Alisha Eisler v Deckers Outdoor Corporation et al

Plaintiff did not believe that the proposed salary would fairly compensate her for the new role, especially with the international travel that was expected. (FAC, ¶ 14.) The same month, plaintiff presented information to Quigley, reporting her concerns, and plaintiff included an analysis of how she would actually lose money working the same hours as she had the prior year. (FAC, ¶ 14.) Plaintiff met in person with Quigley to present her request and analysis, but Quigley quickly dismissed her concerns, telling her: "You're not going to get rich here." (FAC, ¶ 15.)

Plaintiff explained that she was not looking to get rich but wanted to be fairly compensated for her time and did not agree with the proposed salary. (FAC, ¶ 15.) Plaintiff asked Quigley to evaluate her concerns, but Quigley mocked her request, attempting to intimidate plaintiff that her request would have to go to the head of finance for the Performance Lifestyle Group. (FAC, ¶ 15.) Plaintiff stated that she was not concerned and wanted her concerns regarding the salary to be elevated. (FAC, ¶ 15.)

It is unknown if Quigley ever acted on plaintiff's request and ultimately plaintiff's request for reconsideration was denied. (FAC, ¶ 15.) Every year thereafter, plaintiff had significant travel to China and Hong Kong and the time intensive travel made the value of her work even less. (FAC, ¶ 15.) During plaintiff's third year of employment, she experienced several instances where she experienced sexual harassment at work, which she promptly reported, but Deckers took no action and ignored her reports. (FAC, ¶ 16.)

Specifically, on October 31, 2018, plaintiff's colleague assigned to UGG, Oscar Quiroz (Quiroz), said to her, "look at you in your hot little pants" while he was walking underneath her up the stairs at the office. (FAC, ¶ 17.) Plaintiff did not respond to Quiroz but immediately reported it to Quigley. (FAC, ¶ 17.) Nothing ever came of plaintiff's report. (FAC, ¶ 17.) The situation became even more uncomfortable in April 2019, when Quiroz moved over to Teva, and plaintiff reminded Quigley of her previous report and indicated that she did not want to work with Quiroz because he made her feel uncomfortable. (FAC, ¶ 17.)

Quigley questioned plaintiff as to whether the reported comment was ever made. (FAC, ¶ 17.) After Quiroz moved onto plaintiff's team, he called her multiple times in an intoxicated state, telling plaintiff that he missed her. (FAC, ¶ 17.)

In November 2018, plaintiff had a male fit tester who was staring at plaintiff and asking her uncomfortable personal questions during a fit analysis. (FAC, ¶ 18.) Plaintiff reported the incident to Quigley, and Quigley laughed at plaintiff in response. (FAC, ¶ 18.) The next day, the fit tester was in the office and walking around, when Quigley went out of his way to point him out to plaintiff, stating "ha-ha look Alisha." (FAC, ¶ 18.) In April 2019, plaintiff was on a work-related trip to China with two of her colleagues, Mark Norton (Norton), who is a white male, and Canuto Gonzalez (Gonzalez), who is a Hispanic male, both of whom worked as Product Developers at the time. (FAC, ¶ 20.)

During a discussion, plaintiff learned that Norton made $98,000.00 a year at the time he came on board at Deckers in September 2017, and Gonzalez informed plaintiff that he was making $90,000.00 a year at the time he started at Deckers in September 2017. (FAC, ¶ 20.) Norton and Gonzalez encouraged plaintiff to ask Deckers for an adjustment for equal pay. (FAC, ¶ 20.) Several months later, plaintiff received a promotion that leveled her to the same position as Norton and Gonzalez. (FAC, ¶ 21.) Effective July 1, 2019, plaintiff was promoted to Product Developer, at an annual salary of $75,000.00 per year, plus a potential 10 percent incentive bonus. (FAC, ¶ 21.)

While plaintiff appreciated the recognition that she was performing the work of a Product Developer, she remained troubled by the significant differential in pay from her male and non-African American peers. (FAC, ¶ 21.) Plaintiff discovered that another female colleague had similar concerns regarding pay equality at Deckers. (FAC, ¶ 22.) Plaintiff and her colleague put together a pay study group to educate themselves on the promotion process at Deckers and to educate Deckers on its own glaring pay disparities. (FAC, ¶ 22.)

