A.A. BY AND THROUGH GUARDIAN AD LITEM F.K. VS. REDWOOD CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, ET AL.

On November 28, 2023, Plaintiff was left alone by his teacher (who is not identified) in a windowless room that can be locked from the inside. SAC ¶ 17.

MAY 18, 2026 LAW AND MOTION CALENDAR PAGE 4 JUDGE: HONORABLE DAVID A. SILBERMAN, DEPARTMENT 11 ________________________________________________________________________

On that same day, another student entered the room, locked the door and sexually assaulted Plaintiff. SAC ¶¶ 18- 20. Unidentified people at RWCSD were aware of complaints about the student who assaulted Plaintiff. SAC ¶ 21.

Legal Standard

A general demurrer under Section 430.10(e) of the Code of Civil Procedure for failure to state a cause of action challenges defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack; or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 C3d 311, 318.

“It is not necessary that the cause of action be the one intended by plaintiff. The test is whether the complaint states any valid claim entitling plaintiff to relief. Thus, plaintiff may be mistaken as to the nature of the case, or the legal theory on which plaintiff can prevail. But if the essential facts of some valid cause of action are alleged, the complaint is good against a general demurrer.” Cal. Prac. Guide Civ. Pro. Before Trial Ch. 7(I)-A (citations omitted)

“For the purpose of testing the sufficiency of the cause of action, the demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pleaded (i.e., all ultimate facts alleged, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law).” Cal. Prac. Guide Civ. Pro. Before Trial Ch. 7(I)-A (citations omitted).

Discussion

A party filing a demurrer “shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to demurrer for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41, subd. (a).).

The Court notes the parties met and conferred as required under the statute but were unable to reach a resolution.

First Cause of Action: Violation of Mandatory Duties

It is notable that while Doe defendants are included, as to identified defendant(s) currently the First Cause of Action is pled solely against RWCSD, as it should be. While employees carry out a public entity’s mandatory duties, Section 815.6 of the Government Code creates liability for public entities for violation of mandatory duties.

The Supreme Court in Guzman v. Cnty. of Monterey (2009) 46 Cal. 4th 887, 897–99 cogently laid out the standard for such claims:

“Under the Government Claims Act (Gov.Code, § 810 et seq.), there is no common law tort liability for public entities in California; instead, such liability must be based on statute. One such statute is Government Code section 815.6, which provides: Where a public entity is under a mandatory duty imposed by an enactment that is designed to protect against the risk of a particular kind of injury, the public entity is liable for an injury of that kind proximately caused by its failure to discharge the duty unless the public entity establishes that it exercised reasonable diligence to discharge the duty. A private cause of action lies against a public entity only if the underlying enactment sets forth the elements of liability set out in section 815.6.

The elements of liability under Government Code section 815.6 are as follows: First and foremost, application of section 815.6 requires that the enactment at issue be obligatory, rather than merely discretionary or permissive,

MAY 18, 2026 LAW AND MOTION CALENDAR PAGE 5 JUDGE: HONORABLE DAVID A. SILBERMAN, DEPARTMENT 11 ________________________________________________________________________ in its directions to the public entity; it must require, rather than merely authorize or permit, that a particular action be taken or not taken. Courts have construed this first prong rather strictly, finding a mandatory duty only if the enactment affirmatively imposes the duty and provides implementing guidelines.

Second, but equally important, section 815.6 requires that the mandatory duty be designed to protect against the particular kind of injury the plaintiff suffered. The plaintiff must show the injury is one of the consequences which the [enacting body] sought to prevent through imposing the alleged mandatory duty. Our inquiry in this regard goes to the legislative purpose of imposing the duty. That the enactment ‘confers some benefit’ on the class to which plaintiff belongs is not enough; if the benefit is ‘incidental’ to the enactment's protective purpose, the enactment cannot serve as a predicate for liability under section 815.6. If these two prongs are met, the next question is whether the breach of the duty was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury.

Whether a particular statute is intended to impose a mandatory duty, rather than a mere obligation to perform a discretionary function, is a question of statutory interpretation for the courts. We examine the language, function and apparent purpose of each cited enactment to determine if any or each creates a mandatory duty designed to protect against” the injury allegedly suffered by plaintiff.” (numerous citations and quotations omitted).

In opposition to the motion, Plaintiff relies on Section 44807 of the Education Code and Section 815.2 of the Government Code. It appears that Plaintiff concedes (see Opposition, page 4, lines 2-7) that Section 44807 does not support liability for RWCSD as opposed to its employees. As Defendant notes, the Supreme Court held in Hoff v. Vacaville Unified Sch. Dist. (1998) 19 Cal. 4th 925, 939 “by its terms, Education Code section 44807 requires only teachers to hold pupils to a strict account for their conduct; it does not purport to impose a mandatory duty more broadly on any public entity. (quotations omitted).

