FARID S. URQUIZU FLORES v. AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO., INC.

fees.

III. CONCLUSION

Defendant's Motion to Compel Further Responses to Requests for Production, Set One is GRANTED IN PART. Plaintiff is ordered to serve further responses, code-compliant and without further objection, to RPDs number 1-57 and 59-62.

Defendant's Motion to Compel Further Responses to Special Interrogatories, Set One is GRANTED IN PART. Plaintiff is ordered to serve further responses, code-compliant and without further objection, to Special Interrogatories numbers 1-48.

Plaintiff's further responses are ordered to be served on Defendant no later than September 25, 2026. And the awarded sanctions are ordered to be paid to Defense counsel no later than September 25, 2026.

[1] Plaintiff did not file oppositions to Defendant's discovery motions. Instead, Plaintiff filed her: (1) Response to Defendant's Request for Production, Set One; and (2) Response to Defendant's Special Interrogatories, Set One.

[2] Defense counsel's declarations in support of the RPDs Motion and the SROGs motion are nearly identical, save for the identification of the discovery at issue. Accordingly, the Court's further citations in Section II.B and later in Section II.C.4 are made to counsel's declarations filed in support of the RPDs Motion with the understanding that the same information is within the declaration filed in support of the SROGs Motion.

[3] See DSS, p. 22:26-28, p. 23: 22-23, p. 24:15-17, p. 26:11-14, p. 27:7-10, p. 28:3-6, p. 28:26-29:1.

Case Number: 24CMCV01228-1 Hearing Date: August 25, 2026 Dept: E SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - SOUTH CENTRAL DISTRICT FARID S. URQUIZU FLORES, an individual, Plaintiff, vs. AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO., INC. a California Corporation, and SONIC-HARBOR CITY H, INC., a California Corporation d/b/a CARSON HONDA, and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, Defendants. |)))

))))))) | CASE NO: 24CMCV01228 ORDER RE: DEFENDANT CARSON HONDA'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT DATE: August 25, 2026 TIME: 8:30 A.M. DEPT.: E | Moving Party: Defendant Carson Honda Responding Party: Plaintiff Farid S. Urquizu Flores Notice: Ok SHAPE \* MERGEFORMAT Tentative Ruling: Defendant Carson Honda's Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED. SHAPE \* MERGEFORMAT

I. BACKGROUND

This is a Song-Beverly action filed on August 13, 2024. Plaintiff Farid S. Urquizu Flores ("Plaintiff") alleges that on October 28, 2023, he purchased a 2024 Honda CR-V, vehicle identification number 2HKRS3H45RH304709, (the "Subject Vehicle"). Through such purchase, Plaintiff entered a warranty contract with Defendant American Honda Motor Co. ("American Honda"), including various warranties including, inter alia, a 3-year/36,000-mile express bumper-to-bumper warranty, a 5-year/60,000-mile powertrain warranty, and various emissions warranties with greater time and mileage limitations than the bumper-to-bumper and powertrain warranties.

Plaintiff further alleges that subsequent to the purchase and during the express warranty period, the Subject Vehicle exhibited serious defects and nonconformities to warranty including, inter alia, electrical, steering, and suspension system defects. Although Plaintiff presented the Subject Vehicle to Defendant Sonic-Harbor City H, Inc., d/b/a Carson Honda ("Carson Honda"), one of American Honda's authorized repair facilities, for warranty repairs on multiple occasions, none of the repairs brought the Subject Vehicle in conformity with the express warranty.

Plaintiff further alleges that American Honda failed to promptly offer to repurchase or refund the Subject Vehicle. On August 13, 2024, Plaintiff filed the operative Complaint asserting cause of action for: (1) Violation of the Song-Beverly Act - Breach of Express Warranty; (2) Violation of the Song-Beverly Act - Breach of Implied Warranty; (3) Violation of the Song-Beverly Act Section 1793.2; and (4) Negligent Repair.

On April 23, 2026, Carson Honda filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment (the "MSJ") On July 30, 2026, Plaintiff filed an Opposition. As of August 23, 2026, Carson Honda has not filed a Reply. Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Sec. 437c(b)(4), "[a] reply to the opposition shall be served and filed by the moving party not less than 11 days preceding the noticed or continued date of hearing, unless the court for good cause orders otherwise. (Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 437c(b)(4).) Accordingly, any reply papers now filed are untimely, and the Court exercises its discretion to refuse to consider untimely filed papers. (Cal. R. Ct., Rule 3.1300(d); Mackey v. Bd. of Trustees of California State Univ. (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 640, 657.)

