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MOTION FOR SEPARATE TRIAL OF MARY HURLBUT’S STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DEFENSE TO THE CROSS-COMPLAINT OF NANCY H. MARCACCI, TRUSTEE (CCP § 597); MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE AND SERVE SECOND AMENDED ANSWER TO CROSS-COMPLAINT
May 19, 2026 Law and Motion Calendar PAGE 3 Judge: HONORABLE NANCY L. FINEMAN, Department 04 ________________________________________________________________________
2:00 PM LINE 2 22-CIV-04123 MARY HURLBUT VS. WILLIAM B HURLBUT, ET AL.
MARY HURLBUT MARC L SHEA WILLIAM B HURLBUT DARIN T JUDD
MOTION FOR SEPARATE TRIAL OF MARY HURLBUT’S STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DEFENSE TO THE CROSS- COMPLAINT OF NANCY H. MARCACCI, TRUSTEE (CCP § 597)
TENTATIVE RULING:
For reasons explained below, Cross-Defendant Mary Hurlbut’s (“Mary”) Motion for a Separate Trial regarding her statute of limitations defense to the breach of contract claim of Cross- Complaint of Nancy H. Marcacci, as Trustee of the Helen Hurlbut Trust (“Trustee”), is DENIED.
The Court uses the parties’ first names since most of the parties have the same last names. The Court means no disrespect by the use of the first names.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
As alleged in the Cross-Complaint, in 2008, Plaintiff Mary, then a schoolteacher living at her father’s neighboring home in Woodside, California, purchased the property together with her father, Defendant William Hurlbut (“William”), and his wife, Defendant Erica L. Goldman (Erica) . (Trustee’s Cross-Complaint, ¶¶ 1, 9-14.) The three took title as tenants-in-common, with Mary holding a 33% interest and William and Erica holding the remaining 67% as community property. (Id. at ¶ 13.) The sale closed on or around March 12, 2010, at a price of $1,520,000. (Id., ¶ 15.)
The co-owners then undertook substantial renovations from 2010 through 2013, including excavation and foundation work to expand the lower floor into a living space for Mary. (Id., ¶¶ 16-17.) William and Erica paid renovation costs upfront, and Mary made payments on her share as she was able. (Id. at ¶ 16.) In May 2012, during the renovation, Mary executed a promissory note (the “Promissory Note”) in favor of the Trust in the amount of $40,000, the proceeds of which she used to reduce her renovation debt. (Id., ¶ 22.)
As alleged, Mary failed to make the required interest payments and did not repay the Promissory Note by its May 21, 2015 maturity date. (Id., ¶ 22, Ex. 3 at 40.) She subsequently made three payments on the Promissory Note—$3,000 in September 2017, $3,000 in January 2018, and $5,000 in February 2020—all after maturity. (Oppo., at p. 5.) Mary contends that over $125,000 in payments she made between 2012 and 2015 to or at the direction of William and his brother Stephen should have been applied to the Promissory Note, but she provides no accounting of how those payments could have satisfied the Promissory Note while also covering her share of the mortgage, taxes, property expenses, and renovation costs. (Id., at p. 5-6.)
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May 19, 2026 Law and Motion Calendar PAGE 4 Judge: HONORABLE NANCY L. FINEMAN, Department 04 ________________________________________________________________________ Mary previously filed a bifurcation motion seeking a separate trial for the equitable actions in this case. The Court denied that motion, ruling in pertinent part that “[t]he accounting and contribution issues are . . . intertwined with the breach of contract issues.” (Minute Order, February 11, 2025, at p. 2.) The Court also found that “judicial time will not be saved by ordering separate trials and avoiding duplication of effort,” that “[t]here is an overlap of the issues,” and that “[t]he same witnesses will have to testify to most of the same facts in both trials.” (Id. at p. 4.)
LEGAL ANALYSIS
Code of Civil Procedure section 597 provides:
When the answer pleads that the action is barred by the statute of limitations . . . or sets up any other defense not involving the merits of the plaintiffs cause of action but constituting a bar or ground of abatement to the prosecution thereof, the court may, either upon its own motion or upon the motion of any party, proceed to the trial of the special defense or defenses before the trial of any other issue in the case ...
This section also applies to the trial of special defenses pleaded in an answer to a cross-complaint[.]
(Code Civ. Proc., § 597; See also id., §§ 598 and 1048, subd. (b) [authorizing that a court may order a separate trial of any issue for convenience, furtherance of justice, or judicial economy].)