Instead, Plaintiff argues that RWCSD is liable for its employees’ failures under Section 815.2 of the Government Code. Plaintiff is right that in appropriate cases (and the evidence may or may not eventually show this is such a case) school district employees can be held liable for failure to supervise students and, to extent RWCSD employees are found liable, Section 815.2 would make RWCSD liable. But that does not mean that there is a separate cause of action against RWCSD under Section 815.6.

Plaintiff cites Rodriguez v. Inglewood Unified Sch. Dist. (1986) 186 Cal. App. 3d 707, 720; Achay v. Huntington Beach Union High Sch. Dist. (2022) 80 Cal. App. 5th 528, 531; and Iverson v. Muroc Unified Sch. Dist. (1995) 32 Cal. App. 4th 218, 228. But none are apposite. Rodriguez finds a lack of a mandatory duty. Achay does not address mandatory duty. And, Iverson deals with a separate immunity (Section 831.7 of the Government Code) and only references mandatory duty in passing dicta.

Accordingly, the demurrer is to the first cause of action is SUSTAINED as lacking sufficient factual basis under Code of Civil Procedure 430.10, subdivision (e).

Third Cause of Action: Negligent Supervision, Training, and Retention

The issue with the third cause of action is that it is wholly conclusory. There are no allegations that establish what these various named RWCSD employees do, what their connection is to Plaintiff and/or the student who assaulted Plaintiff and what their responsibilities might be as to one another. It is notable to the Court that this case is more than two years old and plaintiff has clearly had an opportunity to conduct discovery to determine those very basic facts.

Plaintiff has made clear that, contrary to Defendants’ argument, this cause of action is not seeking to hold the individual defendants liable for failing to supervise Plaintiff or the student who assaulted him. Presumably, the second cause of action is directed at that. The Third Cause of Action is instead intended to seek to hold the Individual Defendants responsible for negligent hiring, retention, supervision and training of RWCSD employees.

MAY 18, 2026 LAW AND MOTION CALENDAR PAGE 6 JUDGE: HONORABLE DAVID A. SILBERMAN, DEPARTMENT 11 ________________________________________________________________________ And Defendant appears to concede that such liability could attach to appropriate employees (at least as to supervision and training). See Memorandum of Points and Authorities at pp. 3-4, lines 27-3.

Plaintiff cites C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High Sch. Dist. (2012) 53 Cal. 4th 861, 865, in which the Supreme court did explicitly hold that “[w]e conclude plaintiff's theory of vicarious liability for negligent hiring, retention and supervision is a legally viable one. Ample case authority establishes that school personnel owe students under their supervision a protective duty of ordinary care, for breach of which the school district may be held vicariously liable. If a supervisory or administrative employee of the school district is proven to have breached that duty by negligently exposing plaintiff to a foreseeable danger of molestation by his guidance counselor, resulting in his injuries, and assuming no immunity provision applies, liability falls on the school district under section 815.2.”

And C.A. would support liability against RWCSD, which remains a defendant as to the cause of action. It could also support liability in appropriate situations against RWCSD administrators and/or supervisors. But Plaintiff has not alleged any facts to support that liability in any of the four separate complaints (including the TAC) Plaintiff has either filed or submitted. It is notable that in C.A. it appears the plaintiff had not yet named any individual defendants (other than the perpetrator).

Accordingly, demurrer is to the first cause of action is SUSTAINED as lacking sufficient factual basis under Code of Civil Procedure 430.10, subdivision (e).

Leave to Amend

“It is an abuse of discretion for the court to deny leave to amend where there is any reasonable possibility that plaintiff can state a good cause of action... But the court should deny leave to amend where the facts are not in dispute and no liability exists under substantive law... It is not up to the judge to figure out how the complaint can be amended to state a cause of action. Rather, the burden is on plaintiff to show in what manner plaintiff can amend the complaint, and how that amendment will change the legal effect of the pleading.” Cal. Prac. Guide Civ. Pro. Before Trial Ch. 7(I)-A (citations omitted).

While opposing the demurrer and asking for leave to amend, Plaintiff has failed to identify any facts that Plaintiff contends Plaintiff could allege and that would cure the legal defects in the Second Amendment Complaint. And as noted above, this lawsuit is more than two years old and the Court has reviewed the proposed TAC and it does not cure the deficiencies. Accordingly, leave to amend is DENIED.

If Plaintiff believes it is possible to address the deficiencies identified in this tentative, Plaintiff must contest the tentative and appear to explain in reasonable detail what facts Plaintiff can allege to cure.

If the tentative ruling is uncontested, it shall become the order of the court. Thereafter, defendant’s counsel shall prepare a written order consistent with the court’s ruling for the court’s signature, pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1312 and Local Rule 3.403(b)(iv), and provide written notice of the ruling to all parties who have appeared in this action. The order should be e-filed only, do not email or mail a hard copy to the court.