John Beach vs Ford Motor Company et al

Calendar Line # 3 Case Name John Beach vs Ford Motor Company et al Case No. 25CV461310 Motion: Judgment on the Pleadings Before the court is defendant Ford Motor Company’s motion for judgment on the pleadings as to plaintiff’s complaint. Pursuant to California Rule of Court 3.1308, the court issues its tentative ruling as follows.

I. BACKGROUND On or about November 10, 2016, plaintiff John Beach (“Plaintiff”) entered into a warranty contract with defendant Ford Motor Company (“Ford”) regarding a 2017 Ford Fusion vehicle (“Subject Vehicle”). (Complaint, ¶7). Defects and nonconformities to warranty manifested themselves within the applicable express warranty period including, but not limited to, transmission defects, engine defects, and electrical defects. (Complaint, ¶12). Said defects/ nonconformities substantially impair the use, value, or safety of the Subject Vehicle. (Complaint, ¶13). Defendant Ford has failed to either promptly replace the Subject Vehicle or to promptly make restitution. (Complaint, ¶16).

On March 18, 2025, Plaintiff filed a complaint against defendant Ford, among others, asserting causes of action for: (1) Violation of subdivision (d) of Civil Code section 1793.2 (2) Violation of subdivision (b) of Civil Code section 1793.2 (3) Violation of subdivision (a)(3) of Civil Code section 1793.2 (4) Breach of the Implied Warranty of Merchantability (5) Negligent Repair (6) Fraudulent Inducement – Concealment

On May 30, 2025, defendant Ford filed an answer to Plaintiff’s complaint.

On August 11, 2025, defendant Ford filed the motion now before the court, a motion for judgment on the pleadings.

II. LEGAL STANDARD Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 438(c) A motion for judgment on the pleadings is properly granted when the “complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against that defendant.” (Code of Civ. Proc. § 438, subd. (c)(1)(B)(ii)). The rules applicable to demurrers also apply to motions for judgment on the pleadings. (County of Orange v. Association of Orange County Deputy Sheriffs (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 21, 32). The trial court must accept as true all material facts properly pleaded, but does not consider conclusions of law or fact, opinions, speculation, or allegations contrary to law or facts that are judicially noticed. (Stevenson Real Estate Services, Inc. v.

CB Richard Ellis Real Estate Services, Inc. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1215, 1219-20). “A motion for judgment on the pleadings may be made at any time either prior to the trial or at the trial itself.” (Stoops v. Abbassi (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 644, 650).

A court may sustain a demurrer3 on the ground of failure to state sufficient facts if “the complaint shows on its face the statute [of limitations] bars the action.” (E-Fab, Inc. v. Accountants, Inc. Services (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1315 (E-Fab)). A demurrer is not sustainable on statute of limitations grounds if there is only a possibility that the cause of action is time-barred; the defense must be clearly and affirmatively apparent from the allegations of the pleading [and matters of which the court may properly take judicial notice]. (Id., at pp. 1315-1316).4 When evaluating whether a claim is time-barred, the court must determine: (1) which statute of limitations applies, and (2) when the claim accrued. (E-Fab, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at p. 1316).

III. ANALYSIS Defendant Ford contends Plaintiff’s complaint is barred by a statute of repose found at Code of Civil Procedure section 871.21, subdivision (b), which states, “Notwithstanding subdivision (a), an action covered by Section 871.20 shall not be brought later than six years after the date of original delivery of the motor vehicle.”

“‘[W]hile a statute of limitations normally sets the time within which proceedings must be commenced once a cause of action accrues, [a] statute of repose limits the time within which an action may be brought and is not related to accrual. Indeed, “the injury need not have occurred, much less have been discovered. Unlike an ordinary statute of limitations which begins running upon accrual of the claim, [the] period contained in a statute of repose begins when a special event occurs, regardless of whether a cause of action has accrued or whether any injury has resulted.” [Citation.]’” (McCann v.

Foster Wheeler LLC (2010) 48 Cal.4th 68, 78–79, fn. 2 [105 Cal. Rptr. 3d 378, 225 P.3d 516], quoting Giest v. Sequoia Ventures, Inc. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 300, 305 [99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 476]; accord, Cossman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 370, 379, fn. 8 [133 Cal. Rptr. 2d 376]). Whereas statutes of limitations affect a remedy, statutes of repose extinguish a right of action after the period has elapsed. (Stuart v. American Cyanamid Co. (2d Cir. 1998) 158 F.3d 622, 627; 51 Am.Jur.2d (2011) Limitation of Actions, § 354, pp. 762–763 [“a statute of repose ... nullifies both the remedy and the right”]; 51 Am.Jur.2d, supra, Limitation of Actions, § 24, p. 507 [statute of repose “extinguishes the action, or terminates any right to action, after a fixed period of time has elapsed” (fns. omitted)]).

