Deirmendjian v. Fireball 8646, LLC, et al.

(Chatsworth Courthouse: Dept. F43) August 26, 2026 DEPARTMENT F43 LAW AND MOTION RULINGS

Hearing Date: 08-26-26 Case # 25CHCV01230, Deirmendjian v. Fireball 8646, LLC, et al. Trial Date: 06-26-28 MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES MOVING PARTY: Defendant Cynthia Diane Boyle RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff Vic J. Deirmendjian RELIEF REQUESTED Order overruling plaintiff's objections to defendant Cynthia Boyle's first set of special interrogatories and compelling plaintiff's further objection-free responses to the special interrogatories. Order imposing $8,510 in sanctions against plaintiff and his counsel of record. RULING: Motion is moot. The court awards defendant Cynthia Boyle $4,550 in sanctions.

SUMMARY OF ACTION On April 8, 2025, plaintiff Vic J. Deirmendjian (Plaintiff) filed this action against defendants Fireball 8646, LLC, Cynthia Diane Boyle, and Brad Boyle on April 8, 2025, alleging defendants breached a listing agreement and refused to pay him a brokerage fee.

On January 26, 2026, defendant Brad Boyle filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the sixth, seventh, ninth, and tenth causes of action, without leave to amend. The court denied the motion in part as to the Sixth and Tenth Causes of Action and granted in part as to the Seventh and Ninth Causes of Action with leave to amend with leave to amend. (2/18/2026 Minute Order.)

Plaintiff filed and served his First Amended Complaint on March 16, 2026, asserting ten causes of action: (1) breach of contract; (2) breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (3) fraudulent inducement; (4) concealment; (5) breach of Bus. & Prof. Code, Sec. 17200; (6) interference with contractual relations; (7) intentional interference with prospective economic advantage; (8) quantum meruit; (9) tort of another; and (10) conspiracy.

Defendants Cynthia Boyle and Fireball 8646, LLC filed and served an answer on March 26, 2026.

On April 2, 2026, defendant Cynthia Boyle served Plaintiff with her first set of special interrogatories. (Declaration of Bradley W. Gould P.P. 3-4, Exh. A [service by mail and email].) Responses were due no later than May 7, 2026.

On April 27, 2026, Plaintiff's counsel requested a two-week extension to May 15, 2026, which defense counsel granted. (Gould Decl. P. 6, Exh. B.)

On May 15, 2026, Plaintiff's counsel requested a second two-week extension to May 29, 2026. (Id. P. 7, Exh. C.) Defense counsel did not immediately see the email. Thus, later that day, Plaintiff electronically served objection-only responses. (Id. P.P. 8-9, Exh. I.)

On June 5, 2026, defense counsel emailed Plaintiff's counsel a "meet and confer" letter, discussing the deficiencies in the responses and demanding supplemental, objection-free responses by end of business on June 9, 2026, or a motion to compel further would be filed on June 30, 2026. (Gould Decl. P. 11, Exh. D.)

On June 8, 2026, Plaintiff's counsel responded, stating a willingness to meet and confer further and Plaintiff's intent to provide supplemental responses by the end of June of 2026. (Id., Exh. E.) Plaintiff's counsel also mentioned the delay was caused by Plaintiff being out of town for personal matters, counsel's own familial obligations, and counsel's upcoming trial.

Defense counsel responded two days later, stating it was not necessary for the parties to meet and confer further beyond the items in the June 5, 2026, letter. (Id., Exh. F at p. 1.) Defense counsel also agreed to delay filing a motion to compel further and to extend the deadline to provide supplemental responses to July 2, 2026, if Plaintiff's counsel agreed to extend defense counsel's deadline to file a motion to compel further to 45 days from the date supplemental responses are served. Plaintiff's counsel agreed to these conditions on June 11, 2026.