On behalf of multiple female employees at Deckers, plaintiff e-mailed the information to Bella Vaughan (Vaughan), a black female, the Manager of Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion of Deckers, and copied Daalia Refaat (Refaat), a non-black female, the Director, Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion/Senior Legal Counsel. (FAC, ¶ 22.) Deckers was dismissive of the information reported to it regarding violations of equal pay. (FAC, ¶ 23.) Rather than investigate the reports, Refaat suggested that plaintiff and the other women should take their reports of unequal pay up with their leaders. (FAC, ¶ 23.)

Plaintiff told Refaat that being told to meet with their leaders was "inherently intimidating." (FAC, ¶ 23.) Refaat offered no response or alternatives. (FAC, ¶ 23.) At the suggestion of Refaat, plaintiff met with her leader, Quigley, and provided him with the same documentation showing pay disparities that had been provided to Vaughn and Refaat. (FAC, ¶ 24.) Quigley's immediate reaction was dismissive and hostile. (FAC, ¶ 24.) Quigley told plaintiff that the information was not relevant because the people listed were not in her department. (FAC, ¶ 24.)

Plaintiff clarified that some of the people were in her department and that she felt that there was a disparity in pay by gender and race/ethnicity. (FAC, ¶ 24.) Quigley asked what she wanted, and in response, plaintiff confirmed that she should have the same pay rate as Quiroz because they do the same work. (FAC, ¶ 24.) Plaintiff informed Quigley that she had affirmed that she was being paid less than Norton and Gonzalez even though Norton and Gonzalez had performance problems. (FAC, ¶ 24.) Plaintiff told Quigley that she felt she has been treated differently based on her race and sex, that she was the only black Developer at Deckers, and the only woman recently working on the Teva Product Development team. (FAC, ¶ 24.)

Plaintiff reminded Quigley that Quiroz was being paid more despite his harassing behavior towards her and that Quigley did nothing in response to her reports of sexual harassment. (FAC, ¶ 24.) On February 19, 2021, plaintiff and the women met with Samara Page (Page), the then Senior Director of Global Compensation and a member of Deckers' People's Experience, to find out more information regarding the process of obtaining a promotion. (FAC, ¶ 25.) The meeting served to confirm that there was no discernable process Deckers used to set compensation. (FAC, ¶ 25.)

Other the next month, plaintiff followed up with Refaat several times to get more specific direction, but it was not forthcoming. (FAC, ¶ 25.) Apparently recognizing the glaring discrepance in pay and stature, Deckers determined to adjust plaintiff's base salary to $80,000, with all other terms to remain the same. (FAC, ¶ 26.) The adjustment was confirmed in a meeting with plaintiff, Quigley, and the Vice President of Product Development Phil Gallant (Gallant), who is a white male. (FAC, ¶ 26.)

Gallant told plaintiff that she should be thanking Quigley for plaintiff's pay increase and recognized that the pay was low. (FAC, ¶ 26.) No effort was made to account for the losses plaintiff had experienced up to that point, and plaintiff did not believe that the adjustment put her on par with her male, non-black colleagues. (FAC, ¶ 26.) Quigley and Gallant indicated that the pay increase would come with

additional job responsibilities that her other peers did not have. (FAC, ¶ 26.) On March 31, 2021, plaintiff submitted a letter to Quigley and Gallant suggesting a salary of $110,000, stating, "I believe this amount fairly compensates me for the value of my work, level of productivity, competency and continued well-being." (FAC, ¶ 27.) Plaintiff included a proposal with measurable goals for this new salary. (FAC, ¶ 27.) On April 6, 2021, Quigley responded, thanking plaintiff for her concerns, but again denying the counterproposal, claiming that her proposal was for a salary that would require a promotion to Senior Developer. (FAC, ¶ 27.)

Plaintiff's salary remained lower than the amount that was being paid to Gonzalez, Norton, and Quiroz when they were in the Product Developer role. (FAC, ¶ 28.) Plaintiff met with Quigley and told him that she was still being paid less than other Product Developers who did not have the Senior Developer role. (FAC, ¶ 28.) Quigley suggested that plaintiff build an Individual Development Plan (IDP) to guide her to the Senior Developer role. (FAC, ¶ 28.) Plaintiff built the IDP and scheduled multiple meetings with Quigley to discuss it, but Quigley was never prepared to move forward with the plan. (FAC, ¶ 28.)

