Leo Lee v. Steven Kim

(Stanley Mosk Courthouse: Dept. 415) August 26, 2026 DEPARTMENT 415 LAW AND MOTION RULINGS

DEPARTMENT | 415 | HEARING DATE | August 26, 2026 | CASE NUMBER |

| MOTION | Motion to Tax Costs | MOVING PARTY | Plaintiff Leo Lee | OPPOSING PARTY | Defendant Steven Kim | MOTION Defendant Steven Kim ("Defendant") prevailed at trial against Plaintiff Leo Lee ("Plaintiff"). Plaintiff moves to tax the costs on the memorandum of costs Defendant served. Defendant opposes the motion.

ANALYSIS Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5, subdivision (a) sets forth items that are allowable as costs. Allowable costs under Section 1033.5 must be "reasonably necessary to the conduct of this litigation rather than merely convenient or beneficial to its preparation" and "reasonable in amount." (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 1033.5, subds. (c)(2), (3).) "Items not mentioned in [Section 1033.5] and items assessed upon application may be allowed or denied in the court's discretion." (Id., subd. (c)(4).)

On a motion to tax costs, "[i]f the items appearing in a cost bill appear to be proper charges, the burden is on the party seeking to tax costs to show that they were not reasonable or necessary. On the other hand, if the items are properly objected to, they are put in issue and the burden of proof is on the party claiming them as costs. Whether a cost item was reasonably necessary to the litigation presents a question of fact for the trial court and its decision is reviewed for abuse of discretion. However, because the right to costs is governed strictly by statute a court has no discretion to award costs not statutorily authorized." (Ladas v. California State Auto. Assn. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 761, 774, internal citations omitted.)

"The court's first determination, therefore, is whether the statute expressly allows the item, and whether it appears proper on its face. If so, the burden is on the objecting party to show them to be unnecessary or unreasonable." (Nelson v. Anderson (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 111, 131, internal citations omitted.) The objecting party does not meet this burden by arguing the costs were not necessary or reasonable but must present evidence and prove the costs are not recoverable. (Litt v Med. Ctr. (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 1217, 1224; Seever v. Copley Press, Inc. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1550, 1557.)

Service of Process Costs Defendant seeks $850.75 in costs for service of process. These costs are proper on their face. Plaintiff argues, without citation to authority, Defendant cannot recover for costs of attempted service. Plaintiff is incorrect. Defendant may recover these costs.

Court-Ordered Transcript Costs Defendant seeks $20,092.29 in transcript costs, which are not recoverable as a matter of law. The Court did not order any transcripts in this case. (See Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 1033.5, subd. (a)(9) [items allowable as costs include "[t]ranscripts of court proceedings ordered by the court"].) As such, the costs for transcripts are not recoverable.

In opposition, Defendant correctly points out he may recover fees he incurred for the presence of a court reporter. Court reporter fees are recoverable as otherwise provided by law. (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 1033.5, subd. (a)(11).) Pursuant to Government Code section 68086, subdivision (d)(2), "for the presence of a certified shorthand reporter[.] . . . fees and charges . . . shall be recoverable as taxable costs by the prevailing party as otherwise provided by law."

However, in his Memorandum of Costs, Defendant has expressly noted the costs are attributable to "Court-ordered transcripts," not court reporter fees. To the extent, Defendant now claims he seeks costs incurred for "Court Reporter services," the Court cannot determine from the invoices Defendant has submitted (see Declaration of Steven C. Kim in Support of Opposition to Plaintiff Leo Lee's Motion to Tax Costs, Exhibits 2 & 3) what amount Defendant purportedly incurred for the presence of a court reporter versus those related to transcript costs. Accordingly, Defendant fails to meet his burden to show any of these costs are recoverable. Thus, the Court strikes these costs in their entirety.

Interpreter Fees Likewise, the $2,085 Defendant seeks in interpreter fees is not recoverable as a matter of law. Defendant is not an indigent person represented by a qualified legal services project. (See Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 1033.5, subd. (a)(12) [specifies court interpreter fees are allowable costs "for an indigent person represented by a qualified legal services project, as defined in Section 6213 of the Business and Professions Code, or a pro bono attorney"].) Defendant does not fall under either category. Therefore, the Court strikes these costs.

Other Costs Defendant seeks to recover $721.96 for copying charges. "Models, the enlargements of exhibits and photocopies of exhibits . . . may be allowed if they were reasonably helpful to aid the trier of fact." (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 1033.5, subd. (a)(13).) Defendant cannot recover for copies other than for models or exhibits at trial. In opposition, Defendant's counsel states these costs were for copies used at trial. (Kim Decl. P. 12.) Accordingly, Defendant has satisfied his burden to show the costs are recoverable.

Defendant claims he is entitled to recover $240.29 in costs for "Doc. Delivery" and $52.60 for "Court Search/Doc." The precise nature of these costs are unclear. As such, Defendant bears the burden to show they are recoverable. In opposition, Defendant's counsel asserts the costs were incurred for messenger services and for downloading documents from the Court's online services. (Kim Decl., P.P. 13-14.) Defendant has met his burden to show these are recoverable costs. (See, e.g., Nelson v. Anderson (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 111, 132 ["Messenger fees are not expressly authorized by statute, but may be allowed in the discretion of the court"].) The motion to strike these costs is denied.

Defendant seeks $948 attributable to parking costs. Plaintiff presents evidence, during trial, Defendant's counsel parked at the Music Center with Plaintiff's counsel, and the charge there was $20 per day. As such, Plaintiff has met his burden to show the costs Defendant seeks do not reflect the actual cost of parking for trial. (Declaration of Michael C. Lieb, P. 3.) In opposition, Defendant's counsel counters by asserting the parking costs reflect parking for at least 41 court appearances. (Kim Decl., P. 15.) Defendant has met his burden to show these costs are recoverable and, therefore, the motion to strike them is denied.

Deposition Costs Defendant seeks to recover $5,726.90 in deposition costs. Defendant may recover the costs of deposition transcripts. (See Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 1033.5, subd. (a)(3).) Although Plaintiff initially sought to tax these costs and maintained Defendant did not order a copy of every deposition transcript in this case, but rather shared transcripts with co-Defendant Susan Ahn (see Lieb Decl., P. 2), in his reply brief, Plaintiff withdrew his challenge to these costs. (See Reply in Support of Motion to Tax Bill of Costs, p. 5.)

The Court notes, in opposition to the motion, Defendant submitted invoices for depositions taken of three individuals, including Plaintiff. (Kim Decl., Exhibit 1.) In any event, given Plaintiff's concession, the motion to strike these costs is denied. Plaintiff is ordered to provide notice of the Court's ruling and to file proof of service of same.

Case Number: 25STCV04280 Hearing Date: August 26, 2026 Dept: 415 TENTATIVE RULING DEPARTMENT | 415 | HEARING DATE | August 26, 2026 | CASE NUMBER | 25STCV04280 | MOTION | Motion to Compel Depositions | MOVING PARTY | Defendant General Motors LLC | OPPOSING PARTIES | Plaintiffs Manuel Martinez and Samantha Martinez | MOTION Defendant General Motors LLC ("Defendant") moves to compel Plaintiffs Manuel Martinez and Samantha Martinez ("Plaintiffs") to appear for depositions pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 871.26. Plaintiffs oppose the motion.

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 871.26, subdivision (c), within 120 days after the filing of the answer or other responsive pleading in an action under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, the defendant has the right to conduct an initial deposition, each not to exceed 2 hours, of the plaintiff. A party who fails to comply with this