CASTOR vs SONO BELLO INTERNATIONAL LLC, et al.

25CV014904: CASTOR vs SONO BELLO INTERNATIONAL LLC, et al. 08/25/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Plaintiff's Complaint in Department 16D

Tentative Ruling

NOTICE: Consistent with Local Rule 1.06(B), any party requesting oral argument on any matter on this calendar must comply with the following procedure: To request limited oral argument, on any matter on this calendar, you must call the Department 16D Oral Argument Request Line at (916) 874-3056 by 4:00 p.m. the court day before the hearing and advise opposing counsel. At the time of requesting oral argument, the requesting party shall leave a voice mail message (a) identifying themselves as the party requesting oral argument; (b) indicating the specific matter/motion for which they are requesting oral argument; and (c) confirming that it has notified the opposing party of its intention to appear and that opposing party may appear via Zoom using the Zoom link and Meeting ID indicated below.

If no request for oral argument is made, the tentative ruling becomes the final order of the Court. Unless ordered to appear in person by the Court, parties may appear remotely either telephonically or by video conference via the Zoom video/audio conference platform with notice to the Court and all other parties in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure §367.75. Although remote participation is not required, the Court will presume all parties are appearing remotely for non-evidentiary civil hearings.

The Department 16D Zoom Link is https://saccourt-ca-gov.zoomgov.com/j/16146506749 and the Zoom Meeting ID is 161 4650 6749. To appear on Zoom telephonically, call (833) 568-8864 and enter the Zoom Meeting ID referenced above. NO COURTCALL APPEARANCES WILL BE ACCEPTED. Parties requesting services of a court reporter will need to arrange for private court reporter services at their own expense, pursuant to Government code §68086 and California Rules of Court, Rule 2.956. Requirements for requesting a court reporter are listed on the Court Reporter Services webpage available on the Sacramento Superior Court website at https://saccourt.ca.gov/general-information/court-reporter-services-transcripts.

Parties may contact Court- Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore by utilizing the list of Court Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore available at https://saccourt.ca.gov/home/showpublisheddocument/227/639084034465370000. A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list. Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk.

If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided. *** EFFECTIVE APRIL 13, 2026, THIS DEPARTMENT HAS MOVED TO THE TANI G.

CANTIL-SAKAUYE COURTHOUSE LOCATED AT 500 G STREET IN SACRAMENTO, CA 95814. ALL HEARINGS NOTICED FOR DEPARTMENT 53 WILL BE HEARD IN

25CV014904: CASTOR vs SONO BELLO INTERNATIONAL LLC, et al. 08/25/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Plaintiff's Complaint in Department 16D

DEPARTMENT 16D OF THE NEW COURTHOUSE. PARTIES MAY CONTINUE TO APPEAR REMOTELY IN DEPARTMENT 16D UNLESS SPECIFICALLY ORDERED OTHERWISE. ***

TENTATIVE RULING

The notice of demurrer does not provide notice of the Court’s tentative ruling system, as required by Local Rule 1.06. Demurring defendants are directed to contact opposing party and advise him/her of Local Rule 1.06 and the Court’s tentative ruling procedure and the manner to request a hearing. If demurring defendants are unable to contact opposing party prior to the hearing, demurring defendants are ordered to appear at the hearing in person, by Zoom or by telephone.

Plaintiff’s opposition fails to identify the correct court for this action and also fails to comply with CRC Rule 3.1110(b)(1) and (3)-(4).

Plaintiff’s complaint fails to comply with CRC Rule 2.112(4), requiring each cause of action to specify the defendants against which it is alleged.

Defendants Body Contour Centers, LLC d/b/a Sono Bello and Afshin Eslami, M.D.’s demurrer to plaintiff in pro per Castor’s complaint is ruled upon as follows.