The resolution of a motion to bifurcate is left to the sound discretion of the trial judge. (Finley v. Superior Court (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 1152, 1163.) The factors that a judge may consider include whether:
• Judicial time will be saved by ordering separate trials and avoiding duplication of effort; • An obvious injustice will result if the judge does not order separate trials; • There will be little, if any, overlap in the proof in the two trials; • Resolution of the first trial will facilitate settlement of the rest of the case; • Resolution of an issue in the first trial (e.g., an affirmative defense such as the statute of limitations) might make trial of the remaining issues unnecessary; • Separate trials will enable the jurors to evaluate the claims more fairly and avoid confusion.
(Cal. Judges Benchbook Civ. Proc. Before Trial § 2.72 (Mar. 2026 update).)
Bifurcation of issues or claims is not warranted when there is an overlap in evidence because of the similarity of claims and bifurcation would result in duplication and judicial waste. (See Todd Stenberg v. Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 976, 978-79.)
May 19, 2026 Law and Motion Calendar PAGE 5 Judge: HONORABLE NANCY L. FINEMAN, Department 04 ________________________________________________________________________ Mary argues that there are no issues of fact concerning the material facts surrounding her statute of limitations defense. Trustee argues that are several disputed issues of fact regarding Mary’s statute of limitations defense and that a separate trial for that defense would result in a significant overlap in witnesses, evidence, and factual determinations between the two cases.
Trustee provides the following disputed facts which the parties have litigated relevant to the statute of limitations defense:
• Whether California law or Arizona law should govern; • Whether Mary waived her right to assert Arizona statute of limitations law; • Whether Mary’s post-maturity date emails and payments revived the applicable statute of limitations; • Whether Mary is estopped from asserting her statute of limitations defense; • Whether Mary’s post-maturity date payments to her grandmother’s estate should be treated as payments to the Trust; • Whether William and Stephen were in a “confidential relationship” with Mary such that William and Stephen owed her a fiduciary duty and should have applied all of her payments to pay off the Promissory Note before all other obligations; • Whether Mary made her post-maturity date payments in reliance on statements by Stephen and whether Stephen’s statements constituted fraud, actual or constructive; • Whether the Trustee is equitably estopped from asserting revival of the statute of limitations; and • Whether Mary timely satisfied the Promissory Note (which would obviate any trial on the statute of limitations).
(Opp., at pp. 9-10 [citations to prior filings in this case omitted].)
The Court finds that factual disputes here regarding Mary’s post-maturity payments are intertwined with factual issues that are core to Trustee’s breach of contract claim. As Trustee explains:
[T]rying the statute of limitations defense will require, among other things, factual determinations regarding Mary’s payments on the Promissory Note, the timing and allocation of such payments, Mary’s understanding of the true facts, and the reasonableness of Mary’s reliance on the alleged misrepresentations. These same determinations are also relevant to the Trustee’s breach of contract case, and the same witnesses will be required to testify at each trial. Both trials will, at the very least, require findings regarding Mary’s failure to pay under the Promissory Note, Stephen’s representations with respect to Mary’s post-maturity payments in 2017, 2018, and 2020, and her intentions with respect to such payments.
(Opp., at p. 11.)
May 19, 2026 Law and Motion Calendar PAGE 6 Judge: HONORABLE NANCY L. FINEMAN, Department 04 ________________________________________________________________________ The Court agrees. Notably, in denying Mary’s previous motion to bifurcate, this Court similarly ruled that the “accounting and contribution issues [in this case] are . . . intertwined with the breach of contract issues.” (Minute Order, February 11, 2025.) The Court finds that Mary’s statute of limitations defense is likewise intertwined with those issues.
Accordingly, Cross-Defendant Mary Hurlbut’s Motion for a Separate Trial is DENIED.
If the tentative ruling is uncontested, it shall become the order of the Court. Thereafter, counsel for Cross-Complainant Trustee shall prepare for the Court’s signature a written order and judgment in two separate documents consistent with the Court’s ruling, pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1312, and provide written notice of the ruling to all parties who have appeared in the action, as required by law and by the California Rules of Court.
May 19, 2026 Law and Motion Calendar PAGE 7 Judge: HONORABLE NANCY L. FINEMAN, Department 04 ________________________________________________________________________
2:00 PM LINE 3 22-CIV-04123 MARY HURLBUT VS. WILLIAM B HURLBUT, ET AL.
MARY HURLBUT MARC L SHEA WILLIAM B HURLBUT DARIN T JUDD
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE AND SERVE SECOND AMENDED ANSWER TO CROSS-COMPLAINT
TENTATIVE RULING:
Plaintiff and Cross-defendant Mary Hurlbut’s unopposed Motion for Leave to File and Serve Second Amended Answer to Cross Complaint is GRANTED.
The Court uses the parties’ first names since most of the parties have the same last names. The Court means no disrespect by the use of the first names.
