140 BLUE RAVINE, LLC vs PHOENIX MOTOR, INC, et al.

23CV010098: 140 BLUE RAVINE, LLC, A CALIFORNIA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY vs PHOENIX MOTOR, INC, A DELAWARE CORPORATION, et al. 08/25/2026 Hearing on Motion for Order for Right to Attach Order and Issuance of Writ of Attachment as to Phoenix Motor, Inc. in Department 16D

Tentative Ruling

NOTICE: Consistent with Local Rule 1.06(B), any party requesting oral argument on any matter on this calendar must comply with the following procedure: To request limited oral argument, on any matter on this calendar, you must call the Department 16D Oral Argument Request Line at (916) 874-3056 by 4:00 p.m. the court day before the hearing and advise opposing counsel. At the time of requesting oral argument, the requesting party shall leave a voice mail message (a) identifying themselves as the party requesting oral argument; (b) indicating the specific matter/motion for which they are requesting oral argument; and (c) confirming that it has notified the opposing party of its intention to appear and that opposing party may appear via Zoom using the Zoom link and Meeting ID indicated below.

If no request for oral argument is made, the tentative ruling becomes the final order of the Court. Unless ordered to appear in person by the Court, parties may appear remotely either telephonically or by video conference via the Zoom video/audio conference platform with notice to the Court and all other parties in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure §367.75. Although remote participation is not required, the Court will presume all parties are appearing remotely for non-evidentiary civil hearings.

The Department 16D Zoom Link is https://saccourt-ca-gov.zoomgov.com/j/16146506749 and the Zoom Meeting ID is 161 4650 6749. To appear on Zoom telephonically, call (833) 568-8864 and enter the Zoom Meeting ID referenced above. NO COURTCALL APPEARANCES WILL BE ACCEPTED. Parties requesting services of a court reporter will need to arrange for private court reporter services at their own expense, pursuant to Government code §68086 and California Rules of Court, Rule 2.956. Requirements for requesting a court reporter are listed on the Court Reporter Services webpage available on the Sacramento Superior Court website at https://saccourt.ca.gov/general-information/court-reporterservices-transcripts.

Parties may contact Court- Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore by utilizing the list of Court Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore available at https://saccourt.ca.gov/home/showpublisheddocument/227/639084034465370000. A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list. Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk.

If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided. *** EFFECTIVE APRIL 13, 2026, THIS DEPARTMENT HAS MOVED TO THE TANI G.

CANTIL- SAKAUYE COURTHOUSE LOCATED AT 500 G STREET IN SACRAMENTO, CA 95814. ALL HEARINGS NOTICED FOR DEPARTMENT 53 WILL BE HEARD IN DEPARTMENT 16D OF THE NEW COURTHOUSE. PARTIES MAY CONTINUE TO APPEAR REMOTELY IN DEPARTMENT 16D UNLESS SPECIFICALLY ORDERED OTHERWISE. ***

TENTATIVE RULING

23CV010098: 140 BLUE RAVINE, LLC, A CALIFORNIA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY vs PHOENIX MOTOR, INC, A DELAWARE CORPORATION, et al. 08/25/2026 Hearing on Motion for Order for Right to Attach Order and Issuance of Writ of Attachment as to Phoenix Motor, Inc. in Department 16D

The Notice of Application and Hearing does not provide notice of the Court’s tentative ruling system, as required by Local Rule 1.06. Moving counsel is directed to contact opposing counsel and advise him/her of Local Rule 1.06 and the Court’s tentative ruling procedure and the manner to request a hearing. If moving counsel is unable to contact opposing counsel prior to the hearing, moving counsel is ordered to appear at the hearing in person, by Zoom or by telephone.

Plaintiff/cross-defendant 140 Blue Ravine, LLC’s (“Plaintiff”) application for a right to attach order and writ of attachment as against defendant/cross-complainant Phoenix Motor, Inc. (“PMI”) is ruled on as follows.

