Blake Rogers v. William Parapiella

Here, Plaintiff's SAC includes additional allegations sufficient to support a claim for punitive damages under Brewer. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant engaged in affirmative conduct constituting malice, oppression, and fraud separate from its statutory violations. (SAC P. 57.) To that end, she alleges that Defendant engaged in fraudulent conduct by deliberately and falsely characterizing her termination as a "voluntary resignation." (Id. P. 58.) Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant acted with malice in limiting her and other employees' access to certain necessary systems because of their exercise of Labor Code rights. (Id.

P. 59.) Plaintiff alleges that this conduct was undertaken and authorized by Defendant's officers and directors. (Id. P. 60.) Plaintiff thus requests punitive damages. (Id. P. 162, Prayer P. (p).) These allegations include fraudulent and malicious conduct under Civil Code section 3294 separate and apart from Defendant's statutory violations. Indeed, Plaintiff alleges intentional retaliatory behavior by Defendant and fraudulent conduct meant to evade accountability. Thus, Plaintiff has pled sufficient facts to support her requests for punitive damages.

Accordingly, Defendant's motion to strike is denied. Conclusion: Defendant's motion to strike is denied.

WITH MOTION TO STRIKE The Court tenders the following tentative decision in the matter Blake Rogers v. William Parapiella, Los Angeles County Superior Court case number 26STCV12594, set for hearing on August 26, 2026. William Papariella (Defendant) demurs to Blake Rogers's (Plaintiff) complaint and the causes of action contained therein individually. Additionally, Defendant moves to strike Plaintiff's request for attorney's fees. Defendant's demurrer is sustained. Defendant's motion to strike is granted. Plaintiff is granted 20 days' leave to amend his complaint. A.

Legal Standard

A demurrer is sustained where "[t]he pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action." (Code Civ. Proc., 430.10, subd. (e).) "A demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the factual allegations in a complaint." (Yalung v. State (2023) 98 Cal.App.5th 71, 80.) In reviewing a complaint's legal sufficiency, a court will treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of law. (Esparza v. Kaweah Delta Dist. Hospital (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 547, 552.)

It is well settled that a "demurrer lies only for defects appearing on the face of the complaint[.]" (Stevens v. Superior Court (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 594, 601.) "We not only treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but also give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context." (Guclimane Co. v. Stewart Tit. Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 38.) For purposes of ruling on a demurrer, the complaint must be construed liberally by drawing reasonable inferences from the facts pleaded. (Wilner v.

Sunset Life Ins. Co. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 952, 958.)

When ruling on a demurrer, a court may only consider the complaint's allegations or matters which may be judicially noticed. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) The Court may not consider any other extrinsic evidence or judge the credibility of the allegations pleaded or the difficulty a plaintiff may have in proving his allegations. (Ion Equipment Corporation v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 881.) A demurrer is properly sustained only when the complaint, liberally construed, fails to state facts sufficient to constitute any cause of action. (Kramer v.

Intuit Inc. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 574, 578.) The Court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 436, subd. (a).) The Court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the Court. (Id., Sec. 436, subd. (b).) The grounds for a motion to strike are that the pleading has irrelevant, false or improper matter, or has not been drawn or filed in conformity with laws. (Id., Sec. 436.)

The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. (Id., Sec. 437.) When a demurrer is sustained, the Court determines whether there is a reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment. (Blank, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 318.) When a plaintiff "has pleaded the general set of facts upon which his cause of action is based," the court should give the plaintiff an opportunity to amend his complaint, since plaintiff should not "be deprived of his right to maintain his action on the ground that his pleadings were defective for lack of particulars." (Reed v.

Norman (1957) 152 Cal.App.2d 892, 900.) B.

Discussion

Defendant demurs to Plaintiff's first through third causes of action on various grounds. Defendant also moves to strike Plaintiff's request for attorney's fees. The Court will address each argument in turn. Plaintiff's first cause of action for breach of contract is subject to demurrer under section 430.10, subdivision (g). Defendant demurs to Plaintiff's first cause of action for breach of contract on the basis that the type of contract at issue cannot be determined from the complaint. Demurrer is appropriate where "[i]n an action founded upon a contract, it cannot be ascertained from the pleading whether the contract is written, is oral, or is implied by conduct." (Id., 430.10, subd. (g).)

A plaintiff need not explicitly specify the type of contract in the complaint. If reasonable inferences drawn from surrounding allegations allow the Court to determine the type of contract at issue, demurrer will not lie. (See Miles v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 394, 401.) Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant first expressed interest in acquiring a private jet using Plaintiff's services

over a phone call on December 18, 2025. (Compl. P. 8.) During that call, and subsequent written communications that day and the following, the parties allegedly reached an agreement for Plaintiff to provide transaction advisory services. (Id. P. 9.) Plaintiff further alleges that the material terms of the agreement were confirmed in contemporaneous written communications. (Id. P. 10.) Then, in support of Plaintiff's cause of action for breach of contract, he alleges that the parties entered into a "partly written, partly oral agreement." (Id.