*** If oral argument is requested, the parties must at the time oral argument is requested notify the clerk and opposing party of the specific causes of action that will be addressed at the hearing. The parties are reminded that pursuant to local rules, only limited oral argument is permitted on law and motion matters. ***

Factual Background

According to the complaint filed on 6/24/2025, plaintiff Castor agreed to undergo some elective medical procedures which were performed by Dr. Eslami at a Sacramento location of Sono Bello in the fall of 2023. Although not entirely clear, it appears that the second part of the procedure was commenced but not completed and the follow-up “touch-up” procedure was never performed. Plaintiff subsequently requested a refund for the procedures which were not completed and/or not performed. Plaintiff alleges defendants refused her demand but instead offered her $5,000 in exchange for a release of all claims.

Plaintiff rejected this offer as well as a subsequent increased offer. Plaintiff’s complaint names as defendants both Sono Bello and Dr. Eslami and it proceeds to allege causes of action for fraud, unjust enrichment, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and breach of contract.

Defendants now challenge each cause of action on various grounds discussed below. Plaintiff opposes. The Court notes that the opposition includes a variety of details which

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV014904: CASTOR vs SONO BELLO INTERNATIONAL LLC, et al. 08/25/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Plaintiff's Complaint in Department 16D

are not alleged within the complaint itself and as explained in the next section, are not considered by the Court because neither “extrinsic evidence” nor facts set forth in either the moving or opposing memorandum can be properly considered in ruling on a demurrer, where the Court’s consideration is limited to the allegations of the pleading at issue as well as any matters for which judicial notice is both requested and granted.

Legal Standards for Demurrer

A demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the pleadings, raising issues of law, not fact, regarding the form or content of the opposing party’s pleading. (Code Civ. Proc. §§422.10, 589.) A demurrer may only challenge defects on the face of the complaint or from matters that are judicially noticeable. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) However, the face of the complaint includes facts contained in exhibits attached to the complaint. (Frantz v. Blackwell (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 91, 94.) A demurrer can be utilized where a complaint itself is incomplete or discloses some defense that would bar recovery. (Guardian North Bay, Inc. v. Superior Court (Myers) (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 963, 971-972.)

In reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint against a general demurrer, courts treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. Matters which may be judicially noticed may also be considered. The complaint is to be given a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context. (Farmers v. Zerin (1997) 53 CaI.App.4th 445, 451.) Consideration of extrinsic evidence or facts asserted in the memorandum supporting or opposing the demurrer is improper. (Ion Equipment Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 881.)

A demurrer may be sustained only if the complaint lacks any sufficient allegations to entitle the plaintiff to relief. (Financial Corp. of America v. Wilburn (1987) 189 Cal. App. 3d 764, 778.) “Plaintiff need only plead facts showing that he may be entitled to some relief, we are not concerned with plaintiff’s possible inability or difficulty in proving the allegations of the complaint.” (Highlanders, Inc. v. Olsan (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 690, 696-697.) “[Courts] are required to construe the complaint liberally to determine whether a cause of action has been stated, given the assumed truth of the facts pleaded.” (Picton v.

Anderson Union High School Dist. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 726, 733.) Still, the plaintiff has the burden of showing that the facts pleaded are sufficient to establish every element of the cause of action. (See, e.g. Martin v. Bridgeport Community Assn., Inc. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1024, 1031; Sui v. Price (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 933, 938.) The allegations must be factual and specific, not vague or conclusionary. (Rakestraw v. California Physicians’ Service (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 39, 43–44.)

A demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pled and the sole issue raised

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV014904: CASTOR vs SONO BELLO INTERNATIONAL LLC, et al. 08/25/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Plaintiff's Complaint in Department 16D

by a general demurrer is whether the facts pled state a valid cause of action - not whether they are true. (Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5 Cal.3d 584, 591.) Finally, a demurrer may only be sustained where it disposes of an entire cause of action. (See, e.g., Fremont Indemnity Co. v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 119.)