Most of the opposition papers fail to specify the (original) hearing date for this application (7/28/2026) and the correct department for hearing (16D).

Factual Background

This action arises from a 2022 commercial lease whereby defendant PMI agreed to lease certain premises from Plaintiff. The latter commenced this action on 10/18/2023 with a complaint for breach of contract against defendant PMI and its guarantor, defendant SPI Solar, Inc. (“SPI”). The operative Second Amended Complaint filed on 12/27/2024 now alleges a single cause of action against defendant PMI for breach of the lease agreement and a single cause of action against defendant SPI for breach of the lease guaranty.

Defendants PMI and SPI filed on 3/7/2025 an initial cross-complaint against Plaintiff but later filed on 11/18/2025 an amended cross-complaint against Plaintiff, alleging causes of action for conversion, trespass, negligent interference with prospective economic relations, violation of Civil Code §1993.07, negligence, and declaratory relief. This amended cross-complaint is the subject of a motion to strike, now set for hearing on 12/10/2026. Plaintiff also has a motion to amend its complaint set for 12/31/2026.

This action has not yet been set for trial. According to a filing on 8/14/2026, defendant SPI recently filed for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy in the State of Delaware.

Moving Papers. Plaintiff now seeks a right to attach order to secure its recovery of up to $1,195,719.09 claimed to be owed by defendant PMI. According to the moving points & authorities, “Plaintiff’s damages are real, documented, and continuing” and Plaintiff “recently discovered facts demonstrating an immediate and substantial risk of asset dissipation, including evidence that Defendants may be transferring funds, that their principal Xiaofeng Denton Peng is a fugitive with a demonstrated history of abusing

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV010098: 140 BLUE RAVINE, LLC, A CALIFORNIA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY vs PHOENIX MOTOR, INC, A DELAWARE CORPORATION, et al. 08/25/2026 Hearing on Motion for Order for Right to Attach Order and Issuance of Writ of Attachment as to Phoenix Motor, Inc. in Department 16D

the corporate form, and that a liquidation proceeding is underway in the Cayman Islands.” Thus, fearing that assets will be transferred, concealed, or otherwise dissipated, Plaintiff now applies for a right to attach order as against defendant PMI on the grounds that the statutory prerequisites for attachment are satisfied in this case.

Opposition. Defendant PMI opposes, generally arguing that Plaintiff cannot establish the probable validity of the claim upon which this application is based. The opposition asserts that after taking possession of the leased premises in the fall of 2023, Plaintiff not only auctioned off PMI’s personal property without proper notice and for “pennies on the dollar” but also “made only bare minimum efforts to relet the property,” ultimately reletting only portions of the premises despite substantial interest in the form of 35-plus inquiries. (Opp., p.2:22-p.3:8.)

According to PMI, the “probable validity” standard governing the present application requires Plaintiff to make more than “a bare prima facie showing” and the Court to determine the probable outcome of the litigation based on the evidence presented. Relying on this Court’s denial of Plaintiff’s two prior motions for summary judgment/adjudication, the opposition insists Plaintiff cannot actually show the probable validity of its claim. (Id., at p.5:2-p.6:19.)

Defendant PMI next contends that Plaintiff cannot establish the amount to be secured by attachment “because its damages are disputed and subject to mandatory mitigation,” a duty Plaintiff failed to fulfill. (Opp., p.6:20-p.7:13.) Additionally, the opposition maintains that the amount to be secured must be reduced by “Defendants’ crossdemands” as alleged in the pending cross-complaint, including the improper disposition personal property “worth millions [but] sold for a fraction of its value ” and that “Plaintiff’s allegations of flight and asset dissipation are irrelevant” to this application. (Id., at p.7:15-p.8:13.)

