Richard Chamberlain v. Jason Chamberlain

On January 27, 2025, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant alleging a single cause of action for defamation.

On November 3, 2025, Plaintiff filed the operative FAC against Defendant asserting causes of action for: (1) defamation per se; (2) defamation (general); (3) intentional infliction of emotional distress; and (4) false light.

On February 23, 2026, Defendant filed the motion presently before the court, a motion for summary judgment, or in the alternative, summary adjudication to the FAC. Plaintiff filed written opposition. Defendant filed reply papers.

Self-Represented Litigants

Self-represented litigants “are held to the same standards as attorneys.” (Kobayashi v. Super. Ct. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 536, 543; see also Burnete v. La Casa Dana Apartments (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1262, 1270 [“self-represented litigants are generally entitled to no special treatment”].) “[M]ere self-representation is not a ground for exceptionally lenient treatment.” (Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 984.) Otherwise, “exceptional treatment of parties who represent themselves would lead to a quagmire in the trial courts, and would be unfair to the other parties to litigation.” (Id. at p. 985.)

Legal Standard

Any party may move for summary judgment. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (a); Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843 (Aguilar).) “The motion for summary

judgment shall be granted if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) “The object of the summary judgment procedure is ‘to cut through the parties’ pleadings’ to determine whether trial is necessary to resolve their dispute. [Citation.]” (Spinks v. Equity Residential Briarwood Apartments (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1004, 1020.)

“[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact...” (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 850.) “A prima facie showing is one that is sufficient to support the position of the party in question.” (Id. at p. 851.)

If a moving defendant makes the necessary initial showing, the burden of production shifts to the plaintiff to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); see Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 850.)

Similarly, “[a] party may seek summary adjudication on whether a cause of action, affirmative defense, or punitive damages claim has merit or whether a defendant owed a duty to a plaintiff. [Citation.] ‘A motion for summary adjudication...shall proceed in all procedural respects as a motion for summary judgment.’ [Citation.]” (California Bank & Trust v. Lawlor (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 625, 630.)

Throughout the process, the trial court “must consider all of the evidence and all of the inferences drawn therefrom.” (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 856.) The moving party’s evidence is strictly construed, while the opponent’s is liberally construed. (Id. at p. 843.)

“[S]ummary judgment is a drastic remedy and should be used with caution. [Citation.] Because summary judgment is a drastic procedure all doubts as to the propriety of granting a motion for summary judgment should be resolved in favor of the party opposing the motion. [Citations.]” (Tully v. World Savings & Loan Assn. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 654, 660; see Kernan v. Regents of University of California (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 675, 684 [“The drastic remedy of summary judgment may not be granted unless reasonable minds can draw only one conclusion from the evidence.”].)

Defendant Meets His Initial Burden on Summary Judgment

“A defendant meets his burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if he shows that one or more of the elements of the cause of action cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense. [Citation.] Once the defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of material fact exists. [Citation.]” (Salas v. Department of Transportation (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1058, 1067.) The first and second causes of action are claims for defamation per se and defamation respectively.

“Defamation is an invasion of the interest in reputation. The tort involves the intentional publication of a statement of fact that is false, unprivileged, and has a natural tendency to injure or which causes special damage.” (Smith v. Maldonado (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 637, 645.)

A statement is defamatory per se if its defamatory meaning is plain on its face and does not need extrinsic information to be understood. (ZL Technologies, Inc. v. Does 1-7 (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 603, 623; Hawran v. Hixson (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 256, 290.)

On summary judgment, “the pleadings frame the issues to be resolved. ‘ “The purpose of a summary judgment proceeding is to permit a party to show that material factual claims arising from the pleadings need not be tried because they are not in dispute.” [Citation.] “The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment [adjudication] is to delimit the scope of the issues: the function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether there is any triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the pleadings.” [Citations.]’ [Citations.]” (Snatchko v. Westfield LLC (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 469, 477.)

Thus, “[t]he burden of a defendant moving for summary judgment only requires that he or she negate plaintiff’s theories of liability as alleged in the complaint; that is, a moving party need not refute liability on some theoretical possibility not included in the pleadings.” (Hutton v. Fidelity National Title Co. (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 486, 493; see Melican v. Regents of University of California (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 168, 182 [“We do not require [defendant] to negate elements of causes of action plaintiffs never pleaded.”].)