Months went by and plaintiff "was beyond frustrated" with the dismissal of her sexual harassment complaints, the failure to take her equal pay claims seriously and determination to continue to suppress plaintiff's pay, and the hostile treatment from plaintiff's supervisor. (FAC, ¶ 29.) Plaintiff reached out to Deckers' internal compliance hotline on July 15, 2021, by sending a detailed email, reporting her problems in working with Quigley, stating that Quigley was controlling and that she regularly had to have extremely difficult conversations with him. (FAC, ¶ 29.)

Plaintiff reiterated her harassment complaint against Quiroz for calling her "hot pants," and asked if it was possible to speak with someone about moving brands or positions. (FAC, ¶ 29.) Plaintiff said she was looking to protect herself and her well-being. (FAC, ¶ 29.) She heard nothing back for a month. (FAC, ¶ 29.) On August 13, 2021, rather than an investigation or a phone call, plaintiff received an email providing tips on working through manager concerns and workload issues. (FAC, ¶ 30.) In response to her request for a transfer, plaintiff was told she could review internal and external job postings. (FAC, ¶ 30.)

Determining that the environment was so intolerable, due to plaintiff performing the work of a Senior Developer with the requisite experience, but being denied the compensation and title of that role, plaintiff resigned effective September 30, 2021. (FAC, ¶ 32.) Plaintiff met with Gallant to discuss her resignation and told him that she was not receiving equal pay, that she was tired of the harassing and abusive treatment from Quigley, and that she felt that Deckers does not support people of color. (FAC, ¶ 32.)

Gallant asked plaintiff what actions Deckers should take, and plaintiff advised that Deckers needed to provide equal pay and Gallant indicated that a compensation review was forthcoming. (FAC, ¶ 32.) Gallant conceded that plaintiff was underpaid and acknowledged issues Deckers had with the way Quigley treated its employees. (FAC, ¶ 32.) On June 26, 2023, Deckers answered the complaint with a general denial and 21 affirmative defenses. On October 2, 2025, Deckers filed the present motion for summary judgment arguing that "there is no triable issue as to any material fact and Defendant is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.

Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on all of Plaintiff's claims because it is undisputed that Plaintiff was not denied equal pay based on gender or race, was not subjected to an adverse employment action let alone subjected to discriminatory or retaliatory conduct based on gender or race, and was not constructively terminated." (Notice of Motion, p. 2, ll.7-13.) Plaintiff opposes the motion. Analysis: Importantly, and as noted by plaintiff, Deckers only moved for summary judgment. It did not move for summary adjudication. "The language in Code of Civil Procedure section 437c subdivision (f) makes it clear that a motion for summary adjudication cannot be considered by the court unless the party bringing the motion duly gives notice that summary adjudication is being sought. [Citations.] " 'If a party desires adjudication of particular issues or subissues, that party must make its intentions clear in the motion ....' [Citation.]

There is a sound reason for this rule: " '... the opposing party may have decided to raise only one triable issue of fact in order to defeat the motion, without intending to concede the other issues. It would be unfair to grant a summary adjudication order unless the opposing party was on notice that an issue-by-issue adjudication might be ordered if summary

judgment was denied.' " [Citation.]" (Gonzales v. Superior Court (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 1542, 1545-1546.) As such, if there are triable issues of material fact as to any of the causes of action, the motion must be denied in its entirety. Similarly, as to the request by Deckers that the prayer for punitive damages be disposed of: "It is elementary that the prayer is no part of the statement of the cause of action [citation] and that the issues involved are determinable from the facts alleged rather than from the prayer. [Citation.]" (Berg v.

Investors Real Estate Loan Co. (1962) 207 Cal.App.2d 808, 815.) Thus, if summary judgment is not granted in favor of Decker, the prayer for damages shall remain. Evidentiary Objections Plaintiff objects to proffered evidence submitted by Deckers, primarily to Deckers' undisputed facts and statements contained in Quigley's declaration. Deckers objects to proffered evidence submitted by plaintiff, primarily to statements in plaintiff's declaration and two paragraphs of the Ricotta declaration, using boilerplate objections, with little to no substantive explanation of the objections. "In granting or denying a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication, the court need rule only on those objections to evidence that it deems material to its disposition of the motion.

