Jeff Delgado vs. State Water Resources Control Board

34-2016-00189982-CU-OE-GDS: Jeff Delgado vs. State Water Resources Control Board 08/26/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 8C

Tentative Ruling

NOTICE:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that any oral arguments regarding this tentative ruling will be heard at 1:30 p.m. in Department 8C in the Tani G. Cantil-Sakauye Courthouse at 500 G Street, Sacramento, CA, the Hon. Richard C. Miadich presiding.

Any party who wishes to contest the tentative ruling below must:

(1) request a hearing by calling the Law and Motion Oral Argument Request Line at (916) 874-8380, by 4:00 p.m. the Court day before the noticed hearing date, and leave a voicemail message (a) identifying themselves as the party requesting oral argument; (b) indicating the specific matter/motion for which they are requesting oral argument; and (c) confirming that they have notified the opposing party of their intention to appear; and

(2) advise the opposing party of the location and time of hearing pursuant to Local Rule 1.06.

If a hearing is not requested by 4:00 p.m. on the Court day before the noticed hearing date, the tentative ruling will become the final order of the Court.

If a hearing is requested, the Court prefers in-person attendance by the parties. However, parties may appear by Zoom unless the Court specifically orders in-person attendance. Parties choosing to appear by Zoom are reminded, however, that a Zoom appearance is still a formal appearance before the Court. Parties appearing via Zoom should do so from a quiet location, free from undue distractions, and wear attire suitable for an in-person court appearance.

The parties may join the Zoom session for hearing on the tentative ruling by audio and/or video through the following link:

https://saccourt-ca-gov.zoomgov.com/j/16039062174

SIP Address:

34-2016-00189982-CU-OE-GDS: Jeff Delgado vs. State Water Resources Control Board 08/26/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 8C

16039062174@sip.zoomgov.com

(833) 568-8864

ID: 16039062174

Parties requesting services of a court reporter will need to arrange for private court reporter services at their own expense, pursuant to Government code §68086 and California Rules of Court, Rule 2.956. Requirements for requesting a court reporter are listed in the Policy for Official Reporter Pro Tempore available on the Sacramento Superior Court website at https://www.saccourt.ca.gov/court-reporters/docs/crtrp-6a.pdf. Parties may contact Court-Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore by utilizing the list of Court Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore available at https://www.saccourt.ca.gov/court-reporters/docs/crtrp-13.Pdf

A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list.

Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will be forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.

TENTATIVE RULING

***NOTICE: EFFECTIVE APRIL 13, 2026, THIS DEPARTMENT HAS MOVED TO THE TANI G. CANTIL-SAKAUYE COURTHOUSE LOCATED AT 500 G STREET SACRAMENTO, CA. ALL MOTIONS NOTICED FOR DEPARTMENT 28 WILL BE HEARD IN DEPARTMENT 8C OF THE NEW COURTHOUSE. ALL PAPERS FOR THIS DEPARTMENT MUST BE FILED AT THIS NEW LOCATION AND WILL NOT BE ACCEPTED AT THE HALL OF JUSTICE. ALL HEARINGS WILL TAKE PLACE AT THIS NEW LOCATION***

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2016-00189982-CU-OE-GDS: Jeff Delgado vs. State Water Resources Control Board 08/26/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 8C

Defendant State Water Resources Control Board’s (“Defendant”) motion for summary judgment, or in the alternative, motion for summary adjudication, is ruled on as follows.

Plaintiff Jeff Delgado (“Plaintiff”) was formerly employed by Defendant as a Water Resource Control Engineer.

In the operative second amended complaint, filed on August 19, 2024, Plaintiff alleges causes of action for (1) disability discrimination, (2) failure to engage in timely good faith interactive process, (3) failure to accommodate, (4) failure to prevent discrimination and retaliation, (5) harassment, and (6) retaliation.

Trial is set for October 19, 2026.

Defendant now moves for summary judgment on the grounds that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, or in the alternative, summary adjudication, on the following issues:

ISSUE 1: PLAINTIFF’S SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION FOR FAILURE TO ENGAGE IN AN INTERACTIVE PROCESS FAILS BECAUSE SWRCB ENGAGED IN THE INTERACTIVE PROCESS IN GOOD FAITH.