The effect of a statute of repose “‘is [thus] harsher than a statute of limitations in that it cuts off a right of action after a specified period of time, irrespective of accrual or even notice that a legal right has been invaded. [Citation.]’” (McCann v. Foster Wheeler LLC, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 78, fn. 2, quoting Giest v. Sequoia Ventures, Inc., supra, 83 Cal.App.4th at p. 305). Put another way, a statute of repose “‘does not cut off an existing right of action, but rather provides that nothing which happens thereafter can be a cause of action.’” (San Diego Unified School Dist. v.

County of San Diego (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 288, 301 [87 Cal. Rptr. 3d 796], quoting Inco Development Corp. v. Superior Court (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1014, 1020 [31 Cal. Rptr. 3d 872]; accord, CTS Corp., supra, 573 U.S. at p. ___ [134 S.Ct. at p. 2187] [a statute of repose “mandates that there shall be no cause of action beyond a certain point, even if no cause of action has yet accrued. Thus, a statute of repose can prohibit a cause of action from coming into existence”]). (PGA West Residential Assn., Inc. v.

Hulven Internat., Inc. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 156, 177-178 (PGA)).

The court does not find Code of Civil Procedure section 871.21, subdivision (b), operates as a statute of repose. “[U]nlike a procedural statute of limitations, substantive statutes of repose are generally not subject to statutory or equitable tolling.” (PGA, supra, 14 Cal.App.5th at p. 178).

3 “Demurrers and motions for judgment on the pleadings are functionally equivalent.” (Beames v. City of Visalia (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 741, 786). 4 See also Stella v. Asset Management Consultants, Inc. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 181, 191—“‘[A] demurrer based on an affirmative defense will be sustained only where the face of the complaint discloses that the action is necessarily barred by the defense.’”

Code of Civil Procedure section 871.21, however, expressly provides, “The time periods prescribed in subdivisions (a) and (b) shall be tolled as follows. . . ” (Code Civ. Proc., §871.21, subd. (c)). Since Code of Civil Procedure section 871.21, subdivision (b), is expressly subject to statutory tolling, the court finds it to be a statute of limitation, not a statute of repose.

Even if treated as a statute of limitation, for this statute of limitation to apply, the action must be one “covered by [Code of Civil Procedure] Section 871.20.” Turning to Code of Civil Procedure section 871.20, subdivision (a) of that section states:

Notwithstanding any other law, this chapter applies to an action, brought against a manufacturer who has elected under Section 871.295 to proceed under this chapter, seeking restitution or replacement of a motor vehicle pursuant to subdivision (b) or (d) of Section 1793.2, Section 1793.22, or Section 1794 of the Civil Code, or for civil penalties pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section 1794 of the Civil Code, where the request for restitution or replacement is based on noncompliance with the applicable express warranty.

Defendant Ford does not demonstrate from the face of the complaint or from any judicially noticed fact that the instant action is one that is brought against a manufacturer who has elected under section 871.29 to proceed under this chapter. Furthermore, as Plaintiff points out in opposition, only the first and second causes of action are brought “pursuant to subdivision (b) or (d) of Section 1793.2.” Defendant Ford has made no showing that Plaintiff’s entire complaint third through sixth causes of action, in particular) would be subject to the statute of limitations set forth in section 871.21, subdivision (b).

IV. CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, defendant Ford’s motion for judgment on the pleading is DENIED. The court need not decide Plaintiff’s contention in opposition that section 871.20 does not apply retroactively here.

Calendar Line # 4-5 Case Name Fernando Hernandez et al vs Peter Singler et al 25CV467301 Demurrer (Line #4) & Motion to Strike (Line #5) Before the court is Legacy Real Estate & Associates, Inc., William M. Aboumrad, and Grail Marie Nitsch’s (1) demurrer to plaintiffs’ first amended complaint (line # 4); and (2) motion to strike regarding plaintiffs’ first amended complaint (line #5). Pursuant to California Rule of Court 3.1308, the court issues its tentative ruling as follows.