Objections to evidence that are not ruled on for purposes of the motion shall be preserved for appellate review." (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (q).) " 'The same rules of evidence that apply at trial also apply to the declarations submitted in support of and in opposition to motions for summary judgment. Declarations must show the declarant's personal knowledge and competency to testify, state facts and not just conclusions, and not include inadmissible hearsay or opinion.' " [Citation.] " 'The declarations in support of a motion for summary judgment should be strictly construed, while the opposing declarations should be liberally construed. [Citation.]

This does not mean that courts may relax the rules of evidence in determining the admissibility of an opposing declaration. Only admissible evidence is liberally construed in deciding whether there is a triable issue.' " [Citation.]" (Fernandez v. Alexander (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 770, 779.) It is somewhat unclear why plaintiff would object to much of the evidence that she objects to because some of the proffered evidence helps plaintiff in establishing triable issues of material fact. Nonetheless, the court has carefully reviewed all 91 objections and overrules them.

It is all admissible evidence. Deckers' objections that claim hearsay, as a basis for the objections to several statements and documents referenced by plaintiff, fail because the evidence does not appear to be offered to prove the truth of the matters stated. Rather, the evidence appears to be offered to show plaintiff's state of mind, the work environment, and notice to Deckers of plaintiff's grievances. To any extent that they are being offered as proof of the matters asserted, the court will not consider the statements for such purposes.

As such, those objections are overruled. None of the other objections made by Deckers have any merit and are likewise overruled. To the extent that Deckers argues that plaintiff's declaration is insufficient to show the existence of triable issues of fact: A plaintiff's declaration is admissible evidence when it satisfies all statutory requirements for personal knowledge, competency, and admissibility. Plaintiff's declaration in opposition does satisfy those requirements. Standard on Summary Judgment A defendant's motion for summary judgment asks the court to determine that the entire action has no merit, and to terminate the action without the necessity of a trial. (Code Civ.

Proc., § 437c, subd. (a).) The procedure enables the court to look behind the pleadings to determine whether the party against whom the motion is directed has evidence to back up the claims. The court must determine from the evidence presented that there is no triable issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) "[F]rom commencement to conclusion, the party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." (Aguilar v.

Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) There is no obligation on the opposing party to establish anything by affidavit unless and until the moving party has by affidavit stated facts establishing every element

necessary to sustain an adjudication in his favor. (Consumer Cause, Inc. v. Smilecare (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 454, 468.) "[W]e liberally construe plaintiff's evidentiary submissions and strictly scrutinize defendant's own evidence, in order to resolve any evidentiary doubts or ambiguities in plaintiff's favor." (Johnson v. American Standard, Inc. (2008) 43 Cal.4th 56, 64.) "A defendant . . . has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action, even if not separately pleaded, cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.

Once the defendant . . . has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff or cross-complainant to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto." (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) In resolving the motion, the court may not weigh the evidence. (Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 840.) Rather, the role of the trial court in resolving a summary judgment motion is to determine whether issues of fact exist, not to decide the merits of the issues. (Molko v.

Holy Spirit Assn. (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1092, 1107.) A triable issue of material fact exists only if the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 850.) Any doubts as to the propriety of granting the motion should be resolved in favor of the party opposing the motion. (Molko v. Holy Spirit Assn., supra at p. 1107.) Role of Pleadings and Application of Law "The pleadings play a key role in a summary judgment motion." (Hutton v.

Fidelity National Title Co. (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 486, 493 (Hutton).) "The materiality of a disputed fact is measured by the pleadings [citations], which 'set the boundaries of the issues to be resolved at summary judgment.' [Citations.]" (Conroy v. Regents of University of California (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1244, 1250.) "Accordingly, the burden of a defendant moving for summary judgment only requires that he or she negate plaintiff's theories of liability as alleged in the complaint; that is, a moving party need not refute liability on some theoretical possibility not included in the pleadings. [Citations.]" (Hutton, supra, 213 Cal.App.4th at p. 493.)

Separate Statement "Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (b)(1), requires each motion for summary judgment to be accompanied by a separate statement " 'setting forth plainly and concisely all material facts that the moving party contends are undisputed. Each of the material facts stated shall be followed by a reference to the supporting evidence.' " California Rules of Court, rule 3.1350(d)(2)4 states: " 'The separate statement should include only material facts and not any facts that are not pertinent to the disposition of the motion.' " Under the Rules of Court, " ' "Material facts' " are facts that relate to the cause of action, claim for damages, issue of duty, or affirmative defense that is the subject of the motion and that could make a difference in the disposition of the motion.' " (Rule 3.1350(a)(2).)" (Beltran v.