Here, the alleged defamatory statements are set forth in paragraphs 15, 24, 40, 42, 50, 57, and 63 in the FAC. As to paragraphs 15, 24, 50, 57, and 63, Defendant submits undisputed evidence demonstrating there is no viable claim for defamation as to these statements. (See Defendant’s Separate Statement of Undisputed Facts at Nos. 2, 18, 29, 38-40, 41-42; Defendant’s Decl. at ¶¶ 2-4, 6-7, 8, 10, 16-17; Atkinson Decl. at ¶¶ 6, 12-14.) Paragraphs 40 and 42 do not constitute defamation, as a matter of law, as Plaintiff fails to specifically allege the defamatory statements. (See Kahn v.

Bower (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 1599, 1612, fn. 5 [“The general rule is that the words constituting an alleged libel must be specifically identified, if not pleaded verbatim, in the complaint. [Citations.]”]; see also Dowling v. Zimmerman (2001) 85 Cal.App.4th 1400, 1421 [defamation claim failed where based only on conclusory allegation that Zimmerman’s unspecified “words and actions” and unspecified “false allegations” had “lowered” his reputation].)

Based on this evidence, the court finds Defendant has met his initial burden on summary judgment as to the defamation claims. Having done so, the court declines to consider Defendant’s alternative arguments based on the statute of limitations, marital privilege, litigation privilege and common interest privilege. And, as the remaining claims are derivative of the defamation causes of action, Defendant has also met his initial burden on summary judgment as to those claims. (See Eisenberg v. Alameda Newspapers, Inc. (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1385, fn. 13 [“When a false light claim is coupled with a defamation claim, the false light claim is essentially superfluous, and stands or falls on whether it meets the same requirements as the defamation cause of action.”]; Gilbert v.

Sykes (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 13, 34 [“the collapse of Syke’s defamation claim spells the demise of all other causes of action in the cross-complaint such as intentional and negligent interference with economic advantage and intentional infliction of emotional distress, all of which allegedly arise from the same publications on Gilbert’s Web site”]; see also Fellows v. National Enquirer, Inc. (1986) 42 Cal.3d 234, 245 [“[T]o allow an independent cause of action for the intentional infliction of emotional distress, based on the same acts which would not support a defamation action, would

allow plaintiffs to do indirectly what they could not do directly. It would also render meaningless any defense of truth or privilege.”].) Therefore, the burden shifts to Plaintiff to raise a triable issue of material fact.

Plaintiff Fails to Raise a Triable Issue of Fact

A triable issue of material fact exists “if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof.” (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 850, fn. omitted.) If the party opposing summary judgment presents evidence demonstrating the existence of a disputed material fact, the motion must be denied. (Id. at p. 856.)

“ ‘An issue of fact can only be created by a conflict of evidence. It is not created by “speculation, conjecture, imagination or guess work.” [Citation.] Further, an issue of fact is not raised by “cryptic, broadly phrased, and conclusory assertions” [citation], or mere possibilities [citation]. “Thus, while the court in determining a motion for summary judgment does not ‘try’ the case, the court is bound to consider the competency of the evidence presented.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Brown v. Ransweiler (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 516, 525- 526.)

Furthermore, a plaintiff may not rely upon allegations or denials of its pleadings to show that a triable issue of material fact exists but, instead, shall set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as to the cause of action. (Citizens for Odor Nuisance Abatement v. City of San Diego (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 350, 357.)

As an initial matter, Plaintiff did not file and serve a separate statement in response to the separate statement by Defendant in compliance with the Code of Civil Procedure and the California Rules of Court.

“Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (b)(3) requires that an opposition to a motion for summary judgment ‘shall include a separate statement that responds to each of the material facts contended by the moving party to be undisputed, indicating whether the opposing party agrees or disagrees that those facts are undisputed. The statement also shall set forth plainly and concisely any other material facts that the opposing party contends are disputed. Each material fact contended by the opposing party to be disputed shall be followed by a reference to the supporting evidence. Failure to comply with this requirement of a separate statement may constitute a sufficient ground, in the court’s discretion, for granting the motion.’ [Citation.]” (Oldcastle Precast, Inc. v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 554, 568-569.)

