Dale Hobe v. Rhonda Nielsen

Dale Hobe v. Rhonda Nielsen, 19CV-0668

Hearing: Order to Show Cause Motion to Dismiss

Date: August 25, 2026

For the reasons set forth below, the Court dismisses the claims of Jacqueline Hobe and continues this OSC as to Dale Hobe’s single breach of contract claim. Nielsen’s motion to dismiss is denied as to Dale’s claims. 1

A.

Procedural Background

On October 25, 2019, Rhonda Nielsen filed an unlawful detainer action against Dale.2 The complaint sought possession of real property located on Las Flores Drive in Nipomo (the Real Property). Dale’s answer raised various defenses, including disputing Nielsen’s alleged title to the Real Property. Dale argued that Nielsen had unduly influenced Dale’s mother, Jacqueline, to sell the Real Property.

On November 7, 2019, Dale and the Estate of Jacqueline Aubry Hobe (the Estate) filed a civil action against Nielsen. The Court consolidated the civil action and unlawful detainer matter in August 2020. On June 10, 2021, Nielsen filed a cross-complaint in the civil action. Nielsen filed a first amended cross-complaint in November 2024.

In July 2024, Dale filed a first amended complaint asserting the same eight causes of action but adding Debra Trout, as trustee of the Hobe Family Trust Restated on July 7, 2015 (the Trust), and “individually as the successor-in-interest of the Estate,” as a plaintiff. Trout replaced Dale as the plaintiff, except for the first (financial elder abuse) and seventh (breach of contract) causes of action which are asserted by both Dale and Trout.

In February 2026, Trout filed a motion for leave to file a second amended complaint, which is currently pending. The proposed amendment seeks to replace Trout as trustee with Trout, as the special administrator of the Estate. 3 The proposed second amended complaint does not add any new facts, causes of action, or requests for relief, but seeks to address the standing issue raised by

1 The Court refers to the Hobes by their first names for clarity. No disrespect is intended. 2 Dale subsequently passed away on January 7, 2025. 3 The Court (Hon. Tana L. Coates) sitting in probate issued Letters of Special Administration to Trout on February 23, 2026. (Trout Ex. 3.) 1

Nielsen in her motion for summary judgment (which is also pending). Nielsen has disputed the standing of the various plaintiffs throughout these proceedings.

On March 17, 2026, the Court set this Order to Show Cause regarding the five-year deadline set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 583.310. The Court requested briefing on whether the five-year deadline was tolled by “[t]he filing of the probate petition in the Jacqueline Hobe estate and the necessary proceedings in probate to determine how we can proceed in this civil case,” and/or “[t]he death of Dale Hobe and delay in having a probate estate proceeding commenced in LA.” (03/17/26 Order re Continuance.) The Court also asked the parties to address the duration of any such tolling.

Prior to the hearing on July 21, 2026, the Court issued a tentative ruling asking the parties to come prepared to discuss:

• Whether the Court can dismiss the claims brought on behalf of Jacqueline for failure to timely prosecute while retaining jurisdiction over Dale’s breach of contract claim; • Code of Civil Procedure section 583.430(b), which gives the Court authority to “make any order necessary to effectuate the authority provided in this section, including, but not limited to, provisional and conditional orders” and how that affects discretionary dismissal; • Whether the tolling for impracticability due to a party’s death is infinite or dismissal may be entered due to a lack of diligence to obtain appointment of a personal representative. To that end, the Court asked the parties whether the Court has authority to dismiss the claim of a deceased plaintiff without a personal representative appointed to represent that litigant’s interests.

At the July hearing, the Court continued the matter. In the interim, Nielsen filed a Moton to Dismiss pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 583.310.

B.

Discussion

The original deadline for bringing this action to trial was May 7, 2025. (Code Civ. Proc., § 583.310; California Rules of Court, Emergency Rule 10 [additional six months for cases filed prior to April 6, 2020].) After Dale’s death, the parties agreed to extend the deadline to October 25, 2025. (Trial Setting Conf., 02/04/25.) In August 2025, the parties agreed to extend the deadline again to April 3, 2026. (CMC, 08/13/26.)

As for Nielsen’s cross-complaint, which has its own deadline, the time for bringing that action to trial lapsed on June 10, 2026.4 (Tomales Bay Oyster Corp. v. Superior Court (1950) 35 Cal.2d 389, 393-394 [deadline to bring a matter to trial does not lapse until five years from the filing of the cross-complaint]; Perez v. Grajales (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 580, 589 (Perez) [same].)

4 Emergency Rule 10 of the California Rules of Court is inapplicable to Nielsen’s cross- complaint and therefore does not extend the time to bring the cross-complaint to trial.

Trout argues the five-year deadline was tolled, and remains so, because Dale’s death created an impediment that made bringing the action to trial impossible, impracticable, or futile.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 583.340.) The party seeking to apply that exception has the burden of proving the circumstances warrant its application. (Gaines v. Fidelity National Title Ins. Co. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1081, 1100.)

