SVETLANA YEPANECHINIKOVA VS. 200 ASSOCIATES, LLC, ET AL

May 13, 2026, Law and Motion Calendar Judge Nicole S. Healy Department 28 ________________________________________________________________________

02:00 PM LINE 15 25-CIV-07053 SVETLANA YEPANECHINIKOVA VS. 200 ASSOCIATES, LLC, ET AL

SVETLANA YEPANECHINIKOVA JOHN F. DOMINGUE ALEXANDRA DEGAI PRO SE

Application for Right to Attach Order and for Issuance of Writ of Attachment

TENTATIVE RULING:

The unopposed Application for Right to Attach Order and Order for Issuance of Writ of Attachment after Hearing brought by plaintiff Svetlana Yepanechnikova against defendant Alexandra Degai, Managing Member of 200 Associates, LLC is GRANTED in part, as set forth below, and DENIED in part.

A.

Background

Plaintiff alleges that the defendants, her longtime friends, induced her to loan them $690,000 to buy and improve an investment property, promising to give her a deed of trust to secure the loan. (Complaint, Introduction; see also Yepanechnikova Decl., ¶¶ 3-5.) Defendants Degai and Gusseinov are the managing members of defendant 200 Associates, LLC. (Complaint, ¶¶ 2-4; see also Yepanechnikova Decl., ¶ 2.) On about April 13, 2021, Gusseinov executed a Promissory Note under which 200 Associates promised to repay the $690,000 loan with 7.25% interest as of August 14, 2021, which payment would occur in no later than twelve months and be secured by a deed of trust. (Complaint, ¶ 9; see also Yepanechnikova Decl., ¶ 6, & exh. A.) Defendants neither provided plaintiff with the deed of trust nor repaid the loan. (Complaint, Introduction, & ¶ 18; see also Yepanechnikova Decl., ¶¶ 8, & 14-16.)

Plaintiff further alleges that the Promissory Note provided that if defendants were to agree to sell, convey, transfer, or dispose of the realty securing the Promissory Note without plaintiff’s written consent, plaintiff could declare all obligations secured thereunder to be due and payable. (Complaint, ¶ 11; see also Yepanechnikova Decl., ¶ 9, & exh. A.) The Promissory Note also provided that if the renovation took longer than twelve months, the total principal and interest due thereunder would become immediately due at plaintiff’s option unless a formal written extension were made. (Complaint, ¶ 12; see also Yepanechnikova Decl., ¶ 10, & exh.

A.) Defendants told plaintiff that the renovation was taking longer than twelve months and made some payments to plaintiff under terms they placed in an email exchange with plaintiff, but the parties never signed a formal written extension. (Complaint, ¶¶ 12-13; see also Yepanechnikova Decl., ¶ 11-12, & exh. A.) Moreover, the Promissory Note provides that no delay on plaintiff’s part in exercising any right, power, or remedy thereunder shall operate as a waiver thereof, and that no amendment, modification, or waiver of any of its provisions will be effective unless approved and signed by plaintiff and the borrower. (Complaint, ¶ 13; see also Yepanechnikova

May 13, 2026, Law and Motion Calendar Judge Nicole S. Healy Department 28 ________________________________________________________________________ Decl., ¶ 13, & exh. A.) Plaintiff never executed any such modification. (Complaint, ¶ 13; see also Yepanechnikova Decl., ¶ 13, & exh. A.)

Plaintiff also alleges that the Promissory Note provided that in case of any default, the entire principal and interest immediately would become due and payable, and plaintiff may institute collection proceedings, with the interest rate increased to the highest legal rate, and attorney’s fees awarded to the prevailing party. (Complaint, ¶¶ 14 & 16; see also Yepanechnikova Decl., exh. A.) Defendant defaulted within the first year by failing to provide plaintiff with the deed of trust, and also at all times after April 13, 2022, when full payment was due, even though plaintiff demanded both the deed of trust and repayment. (See, e.g., Complaint, ¶¶ 14, & 17-18; see also Yepanechnikova Decl., ¶¶ 14-15, & 19.)

Plaintiff now applies for a Right to Attach Order and Order for Issuance of Writ of Attachment after Hearing (Code Civ. Proc., § 484.090) against Degai. In doing so, Plaintiff further seeks an Order directing Degai to transfer to the levying officer possession of defendant’s documentary evidence of title to property and of debt owed to defendant.

B. The Motion is Granted as to Orders Sought, as Modified

Plaintiff has met the requirements for the court to issue the requested Orders. (Code Civ. Proc., § 484.090, subd. (a).) The Attachment Law provides, inter alia, that the court:

shall issue a right to attach order ... if it finds all of the following:

(1) The claim upon which the attachment is based is one upon which an attachment may be issued.

(2) The plaintiff has established the probable validity of the claim upon which the attachment is based.

(3) The attachment is not sought for a purpose other than the recovery on the claim upon which the attachment is based.

(4) The amount to be secured by the attachment is greater than zero.