“The requirement of a separate statement from the moving party and a responding statement from the party opposing summary judgment serves two functions: to give the parties notice of the material facts at issue in the motion and to permit the trial court to focus on whether those facts are truly undisputed.” (Parkview Villas Assn., Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 1197, 1210.)

As one court explained:

“Separate statements are required not to satisfy a sadistic urge to torment lawyers, but rather to afford due process to opposing parties and to permit trial courts to expeditiously review complex motions for SAI and summary judgment to determine quickly and efficiently whether material facts are disputed.”

(United Community Church v. Garcin (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 327, 335.)

Here, Plaintiff did not submit an opposing separate statement specifically responding to the facts in Defendant’s separate statement as “disputed” or “undisputed” with citation to supporting evidence if disputed. Nor does Plaintiff’s self-representation status excuse him from compliance with court rules and procedures in opposing a motion for summary judgment. Thus, the court may, in its discretion, grant the motion on this ground alone.

On the merits, Plaintiff filed an opposing memorandum, his declaration signed under penalty of perjury with attached exhibits, and a separate statement of four additional material facts. But, the opposing memorandum does not constitute admissible evidence to raise a triable issue of material fact. (See Cole v. Town of Los Gatos (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 749, 767, fn. 8 [“It goes without saying that statements in a memorandum of points and authorities are not evidence.”].) And, neither the declaration nor the attached exhibits refute the issues raised in the motion for summary judgment. (See DiCola v. White Brothers Performance Products, Inc. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 666, 683 [“[T]o avoid summary judgment, plaintiffs must produce admissible evidence raising a triable issue of fact.”].)

The sole argument raised in opposition is that the motion is untimely as Defendant filed his motion less than 60 days after making his general appearance in the action. In support, Plaintiff relies on Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (a)(1) which provides:

“A party may move for summary judgment in an action or proceeding if it is contended that the action has no merit or that there is no defense to the action or proceeding. The motion may be made at any time after 60 days have elapsed since the general appearance in the action or proceeding of each party against whom the motion is directed or at any earlier time after the general appearance that the court, with or without notice and upon good cause shown, may direct.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (a)(1), emphasis added.)

As stated above, the instant motion for summary judgment was filed on February 23, 2026. Defendant thereafter filed his answer to the FAC on February 25, 2026, two days later. (See Plaintiff’s Separate Statement of Additional Facts at Nos. 1-4; see also Batchelor v. Finn (1959) 169 Cal.App.2d 410, 423 [“The filing of an answer is a general appearance”].) Since the motion was filed less than 60 days after Defendant filed his answer, Plaintiff contends the motion is untimely.

But, Plaintiff misinterprets the statute as the 60 day period applies to the general appearance of the party against whom the motion is directed. Here, the motion is directed to the Plaintiff, not Defendant, and thus this section is not applicable to defeat the motion for summary judgment. Furthermore, Defendant made a general appearance in this action prior to filing his answer when he, on April 3, 2025, filed an anti-SLAPP motion challenging the original complaint. (See Mansour v. Super. Ct. (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1750, 1756 [“A general appearance occurs where a party, either directly or through counsel, participates in an action in some manner which recognizes the authority of the court to proceed.”]; see also Factor Health Management

v. Super. Ct. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 246, 250 [“If the defendant raises an issue for resolution or seeks relief available only if the court has jurisdiction over the defendant, then the appearance is a general one.”].)

Therefore, as this procedural argument fails and there are no substantive arguments submitted in opposition, the court concludes that Plaintiff has not raised a triable issue of material fact to overcome the motion for summary judgment. (See Brewer v. Home Owners Auto Finance Co. (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 337, 341 [“The law is clear that summary judgment is proper only if there be no triable issue of fact.”].)

Consequently, the motion for summary judgment to the FAC is GRANTED.

Disposition

The motion for summary judgment to the FAC is GRANTED.

In light of the dispositive ruling on the summary judgment, the remaining motions are rendered moot and ordered off calendar.

The court will prepare the order.

- oo0oo –