Figueroa v. Hyundai Motor America

(Van Nuys Courthouse East: Dept. B) August 27, 2026 DEPARTMENT B LAW AND MOTION RULINGS Attorneys who elect to submit on these published tentative rulings, without making an appearance at the hearing, may so notify the Court by communicating this to the Department's staff before the set hearing time. See, e.g., CRC Rule 324(b).

Figueroa v. Hyundai Motor America, Case no. 26VECV02995 Hearing date August 27, 2026 Defendant Hyundai's Motion to Compel Arbitration Plaintiff Figueroa sues defendant Hyundai Motor America for violations of the Song-Beverly Act. Defendant moves to compel arbitration; plaintiff opposes. Defendant requests judicial notice of the complaint. GRANTED pursuant to Evid. Code Sec.452(d).

California public policy strongly favors arbitration. Code Civ. Proc. Sec.1280 et seq., Madden v. Kaiser Found. Hosps. (1976) 17 Cal.3d 699, 706. Under the California Arbitration Act, if there is a valid written agreement to arbitrate, arbitration is mandatory. Code Civ. Proc. Sec.1281.2. The opposing party bears the burden of proving defenses to arbitrability, including unconscionability. See Pinnacle Museum Tower Ass'n. v. Pinnacle Mkt. Dev. (US), LLC (2012) 55 Cal.4th 223, 236. "[T]he doctrine of unconscionability has both a procedural and substantive element, the former focusing on oppression or surprise due to unequal bargaining power, the latter on overly harsh or one-sided results."

Sanchez v. Valencia Holding Co., LLC (2015) 61 Cal. 4th 899, 910. Defendant moves to compel arbitration, arguing the owner's handbook contained a warranty, which purports to be binding. See Decl. Ameripour, exh.

2. Defendant argues arbitration is mandatory under the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"), as the warranty is in writing, and the sale of vehicles is an interstate commerce activity. See 9 U.S.C. Sec.2. Defendant argues the warranty subjects any Song-Beverly Act claim to arbitration under the FAA. Decl. Ameripour, exh. 2, p.

14. Plaintiff argues a warranty in an owner's handbook does not create a binding agreement to arbitrate. Plaintiff argues defendant does not provide evidence that the handbook was shown to plaintiff at the time of purchase nor that the arbitration agreement was discussed. Plaintiff argues defendant cannot show any offer of arbitration terms, acceptance by plaintiff or contract formation between the parties as to arbitration. Plaintiff's arguments are well taken. Initially, a court must determine whether a valid agreement to arbitrate exists. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. (1985) 473 U.S. 614, 626. Under California law, the party seeking to compel arbitration has the burden of proving its existence by a preponderance of the evidence. Rosenthal v. Great W. Fin. Sec. Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 413.

Defendant offers no signed, written agreement containing an arbitration provision, nor any communications or other acts by plaintiff demonstrating the parties entered into an agreement to arbitrate. Defendant's argument in reply that other courts have ruled in favor of arbitration in similar circumstances is not well-taken. Defendant's reliance on federal district court decisions, even those in the Central District of California, is misplaced. See 8/20/26 Decl. Ameripour, paras. 2-5. Decisions of federal trial courts are not binding precedent.

The law is clear: an essential element of any contract is the consent of the parties, or mutual assent, which must be communicated by each party to the other. See Donovan v. RRL Corp. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 261, 270; Civ. Code, Sec.1565. A unilateral arbitration clause in an unsigned owner's handbook is not sufficient to find that a contract was formed. Defendant failed to meet its burden. DENIED.

Case Number: 26VEUD00801 Hearing Date: August 27, 2026 Dept: B Tentative Ruling Villa Tarzana Development v. Hernandez, Case no. 26VEUD00801 Hearing date August 27, 2026 Defendant Hernandez's Motion to Set Aside Default and Quash Writ - UNOPPOSED Plaintiff Villa Tarzana Development sued defendant Hernandez for unlawful detainer. Default judgment was entered on 5/18/26. A writ of possession issued on 5/20/26 and returned, unfulfilled, on 6/25/26. Judgment was entered 8/4/26. Defendant moved to set aside the default and quash the unfulfilled writ, asserting substitute service was not effective; the motion was unopposed. The court denied the motion for failure to provide proper notice. 7/20/26 Min. Order. Defendant refiled the same motion to set aside and quash on 7/20/26 and filed a proof of service via first-class US mail on 7/30/26. The motion is unopposed.

Per Code Civ. Proc. Sec.473(b) a motion to set aside default is timely if filed "within a reasonable time, in no case exceeding 6 months" after the order was taken. Default was entered 5/18/26; judgment was entered 8/4/26. This motion was filed 7/20/26. The motion is timely.

Plaintiff filed a proof of service dated 5/11/26 asserting substitute service was affected on 4/14/26 at 6000 Etiwanda Avenue #127, Tarzana, CA 91356, via service on a "Jessica H. (FEMALE/ HISPANIC/ 38YRS/ 5'5"/ 170 LBS/ BLK HAIR/ BRN EYES) MEMBER OF HOUSEHOLD)." See 5/11/26 POS. Per defendant's declaration, the property's occupants were defendant, defendant's male spouse/partner Johnson, defendant's 62 year-old mother Villareal and her 1 year-old child. See Decl. Hernandez, para.

6. Defendant declares the only occupants at the property at the time of purported service were Villareal and the child. Id. Defendant asserts she received no notice a lawsuit was filed, despite having been in