On June 30, 2026, Plaintiff's counsel emailed defense counsel, claiming the trial was much longer than expected, that the supplemental responses would not be complete until July 2, 2026, that responses would be served as soon as possible, and the compel further motion deadline would be tolled to align with service of the supplemental responses. (Gould Decl. P. 14, Exh. G.)

The next day, defense counsel granted a final extension to July 7, 2026. (Id., Exh. H.) Plaintiff's counsel responded that more time was needed, and defense counsel clarified the deadline was July 9, 2026. As of July 22, 2026, no supplemental responses were received. (Id. P. 17.)

On July 22, 2026, defendant Cynthia Boyle (Ms. Boyle) filed the instant motion to compel Plaintiff's further, objection-free responses to the special interrogatories, to compel Plaintiff's compliance with the parties' agreement to serve objection-free responses, and to impose $8,510 in monetary sanctions against Plaintiff and his counsel of record.

On August 13, 2026, Plaintiff filed an opposition, contending the motion is moot because he served further responses on August 12, 2026. Plaintiff's substantial justification for the delayed responses is that the special interrogatories were numerous, defense counsel was nonresponsive when Plaintiff's counsel requested a second extension for the original responses, both Plaintiff and Plaintiff's counsel had personal matters that were communicated to defense counsel, and Plaintiff's counsel kept defense counsel informed concerning the responses. (Declaration of Drew H. Sherman, Exhs. A-B.) The court should deny sanctions.

On August 18, 2026, Plaintiff filed a reply, asserting the supplemental responses are improper because they contain objections. Plaintiff waived his right to object to the requests for production through the parties' extensions agreements. Thus, the motion is not moot and sanctions are still warranted.

MEET AND CONFER A motion to compel further responses to interrogatories must include a declaration stating facts showing a "reasonable and good faith attempt" to resolve the issues mentioned in the motion before filing. (Code Civ. Proc., Sec.Sec. 2016.040, 2030.300, subd. (b)(1).) In Department F43, meet and confer means in person or via phone. A letter or email does not suffice. (Department F43 Courtroom Information, p. 2.)

The moving papers do not indicate that Ms. Boyle ever attempted to contact Plaintiff's counsel by phone, in person, or by videoconference. Because the parties had already agreed on supplemental responses and the only issue requiring further discussion was deadline extensions, the court finds it was not necessary for the parties to "meet and confer" directly. Therefore, the "meet and confer" requirement is satisfied.

ANALYSIS A. Compelling Further Responses to Special Interrogatories Each special interrogatory response must be complete and straightforward and contain (1) an answer containing the information sought to be discovered; (2) an exercise of the party's option to produce writings; or (3) an objection. (Code Civ. Proc., Sec.Sec. 2030.210, subd. (a), 2030.220, subd. (a).) Responses containing objections must state the specific ground for the objection. (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 2030.240, subd. (b).)

The propounding party may move to compel further responses to special interrogatories where: (1) a response is evasive and incomplete, (2) an exercise of the option to produce documents under Section 2030.230 unwarranted or the required specification of those documents is inadequate, or (3) an objection to an interrogatory is without merit or too general. (Code Civ. Proc., Sec.Sec. 2030.290, 2030.300, subd. (a)(1)-(3).)

The motion must be filed and served within 45 days after service of verified responses, unless the parties agree, in writing, to extend the time to file. (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 2030.300, subd. (c).) If the responding party serves unverified responses, the 45-day time limit does not run until verified responses are served. (See Golf & Tennis Pro Shop, Inc. v. Superior Court (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 127, 135-136.)

When the propounding party serves more than 35 special interrogatories, the responding need only respond to the first 35 special interrogatories unless the propounding party attaches a declaration of additional discovery to the special interrogatories. (Code Civ. Proc., Sec.Sec. 2030.030, subds. (b)-(c), 2030.50, 2030.070, subd. (a).) However, if the responding party fails to timely object to additional special interrogatories, the responding party waives the objection. (See Leach v. Superior Court (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 902, 905-906.)