I. BACKGROUND On or about November 22, 2024, plaintiff Teriyaki City Grill Santa Clara LLC (“Teriyaki”) and defendant Legacy Real Estate & Associates, Inc. (“Legacy”) entered into a Buyer Representation and Broker Compensation Agreement

5 Code of Civil Procedure section 871.29(a) states, in relevant part: (1) A manufacturer may elect to be governed by this chapter for all actions described in subdivision (a) of Section 871.20 with respect to all of the manufacturer’s motor vehicles sold during a period of five consecutive calendar years by providing writ ten notice of that election to the Arbitration Certification Program within the Department of Consumer Affairs by October 31 of the preceding calendar year, except as provided in Section 871.30. (2) A manufacturer who makes the election described in paragraph (1) may not revoke that election during the five-year period covered by the election, but the manufacturer may make a new election under paragraph (1) that will cover motor vehicles sold in a subsequent five-year period. (b) Unless a manufacturer has made the election described in subdivision (a) that covers a given year, Sections 871.20 to 871.28, inclusive, shall not apply to an action described in subdivision (a) of Section 871.20 with respect to all of the manufacturer’s motor vehicles sold during that year, except as provided in Section 871.30.

(“Representation Agreement”) whereby defendant Legacy represented plaintiff Teriyaki with regard to real property located at 2565 The Alameda in the city of Santa Clara (“Property”). (First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), ¶20 and Exh. A). Defendant Legacy was retained by plaintiffs to represent, advise, explain the legal ramifications of agreements to, and negotiate on behalf of plaintiffs Teriyaki and Buyers, infra, with respect to the Purchase Agreement, First Amendment, and assignment of lease, infra.

On or about December 13, 2024, plaintiffs Fernando Hernandez (“Hernandez”), Ngoc Nguyen (“Ngoc”), Huyen Nguyen (“Audrey”), and Ha Thanh Hoang (“Kelly”) (collectively, “Buyers”), on the one hand, and defendant The Wicked Group Inc. (“Wicked” or “Seller”), on the other, entered into a Purchase and Sale Agre ement (“Purchase Agreement”) of the business assets of a business which operated at the Property. (FAC, ¶21 and Exh. B.) The Purchase Agreement was subject to Buyers obtaining an assignment of the lease for the Property from defendant Matthew Graham McClean (“McClean”), the sole shareholder and director of defendant Wicked. (FAC, ¶¶11, 19, and 21).

On December 19, 2024, Buyers and Wicked entered into a First Amendment to Purchase and Sale Agreement (“First Amendment”) pursuant to which Buyers were entitled to an assignment of the lease for the Property. (FAC, ¶22 and Exh. C).

On December 20, 2024, each of the Buyers wired $18,000 or a total of $72,000 into the trust account of defendant Peter A. Singler (“Singler”), attorney for defendants Wicked and McClean. (FAC, ¶¶9 and 23) . Defendant Singler was the escrow holder for Buyers and Wicked/ McClean. (FAC, ¶9).

Pursuant to the First Amendment, Buyers were entitled to a full or partial refund if the lessor refused to assign the lease for the Property. (FAC, ¶24). The Property’s lessor refused to assign the lease to Buyers through no act, fault, or contribution of Buyers. (Id.) The Property’s lessor refused to assign the lease to Buyers because the lessee, defendant McClean, owed $38,000 in back rent. (Id.). Defendant McClean did not disclose this arrearage to Buyers. (Id.). In addition, the Property’s lessor refused to assign the lease to Buyers unless the lease was amended to include an “early termination” provision giving the lessor the unconditional right to terminate the lease prior to its stated termination date. (FAC, ¶25).

On January 16, 2025, Buyers’ agent emailed defendant Singler instructing Singler not to release the escrowed funds because, among other things, the Property lessor had not assigned the lease to Buyers. (FAC, ¶26).

On or about January 24, 2025, defendant Singler disbursed the escrow funds to his client(s) and himself while there was an unresolved dispute over the rights to the escrow funds, without the Buyers’ consent, and in contravention of Buyers’ specific instructions. (FAC, ¶27).

On May 22, 2025, Buyers made a written demand to defendant Singler for an accounting of the $72,000 deposited to defendant Singler’s trust account. (FAC, ¶28). Defendant Singler responded stating, “request denied.” (Id.).

On May 27, 2025, Buyers made a written demand to defendants Singler and McClean to provide Buyers with an assignment of the lease, but defendants Singler, McClean, and Wicked have failed and refused to deliver to Buyers an assignment of the lease. (FAC, ¶29).

On May 27, 2025, Buyers made a written demand to defendant Singler for a return of their $72,000 but defendant Singler has failed and refused to return the money to Buyers. (FAC, ¶30). Also on May 27, 2025, Buyers made a written demand to defendant Singler for all escrow instructions regarding disbursement of the $72,000 held in