Computerlaw Group LLP v. Todd Yancey, et al.

Russo fabricated a composite “promissory note” based on the December 2021 emails to imply Yancey’s acknowledgment of a debt. Id.

On August 21, 2025, Cross-Defendants filed an ex parte application for a writ of attachment and knowingly submitted false declarations and statements claiming that Yancey (1) owned property and has business interest in Arizona and Texas; and (2) was affiliated with Atherton Software Inc. and Yancey Concrete Inc. Cross-Complaint, ¶ 15.

On August 25, 2025, Yancey filed the verified Cross-Complaint, alleging the following claims against Cross-Defendants: (1) breach of fiduciary duty; (2) intentional misrepresentation; (3) constructive fraud; (4) extortion; (5) harassment; (6) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (7) negligent misrepresentation; (8) abuse of practice; (9) violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200; and (10) declaratory judgment.

VI.

Legal Standard

Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, subdivision (b)(1) provides:

A cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech under the United States Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.

C.C.P. § 425.16(b)(1). This special motion to strike is commonly referred to as an “anti- SLAPP” motion, which are evaluated with a two-step analysis. Country Side Villas Homeowners Assn. v. Ivie (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1116. The California Supreme Court in Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal. 5th 376 (Baral) summarizes the showings and findings required by Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, subdivision (b):

At the first step, the moving defendant bears the burden of identifying all allegations of protected activity, and the claims for relief supported by them. When relief is sought based on allegations of both protected and unprotected activity, the unprotected activity is disregarded at this stage. If the court determines that relief is sought based on allegations arising from activity protected by the statute, the second step is reached. There, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate that each challenged claim based on protected activity is legally sufficient and factually substantiated.

The court, without resolving evidentiary conflicts, must determine whether the plaintiff's showing, if accepted by the trier of fact, would be sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment. If not, the claim is stricken. Allegations of protected activity supporting the stricken claim are eliminated from the complaint, unless they also support a distinct claim on which the plaintiff has shown a probability of prevailing.

Baral, 1 Cal. 5th at 396.

VII. Preliminary Issues

A. Timeliness of the Anti-SLAPP Motion

Yancey contends that the anti-SLAPP motion must be denied as untimely. See Opposition at 13:14-23. Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, subdivision (f) provides that the motion “may be filed within 60 days of the service of the complaint or, in the court’s discretion, at any later time upon terms it deems proper.” The Cross-Complaint was filed and served on August 25, 2025, and the anti-SLAPP was filed on October 28, 2025—purportedly four days late. As CLG points out, however, the Motions were served electronically, and under Code of Civil Procedure section 1010.6(a)(3)(B), “Any period of notice . . . shall be extended after service by electronic means by two court days”. Accordingly, the anti-SLAPP was timely filed on October 28, 2025—two court days after the original deadline of October 24, 2025.

Even if the anti-SLAPP had not been timely filed, the Court would nonetheless exercise its discretion and consider the anti-SLAPP on its merits as Yancey was able to respond to the motion in a timely manner.6 See C.C.P. § 425.16, subd. (f) (permitting filing after 60 days’ service of the complaint in the court’s discretion); see also Olsen v. Harbison (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 278, 287 (Olsen) (“a plaintiff opposing a late anti- SLAPP motion need not demonstrate prejudice.”). Furthermore, the four-day delay does not appear to be a “dilatory tactic” as a matter of law. See Olsen, supra, 134 Cal.App.4th at 280 (denying an anti-SLAPP served 278 days after service of the complaint as untimely); Morin v. Rosenthal (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 673, 679, 681 (finding an anti- SLAPP filed six weeks after the 60-day period untimely).

B. Request for Judicial Notice and Evidentiary Objections

Yancey submits a request for judicial notice of various documents in support of his opposition. The Court GRANTS Yancey’s request for Exhibits A and B, which consist of court filings by “Entrepreneur Law Group LLP” in San Francisco County Superior Court and Alameda County Superior Court and are proper matters for judicial notice. See Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d). The Court DENIES the request for the remaining exhibits as they are not “necessary, helpful, or relevant”. See Aquila, Inc. v. Super.