Hard Rock Hotel Licensing, Inc. (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 865, 874-875.) "The point of the separate statement is not to craft a narrative, but to be a concise list of the material facts and the evidence that supports them. " 'The separate statement serves two important functions in a summary judgment proceeding: It notifies the parties which material facts are at issue, and it provides a convenient and expeditious vehicle permitting the trial court to hone in on the truly disputed facts.' " [Citation.]" (Beltran v.

Hard Rock Hotel Licensing, Inc., supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at page 875.) "The duty to comply with the law regarding separate statements applies to both sides of a motion for summary judgment or adjudication. The opposing party's responses to the separate statement must be in good faith, responsive, and material. Responses should directly address the fact stated, and if that fact is not in dispute, the opposing party must so admit. It is completely unhelpful to evade the stated fact in an attempt to create a dispute where none exists." (Beltran v.

Hard Rock Hotel Licensing, Inc., supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at page 875, italics added.) "Separate statements serve a laudable purpose. As explained in Weil & Brown, California Practice Guide (The Rutter Group 1996) Civil Procedure Before Trial, paragraph 10:94.1, pp. 10-31, 10-32, these documents are 'intended to permit the judge to determine quickly whether the motion is supported by sufficient undisputed facts. If the opposing statement disputes an essential fact alleged in support of the motion, the judge merely has to review the evidence cited in support of that fact.

This saves the judge from having to review all the evidentiary

materials filed in support of and in opposition to the motion.' " (Kulesa v. Castleberry (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 103, 113.) Deckers has submitted a separate statement that contains 94 facts that it contends are undisputed. While plaintiff disputes the majority of the facts, not all of them are reasonably disputed. In opposition, plaintiff submits an additional 129 facts that she contends precludes the granting of summary judgment. In reply to the opposition, Deckers, even though not provided for by statute, responded to plaintiff's additional facts.

And, although not statutorily authorized, the court found it helpful in this particular circumstance. Deckers does not adequately dispute most of the additional facts. Rather, they say things such as: "Disputed but immaterial for purposes of this Motion." However, Deckers cites no evidence to support their disputing of the fact, and some of the facts are clearly material to the disposition of the motion. Deckers also asserts, in many instances, that the proffered evidence contradicts plaintiff's deposition testimony.

Deckers does not identify this alleged contradictory deposition testimony, nor has the court come across it in its thorough review of the evidence submitted. Violation of the Equal Pay Act Because this is solely a motion for summary judgment, rather than a motion for summary judgment or, in the alternative summary adjudication, only one of plaintiff's causes of action is required to survive to defeat Deckers' motion. Plaintiff's second cause of action is for denial of equal pay for equal and substantially similar work in violation of Labor Code section 1197.5, et seq. "(a) An employer shall not pay any of its employees at wage rates less than the rates paid to employees of another sex for substantially similar work, when viewed as a composite of skill, effort, and responsibility, and performed under similar working conditions, except where the employer demonstrates: "(1) The wage differential is based upon one or more of the following factors: "(A) A seniority system. "(B) A merit system. "(C) A system that measures earnings by quantity or quality of production. "(D) A bona fide factor other than sex, such as education, training, or experience.

This factor shall apply only if the employer demonstrates that the factor is not based on or derived from a sex-based differential in compensation, is job related with respect to the position in question, and is consistent with a business necessity. For purposes of this subparagraph, "business necessity" means an overriding legitimate business purpose such that the factor relied upon effectively fulfills the business purpose it is supposed to serve. This defense shall not apply if the employee demonstrates that an alternative business practice exists that would serve the same business purpose without producing the wage differential. "(2) Each factor relied upon is applied reasonably. "(3) The one or more factors relied upon account for the entire wage differential. "(4) Prior salary shall not justify any disparity in compensation.

Nothing in this section shall be interpreted to mean that an employer may not make a compensation decision based on a current employee's existing salary, so long as any wage differential resulting from that compensation decision is justified by one or more of the factors in this subdivision. "(b) An employer shall not pay any of its employees at wage rates less than the rates paid to employees of another race or ethnicity for substantially similar work, when viewed as a composite of skill, effort, and responsibility, and performed under similar working conditions, except where the employer demonstrates: "(1) The wage differential is based upon one or more of the following factors: "(A) A seniority system. "(B) A merit system. "(C) A system that measures earnings by quantity or quality of production.

