MASSIOUI vs MEZA, et al.

25CV018937: MASSIOUI vs MEZA, et al. 08/24/2026 Hearing on Motion to Strike Portions of Complaint in Department 8C

Tentative Ruling

NOTICE:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that any oral arguments regarding this tentative ruling will be heard at 1:30 p.m. in Department 8C in the Tani G. Cantil-Sakauye Courthouse at 500 G Street, Sacramento, CA, the Hon. Richard C. Miadich presiding.

Any party who wishes to contest the tentative ruling below must:

(1) request a hearing by calling the Law and Motion Oral Argument Request Line for Department 8C at (916) 874-8380, by 4:00 p.m. the Court day before the noticed hearing date, and leave a voicemail message (a) identifying themselves as the party requesting oral argument; (b) indicating the specific matter/motion for which they are requesting oral argument; and (c) confirming that they have notified the opposing party of their intention to appear; and

(2) advise the opposing party of the location and time of hearing pursuant to Local Rule 1.06.

If a hearing is not requested by 4:00 p.m. on the Court day before the noticed hearing date, the tentative ruling will become the final order of the Court.

If a hearing is requested, the Court prefers in-person attendance by the parties. However, parties may appear by Zoom unless the Court specifically orders in-person attendance. Parties choosing to appear by Zoom are reminded, however, that a Zoom appearance is still a formal appearance before the Court. Parties appearing via Zoom should do so from a quiet location, free from undue distractions, and wear attire suitable for an in-person court appearance.

The parties may join the Zoom session for hearing on the tentative ruling by audio and/or video through the following link:

https://saccourt-ca-gov.zoomgov.com/j/16039062174

SIP Address:

16039062174@sip.zoomgov.com

(833) 568-8864

25CV018937: MASSIOUI vs MEZA, et al. 08/24/2026 Hearing on Motion to Strike Portions of Complaint in Department 8C

ID: 16039062174

Parties requesting services of a court reporter will need to arrange for private court reporter services at their own expense, pursuant to Government code §68086 and California Rules of Court, Rule 2.956. Requirements for requesting a court reporter are listed in the Policy for Official Reporter Pro Tempore available on the Sacramento Superior Court website at https://www.saccourt.ca.gov/court-reporters/docs/crtrp-6a.pdf. Parties may contact Court- Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore by utilizing the list of Court Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore available at https://www.saccourt.ca.gov/court-reporters/docs/crtrp- 13.Pdf

A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list.

Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will be forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.

TENTATIVE RULING

***NOTICE: EFFECTIVE APRIL 13, 2026, THIS DEPARTMENT HAS MOVED TO THE TANI G. CANTIL-SAKAUYE COURTHOUSE LOCATED AT 500 G STREET SACRAMENTO, CA. ALL MOTIONS NOTICED FOR DEPARTMENT 28 WILL BE HEARD IN DEPARTMENT 8C OF THE NEW COURTHOUSE. ALL PAPERS FOR THIS DEPARTMENT MUST BE FILED AT THIS NEW LOCATION AND WILL NOT BE ACCEPTED AT THE HALL OF JUSTICE. ALL HEARINGS WILL TAKE PLACE AT THIS NEW LOCATION***

Defendants Sarah Jane Egante, Elderly Carehome LLC, Elderly Guest Home LLC, and Home Sweet Home II LLC’s (collectively, “Defendants”) motion to strike portions of Plaintiff Ben Abdelilah El Massioui’s (“Plaintiff”) Complaint is ruled upon as follows.

The notice of motion does not provide notice of the Court’s tentative ruling system, as required by Local Rule 1.06. Moving counsel is directed to contact opposing counsel and advise of Local Rule 1.06 and the Court’s tentative ruling procedure and the manner to request a hearing. If moving counsel is unable to contact opposing counsel prior to the hearing, moving counsel

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV018937: MASSIOUI vs MEZA, et al. 08/24/2026 Hearing on Motion to Strike Portions of Complaint in Department 8C

is ordered to appear at the hearing by Zoom or in person.

Background

The Court has summarized the allegations of the Complaint in its ruling on Defendants’ demurrer on today’s calendar.

In this motion, Defendants move to strike (1) punitive damages allegations; (2) alter ego allegations; (3) conspiracy allegations; and (4) “[a]ny allegation implying conduct by Sarah Jane Egante prior to September 2022—unsupported by fact and immaterial.” (Notice of Motion, p. 2:2-9.)

Legal Standard

A party may move to strike “any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 436(a).) Irrelevant matter includes allegations that are “not essential to the statement of a claim or defense” and allegations that are “neither pertinent to nor supported by an otherwise sufficient claim or defense.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 431.10(b).) Like a demurrer, “[t]he grounds for a motion to strike shall appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 437(b).)

Discussion

Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice

Defendants ask the Court to take judicial notice of the same corporate documents and the facts related to Egante’s immigration status as requested in relation to Defendants’ demurrer. The request is granted as to the corporate documents and denied as to Egante’s immigration status for the same reasons discussed in the Court’s ruling on the demurrer.

Punitive Damages

“In order to state a prima facie claim for punitive damages, a complaint must set forth the elements as stated in the general punitive damages statute, Civil Code section 3294.” (Turman v. Turning Point of Central California, Inc. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 53, 63.) Civil Code section 3294 requires a showing that the defendant is guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice for punitive damages. (Civ. Code § 3294(a).) “Malice” is defined as “conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” (Civ. Code § 3294(c)(1).) “Oppression” is defined as “despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV018937: MASSIOUI vs MEZA, et al. 08/24/2026 Hearing on Motion to Strike Portions of Complaint in Department 8C

unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.” (Civ. Code § 3294(c)(2).) “Fraud” is defined as “an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.” (Civ. Code § 3294(c)(3).)