Reply. Plaintiff claims that PMI’s opposition “does not meaningfully rebut” the moving papers’ showing insofar as PMI “does not dispute the existence of the Lease, the Guaranty, [PMI’s] default, or the resulting unpaid contractual obligations in any way that defeats attachment. Instead, the opposition “relies on procedural history, unsupported factual assertions, and speculative offsets” which are insufficient to defeat this application. The prior denial of Plaintiff’s summary judgment motions is not relevant here, as the “probable validity” inquiry is different from the summary judgment standard and the prior denial of summary judgment is “not an adjudication that [Plaintiff] is unlikely to prevail, nor does it preclude the Court from finding that [Plaintiff] has shown it is more likely than not to obtain judgment on its claims” against PMI.

The opposition’s “mitigation and cross-demand arguments concern, at most, disputed issues about the ultimate amount of damages or potential offsets” but “[t]hey do not negate the probable validity of [Plaintiff’s] claims.” Regardless, Plaintiff insists these arguments are not

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV010098: 140 BLUE RAVINE, LLC, A CALIFORNIA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY vs PHOENIX MOTOR, INC, A DELAWARE CORPORATION, et al. 08/25/2026 Hearing on Motion for Order for Right to Attach Order and Issuance of Writ of Attachment as to Phoenix Motor, Inc. in Department 16D

supported by competent, admissible evidence necessary to defeat this application.

Standards for Attachment

A right to attach order and order for issuance of a writ of attachment may be issued where the trial court finds that (1) the claim upon which the attachment is based is one upon which an attachment may be issued; (2) the applicant has established the probable validity of the claim upon which the attachment is based; (3) the attachment is not sought for a purpose other than the recovery of the claim upon which the attachment is based; and (4) the amount to be secured by the attachment is greater than zero. (Code Civ.

Proc. §484.090(a).) The court’s determination is to be made upon the basis of the pleadings and other papers in the record. (Code Civ. Proc. §484.090(d).) There are strict statutory requirements that must be met to establish a prima facie claim to relief and strict construction of the statutory scheme prevents any relief unless specifically provided in statute. (Pacific Decision Sciences Corp. v Superior Court (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1100, 1106.)

In light of the first element, a writ of attachment may be issued only if the underlying action is a claim for money based upon an express or implied contract; the total amount of the claim is a fixed or readily ascertainable amount of at least $500 exclusive of costs, interest, and attorney fees; the claim is not secured by any interest in real property; and the property sought to be attached must be proper for attachment. (Code Civ. Proc. §483.010; Kadison, Pfaelzer, Woodward, Quinn & Rossi v. Wilson (1987) 197Cal.App.3d 1, fn. 1; Western Steel and Ship Repair, Inc. v. R.M.L, Inc. (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 1108, 1113.) Any claim of attachment against a natural person may be made under the statute only if the debt arises from his/her conduct of a “trade, business, or profession.” (Code Civ. Proc. §483.010(c).)

The applicant has the burden of proving with admissible evidence that it is more likely than not s/he will obtain a judgment against the defendant on the claim. (Code Civ. Proc. §§484.030, 481.190, 484.090(a)(2).) Thus, a trial court not only has the power to but ultimately must weigh the evidence offered in connection with the application in order to determine the “probable validity” of the applicant’s claims. (See, e.g., Hobbs v. Weiss (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 76, 80.) Still, the court is not required to accept as true even undisputed declarations where contrary inferences may be drawn from other evidence. (See, e.g., Bank of America v. Salinas Nissan, Inc. (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 260, 270.)

Request for Judicial Notice

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV010098: 140 BLUE RAVINE, LLC, A CALIFORNIA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY vs PHOENIX MOTOR, INC, A DELAWARE CORPORATION, et al. 08/25/2026 Hearing on Motion for Order for Right to Attach Order and Issuance of Writ of Attachment as to Phoenix Motor, Inc. in Department 16D

Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice of various filings and proceedings in Plaintiff’s unlawful detainer action (including both the original and amended complaints, the default and default judgment, and the Writ of Possession as well as the Return on Writ of Possession); defendants PMI and SPI’s opposition to Plaintiff’s motion to strike the former’s original cross-complaint and the Court’s ruling on such motion to strike; and defendants PMI and SPI’s amended cross-complaint is granted but only for the limited purposes appropriate for judicial notice. (See, Evid.