A plaintiff’s death creates a period of temporary impracticability for purposes of bringing an action to trial. (Pham v. Wagner Litho Machinery Co. (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 966, 973 (Pham) [counsel’s authority does not survive the death of his or her client and any proceedings taken in the absence of a personal representative would be declared void].)5

Trout argues the first amended complaint could not be brought to trial until a personal representative had been appointed to pursue Dale’s claims. The only claim belonging to Dale is the seventh cause of action for breach of contract in which she seeks to pursue her rights as a third party beneficiary. All the other causes of action belong to Jacqueline including the first cause of action for financial elder abuse. 6

“Case law has long held that for the tolling provisions of section 583.340(c), subdivision (c) ... to apply, there must be a ‘ “ ‘period of impossibility, impracticability or futility, over which plaintiff had no control,’ ” because the statute is designed to prevent avoidable delay.’ [Citation.]” (Oswald v. Landmark Builders, Inc. (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 240, 247.) “ ‘ “What is impossible, impracticable, or futile is determined in light of all the circumstances of a particular case, including the conduct of the parties and the nature of the proceedings. ...

Time consumed by the delay caused by ordinary incidents of proceedings, like disposition of demurrer, amendment of pleadings, and the normal time of waiting for a place on the court’s calendar are not within the contemplation of these exceptions. ...” ’ [Citation.]” (Sanchez v. City of Los Angeles (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1262, 1270 [statute to be interpreted liberally consistent with policy favoring trial on the merits].)

Jacqueline was deceased prior to this action being filed. The question of who had standing to pursue legal claims on her behalf was at issue when the initial complaint was filed in November 2019. Trout has not pointed to anything since that time which prevented Dale or Trout from filing a petition for probate seeking appointment as the Estate’s personal representative or filing a petition under Probate Code section 17200 to determine the validity of the Trust, and thus, Trout’s

5 The court acknowledged that such tolling could frustrate the very purpose of the five-year deadline, but it did not address the issue of whether the tolling was infinite in such cases. (Pham, supra, 172 Cal.App.3d at pp. 973-974, fn. 12; see also Ferk v. County of Lake (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 268, 274 [discussing Pham].) 6 Although Dale is named as a plaintiff, the financial elder abuse claim belonged to her mother. An elder can bring an elder abuse claim on his or her own behalf, or a person acting as the elder’s representative can file the claim. (Ring v. Harmon (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 844, 851 [discussing Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 15610.30(d)(2) (definition of “representative) and 15657.3 (right to pursue action upon elder’s death)].) 3

standing as the trustee. Commencing probate proceedings in January 26, 2026, and seeking to amend the complaint to replace Trout as trustee with Trout as the special administrator of the Estate was not completed in sufficient time to meet the trial deadline set out in Code of Civil Procedure section 583.310.

As for any impracticability or impossibility created by Dale’s death in January 2025, Dale’s passing does not affect the majority of Jacqueline’s claims which seek monetary damages and to cancel the grant deed transferring the Real Property to Nielsen on the ground that Nielsen improperly induced Jacqueline to make the many transfers described in the first amended complaint. Dale’s claim in contrast assumes the validity of at least one of those disputed transactions. Specifically, the first amended complaint alleges that Nielsen induced Jacqueline to surrender an annuity of approximately $15,615 to a joint bank account held by Jacqueline and Nielsen upon an agreement that after Jacqueline’s death that Nielsen would use the money for Dale’s benefit. (FAC, ¶ 29.) The first amended complaint alleges Nielsen breached that agreement.

While the seventh cause of action also asserts the many alleged agreements were intended for Jacqueline’s benefit (FAC, ¶ 84), it is essentially pleaded in the alternative should the first through sixth and eighth causes of action prove unsuccessful. To avoid any issues, Trout could have requested bifurcation of the seventh cause of action.

The Court previously continued the hearing on these issues to allow further proceedings to occur in the probate case pending before Judge Coates and the probate case in Los Angeles concerning Dale’s estate, which potentially could affect this Court’s analysis of the issues. It appears that no material progress has been made in Jacqueline’s case. Further delay would not advance any purpose relevant to the section 583.340 issues. Based on the current status and case history, the Court finds that Trout cannot show “impossibility, impracticability or futility” that would excuse the failure to bring Jacqueline’s claims to trial within the statutory period.

Having reviewed the parties’ submissions and the lengthy history of the case, the Court finds the five-year deadline to bring Jacqueline’s action to trial has lapsed. The Court therefore dismisses Jacqueline’s claims.

The Court denies Nielsen’s motion to dismiss without prejudice as to Dale’s claims in light of the ongoing probate matter in the Los Angeles County Superior Court.

ORDER (PROPOSED)

The motion to dismiss is granted as to the claims made by Jacqueline Hobe in the first amended complaint. The motion to dismiss is denied without prejudice as to Dale Hobe’s claims. The Court discharges the pending order to show cause regarding dismissal.

The Court takes Nielsen’s motion for summary judgment and Trout’s motion to amend off calendar on the ground it lacks jurisdiction to hear those motions which concerned Jacqueline Hobe’s now dismissed claims.

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