Rolon v. Fresh Corn Grill, Inc.

relief is denied. Plaintiff's request for further sanctions is also denied. Plaintiff cites no applicable authority in support of the request. Metro's motion is not brought under the Civil Discovery Act, and so the "substantial justification" standard does not apply, and Plaintiff has not satisfied the procedural requirements for a motion under (for example) Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7.

Conclusion

The Court DENIES the motion of Defendant Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority to vacate order of June 12, 2026, imposing sanctions against it and its counsel. Moving Party is to give notice.

judgment submitted on August 19, 2026, is denied without prejudice. The following issues must be addressed before a default judgment can be entered. First, the Doe defendants have not been dismissed. Second, there is not sufficient evidence that Defendant Code is the employer of Defendant Hogans (and thus vicariously liable for the underlying accident). Third, there is not sufficient evidence (such as a declaration from the insureds) setting forth the facts establishing liability and proper identification of Defendants. The Order to Show Cause is continued to November __, 2026, at 8:30 am, in Department 514. Case Number: 25STCV10086 Hearing Date: August 26, 2026 Dept: 514 Rolon v. Fresh Corn Grill, Inc.

Defendants' Motion to Strike Tentative Ruling The motion to strike is denied.

Background

On April 4, 2025, Jose Duenas Rolon ("Plaintiff") filed the complaint in this action against Fresh Corn Grill, Inc., Fresher Corn Grill, Inc., Lena Klein, and Does 1 through 100. On May 5, 2025, Fresher Corn Grill, Inc. filed an answer to the complaint and a cross-complaint against Fresh Corn Grill, Inc. and Lena Klein. On June 2, 2025, Fresh Corn Grill, Inc. and Lena Klein (collectively "Defendants") filed an answer to the complaint and a cross-complaint against Fresher Corn Grill, Inc., Joshua Kleinberg, and Roes 1 through 25. On February 23, 2026, the Court granted, with leave to amend, Defendants' motion to strike the punitive damages allegations in the complaint.

On March 9, 2026, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (the "FAC") against Defendants, Fresher Corn Grill, Inc., and Does 1 through 100, asserting causes of action for (1) age discrimination in violation of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (the "FEHA"), (2) disability discrimination in violation of the FEHA, (3) retaliation in violation of the FEHA, (4) failure to prevent in violation of the FEHA, (5) failure to accommodate in violation of the FEHA, (6) failure to engage in the interactive process in violation of the FEHA, (7) California Family Rights Act ("CFRA") interference, (8) whistleblower retaliation in violation of Labor Code section 1102.5, (9) violation of Labor Code section 1198.5, (10) failure to provide meal and rest breaks, (11) failure to pay overtime and doubt-time wages, (12) waiting time penalties, (13) meal period violations, (14) rest period violations, (15) intentional infliction of emotional distress, and (16) wrongful termination in violation of public policy.

On March 30, 2026, Defendants filed this motion to strike certain portions of the FAC. Plaintiff filed an untimely opposition on May 19, and Defendants filed a reply on May 22. The hearing on the motion was initially set for June 1, 2026. Due to the Court's unavailability, the hearing was continued to July 22, and then was continued to August 26 on the Court's own motion. On May 5, 2026, the Court, at the request of Plaintiff, dismissed Defendant Fresher Corn Grill, Inc. with prejudice. Trial is set for September 15, 2027.

Legal Standard

Under Code of Civil Procedure section 435, "Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof." (Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 435, subd. (b)(1).) Code of Civil Procedure section 436 provides as follows: "The court may, upon a motion made pursuant to Section 435, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper: (a) Strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (b) Strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court." (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 436.) In ruling on a motion to strike, the court must assume the truth of the properly pleaded facts in the complaint or other pleading. (Turman v. Turning Point of Central California, Inc. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 53, 63.)

Meet and Confer "Before filing a motion to strike pursuant to this chapter, the moving party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to the motion to strike for the purpose of determining if an agreement can be reached that resolves the objections to be raised in the motion to strike. If an amended pleading is filed, the responding party shall meet and confer again with the party who filed the amended pleading before filing a motion to strike the amended pleading." (Code of Civ. Proc. Sec. 435.5(a).) This requirement is met. (Horowitz Decl., P.P. 2-6.)