"(D) A bona fide factor other than race or ethnicity, such as education, training, or experience. This factor shall apply only if the employer demonstrates that the factor is not based on or derived from a race- or ethnicity-based differential in compensation, is job related with respect to the position in question, and is consistent with a business necessity. For purposes of this subparagraph, "business necessity" means an overriding legitimate business purpose such that the factor relied upon effectively fulfills the business purpose it is supposed to serve.

This defense shall not apply if the employee demonstrates that an alternative business practice exists that would serve the same business purpose without producing the wage differential. "(2) Each factor relied upon is applied reasonably. "(3) The one or more factors relied upon account for the entire wage differential. "(4) Prior salary shall not justify any disparity in compensation. Nothing in this section shall be interpreted to mean that an employer may not make a compensation decision based on a current employee's existing salary, so long as any wage differential resulting from that compensation decision is justified by one or more of the factors listed in this subdivision." (Lab.

Code, § 1197.5, subds. (a)(b).) "To prove a prima facie case of wage discrimination, " 'a plaintiff must establish that, based on gender, the employer pays different wages to employees doing substantially similar work under substantially similar conditions. [Footnote omitted.]' " [Citation.] " 'If that prima facie showing is made, the burden shifts to the employer to prove the disparity is permitted by one of the EPA's [four] statutory exceptions--[such as,] that the disparity is based on a factor other than sex.' " [Citation.]

But a plaintiff must show " 'not only that she [was] paid lower wages than a male comparator for equal work, but that she has selected the proper comparator.' " [Citation.] " 'The [EPA] does not prohibit variations in wages; it prohibits discriminatory variations in wages.... [Accordingly,] ' "a comparison to a specifically chosen employee should be scrutinized closely to determine its usefulness." ' " [Citation.]" (Allen v. Staples, Inc. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 188, 194.) The same standard applies to wage discrimination based on race.

The court again emphasizes that the role of the trial court in resolving a summary judgment motion is to determine whether issues of fact exist, not to decide the merits of the issues. Deckers has met its initial burden of producing evidence that any pay discrepancy was based on one or more of the four factors set forth in Labor Code section 1197.5, subdivisions (a)(1) and (b)(1). Specifically undisputed material facts Nos. 4-10, 14-26, 40, 42, 44, 53, 54, 57, 59, 61, 89, and 90 tend to show that the pay discrepancy was based on position, experience, the complexity of assignments, performance, and tenure with Deckers.

However, plaintiff has produced evidence that decisions by Deckers regarding plaintiff's lower pay and delays in being promoted were, at least in part, motivated by plaintiff's race, gender, or both. Specifically, plaintiff has adequately disputed some of Deckers' facts and has produced additional evidence that she was paid lower wages, for equal work, based on discriminatory factors. Those disputed and additional facts include, but are not limited to, facts Nos. 11, 27, 28, 29, 32, 33 (to the extent she produced evidence that she was denied employment opportunities by them being delayed), 45, 46, 49, 51, 52, 55, 74, 76, 83, and plaintiff additional facts Nos. 7, 11, 12, 16, 36, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 66, 76, 96, 98, 99, and 107.

Those facts show the existence of competing inferences that must, on summary judgment, be viewed favorably for plaintiff. In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court must determine all contradictory inferences in favor of the opposing party. Here, there are conflicting inferences which can be drawn from the evidence. "A trial court is not prohibited from drawing reasonable inferences from the evidence on summary judgment, only from granting the motion on such inferences if they are contradicted by other inferences or evidence: " 'In determining if the papers show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact, the court shall consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers ... and all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence, except summary judgment shall not be granted by the court based on inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence if contradicted by other inferences or evidence that raise a triable issue as to any material fact.' " (Code Civ.

Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).)" (Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London v. ConAgra Grocery Products Co., LLC (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 729, 750 fn. 10.) Deckers' argument regarding the statute of limitations partially barring plaintiff's CEPA claims need not be ruled

upon as it would not completely dispose of the complaint, as necessary to grant summary judgment. Likewise, because the cause of action for denial of equal pay for equal and substantially similar work is not disposed of by Deckers' motion, the other causes of action, though they may or may not have merit, need not be addressed. The motion for summary judgment will be denied.

Tentative Ruling: Estate of Warren Fawthrop Lewis Tentative Ruling: Estate of Warren Fawthrop Lewis