Ct. (City and County of San Francisco) (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 556, 569, (“[a]lthough a court may judicially notice a variety of matters... only relevant material may be noticed... judicial notice... is always confined to those matters which are relevant to the issue at hand.”). The Court declines to rule on the evidentiary objections submitted by the parties as they are not material to the disposition of these motions.

6 Yancey argues CLG served the draft anti-SLAPP motion on October 24, 2025 (within

the 60-day window) to the wrong email address in bad faith. The Court notes that Yancey concedes that CLG ultimately forwarded the draft to him at the correct address just seventeen minutes later. See Declaration of Todd Yancey, Ex. O.

C. Non-opposition as to the Fourth and Fifth Causes of Action. Yancey concedes that the anti-SLAPP should be granted as to the Fourth Cause of Action for Extortion and the Fifth Cause of Action for Harassment. Opposition at 12:22- 25. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS CLG’s anti-SLAPP motion as to the Fourth Cause of Action for Extortion and the Fifth Cause of Action for Harassment.

VIII. Analysis of the Anti-SLAPP Motion

CLG contends the entire Cross-Complaint is subject to the special motion to strike because: (1) the Cross-Complaint targets protected activity; and (2) the litigation privilege is an absolute bar. Motions at 2:18-27.

A. Analysis of the First Prong

For the first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis, CLG’s “burden is to identify what acts each challenged claim rests on and to show how those acts are protected under a statutorily defined category of protected activity.” Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995, 1009 (Bonni) (citing Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 871, 884.). Litigation activity such as the filing, funding, and prosecution of a civil action is considered a protected activity pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, subdivision (e)(1), which provides: “any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law”. See Rusheen v. Cohen (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1048, 1056.

An anti-SLAPP movant must also demonstrate that the claim sought to be stricken arises from the protected activity. See Bonni, supra, 11 Cal.5th at 1009. “A claim arises from protected activity when that activity underlies or forms the basis for the claim. [Citations.] Critically, ‘the defendant’s act underlying the plaintiff’s cause of action must itself have been an act in furtherance of the right of petition or free speech.’ [Citations.]” Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1062- 1063. “In deciding whether the ‘arising from’ requirement is met, a court considers ‘the pleadings [] and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is based.’” Peregrine Funding, Inc. v.

Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 658, 670 (Peregrine) (quoting City of Cotati v. Cashman (2002) 29 Cal.4th 69, 79 (Cotati)). “[I]f the defendant does not demonstrate this initial prong, the court should deny the anti-SLAPP motion and need not address the second step.” Baharian-Mehr v. Smith (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 265, 271 (Baharian- Mehr).)

Here, CLG identifies the following acts as protected activity: (1) filing pleadings and motions on behalf of CLG; (2) sending the 21-day safe harbor letter pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 128.5 and 128.7; (3) participating in court hearings; and (4) communicating with opposing party and the Court regarding case management and discovery issues. See Declaration of Jack Russo in Support of Cross-Defendant’s Special Motion to Strike, ¶ 4. CLG summarily concludes, “All allegations stem from counsel’s communications in this case – e.g., pleadings, discovery, or advocacy. Such conduct is ‘in furtherance of the right of petition’ under CCP §425.16(e)(1).” Motions at 2:19-21.

Notably, the moving papers and supporting declaration are devoid of any reference to specific allegations or claims within the Cross-Complaint or any analysis on how the vaguely identified protected activities necessarily give rise to any claims within the Cross- Complaint.

CLG cannot rely on vague references to allegations in the Cross-Complaint to meet its initial burden on an anti-SLAPP motion. See Bonni, supra, 11 Cal.5th at 1009. And, the Court will not “comb the record and the law for factual and legal support that a party has failed to identify or provide.” Quantum Cooking Concepts, Inc. v. LV Assocs., Inc. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 927, 934. Furthermore, that the Cross-Complaint alleges that CLG engaged in potentially protected activity does not necessarily mean that protected activity automatically underlies the basis of all of Yancey’s claims.

See Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 89 (“[T]he mere fact that an action was filed after protected activity took place does not mean the action arose from that activity for the purposes of the anti-SLAPP statute.”). CLG has not met its initial burden of demonstrating that the entire Cross- Complaint arises from protected activity.

CLG’s reply does not address this failure—nor can it. See Keyes v. Bowen (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 647, 656 (“Appellants may not attempt to rectify their omissions and oversights for the first time in their reply briefs because this deprives the opposing party of an opportunity to respond.”). Instead of demonstrating that the protected activities underly or form the basis of the entire Cross-Complaint, CLG’s reply focuses on refuting Yancey’s assertion that claims by a client against a former attorney are not within the purview of the anti-SLAPP statute.

Specifically, Yancey cites PrediWave Corp. v. Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 1204, 1227 (PrediWave), which stated “In determining the applicability of the anti-SLAPP statute, we think a distinction must be drawn between (1) clients’ causes of action against attorneys based upon the attorneys’ acts on behalf of those clients, (2) clients’ causes of action against attorneys based upon statements or conduct solely on behalf of different clients, and (3) nonclients’ causes of action against attorneys. . . . The causes of action in this first class categorically are not being brought ‘primarily to chill the valid exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition. . . .’” Id.

Here, CLG asserts that the filing of its Complaint and the writ of attachment falls under the second class because CLG’s conduct is on behalf of another client (i.e., CLG).7 Reply at 3:2-3. CLG’s reading of the Cross-Complaint is improperly narrow and ignores allegations that underlie the Cross-Complaint. See Peregrine, supra, 133 Cal.App.4th at 670. In fact, Yancey maintains that CLG’s filing of the Complaint and writ of attachment are “instruments” or incidental to his claims, which are premised on the allegations of CLG’s breach of fiduciary duties by overbilling Yancey and attempting to collect on the fees—all of which took place before CLG initiated the lawsuit—and fall under the first

7 Notably, CLG does not mention the other identified protected activities (i.e., safe harbor letter, participation in court hearings, correspondence with Yancey).

class. See Opposition at 15:13-26; see also Cross-Complaint at ¶¶ 2-3 (alleging acts constituting breach of fiduciary duty). Indeed, “a client’s actions against his or her attorney, whether it is pleaded as a claim for malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, or any other theory of recovery, is not subject to the anti-SLAPP statute merely because some of the allegations refer to the attorney’s actions in court.” Wittenberg v. Bornstein (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 303, 312, citation and quotations omitted.

And, when the allegations referring to litigation “are only incidental to a cause of action based essentially on nonprotected activity, collateral allusions to protected activity should not subject the cause of action to the anti-SLAPP statute.” Hylton v. Frank E. Rogozienski, Inc. (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1264, 1275 (affirming denial of anti-SLAPP where plaintiff’s claim for unconscionable fee against attorney did not arise from protected petitioning activity, but from attorney’s ethical violations and breaches of fiduciary obligations).

While CLG claims that Witte v. Kaufman (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1201 (Witte) is “materially identical” and supports a finding that the “arising from” analysis has been satisfied, CLG misstates the pertinent facts and ruling of the case. Reply at 1:28-2:4. In Witte, the anti-SLAPP concerned an attorney’s claim of interference with contract against adverse attorneys in a separate matter—not, as CLG represents, an attorney’s collection action or writ of attachment against a former client. Id. at 1206. Moreover, the appellate court did not reverse but affirmed the orders granting the anti-SLAPP. Id. at 1203. And the published portion of the decision was silent as to whether the cross-complaint “arose from” the firm’s protected petitioning. Id. at 1207.

CLG’s citation to Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 871, 892 highlights its omission. There, the California Supreme Court stated, “If conduct that supplies a necessary element of a claim is protected, the defendant’s burden at the first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis has been carried, regardless of any alleged motivations that supply other elements of the claim.” Id. Here, CLG has not demonstrated that any of the identified protected activities supplies that “a necessary element of a claim”.