Code §451(a); §452(b)-(d); see also, Johnson & Johnson v. Superior Court (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 757, 768 [court may take judicial notice of the existence of court documents but not to the truth of any statements contained therein]; Kilroy v. State of California (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 140, 145-148; Sosinsky v. Grant (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1548, 1569-70.)

Objections to Evidence

Defendant PMI did not file any written objections to evidence.

Plaintiff filed on 7/21/2026 written objections to the Peng Declaration filed in support of defendant PMI’s opposition to the present application. The Court rules on these written objections as follows:

Obj. No. 1: Sustained because the Peng Declaration filed on 7/15/2026 fails to set forth a sufficient factual foundation to affirmatively establish the personal knowledge necessary to properly attest to the fact that Plaintiff and PEV, an entity not identified anywhere in the declaration, “entered into an agreement for the rental of the subject premises” or that the parties thereafter “had disputes about the terms and conditions of the agreement.” It appears that the only attestations provided in the Peng Declaration that appear intended to address foundation for the foregoing are the following statements:

2. I am/was CEO of both defendants in this matter, and if called as a witness, I could and would competently testify to the matters stated herein. I am currently Chairman of the Board and CEO of Phoenix Motor, Inc. I was previously CEO of SPI Solar, Inc. I submit this Declaration in support of defendant's Opposition to Plaintiffs Application for Right to Attach Order and Order for Issuance of Writ of Attachment.

3. I know the contents of this declaration. The same is true of my own knowledge, except as to those matters which are therein stated on information and belief, and, as to those matters, I believe them to be true. (Peng Decl., ¶¶2-3.)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV010098: 140 BLUE RAVINE, LLC, A CALIFORNIA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY vs PHOENIX MOTOR, INC, A DELAWARE CORPORATION, et al. 08/25/2026 Hearing on Motion for Order for Right to Attach Order and Issuance of Writ of Attachment as to Phoenix Motor, Inc. in Department 16D

However, the mere fact the declarant is/was the “CEO of both defendants in this matter” does not without more affirmatively or necessarily establish his own “personal knowledge” regarding any specific activities of PMI and/or SPI, much less the existence of a purported lease agreement between “PEV [sic] and Plaintiff” or any “disputes” relating thereto, as claimed in Paragraph 4. While it remains unclear from the Peng Declaration whether its repeated reference to “PEV” might have been intended to refer to either defendant Phoenix Motor, Inc. or defendant SPI Solar, Inc., what is indisputable is that the Peng Declaration includes no attestations regarding the meaning of the apparent acronym “PEV,” much less state facts to establish any foundational basis for Peng’s statements regarding “PEV.” Nor would the acronym “PEV,” even on its face, appear to relate to a company with the name of either “Phoenix Motor, Inc.” or “SPI Solar, Inc.”

Obj. No. 2: Sustained because the Peng Declaration filed on 7/15/2026 fails to set forth a sufficient factual foundation to affirmatively establish the personal knowledge necessary to properly attest to the fact that “Plaintiff wrongfully took possession of equipment belonging to PEV,” which again is an entity not identified anywhere in the declaration, or that such equipment “had been appraised at a value of nearly $5,000,000.00.” Notably, no document purporting to reflect such an appraisal is included with the Peng Declaration or any other declaration submitted with the opposition papers, much less explain how “equipment belonging to PEV” is somehow relevant to this motion or action.

Obj. No. 3: Sustained because the Peng Declaration filed on 7/15/2026 fails to set forth a sufficient factual foundation to affirmatively establish the personal knowledge necessary to properly attest to the fact that “Plaintiff, without consent, permission, or a right, auctioned off PEV’s property, without giving notice per the terms of the agreement to PEV and SPI,” especially when “PEV” is not identified anywhere in the declaration as previously discussed.