(Code Civ. Proc., § 484.090, subd. (a).) As to the first requirement, the Attachment Law further requires that:

Except as otherwise provided by statute, an attachment may be issued only in an action on a claim or claims for money, each of which is based upon a contract, express or implied, where the total amount of the claim or claims is a fixed or readily ascertainable amount not less than five hundred dollars ($500) exclusive of costs, interest, and attorney’s fees.

(Code Civ. Proc., § 483.010, subd. (a).)

May 13, 2026, Law and Motion Calendar Judge Nicole S. Healy Department 28 ________________________________________________________________________ In her complaint, plaintiff seeks money damages, based on the contract reflected in the Promissory Note, for which the total amount is readily ascertainable ($690,000) and greater than $500, exclusive of costs, interest, and attorney’s fees.

Although the governing statute provides that attachment may not be issued on a claim secured by a deed of trust (Code Civ. Proc., § 483.010, subd. (b)), plaintiff’s complaint alleges that she loaned defendants a sum of money which was not repaid when due, and that the defendants did not repay the loan nor provide her the deed of trust despite her demand. (See, e.g., Yepanechnikova Decl., ¶¶ 8, 14-16, 18, & 19; Complaint, Introduction & ¶¶ 15, 18, & 21.)

The governing statute further provides that:

If the action is against a defendant who is a natural person, an attachment may be issued only on a claim which arises out of the conduct by the defendant of a trade, business, or profession. An attachment may not be issued on a claim against a defendant who is a natural person if the claim is based on the sale or lease of property, a license to use property, the furnishing of services, or the loan of money where the property sold or leased, or licensed for use, the services furnished, or the money loaned was used by the defendant primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.

(Code Civ. Proc., § 483.010, subd. (c).)

Although Degai is a natural person, plaintiff’s claim arises out of her conduct of a trade, business, or profession. That is, she is sued as a managing member of the defendant LLC – 200 Associates. (Complaint, caption and ¶¶ 2-3; Yepanechnikova Decl., ¶ 2; Domingue Decl., ¶ 3, & exh. A, at p. 5.) The Borrower under the Promissory Note is 200 Associates, the LLC for which Gusseinov signed as a Managing Member (Yepanechnikova Decl., exh. A, at p. 6), and plaintiff’s evidence shows that defendants Desai and Gusseinov are both managing members of 200 Associates. (Domingue Decl., exh. A, at p. 5.) The Complaint also alleges that all defendants are alter egos of each other. (Complaint, ¶ 6; see also Domingue Decl., ¶ 4.)

The foregoing allegations and evidence therefore satisfy the first requirement. (Code Civ. Proc., § 484.090, subd. (a)(1).)

As to the second requirement, the Attachment Law states that, “[a] claim has ‘probable validity’ where it is more likely than not that the plaintiff will obtain a judgment against the defendant on that claim.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 481.190.) Plaintiff has alleged a breach of contract. The “elements of a cause of action for breach of contract are (1) the existence of the contract, (2) plaintiff's performance or excuse for nonperformance, (3) defendant's breach, and (4) the resulting damages to the plaintiff.” (Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman (2011) 51 Cal.4th 811, 821.)

Plaintiff has shown that the Promissory Note is an agreement between the parties, and that she has performed her obligation to loan the money. (Yepanechnikova Decl., ¶ 17.) Plaintiff further avers that defendants breached their obligations under the note and that she has suffered

May 13, 2026, Law and Motion Calendar Judge Nicole S. Healy Department 28 ________________________________________________________________________ damages. (Id., ¶¶ 14, 18-20.) Accordingly, the second requirement is satisfied. (Code Civ. Proc., § 484.090, subd. (a)(2).)

Plaintiff has also satisfied the third and fourth requirements. She asserts that the purpose of the attachment is to secure defendants’ debt so that she may recover on her claim. (Code Civ. Proc., § 484.090, subd. (a)(3).) And, the amount to be secured by attachment is greater than zero. (Yepanechnikova Decl., ¶ 20; Domingue Decl., ¶ 8; Code Civ. Proc., § 484.090, subd. (a) (4).)

Finally, defendant has failed to prove that “all the property sought to be attached is exempt from attachment.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 484.090, subd. (b).)

Plaintiff is therefore ORDERED to file undertaking in the amount of ten thousand dollars ($10,000). (Ibid., & id., § 489.220, subd. (a).)

C. Plaintiff Has Inaccurately Stated the Amount of Principal and Interest to Be Secured by Attachment; Which is Corrected Below

Plaintiff asks the court to attach in the amount of $1,027,810.00 defendant’s property in California that is subject to writ of attachment, including deposit accounts except as provided by Code of Civil Procedure section 486.060 (pertaining to defendant’s ability to write specified checks), and all realty in which defendant holds title or claims an interest. (Proposed Order, box 3.a at p.2, & p.3.)