Having failed to meet its initial burden on the anti-SLAPP motion, the Court need not address CLG’s arguments on the second prong (i.e., the application of the litigation privilege as codified in Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b)). Therefore, the special motion to strike the complaint is DENIED, and consequently, CLG’s request for attorney’s fees and costs incurred in bring the motion is also DENIED. See Baharian- Mehr, supra, 189 Cal.App.4th at 271; see also C.C.P. § 425.16, subd. (c)(1) (“a prevailing defendant on a special motion to strike shall be entitled to recover that defendant’s attorney’s fees and costs.”).

Likewise, the Motion to Dismiss made pursuant to Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b), which CLG “invokes as a complete substantive defense at Prong Two” (see Reply at 8:22-23) of the anti-SLAPP analysis is also DENIED.8

8 For the first time on Reply, CLG invites the Court to consider the litigation privilege

defense as a basis for a judgment on the pleadings. The Court declines to do so. See Browne v. County of Tehama (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 704, 720, fn. 10 (“‘Points raised

IX. Analysis of the Motion to Strike

CLG alternatively seeks to strike the Cross-Complaint on the ground of improper purpose pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 436. The Court notes, however, that CLG does not advance any substantive argument in its moving papers on this point. Instead, CLG claims that the Cross-Complaint is brought to harass and intimidate before outlining various arguments that purportedly support striking the Cross-Complaint in its entirety. Motions at 5:6-21. These arguments (i.e., litigation privilege is an absolute bar, the claims are legally defective, the fraud allegations lack the requisite specificity) are better raised through demurrer, not a motion to strike.

See Ferraro v. Camarlinghi (2008) 161 Cal. App. 4th 509, 528 (noting Code of Civil Procedure section 436, “does not authorize attacks on entire causes of action, let alone entire pleadings...Its purpose is to authorize the excision of superfluous or abusive allegations.”); Quiroz v. Seventh Ave. Center (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1256, 1281 (“Where a whole cause of action is the proper subject of a pleading challenge, the court should sustain a demurrer to the cause of action rather than grant a motion to strike.”).

Accordingly, CLG’s motion to strike the Cross-Complaint under Code of Civil Procedure section 436 is DENIED.

X. Analysis of the Motion for Sanctions

CLG argues that the motion for sanctions should be made sua sponte by the Court pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7, subdivision (c)(2) because the Cross- Complaint is frivolous. Motions at 4:3-4. The Court declines to do so as it does not appear that the Cross-Complaint was filed for an improper purpose or frivolously made. For example, CLG complains that Yancey erroneously sued “Entrepreneur Law Group LLP, a California limited law partnership” for conduct in 2018-2019, when the entity did not exist until December 21, 2021.

The court filings made by Entrepreneur Law Group LLP—specifically Cross-Defendant Russo—in San Francisco County Superior Court on July 18, 2016 and in Alameda County Superior Court on June 13, 2018 say otherwise. See Todd Yancey’s Request for Judicial Notice, Exs. A-B. CLG also complains that Yancey failed to properly serve CLG, Russo, and ELG. As discussed above, the Court has granted the motion to quash as to ELG and Russo only. See April 24, 2026 Order. Finally, the remaining bases for sanctions hinge on the outcome of the anti-SLAPP and motion to strike—bases that the Court need not consider given CLG’s failure to meet its initial burden on the anti-SLAPP and CLG’s error on the motion to strike.

Accordingly, CLG’s motion for sanctions under Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7 is DENIED.

for the first time in a reply brief will ordinarily not be considered, because such consideration would deprive the respondent of an opportunity to counter the argument.’”).

XI. Conclusion & Order

CLG’s special motion to strike the Cross-Complaint under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 is GRANTED only as to the Fourth Cause of Action for Extortion and Fifth Cause of Action for Harassment, but DENIED as to all remaining claims. CLG’s request for attorney’s fees and costs incurred on the special motion to strike is DENIED.

CLG’s motion to dismiss the Cross-Complaint is DENIED.

CLG’s motion to strike the Cross-Complaint under Code of Civil Procedure section 436 is DENIED.

CLG’s motion for sanctions under Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7 is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Date: May 13, 2026 Hon. Vincent I. Parrett Superior Court of the State of California, County of Santa Clara

29