ISSUE 2: PLAINTIFF’S THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION FOR FAILURE TO PROVIDE ACCOMMODATION FAILS BECAUSE PLAINTIFF DID NOT PROVIDE ADEQUATE MEDICAL SUBSTANTIATION FOR HIS REQUESTS TO WORK PART-TIME AND FULLY REMOTE.

ISSUE 3: PLAINTIFF’S THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION FOR FAILURE TO PROVIDE ACCOMMODATION FAILS BECAUSE SWRCB DID NOT GRANT PLAINTIFF’S REQUESTS TO WORK PART-TIME AND FULLY REMOTE FOR LEGITIMATE, NONDISCRIMINATORY REASONS.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2016-00189982-CU-OE-GDS: Jeff Delgado vs. State Water Resources Control Board 08/26/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 8C

ISSUE 4: PLAINTIFF’S FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION FOR DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION AND SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION FOR RETALIATION FAIL BECAUSE SWRCB DID NOT SUBJECT PLAINTIFF TO AN ADVERSE EMPLOYMENT ACTION

ISSUE 5: PLAINTIFF’S FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION FOR DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION FAILS BECAUSE SWRCB SEPARATED PLAINTIFF FROM EMPLOYMENT FOR A LEGITIMATE, NONDISCRIMINATORY REASON.

ISSUE 6: PLAINTIFF’S SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION FOR RETALIATION FAILS BECAUSE SWRCB SEPARATED PLAINTIFF FROM EMPLOYMENT FOR A LEGITIMATE, NONDISCRIMINATORY REASON.

ISSUE 7: PLAINTIFF’S FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION FOR FAILURE TO PREVENT DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION AND RETALIATION FAILS BECAUSE PLAINTIFF CANNOT ESTABLISH THAT HE WAS SUBJECTED TO DISCRIMINATION OR RETALIATION.

(Notice, 2:23 – 3:14.)

Standards for Summary Judgment/Adjudication

In ruling on a motion for summary judgment/adjudication, the Court engages in a threestep process. First, the issues framed by the pleadings must be identified since the pleadings themselves define the scope of what may be addressed via a motion for summary judgment/adjudication (FPI Development Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 381-382) and the evidence submitted in support of or in opposition to the motion must be addressed to the claims and defenses raised in the pleadings. The Court cannot consider an unpleaded issue in ruling on a motion for summary judgment/adjudication. (Roth v. Rhodes (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 530, 541.) The papers filed in response to such a motion may not create triable issues beyond the scope of the pleadings, nor are they a substitute for filing amended

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2016-00189982-CU-OE-GDS: Jeff Delgado vs. State Water Resources Control Board 08/26/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 8C

pleadings. (Tsemetzin v. Coast Federal Savings & Loan Assn. (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 1334, 1342.)

Next, the Court must determine whether the moving party has met its initial burden of production. A defendant moving for summary judgment 'bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that [the defendant] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.' (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850; Chavez v. Glock, Inc. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1283, 1301.) This burden may be met by establishing either that one or more elements of a cause of action, even if not separately pleaded, cannot be established or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.' (Code Civ.

Proc. §437c(p)(2).) A defendant cannot successfully shift the burden to a plaintiff by merely suggesting the possibility that the latter cannot prove his/her case but must make 'an affirmative showing' in support of its motion. (Addy v. Bliss & Glennon (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 205, 214.) If a plaintiff pleads several theories of liability against the defendant, then the latter has the burden of demonstrating there are no material facts requiring trial on any of them. A moving defendant whose evidence omits facts as to any theory of liability effectively permits that portion of the complaint to be unchallenged and even where no opposition is presented, a moving defendant must still make a showing sufficient to eliminate all triable issues of fact. (Wright v.

Stang Manufacturing Co. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1218, 1228; see also Juarez v. Boy Scouts of America, Inc. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 377, 397.)