Discussion

Fraud. The first cause of action is labelled as one for “fraud.” Defendants demur to it on the grounds plaintiff has failed to allege with the requisite heightened factual particularity any fraudulent conduct on the part of either defendant. For instance, the current allegations in Paragraphs 53-57 relate to the fees for the procedures to be performed and defendants subsequently refused to refund the portion for services which were not ultimately provided, thereby possibly stating a breach of contract claim but falling far short of pleading the existence of any actionable fraud on the part of either defendant. (Mov. MPA, p.6:24-p.8:8.)

The demurrer to the first cause of action is SUSTAINED. Although generically labelled as cause of action “fraud,” the express allegations found in Paragraphs 45-52 plainly suggest that the actual theory of fraud advanced here is misrepresentation, as distinguished from other forms of actionable fraud such as concealment or false promise. Still, it remains entirely unclear if plaintiff is attempting to assert a claim for intentional misrepresentation or negligent misrepresentation, or perhaps both. As such, this cause of action is fatally uncertain and subject to demurrer on such grounds.

Additionally, regardless of whether plaintiff is making a claim for intentional or negligent misrepresentation, she is under current California law obligated to plead “the names of the persons who made the allegedly fraudulent misrepresentations, their authority to speak, to whom they spoke, what they said or wrote, and when it was said or written” (Tarmann v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 153, 157-158), but this first cause of action does not include such specificity. Instead, plaintiff merely asserts the following:

53. Here, a price for the surgical procedure was made, which specifically included Upper Abs, Lower Abs, Waist, Hips, Back Bra Rolls, Pre-Operative Appointment, Diamond PLUS Recovery Package, and Surgical Fee.

54. The fee for the service set out in paragraph 53, above, was paid in full by Plaintiff before the procedure was undertaken.

55. Here, fraud was committed by Defendants when the fee paid by Plaintiff was accepted and kept by Defendants, and the services for which Plaintiff had paid Defendants were not rendered.

56. Here, fraud was committed by Defendants when the fee paid by Plaintiff was accepted by Defendants and not returned when lawful demand was made by

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV014904: CASTOR vs SONO BELLO INTERNATIONAL LLC, et al. 08/25/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Plaintiff's Complaint in Department 16D

Plaintiff.

57. Here, fraud was committed by Defendants when the fee paid by Plaintiff was accepted and kept by Defendants, and the excuse made by Defendants for not performing the remaining procedures for which Defendants had receive payment was to blame Plaintiff.

Such allegations are plainly insufficient especially to the extent they fail to identify who made the alleged misrepresentation; the authority of such person to speak on behalf of either defendant; whether the alleged misrepresentation was made orally or in writing; when the alleged misrepresentation was made; and to differentiate between the two named defendants. This latter point is significant here because the complaint fails to allege the existence of any employment, agency or other legally significant relationship between these named defendants.

Finally, the complaint also currently fails to allege whether such misrepresentation was known to be false at the time it was made or made without reasonably believing it to be true at the time; such misrepresentation induced plaintiff to act or refrain from acting; and reliance on such misrepresentation proximately caused plaintiff’s alleged harm and damage. Accordingly, the demurrer to the first cause of action is sustained.

Unjust Enrichment. The second cause of action, similar to the first, generally alleges there was a price for the surgical procedures plaintiff had selected and this price was paid in full by plaintiff before the procedures but “unjust enrichment was committed by Defendants” when they failed to return that portion of the payment for services which were ultimately not rendered. (Compl., ¶¶60-63.) Defendants demur to this unjust enrichment claim on the grounds it is not a valid, independent cause of action but rather merely a remedy which is available in the absence of an express contract. (Mov. MPA, p.8:8-p.9:8.)

The Court SUSTAINS the demurrer to the second cause of action as well. According to current California law, “unjust enrichment” is not a valid, independent cause of action in this state (see, e.g., Melchior v. New Line Productions, Inc. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 779, 793 [“[T]here is no cause of action in California for unjust enrichment. Unjust enrichment is ‘a general principle, underlying various legal doctrines and remedies,' rather than a remedy itself. (Dinosaur Development, Inc. v. White (1989) 216 Cal.