P. 17.) Plaintiff's allegations are inconsistent and leave some ambiguity as to the form of the contract. He maintains that the alleged agreement was both oral and written, but other allegations state that material terms were confirmed in writing, and that in the initial oral conversation Defendant merely "expressed interest." The Court finds that these allegations do not adequately convey the form of the agreement. Plaintiff offers no argument in opposition. Accordingly, Defendant's demurrer to the first cause of action is sustained pursuant to section 430.10, subdivision (g).

The Court need not address Defendant's alternative argument related to the Plaintiff's alleged failure to plead the existence of an enforceable contract. Plaintiff has not pled sufficient facts to state a cause of action for quantum meruit. Defendant argues that Plaintiff has not pled sufficient facts to state a cause of action for quantum meruit. (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 430.10, subd. (e).) "To recover in quantum meruit, a party need not prove the existence of a contract, but it must show the circumstances were such that 'the services were rendered under some understanding or expectation of both parties that compensation therefor was to be made.'" (Port Medical Wellness, Inc. v.

Connecticut General Life Insurance Company (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 153, 180.) The parties' agreed upon price under an unenforceable contract does not provide the value of the services rendered. (Smith v. Bliss (1941) 44 Cal.App.2d 171, 178.) Here, Plaintiff alleges only that the benefit conferred upon Defendant was Plaintiff's expertise and that Plaintiff is thus entitled to a $500,000 award. (Compl. P.P. 22-23.) Plaintiff makes no allegations as to the value of his services rendered, merely offering the price under the parties' alleged agreement.

Plaintiff's invocation of Producers Cotton Oil Co. v. Amstar Corp. (1988) 197 Cal.App.3d 638, is not directly relevant. There, the Court of Appeal merely found that a price discussed during negotiations could provide evidence of service value. (Id. at p. 359.) Plaintiff makes no such allegations here. Accordingly, Defendant's demurrer to Plaintiff's second cause of action is sustained as well. Plaintiff has not pled sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action for promissory estoppel. Defendant demurs to Plaintiff's third action for promissory estoppel on the basis that Plaintiff has failed to state sufficient facts. (Code Civ.

Proc., Sec. 430.10, subd. (e).) The elements of a promissory estoppel claim are: (1) a promise; (2) a reasonable expectation by the promisor that the promise will induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person; (3) action or forbearance; and (4) injustice may only be avoided by enforcement of the promise. (Newport Harbor Ventures, LLC v. Morris Cerullo World Evangelism (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 1207, 1225 (Newport).) However, "[i]f the promisee's performance was requested at the time the

promisor made his promise and that performance was bargained for, the doctrine is inapplicable." (Fontenot v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 256, 275 (Fontenot).) Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant made a clear and unambiguous promise to Plaintiff, to pay an advisory fee if he acquired a certain jet for Defendant. (Compl. P. 25.) However, Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant entered a contract with Plaintiff agreeing to pay him for his services and that his performance was requested at that time. (Id.

P.P. 10, 17.) This constitutes a bargained for exchange at the time of the promise, making promissory estoppel inappropriate under Fontenot. Thus, Plaintiff has not pled sufficient facts to constitute his third cause of action either. Accordingly, Defendant's demurrer is sustained in full. Plaintiff's request for attorney's fees is stricken. Defendant moves to strike Plaintiff's request for legal fees and costs. "[A]s a general rule, attorney fees are not recoverable as costs unless they are authorized by statute or agreement." (People ex rel.

Dept. of Corporations v. Speedee Oil Change Systems, Inc. (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 424, 429.) " In any action on a contract, where the contract specifically provides that attorney's fees and costs, which are incurred to enforce that contract, shall be awarded either to one of the parties or to the prevailing party, then the party who is determined to be the party prevailing on the contract, whether he or she is the party specified in the contract or not, shall be entitled to reasonable attorney's fees in addition to other costs." (Civ.

Code, Sec. 1717, subd. (a).) A party may move to strike any "irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading." (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 436, subd. (a).) Here, Plaintiff requests attorney's fees but pleads no statutory or contractual basis for their recovery. Rather, Plaintiff argues that he need not specify a ground for his fee award in the complaint, citing Yassin v. Solis (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 524, 533. While that may be true with respect to a post-judgment motion for attorney's fees, Plaintiff's request for fees in this instance is still unsupported and thus properly stricken as an irrelevant and improper matter.

Accordingly, Defendant's motion to strike is granted. Conclusion: The Court sustains Defendant's demurrer and grants his motion to strike. Plaintiff is granted 20 days' leave to amend. | Home -->)" -->