A plaintiff opposing summary judgment/adjudication has no evidentiary burden unless the moving defendant has first met its initial burden. (Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 840; see also Rubenstein v. Rubenstein (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1131, 1151-1152; Thatcher v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1081, 1085-1086.) If a moving defendant has met its initial burden, the burden then shifts to the opposing party to show the existence of a material factual issue as to the cause of action alleged or the defense to it. (Code Civ.

Proc. §437c(p)(2); see also, Bush v. Parents Without Partners (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 322, 326-327.) Only where the moving defendant makes the requisite initial showing does a court need to examine the opposition papers to determine if the latter demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of material fact. (Salazar v. Southern Cal. Gas Co. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1370, 1376; Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 840.) The opposing party must present admissible evidence and may not rely upon the allegations or denials of its pleading. (Id.)

In ruling on the motion, a court must construe the evidence of the opposing party liberally and that of the moving party strictly,

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2016-00189982-CU-OE-GDS: Jeff Delgado vs. State Water Resources Control Board 08/26/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 8C

resolving any doubts in the opposing party's favor. (Miller v. Bechtel Corp. (1983) 33 Cal.3d 868, 874; Cortez v. Vogt (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 917, 925-926; see also, Salazar v. Southern Cal. Gas Co. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1370, 1376; Brown v. FSR Brokerage, Inc. (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 766, 773.)

“In cases alleging employment discrimination, [courts] . . . us[e] a three-step process that is based on the burden-shifting test that was established by the United States Supreme Court for trials of employment discrimination claims in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973) 411 U.S. 792.” (Serri v. Santa Clara Univ. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 830, 860.) “The McDonnell Douglas framework is modified in the summary judgment context. In a summary judgment motion . . . ‘the employer, as the moving party, has the initial burden to present admissible evidence showing either that one or more elements of plaintiff's prima facie case is lacking or that the adverse employment action was based upon legitimate, nondiscriminatory factors.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 861; accord Jones v. Dep't of Corrections (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1367, 1379.)

“If the employer meets its initial burden, the burden shifts to the employee to 'demonstrate a triable issue by producing substantial evidence that the employer's stated reasons were . . . pretextual, . . . such that a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that the employer engaged in intentional discrimination . . . .” (Serri, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at 861.)

Discussion

Issue One: Plaintiff’s Second Cause of Action for Failure to Engage in the Interactive Process

To establish his claim for failure to engage in the interactive process, Plaintiff must show that: (1) he suffered from a disability; (2) he requested a reasonable accommodation for his disability; (3) he was willing to participate in an interactive process to determine whether a reasonable accommodation could be made; and (4) Defendant failed to participate in a timely good-faith interactive process. (See Gelfo v. Lockheed Martin Corp. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 34, 54.) The interactive process is an informal process designed to identify a reasonable accommodation that will enable the employee to perform the employee’s job effectively. (Scotch v. Art Institute of California (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 986, 1013.) “Each party must participate in good faith, undertake reasonable efforts to communicate its concerns, and make available to the other

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2016-00189982-CU-OE-GDS: Jeff Delgado vs. State Water Resources Control Board 08/26/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 8C

information which is available, or more accessible, to one party.” (Gelfo, supra, 140 Cal.App.4th at p. 54.)

Defendant argues that employee Serena Diaz engaged in the interactive process in good faith involving Plaintiff’s request to work remotely and to work part-time. Defendant relies on undisputed material facts (“UMF”) 1.1 – 1.32 for its motion for summary adjudication as to issue one.

As a result, if any one of these asserted UMFs is not sufficiently established by Defendant’s evidence, Defendant will have failed to satisfy their initial burden and summary judgment must be denied. Further, even if Defendant sufficiently establishes UMFs 1.1 – 1.32 with competent evidence, a single triable issue of disputed fact raised by Plaintiff as to asserted UMFs 1-47 mandates denial of summary judgment. (See, Homestead Savings v. Super. Court (Dividend Devel. Corp.) (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 494, 498.) Defendant’s separate statement effectively concedes the materiality of the facts included therein such that a triable issue raised as to any one fact is grounds for denial. (Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 243, 252.)

