drop talc into an anonymous stream. [They] specifically contracted for a 'market presence' in California, 'for the distribution and sale of its cosmetic and USP talc,' through CSI as [their] sales agent. (Exhibit 5, Fabi Dep., June 26, 2026, at 33:15-34:6 and 41:2-11 and exhibit 5 attached thereto; Exhibit 8, Baker Dep., April 30, 2024, at 109:23-110:5.)

That is precisely the 'additional conduct' that satisfies purposeful availment under Asahi and L.W." (Opp., at pp. 12-13.) Ms. Gordon heavily relies upon L.W. v. Audi AG (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 95, 100, 116, 199, in support of her argument that "when a company intends that its products ultimately be sold to consumers across the entire United States including California, the company purposefully avails itself of the California market when the evidence shows 'something more than that the defendant was aware of its product's entry into the forum State through the stream of commerce.'" (Opp., at p. 12.)

Ms. Gordon puts forth Corrado Fabi's deposition from another matter, Schlechter, et al. v. Bayer Consumer Care Holdings, LLC, et al., in which he attests that Fabi LLC entered into a distribution agreement with CSI to "distribute our products in United States" and to have a "market presence" in the country. (Opp., at p. 13; Horowitz Decl., Exh. 5, Fabo Dep., at 41:2-24.) Ms. Gordon also submits a certificate of analysis from Fabi LLC to CSI in Merle Norma's records and Ronald Grexa's inadmissible deposition testimony from another matter, Mokhtarian, et al. v.

Alfred Dunhill Americas, LLC, et al., wherein Mr. Grexa states CSI shipped talc to Merle Norman, Classic Cosmetics, and Color Factory from the Long Beach warehouse. (Horowitz Decl., Exh. 4 Grexa Mokhtarian Depo. at 73:7-74:8, 88:21-89:1.) In support of her contention that Fabi Diana also served the California market, Ms. Gordon advances Mr. Brown's deposition testimony from another matter, Pritchett v. 4520 Corp., Inc., et al., wherein Mr. Brown stated that Fabi Diana sometimes knew per CSI's instructions which manufacturers certain shipments were going to. (Id., Exh. 9, Brown Dep., at 62:6-63:15,

64:9-16.) An inadmissible purchase order from 2002 shows Fabi Diana shipped bags of talc to CSI's distribution center in Long Beach, California. (Id., Exh. 10.) Ms. Gordon argues that the inadmissible purchase order, Mr. Grexa's inadmissible deposition testimony, and the certificate of analysis show "a regular flow of Fabi Diana's talc into California." (Opp., at p. 13.) In reply, Defendants argue that the shipments to Long Beach were not at their direction. Rather, the shipment was FOB at Diana, NY, "meaning title transferred to CSI in New York...

Thus, it was CSI who shipped cosmetic talc to California - not Fabi Defendants." (Reply at p. 8; Horowitz Decl., Exh. 10.) Additionally, Defendants argue that whether they knew their talc was incorporated into products that were sold nationwide is not the test for personal jurisdiction. (Reply at pp. 8-9.) Defendants cite¿ Bombardier Recreational Products, Inc. v. Dow Chemical Canada ULC ¿(2013)¿216 Cal.App.4th 591, 603-604, for the proposition that "[m]erely¿selling a product that ends up being used in California is insufficient to create specific personal jurisdiction."¿(Reply at p. 8.)

As to Ms. Gordon's reliance on L.W. v. Audi AG (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 95, Defendants argue that the facts here are not comparable because "[t]here is no showing of regular sales in California as is required by Fabi Defendants (not just a product that happens to end up in California through other means), there is no advertising or otherwise soliciting of business in California by Fabi Defendants, nor is there any acknowledgement regarding sales in California by Fabi Defendants." (Reply at pp. 9-10.)