I. ANALYSIS

A.

Legal Standard

The purpose of a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication "is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties' pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute." (Aguilar v. Atl. Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.)

"Code of Civil Procedure section 437c(c), requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and 'all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence' and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)¿

"On a motion for summary judgment, the initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact." (Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.) A defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication "has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action ... cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action." (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 437c(p)(2).)

"Once the defendant ... has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff ... to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto." (Ibid.) "If the plaintiff cannot do so, summary judgment should be granted." (Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Med. Ctr. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467.)¿

A motion for summary judgment must be granted "if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." (Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 437c(c).) On the other hand, a motion for summary adjudication must be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for damages, or an issue of duty. (Id., Sec. 437(f)(1).)¿

"When deciding whether to grant summary judgment, the court must consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers (except evidence to which the court has sustained an objection), as well as all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment." (Avivi, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at p. 467; see also Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 437c(c).)

B. The Undisputed Material Facts

1. Carson's Undisputed Material Facts ("CUMF")

Plaintiff purchased the Subject Vehicle from Riverside Honda. (CUMF # 1.) Plaintiff alleges that Carson Honda negligently repaired Plaintiff's Vehicle under warranty. (Id., # 2.) Plaintiff makes no claim for personal injury damages and does not allege any intentional damage to the Subject Vehicle. (Id., # 3.)

2. Plaintiff's Additional Undisputed Material Facts ("PUMF")

This Subject Vehicle is a 2024 Honda CR-V purchased by Plaintiff (PUMF # 1.) Despite bringing the Subject Vehicle multiple times to multiple Honda authorized dealerships, including multiple times to Carson Honda, the Subject Vehicle has never been fully conformed to warranty. (Id., # 2.) Plaintiff trusted Carson Honda to repair the Subject Vehicle, and to use all available resources in doing do. (Id., # 3.) Carson Honda has never been able to fully conform the Subject Vehicle to warranty and it has not used all available resources in attempting to conform the Subject Vehicle to warranty. (Id., # 4.) At every visit, Techline/FTS/DPSM were all available and yet a review of the records does not show those being utilized at each repair opportunity despite them being accessible by Carson Honda. (Id., # 5.)

C.

Discussion

Carson Honda moves for summary judgment as to Plaintiff's Fourth Cause of Action for Negligent Repair on the ground that Plaintiff's claim is barred by the Economic Loss Rule because Plaintiff's only damages, if any, are economic losses. Plaintiff opposes, arguing that the Economic Loss Rule does not bar the Fourth Cause of Action because Honda's argument oversimplifies California law, ignores well-recognized exceptions, and relied upon distinguishable decisions that are not binding on this Court and do not address the circumstances presented in this matter.

The Economic Loss Rule generally bars recovery in tort for negligently inflicted purely economic losses and requires a contractual party to recover in contract for purely economic loss due to disappointed expectations unless the party can demonstrate harm above and beyond a broken contractual promise. (Rattagan, supra, 17 Cal.5th 1 at p. 20, citing Robinson Helicopter Co., Inc. v. Dana Corp. (2004) 34 Cal.4th 979, 988 (" Robinson Helicopter ") and Sheen v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 905, 922 (" Sheen ").)

The distinction in a plaintiff's recovery "rests ... on an understanding of the nature of the responsibility a manufacturer must undertake in distributing his products. He can appropriately be held liable in tort for physical injuries caused by defects by requiring his good to match a standard of safety defined in terms of conditions that create unreasonable risks of harm. He cannot be held liable in contract for the level of performance of his products in the consumer's business unless he agrees that the product was designed to meet the consumer's demands." (Rattagan, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 22, citing Seely v. White Motor Co. (1965) 63 Cal.2d 9, 18 (emphasis in original).)

The restrictions on contract remedies serve purposes not found in tort law--they protect the parties' freedom to bargain over special risks, and they promote contract formation by limiting liability to the value of the promise. (Harris v. Atlantic Richfield (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 70, 77.) This encourages efficient breaches, resulting in increased production of goods and services at a lower cost to society. (Ibid.) Because of these overriding policy considerations, the California Supreme Court has proceeded with caution in carving out exceptions to the traditional contract remedy restrictions. (Ibid.)

