Unknown v. Unknown

continued to today.

On August 13, 2026, defendants filed a notice of non-receipt of any opposition to their motions. The discovery has been outstanding now for eight months. That is more than enough time for plaintiffs to have responded or at least filed an opposition. The court has reviewed the discovery, and the court sees no reason why plaintiffs have not responded to it. Therefore, the motions are GRANTED.

Plaintiffs have 15 days to provide verified responses to the outstanding written discovery without objection. Documents are to be provided at the same time. The court notes that there was no sanction request in the notice of motion, which the court views as an act of goodwill by the defense.

Plaintiffs are advised again: they are entitled to litigate and sue the defendants. What they are not entitled to do is be plaintiffs but refuse to participate in the litigation process. They are strongly urged to provide the discovery responses. The court sees no reason why, in this lengthy period, they have not done so. The court also warns plaintiffs that the failure to comply could lead to a renewed motion, but this time with the possibility of evidentiary, issue, or even terminating sanctions.

by the parties. Plaintiff wants to take action because the housing subsidy was not reinstated earlier, but defendant states that if there is no reinstatement, defendant will not need to start paying until 8/22. Defendant's recollection is not quite consistent with the settlement's language.

The settlement requires that defendant's subsidy is to be reinstated by August 6 (changed from August 1), and money applied no later than August 22 (changed from August 15). That means that the agreement with the VA is to be in place by August 6, and payments received and applied by August 22. The dates were changed at defendant's request to give defendant more time, but those changes were as set forth above.

Plaintiff's theory is that the subsidy was not in fact reinstated in time, and therefore plaintiff is entitled to possession--not because of misconduct by defendant, but because the subsidy is not in place and retroactively applied. Defendant states, however, that the parties all met with the VA and that the VA has agreed to restore the subsidy effective September 2. Defendant claims he relied on that, and that he is fully prepared to ensure that plaintiff is fully paid for all rent.

The court will inquire. If in fact there is an agreement with the VA to restore the subsidy but it is not effective until September 2, that is a technical breach because plaintiff is right that the agreement needed to be in place by August 6. But there remain two questions. The first is whether plaintiff led defendant and the VA to believe that a September 2 date would be sufficient. If so, that conduct might be sufficient to waive the August 6 deadline. Second, if the subsidy is really going to be reinstated by September 2, is that a material breach? The court is not saying no, but it is saying that it is unsure.

Right now, the court is in the middle of a jury trial. The court will not be able to hold a significant hearing on this today. The court will discuss a continuation date to allow the parties to respond to this issue. Further, the court will at least inquire whether defendant has in fact started paying the money back to plaintiff as defendant states he was required to do as of August 22 (which has now passed).

Case Number: 26SMCP00213 Hearing Date: August 25, 2026 Dept: I

The court has before it a petition to compel arbitration. The petition is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Respondent was only served with process on July 31, 2026. The time to respond has not yet expired. As such, it would deny respondent due process to rule on the petition at this time. However, petitioner may reschedule the motion when it would be appropriate to do so.

To aid the parties in the future, the court questions whether there has been an adequate showing on this motion in any event. Petitioner assumes the FAA applies, but that is not clear from the showing. The arbitration clause does not state that it is subject to the FAA. It is true that the FAA governs arbitrations in written agreements involving interstate commerce, but the moving party has the burden of showing that this is such a contract. The court also notes that the contract states that it is governed by Maryland law. Accordingly, any argument made to compel arbitration must address Maryland law (to the extent not inconsistent with the FAA if the FAA applies) or explain why California law would nonetheless govern.

All of that said, the court is not suggesting that these issues cannot be overcome; only that petitioner ought to address them. It might also be that respondent does not oppose the petition to compel arbitration. The parties ought to discuss that in advance of the CMC.

Case Number: 26SMCV00232 Hearing Date: August 25, 2026 Dept: I

The application is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Plaintiff claims that it rented Unit E from defendant, which plaintiff states included the exclusive use of an attached garage. According to plaintiff, after plaintiff began to complain about certain issues relating to the premises, defendant suddenly suggested that the garage was shared space and demanded access. Worse, according to plaintiff, defendant has changed the garage door opener so plaintiff cannot open the exterior door, and defendant has forced entry into the garage. Plaintiff seeks a TRO to bar defendant from continuing to do so.

The court does not believe that plaintiff has claimed that defendant is denying plaintiff use of the garage. Plaintiff also contends that defendant has damaged plaintiff's property in the garage. The reason that the application is denied is because nowhere in the court file is there a copy of the actual lease. Without the lease, the court cannot say with confidence that defendant actually leased the garage to plaintiff for plaintiff's exclusive use. Plaintiff may file again, but this time plaintiff needs to establish the fundamentals of its claim. | Home