A manufacturer's¿mere knowledge of the likelihood that a product will enter a state¿is insufficient, without more, to¿establish¿personal¿jurisdiction¿over that Defendant.¿(Jayone,¿ supra, 31 Cal.App.5th 543, 559.¿["In the products liability context, merely placing a product into the stream of commerce, even with knowledge that the product might enter the forum state, is not a sufficient basis for personal¿jurisdiction¿over a nonresident defendant.]; Dow Chemical Canada ULC v. Superior Court ¿(2011) 202 Cal.App.4th¿170, 179 ["It is not sufficient for jurisdiction in this case that the defendant Dow might have predicted or known that its products would reach California."].)¿Instead, the relevant inquiry is whether¿the defendant manufacturer¿attempted¿to¿purposefully "serve, directly or indirectly, the market for its product" in California. (Jayone,¿ supra, 31 Cal.App.5th 543, 559.)¿ Here, as discussed, Ms.

Gordon relies on inadmissible purchase orders and shipping records to prove that Defendants directed shipments of talc to California. Even if the evidence was admissible, the records do not show that Defendants intended to send their products to California, as¿they¿surrendered control¿of the products as soon as they left Defendants' plant in New York.¿As such, records of these transactions, without more, do not provide sufficient evidence for a finding of purposeful¿availment. As for the distribution agreement, the Fabi LLC distributor agreement was executed in 2004 and encompassed 16 states and Canada. (Horowitz Decl., Exh. 5.)

Although the agreement states Fabi LLC desired a market presence in a large swath of territories that included California, evidence that the Fabi entities desired to have a market presence in several territories, including California, is insufficient evidence

that the Fabi entities purposefully served the California market. Even if Fabi LLC knew its talc was likely to end up in California under the distributor agreement, the agreement does not show that it acted to purposefully serve the California market, such as requiring CSI to distribute to California or directing CSI to distribute talc to California. Thus, the distribution agreement is insufficient to support a finding of purposeful availment. Accordingly, Ms. Gordon has not satisfied her burden to show with admissible evidence that the Fabi entities purposefully availed themselves of the California market.

2. Relatedness Even assuming Ms. Gordon's evidence was sufficient to¿establish¿purposeful availment, Plaintiffs¿fail to¿present evidence of relatedness.¿The relatedness inquiry is not strictly causal and instead focuses on whether the causes of action "rises out of or has a substantial connection with a business relationship defendant has purposefully established with California." (Vons, ¿supra,¿14 Cal.4th¿at p.¿448.)¿ Here, Ms. Gordon argues in opposition that "the defendants' talc, in Merle Norman's sheer face powder, is the very product Carole used...

Fabi Diana produced cosmetic talc from 2001 to 2004, Fabi LLC has produced it since 2004, and Merle Norman's records show continuous IMI Fabi supply from 2000 forward. (Exhibit 3, Gahagan Decl., at P. 5.) Carole used Merle Norman talc products continuously across both periods." (Opp., at p. 15.) In reply, Defendants argue: "The specific claim at issue is whether Ms. Gordon's injury was caused in part by cosmetic talc allegedly incorporated into Merle Norman face powder. Fabi Defendants are not product manufacturers they supply raw materials.

Thus, Ms. Gordon was required to produce evidence of Fabi Defendants' forum related activities to the products at issue, and she does not. She shows that CSI sold cosmetic talc to Merle Norman, but she does not show any activities between Fabi Defendants and Merle Norman or California." (Reply at p. 13.) The court finds that Ms. Gordon has not satisfied her burden to establish the relatedness of Defendants' forum contacts to their causes of action. Specifically, Ms. Gordon presents no evidence that the products at issue in this case, Merle Norman face powder, contained talc supplied by Defendants.

At most, the inadmissible purchase order and deposition testimony show that Fabi Diana shipped talc to CSI and CSI supplied talc to Merle Norman, Classic Cosmetics, and Color Factory. However, there is no evidence that Defendants directed CSI to ship the talc to those entities during the relevant time period. Accordingly, Ms. Gordon fails to present evidence that Defendants "systematically served a market in [the forum state] for the very [products] that the plaintiffs allege malfunctioned and injured them in those States." (Ford, supra, 592 U.S. 351 at p. 365.)

Therefore, Ms. Gordon has not satisfied her burden to show with admissible evidence this court has specific jurisdiction over Defendants.