Mary seeks to file a first amended answer to Cross-complainants William H. Hurlbut and Erica Goldman’s cross-complaint to cite an additional statute supporting Mary’s statute of limitations defense, California Commercial Code Section 3118, subdivision (a), applicable to negotiable instruments. (Apr. 29, 2025 Notice of Motion, p. 2; Apr. 29, 2025 Declaration of Marc L. Shea (“Shea Decl.”), exh. C.)
Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (a)(1), provides:
The court may, in furtherance of justice, and on any terms as may be proper, allow a party to amend any pleading or proceeding by adding or striking out the name of any party, or by correcting a mistake in the name of a party, or a mistake in any other respect; and may, upon like terms, enlarge the time for answer or demurrer. The court may likewise, in its discretion, after notice to the adverse party, allow, upon any terms as may be just, an amendment to any pleading or proceeding in other particulars; and may upon like terms allow an answer to be made after the time limited by this code.
Motions for leave to amend are directed to the sound discretion of the judge, but that discretion must be “exercised liberally to permit amendment of the pleadings. The policy favoring amendment is so strong that it is a rare case in which denial of leave to amend can be justified.” (Howard v. County of San Diego (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1422, 1428.) “With respect to the amendment of pleadings, there has developed in this state a policy of great liberality in allowing amendments at any stage of the proceeding so as to dispose of cases upon their substantial merits where the authorization does not prejudice the substantial rights of others.” (Dunzweiler v.
Superior Court (1968) 267 Cal.App.2d 569, 576.) If the motion to amend is timely made and the granting of the motion will not prejudice the opposing party, it is error to refuse permission to amend and where the refusal also results in a party being deprived of the right to assert a meritorious cause of action or a meritorious defense, it is not only error but an abuse of discretion. (Morgan v. Superior
May 19, 2026 Law and Motion Calendar PAGE 8 Judge: HONORABLE NANCY L. FINEMAN, Department 04 ________________________________________________________________________ Court (1959) 172 Cal.App.2d 527, 530 [collecting citations.].) Recently, two different Courts of Appeal have reversed a trial court who refused leave to amend after a demurrer, even where it appeared doubtful that plaintiff could state a cause of action. (Black v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 677; Sproul v. Vallee (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 285.) The same public policy considerations apply to this motion to amend. Since no opposition has been filed, there are no facts demonstrating prejudice. Accordingly, the motion is GRANTED.
The court asks that if there is not going to be opposition to a motion such like this one, the parties stipulate to the amended answer either before or once the motion is filed rather then using scarce judicial resources and delaying a decision on another case’s law and motion matter or, if the motion line cannot be assigned to someone else, at least then the research attorneys and court do not need to review and rule on the motion, which leaves time for other work.
The proposed second amended answer is not deemed filed and served. It shall be filed and served no later than five (5) days after written notice of entry of the formal order.
If the tentative ruling is uncontested, it shall become the order of the court. Thereafter, counsel for Mary Hurlbut shall prepare a written order consistent with the court’s ruling for the court’s signature, pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312, and provide written notice of the ruling to all parties who have appeared in the action, as required by law and the California Rules of Court.
May 19, 2026 Law and Motion Calendar PAGE 9 Judge: HONORABLE NANCY L. FINEMAN, Department 04 ________________________________________________________________________
2:00 PM LINE 4 22-CIV-05095 LUIS AMAYA VS. HEATHER MARIE MILESTONE
LUIS AMAYA KATE JAMSHEED HEATHER MARIE MILESTONE CHRISTOPHER W. RIVERA
MOTION TO BE RELIEVED AS COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF LUIS AMAYA
TENTATIVE RULING:
The motion of Kate Jamsheed and KJ Injury & Accident Lawyers, PC to be relieved as counsel for plaintiff Luis Amaya is DENIED without prejudice. On January 27, 2026, the court denied without prejudice the motion to be relieved of counsel of record for plaintiff “for lack of proof that all parties received proper notice of the motion. The proof of service does not indicate that defendant Heather Marie Milestone was served with the moving papers. With respect to plaintiff, it indicates the motion was served on the same day it was filed.
However, the hearing date on the Notice of Motion was changed from October 21, 2025, to January 27, 2026, at the time of filing. It is unclear whether the copy served on plaintiff was the original or amended version. The court’s record does not reflect that counsel served an Amended Notice of Motion.” (Min. of Jan. 27, 2026.) Plaintiff’s counsel has now refiled the motion and served plaintiff and defense counsel with a notice and an amended notice, which amended notice shows the May 19, 2026 hearing date.
However, plaintiff’s counsel served plaintiff at a South San Francisco address, but the declaration in support of the motion to be relieved attaches some sort of printout, which is not authenticated, and thus, there are no admissible facts to show that plaintiff was served at his current address, an address that has been verified within the last thirty days as being current. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1362(d).)
If the tentative is not contested, it will become the order of the court without a formal order.