While Plaintiff states that many of these UMFs are “disputed in part,” the Court concludes that the UMFs in support of Defendant’s Issue One that are actually disputed by Plaintiff are UMF 1.31 (The amount of time it was taking to engage in the interactive process and to assess Plaintiffs requests was reasonable given the circumstances) and UMF 1.32 (Diaz did not delay the interactive process, nor was she told to do so.)

Per Defendant’s asserted facts, after Defendant let Plaintiff know on August 24, 2021, that they were denying his request for part-time work, Plaintiff elected to return to work and wanted to engage further in the interactive process about accommodations. (UMF ¶ 1.21.) Diaz met with Plaintiff a month after he requested to do so and followed up with his management in November 2021 to see if Defendant’s operational needs had changed. (UMF ¶¶ 1.23-1.24, 1.28.)

Plaintiff asserts that, “[Defendant] could have responded much sooner because it already possessed much of the information supporting Plaintiffs reasonable accommodation requests. Further, [Defendant] could have acted sooner if it wanted to, but did not because management was motivated by discriminatory animus towards Plaintiff.” (Plaintiff’s Amended Corrected Response in Opposition, 10:2-12.)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2016-00189982-CU-OE-GDS: Jeff Delgado vs. State Water Resources Control Board 08/26/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 8C

The Court concludes that Plaintiff has raised a triable issue of material fact as to UMFs UMFs 1.31 and 1.32, that is whether the amount of time it took to engage in the interactive process by Defendant was reasonable or whether Diaz delayed the interactive process by waiting over a month to meet with Plaintiff after he requested follow-up after the August 24, 2021 denial.

As the Court has found that Plaintiff has raised a triable issue of material fact as UMFs 1.31 and 1.32, Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication as to Issue One fails.

Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication as to Issue One is DENIED.

Issue Two: Plaintiff’s Third Cause of Action for Failure to Accommodate - Plaintiff’s Medical Substantiation

Defendant argues that Defendant should be granted summary adjudication as to Plaintiff’s third cause of action for failure to accommodate because Plaintiff did not provide adequate medical substantiation for his requests to work part-time and fully remote.

Defendant relies on UMFs 2.1 – 2.40 in support of its motion as to Issue Two.

Plaintiff disputes UMF 2.34, which states, “That medical documentation was not sufficient to support Plaintiffs request to work fully remote because it did not explain how his disability limited his ability to work four hours in the office weekly.” Plaintiff also disputes UMF 2.35, which states, “That medical documentation did not indicate anything about Plaintiffs recovery from anything related to his disability that necessitated him to recover at home, which would specifically support his need to work from home, like the type and duration of recovery periods.”

Plaintiff argues, “The medical substantiation supported Plaintiffs reasonable accommodation requests. If SWRCB truly believed the requests were not properly substantiated, it should have requested additional information. Moreover, SWRCB should not have substituted its medical judgment over the recommendations of Plaintiffs doctors.” (Plaintiff’s Amended Corrected Response in Opposition, 19:12-17.)

UMF 2.23 states, “That medical documentation related to Plaintiffs request for telework, including his high-risk status because of his underlying medical conditions for

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2016-00189982-CU-OE-GDS: Jeff Delgado vs. State Water Resources Control Board 08/26/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 8C

complications related to COVID-19. This documentation was still not sufficient to support Plaintiffs request to work part-time at the time submitted and Dr. Kachhi's oblique reference to these was insufficient for the same reasons.” Plaintiff disputes that the records failed to support Plaintiff’s reasonable accommodation request and disputed that Dr. Kachhi’s medical recommendations were oblique or insufficient. (Plaintiff’s Amended Corrected Response in Opposition, 17:2-8.)

UMF 2.25 states, “SWRCB did not grant Plaintiffs request for a reduced work schedule of four-hour workdays in part because Plaintiff failed to provide medical substantiation that supported his specific request”), Plaintiff disputes that Plaintiff failed to provide medical substantiation that supported this request. (Plaintiff’s Amended Corrected Response in Opposition, 17:18-20.)