E. Jurisdictional Discovery Ms. Gordon alternatively requests jurisdictional ¿ discovery. ¿ " A plaintiff attempting to assert jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant is entitled to an opportunity to conduct ¿ discovery of the jurisdictional ¿ facts necessary to sustain its burden of proof[.] " (Hardell v. Vanzyl ¿ (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 960, 975-976; ¿ Goehring v. Superior Court (Bernier) ¿ (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 894.) This court has "discretion to continue the hearing on a motion to quash service of summons for lack of personal jurisdiction to allow the plaintiff to conduct ¿ discovery on jurisdictional issues. " (HealthMarkets, Inc. v.

Superior Court ¿ (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1160, 1173.) ¿ However, " In order to prevail on a motion for a continuance for jurisdictional ¿ discovery, the plaintiff should demonstrate that ¿ discovery is likely to lead to the production of evidence of facts establishing jurisdiction. " (In re Automobile Antitrust Cases I & II ¿ (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 100, 127.) ¿ ¿Here, Ms. Gordon moves for jurisdictional discovery, arguing that "[a] plaintiff has the right to conduct discovery with regard to the issue of jurisdiction to develop the facts necessary to sustain her burden. (Mihlon v.

Superior Court (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 703, 710.)...[and] because Fabi USA's own witness was improperly instructed not to answer questions about the commingling of funds between Fabi USA and Fabi LLC... Plaintiff respectfully requests that she be permitted to complete that inquiry, including into, for example, Fabi USA's capitalization, intercompany transfers, observance of corporate formalities, and the purpose of the holding structure. (Opp. at p. 17.) Defendants argue in reply: "In moving to obtain a continuance of a pending motion to quash to conduct jurisdictional discovery, a plaintiff must demonstrate that such discovery is likely to yield evidence sufficient to establish jurisdiction over the defendant. (In re Auto Antitrust Cases I & II, (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 100, 127.)

Ms. Gordon has made no attempt to satisfy this requirement. Further, based upon the evidence presented, there is no further evidence to be had sufficient to establish jurisdiction over Fabi Defendants. Plaintiff's request for discovery is entirely unnecessary and harassing." (Reply at p. 15.) The Court finds that further jurisdictional discovery is¿appropriate to¿determine¿whether there are admissible facts that show the Court has personal¿jurisdiction¿over Defendants. This Court has "discretion to continue the hearing on a motion to quash service of summons for lack of personal jurisdiction to allow the plaintiff to conduct discovery on jurisdictional issues." (HealthMarkets, Inc. v.

Superior Court¿ (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1160, 1173.) Given Ms. Gordon's significant reliance on inadmissible depositions from¿previous¿jurisdictional discovery, it is reasonable to infer¿additional¿discovery will provide admissible evidence relevant to whether this court may exercise personal¿jurisdiction¿over Defendant.

Specifically, jurisdictional discovery would reveal whether Defendants' desire for a market presence in California amounted to any purposeful conduct to serve the California market. Additionally, jurisdictional discovery would likely lead to evidence of whether talc sold by Fabi LLC or Fabi Diana was used in the products at issue during the relevant time period. Ms. Gordon's request for leave to conduct jurisdictional discovery is granted. IV.

Conclusion

Ms. Gordon did not provide sufficient evidence to show that Defendants are subject to the personal¿jurisdiction¿of this court. However, Ms. Gordon presents sufficient evidence to entitle her to targeted and focused jurisdictional discovery as to Defendants' connections to the California market. Therefore,¿Defendants'¿motions to¿quash service of¿summons¿and complaint are continued¿to¿October 23, 2026¿at 9 a.m. in Department 14 at the Spring Street Courthouse. Ms. Gordon's opposition to the motion to¿quash¿shall be served and filed on or before October 9, 2026.

Defendants' supplemental reply shall be served and filed on or before October 16, 2026.¿ Ms. Gordon is ordered to give notice.¿¿ [1] It is undisputed that: (1) Fabi LLC is a West Virginia corporation with its principal place of business in West Virginia; (2) Fabi Diana is a North Carolina corporation with its principal place of business in New York; and (3) Fabi USA is a Delaware corporation (holding company). | Home -->)" -->