Plaintiff’s declaration states that the amount of damages including principal and interest, but not fees and costs, through December 31, 2025, is $944,431.76. (Yepanechnikova Decl., ¶ 20.) Plaintiff’s counsel declares that the amount sought to be secured by the requested attachment is $1,027,810.00, which “includes the $917,111.00 due under the Note, in addition to the estimated fees and costs” requested in the amount of $110,699. (Domingue Decl., ¶¶ 8-10.) This implies that plaintiff is not seeking interest post August 31, 2025.

Plaintiff’s declaration stated that she calculated the amount owed by deducting all payments made by defendants from the principal under the Promissory Note, and adding the interest due on that net principal owed at the rate set forth in the Promissory Note to arrive at the result of $917,111 as of August 31, 2025. (Yepanechnikova Decl., ¶ 20.) Plaintiff further states that interest after that date accrues at a rate of $222.12 per day, so that the amount due through December 31, 2025, is $944,431.76, excluding fees and costs. (Ibid.)

Plaintiff has not supplied evidence of defendants’ payments and the principal owed net thereof on which she declares that interest was calculated, so that her calculations cannot further be checked. Plaintiff’s counsel’s declaration offers more detail, explaining that to calculate the payoff amount of $917,111 as of August 31, 2025, interest of 7.25% was applied to $690,000 for the first year, and 10% thereafter due to the Promissory Note’s provision for the maximum legal rate to apply after default. (Domingue Decl., ¶ 6.)

Counsel also explains that the total due credited 18 payments by defendants during 2022-2023, totaling $74,940.23. (Ibid.) Counsel further states that, “[t]he above payoff does not apply a default interest rate in the first year,” though it should have because defendants defaulted soon after executing the Promissory Note by failing to execute and

May 13, 2026, Law and Motion Calendar Judge Nicole S. Healy Department 28 ________________________________________________________________________ record the deed of trust. (Ibid.) This is consistent with the declaration of the opening sentence of the paragraph that the payoff amount “is based upon the original loan amount of $690,000 with interest applied at 7.25% for the first year (the non-default rate), ... .” (Ibid.) Counsel declares that while plaintiff reserves the right to seek the maximum interest rate, for the instant writ, “Plaintiff only seeks $917,111 as of August 31, 2025, plus the daily interest thereafter at $222.12, plus her attorneys’ fees and costs of suit.” (Ibid., emphasis added.)

Using the plaintiff’s stated interest per day and counting 122 days from September 1, 2025, through and including December 31, 2025, the interest to be added to the $917,111 identified in the declarations is 122 * $222.12 = $27,098.64. Although plaintiff staes that the $917,111is the total due as of August 31, 2025, and that $222.12 is “the daily interest after August 31, 2025” (Yepanechnikova Decl., ¶ 20, emphasis added; see also MPA, at p. 6:27-27, n.1 [Promissory Note “will continue to accrue interest at the rate of $222.12 per day from September 1, 2025 forward”]), plaintiff adds interest for 123 days for a declared total of $27,320.76. Based on plaintiff’s declaration, the total amount of principal and interest sought is incorrect and should be modified to $917,111 + $27,098.64 = $944,209.64.

D. The Motion is Denied As to the Inclusion of Estimated Fees and Costs in the Amount to Be Secured by Attachment

Plaintiff’s counsel supplies estimated fees and costs, which the court in its discretion may include in “the amount to be secured by the attachment.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 482.110, subd. (b).). Counsel states that plaintiff incurred fees of $6,318.00 through November 14, 2025, but estimates a further $93,750.00 in fees through and including trial, for a total of $100,068.00 to be secured by attachment. (Domingue Decl., ¶ 9.) Similarly, counsel states that plaintiff incurred costs of $631.00 through that date, but estimates a further $10,000.00 in costs through and including trial, for a total of $10,631.00 to be secured by attachment. (Id., ¶ 10.)

Counsel states that plaintiff is willing to post a bond to obtain the attachment orders. (Id., ¶ 11.) However, counsel does not state his hourly rate, nor has he set out the tasks performed and the hours expended. He also does not show how the costs were incurred. The court therefore lacks information regarding the basis of the estimated future $93,750.00 in fees and $10,000.00 in costs. The court declines to include an estimated amount for attorney’s fees and costs in the amount to be secured by the attachment.

The court will issue a Right to Attach Order and an Order for Issuance of Writ of Attachment after Hearing, where the amount to be secured by attachment is $944,209.64. The court will further issue an Order directing defendant to transfer to the levying officer possession of defendant’s documentary evidence of title to property and of debt owed to defendant. Plaintiff shall file an undertaking of $10,000.

If the tentative ruling is uncontested, it shall become the order of the court. Thereafter, plaintiff’s counsel shall prepare a written order consistent with the court’s ruling for the court’s signature, pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1312 and Local Rule 3.403(b)(iv), and

May 13, 2026, Law and Motion Calendar Judge Nicole S. Healy Department 28 ________________________________________________________________________ provide written notice of the ruling to all parties who have appeared in this action. The order should be e-filed only, do not email or mail a hard copy to the court.