In support of his argument, Plaintiff refers to Defendant’s Exhibits 14, 15, and 17, which include various medical documentation sent by Plaintiff to Defendant.

The Court has reviewed the medical documentation relied upon by the parties, and concludes that there is a triable issue of material fact as to whether the medical documentation provided by Plaintiff was sufficient to support his accommodation requests.

As a result, Defendant motion for summary adjudication as to Issue Two is DENIED.

Issue Three: Plaintiff’s Third Cause of Action for Failure to Accommodate - Reasons for Denial of Requested Accommodations

Defendant argues that Defendant should be granted summary adjudication as to Plaintiff’s third cause of action for failure to accommodate because Defendant had legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for not providing a reduced schedule of four-hour workdays and not removing a requirement to work one four-hour shift each week in the office.

Defendant relies on UMFs 3.1 – 3.29 in support of its motion as to Issue Three.

UMF 3.24 asserts that “[Defendant] did not grant Plaintiffs request to work fully remote in part because of [Defendant]'s operational needs.”

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2016-00189982-CU-OE-GDS: Jeff Delgado vs. State Water Resources Control Board 08/26/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 8C

Plaintiff disputes this fact and asserts:

Disputed that SWRCB's operational needs required it to deny Plaintiffs reasonable accommodation request. SWRCB could have managed its “operational needs” while granting Plaintiff his medically supported reasonable accommodation request. SWRCB management could have (1) hired more full- time staff, and/or (2) hired either part-time workers or temporarily reassigned workers to help cover for Plaintiffs reduced work schedule. The redirection of staff to perform contact tracing demonstrates that staff can be redirected when necessary. Further, SWRCB's management used this stated reason as a pretext to deny Plaintiffs requested disability related reasonable accommodation request because they considered Plaintiff’s requests “untenable” and they wanted to terminate Plaintiff.

(Plaintiff’s Amended Corrected Response in Opposition, 29:5-16.)

Plaintiff similarly disputes UMF 3.17, that Defendant was unable to hire additional staff to address workload issues. (Plaintiff’s Amended Corrected Response in Opposition, 27:2-7.)

Defendant avers, “Further, over the years I witnessed SWRCB management taking a variety of steps to solve claims backlogs. These management steps have included, but were not limited to, (1) hiring more full-time staff when necessary, (2) hiring either parttime workers or temporarily workers, (3) reassigning workers to help cover for employees on medically related reduced work schedules, borrowing workers from other departments, and (5) obtaining workers to perform certain tasks from federal partner agencies. Redirection of staff to perform contact tracing during the COVID-19 crisis demonstrated that these steps can be implanted when necessary.” (Amended Corrected Decl. Delgado, 5:5-11.)

The Court concludes that there is a triable issue of material fact as to whether Defendant denied Plaintiff’s accommodation requests in part because of operational needs and as to whether Defendant could have hired additional staff.

As a result, Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication as to Issue Three is DENIED.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2016-00189982-CU-OE-GDS: Jeff Delgado vs. State Water Resources Control Board 08/26/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 8C

Issue Four – Adverse Employment Action

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s first cause of action for disability discrimination and sixth cause of action for retaliation fail because Defendant did not subject Plaintiff to adverse employment action.

For his discrimination and retaliation claims, Plaintiff must show that SWRCB subjected him to an adverse employment action. (Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 355 [discrimination]; Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1042 [retaliation].) An adverse employment action is an action that materially changed the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment. (Yanowitz, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 1054.)

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s AWOL separation is not an adverse employment action by Defendant as a matter of law.

Defendant relies on UMFs 4.1 – 4.4 for in support of its motion as to Issue Four.

The only fact truly disputed by Plaintiff is “that his loss of employment in December 2021, can be characterized as a separation. He was terminated.” (Plaintiff’s Amended Corrected Response in Opposition, 33:15-17.)