App.3d 1310, 1315.) It is synonymous with restitution. (Id. at 1314.)”].) Other authority indicates that “unjust enrichment” is essentially a different label for restitution (see, e.g., Hirsch v. Bank of America (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 708, 721 [“[A]ppellants’ unjust enrichment claim is grounded in equitable principles of restitution.”]) but “restitution” itself is not a valid cause of action either. It is simply a remedy to which a party may be entitled under certain circumstances (see, e.g., Rutherford Holdings, LLC v.

Plaza Del Rey (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 221, 231). On these bases, the demurrer to the second

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV014904: CASTOR vs SONO BELLO INTERNATIONAL LLC, et al. 08/25/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Plaintiff's Complaint in Department 16D

cause of action which is alleged as “unjust enrichment” is sustained.

Furthermore, the Court notes that in Durell v. Sharp Healthcare (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1350, the Fourth District Court of Appeal not only confirmed “there is no cause of action in California for unjust enrichment” but also clarified that “[a]s a matter of law, an unjust enrichment claim does not lie where the parties have an enforceable express contract. (Durell, at 1370 (citing California Medical Assn v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare of California, Inc. (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 151, 172).) It is not clear from the complaint whether plaintiff intends to allege inconsistent causes of action in the alternative. Therefore, given the allegations as they presently appear, because the complaint’s final cause of action is identified as one for breach of a contract “between Plaintiff and Defendants” (Compl., ¶70), this unjust enrichment claim is subject to demurrer.

Breach of Contract. The fourth cause of action specifically alleges that “Plaintiff and Defendants” entered into a contract in October 2023 whereby the former paid to the latter “a sum certain” for “surgical services [which] were to be performed by Defendants” (Compl., ¶70) and that some of the services for which plaintiff paid pursuant to the contract were never performed (Id., at ¶¶73-80) but “[n]o refund or recompense of the amount paid by Plaintiff to Defendants was made to Plaintiff for the services not provided or rendered by Defendants,” thereby constituting “a breach of contract by Defendants” (Id., at ¶¶81-83).

Defendants demur to this breach of contract cause of action on the grounds the complaint fails to specify whether the alleged contract was written, oral or implied; there is “no specified claim that Dr Eslami, an individual, entered into any contractual agreement with plaintiff;” the exhibits attached to the complaint “are unsupported by applicable law” and/or fail to establish the follow-up “touch up” procedure was actually contracted for; and the plaintiff fails to specify the contractual term(s) allegedly breached by defendants. (Mov. MPA, p.10:7-p.11:7.)

The demurrer to the fourth cause of action is SUSTAINED as well. Although the complaint does specifically allege in Paragraph 70 that “Plaintiff and Defendants” (underline added for emphasis) entered into a contract and this express allegation must be accepted as true for purposes of this demurrer, this cause of action remains fatally defective insofar as the complaint fails to specify whether alleged contract with “Defendants” was written, oral or implied as required by California law. (See, e.g., Otworth v.

Southern Pac. Transportation Co. (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 452, 458-459.) While attached to the complaint are what are identified as “Supporting Exhibits,” such attachments do not appear to be referenced or otherwise mentioned within the body of the complaint and thus, such attachments do not have any legal significance. Consequently, for this reason alone, the breach of contract cause of action is subject to demurrer.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV014904: CASTOR vs SONO BELLO INTERNATIONAL LLC, et al. 08/25/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Plaintiff's Complaint in Department 16D

Additionally, it is well established that a claim for breach of a contract must either set forth the material terms of the contract or plead the legal effect of the agreement but if the agreement is written, a copy of it may be attached to the complaint and incorporated therein. (See, e.g., Construction Protective Services, Inc. v. TIG Specialty Insurance Co. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 189, 198-199.) The breach of contract claim must also plead facts sufficient to demonstrate the violation of some specific material contract term. (See, e.g., Levy v.

