Stewart vs. Hyundai Motor America

The Court approves the hourly rate of Derhartounian, but reduces the hourly rates of Storti, Hayes, Pascal and Lara to $350 and of Barry to $500, based on the type of work performed and/or lack of evidence of the attorney’s level of skill and experience. The Court reduces time spent by Derhartouniar by 3.7 hours, Barry by 14.1 hours, and all other attorneys by 4.3 hours, which the Court finds excessive, inflated or not actually incurred; all other time spent is approved. (See Warren v. Kia Motors America, Inc. (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 24, 36 [standard for determining reasonableness of fees].) The Court declines to award a multiplier. (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1138 [purpose of fee enhancement].)

The court continues the 8/24/26 OSC to 10/5/26 at 8:45am in Dept. C24. If the case is fully resolved, please file a dismissal at least 5 court days before the hearing.

Plaintiff shall give notice.

308 Stewart vs. Defendant Hyundai Motor America’s (Defendant) Hyundai Motor demurrer to the first amended complaint (FAC) of America plaintiffs Gregory P. Stewart and Arleen S. Ramos (collectively, Plaintiffs) is OVERRULED. Defendant’s motion to strike is DENIED.

Defendant shall file an answer to the FAC within 20 days.

Motion No. 1: Demurrer

Defendant demurs to the second cause of action for violation of Civil Code section 1793.2, subdivision (b), the third cause of action for violation of Civil Code section 1793.2, subdivision (a)(3), and the fifth cause of action for fraudulent inducement- concealment.

Second and Third Causes of Action

A complaint must contain “[a] statement of the facts constituting the cause of action, in ordinary and concise language.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.10.) “A complaint will be upheld so long as the pleading gives notice of the issues sufficient to enable preparation of a defense. [Citation.]” (Thomas v. Regents of the University of California (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 587, 610-11.) (Internal quotations omitted.) “ ‘[L]ess particularity [in pleading] is required when it appears that defendant has superior knowledge of the facts, so long as the pleading gives notice of the issues sufficient to enable preparation of a defense.’ ” (Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 549-50.)

The allegations in the FAC are sufficiently particularized to apprise Defendant of the nature and extent of Plaintiff’s claims under the second and third causes of action. (See FAC ¶¶ 12-23, 34- 39, 65-66, 70.) Defendant cites no authority requiring Plaintiffs to plead the level of detail Defendant seeks for these Song-Beverly claims.

Fifth Cause of Action for Fraudulent Inducement – Concealment

Defendant argues the fraud claim fails because: (1) it is not pled with the requisite specificity; (2) Plaintiffs fail to allege actual or justifiable reliance; (3) Plaintiffs fail to allege a direct transactional relationship giving rise to a duty to disclose on the part of Defendant; and (4) the claim is barred by the economic loss rule.

Specificity: Fraud claims must be pled with particularity. (Wilhelm v. Pray, Price, Williams & Russell (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 1324, 1332.) However, “the requirement of specificity is relaxed when the allegations indicate that ‘the defendant

must necessarily possess full information concerning the facts of the controversy’ . . . or when the facts lie more in the knowledge of the opposite party.” (Tarmann v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 153, 158.) The allegations in the FAC are pled with sufficient specificity to support the fraud claim. (See FAC ¶¶ 77-89.)

Reliance: The FAC adequately alleges actual and justifiable reliance on Defendant’s omissions. (See FAC ¶¶ 80, 82-83, 87-89.)

Transactional Relationship: Defendant relies on, among other cases, Bigler-Engler v. Breg, Inc. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 276, in support of its argument that no transactional relationship between the parties is alleged. The court in Bigler- Engler held that “ ‘[a] duty to disclose facts arises only when the parties are in a relationship that gives rise to the duty, such as ‘... parties entering into any kind of contractual arrangement.’ [Citation.]” (Bigler-Engler, supra, 7 Cal.App.5th at p. 311). Here, Plaintiffs allege Defendant provided Plaintiffs a warranty regarding the Subject Vehicle, which was manufactured and/or distributed by Defendant. (FAC ¶¶ 6-7). This appears sufficient to allege a transactional relationship between the parties.

Economic Loss Rule: Defendant’s argument that the fraudulent inducement claim is barred by the economic loss rule is no longer compelling following the ruling in Dhital v. Nissan N. Am., Inc. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 828, 843, wherein the court declined to apply the economic loss rule to a purchaser’s fraudulent inducement by concealment claim. (Dhital, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at 840-841.)

Defendant points to Rattagan v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2024) 17 Cal.5th 1 to support its argument that the economic loss rule bars Plaintiffs’ fraud

claim. Rattagan, however, dealt with whether, “[u]nder California law, a plaintiff may assert a cause of action for fraudulent concealment based on conduct occurring in the course of a contractual relationship.” (Rattagan, supra, 17 Cal.5th at 45; see also Moore v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (N.D. Cal., Mar. 28, 2025, No. 5:23-CV-05011-BLF) 2025 WL 948114, at *7 [noting the distinction between Rattagan and Dhital and concluding Rattagan controls fraudulent concealment within contractual relationships, whereas Dhital controls fraudulent concealment inducing the formation of a contractual relationship.].) As such, the economic loss rule would not bar Plaintiffs’ claim for fraudulent inducement-concealment.

Motion No. 2: Motion to Strike

Defendant contends Plaintiffs are not entitled to civil penalties or the remedies of restitution or replacement for a violation of Civil Code sections 1793.2(b) or (a)(3). Defendant cites Gavaldon v. Daimler Chrysler Corp. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1246 in support of its argument. In Gavaldon, the California Supreme Court held Civil Code section 1794, which outlines the damages available to plaintiffs under the Song-Beverly Act, does not provide a replacement/restitution remedy for breach of a service contract. (Gavaldon v.

Daimler Chrysler Corp., supra, 32 Cal.4th at 1262.) Gavaldon did not involve Civil Code sections 1793.2(b) or (a)(3), and the Court did not hold a plaintiff is not entitled to civil penalties or restitution/replacement for a violation of said sections. Defendant thus failed to show, at this stage, that these remedies are unrecoverable in connection with the second and third causes of action.

Defendant also moves to strike the prayer for punitive damages. Because Plaintiffs’ fraud cause

of action remains viable, punitive damages may be recoverable pursuant to said claim. (Civ. Code § 3294(a).)

The 8/24/26 CMC is continued to 10/5/26 at 8:45am.

Plaintiff shall give notice.

310 Santos vs. Defendants Acacio Fertility Center, Inc., Brian Acacio Fertility David Acacio, M.D., Brian David M.D., APC and Center, Inc. John Scodras, PhD’s motion to admit counsel Kim M. Schmid to appear pro hac vice is GRANTED.

Counsel has submitted a verified application that complies with the requirements of California Rules of Court, rule 9.40.

The 8/24/26 CMC shall remain on calendar.

Defendants shall give notice.

311 Kerns vs. Burch The motion to compel arbitration filed by defendants Burch Shepard Family Law Group, APC and Robert Brett Burch (Defendants) is GRANTED. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.2.)

Plaintiff Bryan Kerns shall submit his claims against the Defendants to binding arbitration pursuant to the arbitration agreement set forth in Paragraph 6(A) of the Attorney-Client Retainer Agreement attached as Exhibit A to the declaration of Robert Burch.

Defendants met their burden to show a written arbitration agreement that covers plaintiff’s claims. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.2; see also Rosenthal v. Great Western Fin. Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 413 [elements]; Ex. A; para. 6(A).) While plaintiff argues the Defendants never made a demand to arbitrate, “[t]he statute does not include a requirement that the petitioning party have made