Ms. Boyle asks the court to overrule Plaintiff's objections to her first set of special interrogatories and to compel further objection-free responses. Ms. Boyle reasons that Plaintiff waived his objections through a party agreement and by failing to serve his supplemental responses by the deadline extensions. (See Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 2030.270; Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 2030.290, subd. (a) ["If a party to whom interrogatories are directed fails to serve a timely response, . . . [t]he party to whom the interrogatories are directed waives . . . any objection to the interrogatories, including one based on privilege or on the protection for work product[.]"].)

But Plaintiff served supplemental responses after Ms. Boyle filed her motion. Although Plaintiff has now served supplemental responses containing objections, this does not divest the court of its authority to evaluate the adequacy of the supplemental responses. (See Sinaiko Healthcare Consulting, Inc. v. Pacific Healthcare Consultants (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 390, 396; County of San Benito v. Superior Court (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 243, 255-256.)

California courts have consistently recognized that stipulations between counsel regarding discovery obligations are binding. (Mileikowsky v. Tenet Healthsystem (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 262, 273-275 [stipulations between counsel concerning discovery obligations are binding].) An objection raised in breach of a written agreement to provide objection-free responses is, by definition, without merit. (See Jerry's Shell v. Equilon Enterprises, LLC (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1058, 1072-1074 [imposing terminating sanctions against party who served supplemental responses with objections despite being ordered to serve objection-free responses].)

At an August 25, 2026, hearing on a separate compel further motion, the parties disputed whether Plaintiff has waived objections based on the "meet and confer" letter requesting objection-free responses or based on serving the supplemental responses after the two deadline extensions. Considering supplemental responses were only recently served and Ms. Boyle has not thoroughly reviewed the responses, the court finds that the motion to compel Plaintiff's further responses to Ms. Boyle's first set of special interrogatories is moot.

B. Sanctions Ms. Boyle asks the court to impose $8,510 in monetary sanctions against Plaintiff and his counsel of record. (Gould Decl. P. 20.) The court must impose monetary sanctions against a party or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel further responses to interrogatories, unless the court finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 2030.300, subd. (d).)

Ms. Boyle is entitled to monetary sanctions because Plaintiff failed to comply with the parties' agreement serve supplemental responses by several deadline extensions.

The court acknowledges Plaintiff's counsel's assertions concerning trial, familial obligations, and Plaintiff being out of the country in June of 2026. But Plaintiff provides no substantial justification for the delay between the final deadline extension (July 9, 2026) and the filing of this motion (July 22, 2026). Finally, the responses were not served until after Ms. Boyle filed the instant motion. (See Masimo Corp. v. The Vanderpool Law Firm, Inc. (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 902, 909 fn. 9 ["[F]orcing a party to resort to the court to get discovery is . . . sanctionable behavior."]; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1348(a) [allowing courts to award sanctions under the Discovery Act for the party who files a motion to compel discovery, even if the requested discovery is provided after the motion was filed].)

Defense counsel's hourly rate is $650. (Gould Decl. P. 20.) The request includes 7.0 hours preparing the motion and supporting papers; 6.0 hours reviewing and responding to the opposition, and traveling to and appearing at the hearing. The court finds the requested hourly rate is reasonable, but the time requested is excessive, the motion is similar to Ms. Boyle's requests for production motion, and the supporting declaration does not account for a $60 discrepancy.

Therefore, the court grants defendant Cynthia Boyle's request for monetary sanctions in the reduced amount of $4,550: 4.0 hours preparing the motion; 2.0 hours reviewing and responding to the opposition; and 1.0 hour to attend the motion hearing.

CONCLUSION and ORDER Defendant Cynthia Boyle's motion to compel further responses to her first set of special interrogatories is moot. The court awards defendant Cynthia Boyle $4,550 in monetary sanctions. Plaintiff is ordered to pay Ms. Boyle's counsel within 30 days of the issuing of this order. Clerk of the Court to give notice. | Home -->)" -->