STANISLAUS COUNCIL OF GOVERNMENTS vs COOPER, BRANDON W

Interrogatory Nos. 6 and 10--Defendants' responses point to an email log and/or email string but failed to fully identify the requested information. Defendants responded to Interrogatory No. 11 by referring to the summary of events prepared for the Parties' prior arbitration. This appears sufficient. Defendant shall provide verified further responses within 20 days.

b) Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Further Responses to Plaintiff's First Set of Requests for Production of Documents is GRANTED. Defendants shall serve further responses which are code-compliant no later than September 10, 2026. The requests for sanctions are DENIED.

Defendant argues that the motion should be denied because Plaintiff did not meet and confer in person, by video, or teleconference. "A meet and confer declaration in support of a motion shall state facts showing a reasonable and good faith attempt, either in person, by telephone, or by videoconference, to informally resolve each issue presented by the motion." (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 2016.040.)

Here, Plaintiff initially sent written correspondence to Defendants outlining purported deficiencies with Defendants discovery responses and requesting to meet and confer. In response, Defendants served amended responses. Unsatisfied with the amended responses, Plaintiff avers that she subsequently emailed Defendants prior to filing the motion to compel and offered to confer by telephone, but Defendants stated that it could not respond because there was a pending demurrer. The Court finds Plaintiff's efforts constitute a reasonable and good faith attempt to meet and confer.

Plaintiff seeks further responses to Request Nos. 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 13 and 14. For the most part, Defendants' opposition responds either that the requested documents do not exist or that all documents in Defendants' possession have been produced, but Defendants' statements in opposition are unsupported by any declaration. Further, each of Defendants' responses does not comply with the form of response required by Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.210 et seq. For example, each response does not include a statement of compliance (section 2031.220) and/or a statement of inability to comply (section 2031.230); nor did Defendants identify the specific request number to which the produced documents respond (section 2031.280).

In addition, several responses appear deficient. For example, Request No. 3 seeks documents sufficient to show calendaring. The opposition states that responsive information does not exist but Defendants have also referenced a calendaring error. If these items once existed but do not exist now, Defendant should so assert. Defendant argues in opposition that the information is premature but that contention is unsupported by the cited legal authority. Instead, "a request for production of documents to be a legislatively authorized method of discovery of insurance information[.]" (Irvington-Moore, Inc. v. Superior Court (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 733, 743-744.) Defendant shall provide verified further responses within 20 days.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Stacy P. Speiller in Department 22:

CV-26-001914 - STANISLAUS COUNCIL OF GOVERNMENTS vs COOPER, BRANDON W - Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration - GRANTED. For the reasons below, the motion for reconsideration is GRANTED. The Court will modify its previous order to set November 30, 2026, as the effective date on which Plaintiff shall be entitled to take possession of the Subject Property. Moving party to submit a proposed order within five court days that comports with this ruling.

On July 17, 2026, Defendants Brandon W. Cooper and Katie M. Cooper filed the instant motion for reconsideration pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1008. Defendants seek reconsideration of the Court's July 21, 2026 order granting Plaintiff Stanislaus Council of Government's ("StanCOG") Motion for an Order for Possession of the Subject Property. Plaintiff opposed and Defendants replied. Per the Court's previous July 21, 2026, Plaintiff is authorized to take prejudgment possession of the Subject Property no earlier than August 23, 2026.

A party "may, within 10 days after service upon the party of written notice of entry of the order and based upon new or different facts, circumstances, or law, make application to the same judge or court that made the order, to reconsider the matter and modify, amend, or revoke the prior order." (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 1008.)

"If the motion is opposed by a defendant or occupant within 30 days of service, the court may make an order for possession of the property upon consideration of the relevant facts and any opposition, and upon completion of a hearing on the motion, if the court finds each of the following: (A) The plaintiff is entitled to take the property by eminent domain. (B) The plaintiff has deposited pursuant to Article 1 (commencing with Section 1255.010) an amount that satisfies the requirements of that article. (C) There is an overriding need for the plaintiff to possess the property prior to the issuance of final judgment in the case, and the plaintiff will suffer a substantial hardship if the application for possession is denied or limited. (D) The hardship that the plaintiff will suffer if possession is denied or limited outweighs any hardship on the defendant or occupant that would be caused by the granting of the order of possession." (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 1255.410(d)(2).)

Defendants argue that Plaintiff does not satisfy the "overriding need" or "substantial hardship" elements required for prejudgment possession under Code of Civil Procedure section 1255.410(d)(2). The parties appear to be in agreement that the timeline of the project as issue in this matter has been extended. Plaintiff admits that the certification deadline was moved to January 19, 2027, and thus requests that the effective date of the Court's previous order be extended to November 30, 2026.

The change in timeline does not alter the Court's previous findings regarding overriding need, substantial hardship, or the balance of hardships. (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 1255.410(d)(2).) It merely changes the date by which possession is required. Defendant's argument regarding an "urgent" overriding need is not persuasive. A showing of urgency is required for an emergency order of possession that seeks possession earlier than permitted under the notice requirements because of, e.g., "a utility's urgent need to protect the public's health and safety[.]" (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 1255.410(e)(1); Israni v. Superior Court (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 621, 632 ["If the condemning authority wishes to obtain possession earlier than permitted under the 30 or 90-day notice requirements, it must make an additional showing that it has an urgent need for possession[.]"].)

That is unlike the situation here since Plaintiff is not seeking to obtain possession before the required 30 day notice period on an emergency basis under subdivision (e)(1). Defendants' cite to Israni is inapposite because that case discusses "an ex parte application . . . for an [order of immediate possession] authorizing [Plaintiff] to take possession of the Property . . . three days after notice of the order is served[.]" (Israni v. Superior Court, supra 88 Cal.App.4th at 629.) In addition, Defendants quotation of section 1255.420 is taken out of context regarding timing and it is also misplaced. That section was repealed in 2006 by Senate Bill 1210, Section 4. (2006 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 594 (S.B. 1210, SEC. 4) (WEST).)

CV-26-004906 - FLORY, RYAN T vs HYUNDAI MOTOR AMERICA - Defendant's Motion to Compel Binding Arbitration - DENIED without prejudice. Defendant Hyundai Motor America's motion to compel binding arbitration appears premature. The instant case is a lemon law action filed after January 1, 2025. Therefore, it appears the action is governed by Code of Civil Procedure section 871.26.

Section 871.26 requires, inter alia, that "[w]ithin 90 days after filing of the answer or other responsive pleading, all parties shall schedule a mediation to occur within 150 days after filing of the answer or other responsive pleading with a court-appointed or private mediator." Except for initial disclosures and the initial depositions, "all other discovery shall be stayed until mediation is concluded." (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 871.26.) Accordingly, the motion is DENIED without prejudice. Defendant may re-file its motion to compel after mediation is concluded.

PR-26-000073 - IN THE MATTER OF DONALD & MARY ANN MCBRIDE LIVING TRUST - Petitioner's Motion to Compel Further Responses to Petitioner's First Set of Requests for Production of Documents to Respondent - CONTINUED to August 26, 2026, at 8:30 am in Department 22. This matter is CONTINUED on the Court's own motion to August 26, 2026, at 8:30 am in Department 22, to be