Obj. No. 4: Sustained because the Peng Declaration filed on 7/15/2026 fails to set forth a sufficient factual foundation to affirmatively establish the personal knowledge necessary to properly attest to the fact that “Plaintiff made minimal efforts to relet the premises, and there is no evidence that they used a broker, agent, or listing company to market or relet the premises after the dispute, as required by the agreement.” As explained above, the mere fact the declarant is/was the “CEO of both defendants in this matter” does not without more affirmatively or necessarily establish his own “personal knowledge” regarding any specific activities of PMI and/or SPI, much less the actions which Plaintiff allegedly did or did not take after obtaining possession of the leased premises. Additionally, Peng’s assertion about what may have been required by the

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV010098: 140 BLUE RAVINE, LLC, A CALIFORNIA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY vs PHOENIX MOTOR, INC, A DELAWARE CORPORATION, et al. 08/25/2026 Hearing on Motion for Order for Right to Attach Order and Issuance of Writ of Attachment as to Phoenix Motor, Inc. in Department 16D

purported lease agreement between Plaintiff and “PEV” constitutes an improper legal opinion which is not admissible here even if such statement could have otherwise had relevance to this case.

Obj. No. 5: Sustained because the Peng Declaration filed on 7/15/2026 fails to set forth a sufficient factual foundation to affirmatively establish the personal knowledge necessary to properly attest to the fact that “Plaintiff has not provided any evidence of reletting efforts, expenditures spent to release the property while seeking millions in future rent, and has not provided any evidence of the auction sales, reletting leases, reletting income, and many other expenses.” Additionally, such assertions amount to improper opinion testimony which is inadmissible.

Discussion

As explained above, a right to attach order and writ of attachment may be granted where the action is a claim for money based upon an express or implied contract relating to the defendant’s operation of a “trade, business, or profession” and the Court finds (1) the applicant has established the “probable validity” of the claim upon which the attachment is based; (2) the claim is for a fixed or readily ascertainable amount of at least $500 exclusive of costs, interest, and attorney fees; (3) the claim is not secured by any interest in real property; and (4) the attachment is not sought for a purpose other than the recovery of the claim upon which the attachment is based.

Plaintiff contends all of these prerequisites are met here but the opposition insists some of them are not satisfied, thereby mandating denial of this application. The Court will now address each of defendant PMI’s arguments.

Probable Validity. The Court finds that Plaintiff has satisfied its burden of establishing the “probable validity” of its breach of contract claim against defendant PMI. As to the latter’s arguments in opposition, they do not detract from or otherwise demonstrate that Plaintiff’s showing is deficient. The opposition first asserts that Plaintiff has failed to establish the “probable validity” of its breach of contract cause of action because this Court previously denied both of Plaintiff’s prior motions for summary judgment/adjudication. Although both of Plaintiff’s prior motions for summary judgment/adjudication were indeed denied, this does not necessarily establish preclude Plaintiff from establishing the “probable validity” of its breach of contract cause of action against defendant PMI.

First, as correctly pointed out by the reply, the standards applicable to a summary judgment/adjudication motion is vastly different from those governing the present application for prejudgment attachment. Thus, the outcome of the prior motions does

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV010098: 140 BLUE RAVINE, LLC, A CALIFORNIA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY vs PHOENIX MOTOR, INC, A DELAWARE CORPORATION, et al. 08/25/2026 Hearing on Motion for Order for Right to Attach Order and Issuance of Writ of Attachment as to Phoenix Motor, Inc. in Department 16D

not necessarily dictate the outcome of the present application.

Second, the opposition overlooks the fact that Plaintiff’s first motion for summary judgment/adjudication was denied largely because defendants filed numerous objections to the Strombom Declaration on which the moving papers primarily relied and the bulk of these objections were sustained, resulting in the Court’s determination that Plaintiff had failed to carry its initial burden of production under Code of Civil Procedure §437c(p)(1) and (2). Notably, defendant PMI’s opposition to the instant application includes no objections at all, much less objections to the Strombom Declaration on which the instant application primarily relies. As such, the outcome of Plaintiff’s first motion for summary judgment/adjudication does not compel denial of the instant application.