State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 1, 5 [breach of contract must be pleaded with factual specificity which affirmatively demonstrates breach of a material contract term].) However, to the extent plaintiff appears to be alleging the breach of a written contract with one or both defendants, the complaint currently fails to set forth the verbatim material terms of the contract, attach a copy, or otherwise adequately plead the legal effect of the agreement and additionally, to the extent plaintiff is claiming that defendants’ failure to perform the subsequent “touch up” procedure constitutes a breach of contract, the complaint does not clearly plead that defendants’ were unqualifiedly obligated to perform such procedure.

For these additional reasons, the Court sustains the demurrer to the fourth cause of action.

Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith. This cause of action, like the breach of contract cause of action, generally alleges there was a price for the surgical procedures plaintiff had selected and this price was paid in full by plaintiff before the procedures were commenced but in breach of the good faith covenant, defendants failed to refund that portion of the funds paid for services which were ultimately not rendered or not completed. (Compl., ¶¶66-69.)

Defendants demur to this cause of action on the grounds that there is “no specified claim that Dr Eslami, an individual, entered into any contractual agreement with plaintiff;” there is “no specified allegation as to what services were and were not provided during the two surgeries, nor is there any assertion regarding a basis for the claim that the covenant of good faith and fair dealing warranted a complete refund of the money she spent;” and “there is no specified allegation as to which ‘rights to receive benefits of the agreement actually made’ were frustrated.”(Mov. MPA, p.9:8-p.10:6.)

The Court also SUSTAINS the demurrer to the third cause of action. Although the Court again rejects defendants’ suggestion there is no allegation that plaintiff entered into an agreement with Dr. Eslami (see, Compl., ¶70 [“Plaintiff and Defendants” (underline added for emphasis) entered into a contract]), defendants correctly assert that this cause of action fails to specifically identify any benefits under the alleged contract which plaintiff was unfairly or improperly denied by virtue of defendants’ conduct. After all, to constitute a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, an act of the defendant(s) must substantially interfere with the right of the plaintiff to receive some benefits of an existing contract (see, e.g., Commercial Union

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV014904: CASTOR vs SONO BELLO INTERNATIONAL LLC, et al. 08/25/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Plaintiff's Complaint in Department 16D

Assurance Companies v. Safeway Stores, Inc. (1980) 26 Cal.3d 912, 918; Koehrer v. Superior Court (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 1155, 1170) and thus, without an allegation that plaintiff was denied some right she was actually entitled to under the alleged agreement, she has failed to plead any actionable breach of the implied covenant. For these reasons, this cause of action is not sufficiently pled.

Additionally, the Court notes that the substance of this cause of action for breach of the implied covenant appears essentially identical to the separate cause of action for breach of contract insofar as both expressly allege plaintiff paid in advance a certain sum for all the procedures she had elected but then defendants subsequently refused to return or refund the fees associated with those procedures which were not performed or not completed. (See, Compl., ¶¶66-69, 71-83.) “If the allegations [for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing] do not go beyond the statement of a mere contract breach and, relying on the same alleged acts, simply seek the same damages or other relief already claimed in a companion contract cause of action, they may be disregarded as superfluous as no additional claim is actually stated.” (Careau & Co. v. Security Pacific Business Credit, Inc. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1371, 1395 (underline added for emphasis).)

Disposition

For the reasons explained above, defendants’ demurrer to plaintiff’s complaint is SUSTAINED as to all causes of action.

Since this is the first challenge to plaintiff’s complaint, leave to amend is GRANTED. Plaintiff may file and serve an amended complaint no later than 9/15/2026. Although not required by Court rule or statute, plaintiff is directed to present a copy of this order if and when the amended complaint is presented for filing.

Defendants to respond within 30 days if the amended complaint is personally served, 35 days if served by mail.

Defendants to provide notice of this ruling and file proof of service of same within five (5) court days.

This minute order is effective immediately. No formal order or other notice is required. (Code Civ. Proc. §1019.5; CRC Rule 3.1312.)