Nevertheless, the most widely recognized exception to the Economic Loss Rule is when a defendant's conduct constitutes a tort as well as a breach of contract. (Id. at p. at 78.) When one party commits fraud during the contract formation or performance, the injured party may recover in both contract and tort. (Ibid.)

Carson Honda argues the Economic Loss Rule bars Plaintiff's claim because Plaintiff only alleges that it negligently repaired Plaintiff's Vehicle, failed to plead property or physical damage due to the allegedly negligent repairs, and does not claim personal injury or have evidence of any intentional property damage to the Subject Vehicle.

Plaintiff argues in opposition that the harm to Plaintiff was foreseeable because in the event that Defendants negligently performed repairs on Plaintiff's Vehicle, it is foreseeable that Plaintiff would suffer harm. Plaintiff further argues that the Complaint alleges that he suffered injury due to negligent repair and the Court in North American Chemical Company v. Superior Court (1997) 59 Cal. App. 4th 764 (" North American ") held that the Economic Loss Rule does not apply to contracts for services, which holding was affirmed in Sheen v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. 12 Cal.5th 905 (" Sheen "). Plaintiff further contends that his negligent repair cause of action is rooted in tort and is independent of his first three causes of action alleged against the manufacturer for violation of the Song-Beverly Act.

In North American, the Court discussed that, in negligent performance cases, a Plaintiff will be entitled to recover economic loss damages without the need to allege or prove personal injury or property damage when Plaintiff is able to satisfy the following criteria for showing a special relationship between the parties: "(1) the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff, (2) the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, (3) the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, (4) the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, (5) the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, and (6) the policy of preventing future harm." (North American, supra, 59 Cal.App.4th at pp. 782, 785 ("[I]n negligent performance cases . . . if those six criteria are satisfied the plaintiff will be entitled to recover economic loss damages without the need to allege and prove personal injury or property damage")(discussing and citing J'Aire Corp v. Gregory (1979) 24 Cal.3d 799).)

Viewed in the context of the Second District Court of Appeal's holding in North American, the Court determines that Carson Honda has not met its burden and the burden does not shift to Plaintiff. First, Carson argues that "the repair services performed by Carson Honda were performed pursuant to contract . . . Therefore, Plaintiff's negligence claim is limited to contract and warranty remedies for the alleged defective vehicle." (See Mot., p. 5:9-12 (citing "UMF No. 4" and referencing various cases setting forth the general Economic Loss Rule that economic loss alone, without physical injury, cannot be recovered in a matter premised in contract).)

However, there is no "UMF No. 4;" Carson Honda presents only undisputed material facts numbered 1 through 3. (See, generally, Carson Honda's Separate Statement, filed 4/23/26.) Thus, whatever the argument, Carson Honda has not presented evidence in support of its argument.

Next, Carson Honda does not address the applicability of the North American Court's decision to the facts at issue here nor does it address whether a triable issue of material fact exists as to any of the six criteria set forth in North American. Upon review of the North American decision, the North American Court determines that the criteria set forth there are indeed applicable in the instant matter because, as is stated in the decision "in negligent performance cases, the reasoning of J'Aire and the six criteria on which it relies will determine the existence of the necessary special relationship and it does not matter whether the plaintiff and defendant are in privity or not.

In addition, if those six criteria are satisfied the plaintiff will be entitled to recover economic loss damages without the need to allege and prove personal injury or property damage." (North American, supra, 59 Cal.App.4th at p. 785 (emphasis added).)

Thus, in failing to address whether a triable issue of material fact exists as to any of the six criteria set forth in North American, Carson Honda fails to meet its burden and the burden does not shift to Plaintiff.

III. CONCLUSION

Carson Honda's Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.

Case Number: 24CMCV01228-2 Hearing Date: August 25, 2026 Dept: E SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - SOUTH CENTRAL DISTRICT FARID S. URQUIZU FLORES, an individual, Plaintiff, vs. AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO., INC. a California Corporation, and SONIC-HARBOR CITY H, INC., a California Corporation d/b/a CARSON HONDA, and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, Defendants. |))))))))))))))) | CASE NO: 24CMCV01228 [TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: DEFENDANT AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO., INC.'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION DATE: August 25, 2026 TIME: 8:30 A.M.