The same is true for Plaintiff’s second motion for summary judgment/adjudication, which was denied solely because it was procedurally improper pursuant to the provisions of §437c(a)(4) and §437c(f)(2), neither of which has any bearing on the outcome of the instant application for attachment.

In the end, because Plaintiff’s evidence and arguments are sufficient to establish “probable validity” of its breach of contract claim against PMI and because defendant PMI’s opposition also fails to identify any particular deficiency in the evidence submitted with the moving papers filed on 7/1/2026 which undermines the “probable validity” of Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim, this Court remains satisfied that Plaintiff has satisfied its burden of showing the “probable validity” of its breach of contract claim against PMI. While the opposition insists that Plaintiff must make more than “a bare prima facie showing” and this Court must determine the probable outcome of the litigation based on the evidence presented, the Court finds that Plaintiff has satisfied this standard and additionally, the opposing papers are devoid of competent, admissible evidence which would allow the Court to conclude Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim against defendant PMI is not probably valid, keeping in mind that all five objections to the Peng Declaration in opposition have been sustained.

Disputed Damages. The Court also finds that Plaintiff has satisfied its burden of establishing the amount of damages to be secured by attachment. In opposition, defendant PMI contends that Plaintiff cannot establish the amount of damages to be secured “because its damages are disputed and subject to mandatory mitigation,” a duty Plaintiff failed to fulfill. (Opp., p.6:20-p.7:13.) Although Plaintiff, as the lessor of the subject premises, does have an obligation to take reasonable steps to mitigate its damages, the opposition does not include any competent, admissible evidence which tends to show either that Plaintiff failed to take reasonable measures to mitigate its

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV010098: 140 BLUE RAVINE, LLC, A CALIFORNIA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY vs PHOENIX MOTOR, INC, A DELAWARE CORPORATION, et al. 08/25/2026 Hearing on Motion for Order for Right to Attach Order and Issuance of Writ of Attachment as to Phoenix Motor, Inc. in Department 16D

damages after obtaining possession of the leased premises or that the amount of damages cited in the moving papers is otherwise subject to reduction, given that all of Plaintiff’s objections to the Peng Declaration have been sustained. Defendant PMI’s related arguments about Plaintiff’s improper auctioning of the former’s personal property claimed to be “worth millions [but] sold for a fraction of its value” are also unavailing given the lack of competent, admissible evidence demonstrating that the value of PMI’s property was “worth millions” or that Plaintiff’s alleged disposition of such proper was improper in any respect. Accordingly, the Court does not find that any of these additional unsupported arguments advanced by the opposition actually preclude the granting of the present application for pre-judgment attachment relative to defendant PMI.

Finding the probable validity of Plaintiff’s breach of contract cause of action as against defendant PMI and no merit to the primary contentions in the latter’s opposition papers, this Court concludes that Plaintiff has established its entitlement to the relief requested in moving papers including a right to attach order and writ of attachment as against defendant PMI in the amount of $1,195,719.09

Disposition

For the reasons explained above, Plaintiff’s application for a right to attach order and writ of attachment as against defendant PMI is GRANTED.

Because of the sizeable amount of the attachment granted here, Plaintiff shall post a $30,000 undertaking within 20 court days.

Having received no objection thereto, the proposed right to attach order and proposed writ of attachment which were submitted with the moving papers will be signed by the Court upon proof of posting of the $30,000 undertaking.

Defendant PMI is reminded that it may pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure §489.310 post an undertaking in order to liberate any asset which may hereafter be attached by Plaintiff pursuant to this ruling and subsequent writ of attachment.

This minute order is effective immediately. No formal order or other notice is required other than as indicated above. (Code Civ. Proc. §1019.5; CRC Rule 3.1312.)