Discussion

As a preliminary matter, the Court exercises its discretion to consider Plaintiff's opposition, which was filed late. Defendants move to strike paragraphs 39-42, 44, 53-56, 58, 62-64, 67, 71, 77, 81-85, 88-90, 92-93, 99-101, 106, 109, 122, 123, 144, 147, 151-152, 154 of Plaintiff's FAC and item 3 of the prayer for relief on page 28 of the FAC. The allegations at issue relate to Plaintiff's claim for punitive damages.

First, Defendants argue that Plaintiff has exceeded the scope of the leave to amend granted by the Court in the order dated February 23, 2026. The Court has reviewed the new allegations in the FAC and determines that the amendments are procedurally proper. Plaintiff has not exceeded the scope of the leave to amend granted.

Second, Defendants argue that the new allegations do not cure the defect previously identified by the Court, and that the allegations relating to punitive damages are still too general to state a claim for punitive damages. To recover punitive damages in a tort action, Civil Code section 3294 requires a plaintiff to prove by clear and convincing evidence "that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice." (Civ. Code, Sec. 3294, subd. (a); see also College Hosp., Inc. v. Super.

Ct. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 721; Smith v. Super. Ct. (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1042.) "Malice" is defined in section 3294, subdivision (c)(1), as "conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury" or "despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others." "Oppression" is defined in section 3294, subdivision (c)(2), as "despicable conduct subjecting a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person's rights." "Fraud" is defined in section 3294, subdivision (c)(3), as "an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury."

The term "despicable conduct," as used in subdivisions (c)(1) and (c)(2), has been defined in the case law as actions that are "base," "vile," or "contemptible." (See, e.g., College Hospital, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 725; Shade Foods, Inc. v. Innovative Products Sales & Marketing, Inc. (2000) 78 Cal. App. 4th 847, 891; see also CACI 3940 ["Despicable conduct is conduct that is so vile, base, or contemptible that it would be looked down on and despised by reasonable people."].) A plaintiff seeking punitive damages must include in the complaint "specific factual allegations showing that defendant's conduct was oppressive, fraudulent, or malicious." (Today's IV, Inc. v.

Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transit Authority (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 1137, 1193; see also Anschutz Entertainment Group, Inc. v. Snepp (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 598, 643; Smith, supra, 10 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1041-1042; 1 Weil & Brown, California Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (2025), P. 6:158.). "Punitive damages may not be pleaded generally." (Today IV's Inc., supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at p. 1193; see also Spinks v. Equity Residential Briarwood Apartments (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1004, 1055-56.)

Pleading negligence, gross negligence, or even recklessness is not sufficient. (Dawes v. Super. Ct. (1980) 111 Cal. App. 3d 82, 87.) Rather, a plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating that the defendant intended to cause harm to plaintiff or "acted in such an outrageous and reprehensible manner that the jury could infer that [the defendant] knowingly disregarded the substantial certainty of injury to others." (Id. at p. 90; see also, e.g., American Airlines, Inc. v. Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1017.)

When a plaintiff seeks punitive damages against an employer for the acts of an employee, the plaintiff must plead, and ultimately prove, that "the employer had advance knowledge of the unfitness of the employee and employed him or her with a conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others or authorized or ratified the wrongful conduct for which the damages are awarded or was personally guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice." (Civ. Code, Sec. 3294, subd. (b).) When the employer is a corporation, "the advance knowledge and conscious disregard, authorization, ratification or act of oppression, fraud, or malice must be on the part of an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation." (Ibid.)

The Court has reviewed the new allegations in the FAC. The Court determines that Plaintiff has now sufficiently alleged facts to support his claim for punitive damages. The defect previously identified by the Court in the order dated February 23, 2026, has been remedied. The motion to strike is denied.

Conclusion

The Court DENIES the motion of Defendants Fresh Corn Grill, Inc. and Lena Klein to strike portions of Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint. Defendants are to file an answer or other responsive pleading by no later than September 16, 2026. Moving