In Defendant’s moving papers, Defendant argues:

Plaintiff’s AWOL separation is not an adverse employment action by SWRCB as a matter of law. The AWOL statute provides that “[a]bsence without leave, whether voluntary or involuntary, for five consecutive working days is an automatic resignation from state service,” not that it is an automatic termination. (Gov. Code, § 19996.2, subd. (a), emphasis added.) As the Supreme Court ruled in Coleman, a resignation is a severance of the employment relationship by the employee, not the employer, and carries no stigma. (Coleman, supra, 52 Cal.3d at pp. 1115, 1120; see also e.g., Price v. California Dept. of Corrections (E.D. Cal., Mar. 21, 2006, No. CIVS041235GEBDADPS) 2006 WL 707407, at *4, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11650, at *12 [holding that an AWOL separation is not an adverse employment action], report and

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2016-00189982-CU-OE-GDS: Jeff Delgado vs. State Water Resources Control Board 08/26/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 8C

recommendation adopted (E.D. Cal., May 2, 2006, No. 2:04CV1235GEBDAD) 2006 WL 3Plaintiff’s written discovery responses bind him to the AWOL-separation only. (D’Amico, supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 21.)

(Defendant’s Memorandum, 20:17 – 21:1.)

Price, supra, did look at the specific issue of whether a separation caused by an AWOL determination could constitute an adverse employment action for the purpose of a retaliation claim, and found it could not, explaining:

Nor do the terminations of plaintiff's employment for being AWOL constitute adverse employment actions. See Cal. Gov't Code § 19996.2(a) (“Absence without leave, whether voluntary or involuntary, for five consecutive working days is an automatic resignation from state service, as of the last date on which the employee worked.”); Coleman v. Department of Personnel Administration, 52 Cal. 3d 1102, 1115, 278 Cal. Rptr. 346, 805 P.2d 300 (1991) ('Under the AWOL statute, when an employee is absent without leave for five consecutive working days, it is the employee who severs the employment relationship, not the state.').

(Price v. Cal. Dep't of Corr., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11650, *12 (2006).)

While the Court surmises that Plaintiff asserts that his separation was not proper under the AWOL statute and thus can constitute retaliatory termination and an adverse employment action, Plaintiff fails to address the Coleman or Price cases in his papers. Moreover, while Plaintiff introduces additional material facts relating to his separation that go to the propriety of the AWOL determination, namely Plaintiff’s additional facts 65-78, the Court cannot consider these additional facts because these are not supported by any reference to evidence by Plaintiff.

Plaintiff has not raised a triable issue of material fact as to whether he was terminated because, as a matter of law, because absence without leave, whether voluntary or involuntary, for five consecutive working days is an automatic resignation from state service, and cannot constitute an adverse employment action by Defendant.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2016-00189982-CU-OE-GDS: Jeff Delgado vs. State Water Resources Control Board 08/26/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 8C

Additionally Plaintiff offers no additional facts that would constitute an adverse employment action separate from the AWOL resignation.

As a result, Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication as to Issue Four is GRANTED and summary adjudication is GRANTED as to Plaintiff’s first cause of action for disability discrimination and sixth cause of action for retaliation.

The Court need not reach Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication on Issue Five as that goes to Plaintiff’s first cause of action for disability discrimination.

The Court need not reach Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication on Issue Six as that goes to Plaintiff’s sixth cause of action for retaliation.

Issue Seven – Plaintiff’s Fourth Cause of Action for Failure to Prevent Disability Discrimination and Retaliation

Because Plaintiff’s disability discrimination and retaliation claims fail, his fourth cause of action for failure to prevent discrimination and retaliation fails as a matter of law.

As a result, Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication as to Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action for failure to prevent is GRANTED.

Disposition

Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED.

Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication as to Issues One, Two, and Three are DENIED.

Defendant’s motion for Summary Adjudication as to Issues Four and Seven are GRANTED.

The Court did not reach determinations as to Issues Five and Six.

This minute order is effective immediately. No formal order or other notice is required. (Code Civ. Proc. §1019.5; CRC Rule 3.1312.)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2016-00189982-CU-OE-GDS: Jeff Delgado vs. State Water Resources Control Board 08/26/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 8C