“In addition to the requirement that the operative complaint set forth the elements as stated in section 3294, it must include specific factual allegations showing that defendant’s conduct was oppressive, fraudulent, or malicious to support a claim for punitive damages.” (Today’s IV v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 1137, 1193.) “Pleading in the language of the statute is acceptable provided that sufficient facts are pleaded to support the allegations.” (Blegen v.

Superior Court (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 959, 963.) Specific facts must be pled; mere conclusions are not enough. (Grieves v. Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159,166; Hilliard v. A.H. Robbins (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 374, 391; Perkins v. Superior Court (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 1, 6-7.) To establish malice, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant acted not just with a conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others, but also that the defendant willfully engaged in despicable conduct. (Civ.

Code § 3294(c)(1); College Hospital Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 713.) As the Supreme Court noted in College Hospital, the reference to “despicable” conduct is a substantive limitation on punitive damage awards because the term refers to circumstances which are base, vile, or contemptible. (Id. at p. 725.) Likewise, oppression requires “despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard” of another’s rights. (Civ. Code § 3294(c)(2).)

Defendants’ only discussion of Plaintiffs’ punitive damages allegations states, “The Complaint contains no specific facts showing malice, oppression, or fraud by these defendants. (Cyrus v. Haveson (1976) 65 Cal.App.3d 306.)” (Mot. MPA, p. 2:2-3.) No further argument is made, and there is no connection to or discussion of the actual allegations in the Complaint. A court “may properly disregard contentions perfunctorily asserted without legal development.” (Cameron v. Sacramento County Employees’ Retirement System (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 1266, 1282.) Even so, the Court finds Plaintiff sufficiently alleges facts to support a claim for punitive damages based on fraud in that Plaintiff alleges that Defendants knew they were participating in intentionally tortious conduct by accepting and/or assisting in the alleged fraudulent transfer of assets. (See Complaint, ¶¶ 46-47.)

Thus, Defendants’ motion is DENIED with respect to Plaintiff’s punitive damages prayer.

Alter Ego

To establish that a person is an alter ego of a corporation, the plaintiff must show “(1) such a unity of interest and ownership between the corporation and its equitable owner that no separation actually exists, and (2) an inequitable result if the acts in question are treated as those

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV018937: MASSIOUI vs MEZA, et al. 08/24/2026 Hearing on Motion to Strike Portions of Complaint in Department 8C

of the corporation alone.” (Id. at p. 417.) Several factors may be considered in applying these elements, including the commingling of funds and assets, the conduct of the individual in treating the corporation’s assets as his own, the lack of compliance with corporate rules and formalities, undercapitalization of the corporation, and the use of the corporation as a shell or conduit for a single venture or for the business of the individual. (Id. at pp. 417-418.) Other relevant factors may be considered, and no single factor is determinative. (Id. at p. 418.) To establish the inequitable result element, the plaintiff must show “some conduct [by the alleged alter egos] amounting to bad faith [that] makes it inequitable for the corporate owner to hide behind the corporate form.” (Sonora Diamond Corp. v. Superior Court (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 523, 539.)

Defendants contend: “Plaintiff’s alter-ego allegations (¶¶ 7–8) lack the factual showing required to pierce the corporate veil and are contradicted by Secretary of State records showing formation in 2024. (Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531.)” (Mot. MPA, p. 2:6-8.) This argument may be disregarded for lack of adequate development. (Cameron, supra, 4 Cal.App.5th at p. 1282.) Moreover, Defendants’ argument is rejected on the merits. Plaintiff adequately alleges unity of interest and ownership. (Complaint, ¶¶ 7-8.) The timing of when the entity defendants were formed is not dispositive, as discussed in the Court’s ruling on Defendants’ demurrer.

Thus, Defendants’ motion is DENIED with respect to Plaintiff’s alter ego allegations.

Conspiracy

Defendants contend: “The Complaint’s general statements ‘on information and belief’ (¶¶ 49– 55) fail to plead specific acts showing any agreement or overt act. (Choate v. County of Orange (2000) 86 Cal.App.4th 312.)” (Mot. MPA, p. 2:11-13.) Paragraphs 49-55 of the Complaint make up the entirety of Plaintiff’s seventh cause of action for violation of the Uniform Voidable Transactions Act. The Court has rejected this argument in relation to Defendants’ demurrer. Moreover, a motion to strike is not a proper vehicle to object to an entire cause of action on substantive grounds. (Ferraro v. Camarlinghi (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 509, 528.)

Thus, Defendants’ motion is DENIED with respect to Plaintiff’s conspiracy allegations.

Pre-2022 Events

This ground for Defendants’ motion is based on matters outside the four corners of the Complaint and of which the Court had not taken judicial notice. Moreover, the argument, as presented, is not developed in any way and is not a proper subject of a motion to strike. The Court cannot strike implied allegations.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV018937: MASSIOUI vs MEZA, et al. 08/24/2026 Hearing on Motion to Strike Portions of Complaint in Department 8C

Thus, Defendants’ motion is DENIED with respect to pre-2022 allegations related to Egante.

Disposition

Defendants’ motion to strike is DENIED in full.

Defendants shall file and serve an Answer to the Complaint by no later than September 3, 2026.

This minute order is effective immediately. No formal order or other notice is required. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1019.5; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1312.)