Gash v. California Teaching Fellows Foundation

Here, the class appears to be ascertainable, as defendant’s personnel records should be sufficient to allow the parties to identify the class members. The class is also sufficiently numerous to justify certification, as plaintiff’s counsel claims that there are 10,275 class members who worked for defendant during the class period. Therefore, the court intends to find that the class is sufficiently numerous and ascertainable for certification.

c. Community of Interest “[T]he ‘community of interest requirement embodies three factors: (1) predominant common questions of law or fact; (2) class representatives with claims or defenses typical of the class; and (3) class representatives who can adequately represent the class.’” (Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1004, 1021, internal citations omitted.) “The focus of the typicality requirement entails inquiry as to whether the plaintiff’s individual circumstances are markedly different or whether the legal theory upon which the claims are based differ from that upon which the claims of the other class members will be based.” (Classen v.

Weller (1983) 145 Cal. App. 3d 27, 46.) "[T]he adequacy inquiry should focus on the abilities of the class representative's counsel and the existence of conflicts between the representative and other class members." (Caro v. Procter & Gamble Co. (1993) 18 Cal. App. 4th 644, 669.)

Here, it does appear that there are common questions of law and fact, as all of the proposed class members worked for the same defendant and allegedly suffered the same type of Labor Code violations. Therefore, the proposed class involves common issues of law and fact. With regard to the requirement of typicality of the representative’s claims, it does appear that the named plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the rest of the class and that they seek the same relief as the other class members. There is no evidence that the named plaintiffs have any conflicts between their interests and the interests of the other class members that would make them unsuitable to represent their interests. Therefore, plaintiffs have shown that they have claims typical of the other class members.

Plaintiffs’ counsel have submitted declarations that establish that they are experienced and qualified to represent the class. Counsel’s declarations discusses their background, education, and experience in class action litigation. Therefore, counsel have provided sufficient evidence to support their assertion that they are experienced and qualified to represent plaintiffs and the other class members here.

d. Superiority of Class Certification It does appear that certifying the class would be superior to any other available means of resolving the disputes between the parties. Absent class certification, each employee of defendant would have to litigate their claims individually, which would result in wasted time and resources relitigating the same issues and presenting the same testimony and evidence. Class certification will allow the employees’ claims to be resolved in a relatively efficient and fair manner. (Sav-On Drugs Stores, Inc. v. Superior Court (2004) 34 Cal.4th 319, 340.) Therefore, plaintiffs have shown that class certification is the superior means of resolving her claims. 4

Conclusion: The court intends to grant certification of the class for the purpose of settlement.

2. Settlement

a. Fairness, Adequacy, and Reasonableness of the Settlement “In determining whether a class settlement is fair, adequate and reasonable, the trial court should consider relevant factors, such as ‘the strength of plaintiffs' case, the risk, expense, complexity and likely duration of further litigation, the risk of maintaining class action status through trial, the amount offered in settlement, the extent of discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings, the experience and views of counsel, the presence of a governmental participant, and the reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement.’ The list of factors is not exclusive and the court is free to engage in a balancing and weighing of factors depending on the circumstances of each case.” (Wershba v.

Apple Computer, Inc. (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 244–245, internal citations omitted, disapproved of on other grounds by Hernandez v. Restoration Hardware, Inc. (2018) 4 Cal.5th 260.)

Here, plaintiffs’ counsel has presented a sufficient discussion of the strength of the case if it went to trial, the risks, complexity, and duration of further litigation, and an explanation of why the settlement is fair and reasonable in light of the risks of taking the case to trial. Plaintiff’s counsel estimates that defendant faced a maximum potential liability of $9,155,776 in damages, plus potential waiting time penalties of $13,958,222 and potential wage statement penalties of $14,951,200. However, there were substantial barriers to recovery, including defendants’ contention that the claims were without merit and were not suitable for class certification. There was a risk that the court would deny certification. Thus, plaintiff substantially discounted the defendant’s liability based on the inherent risks of trying the class claims.

The PAGA claim also carried substantial risks. The parties agreed that it was reasonable to allocate $35,000 to the PAGA claims. The PAGA claims are subject to the same defenses and risks as the other claims, as well as defenses unique to PAGA, the risk that PAGA penalties would not be stacked, and the risk that the court might reduce the penalties in order to avoid duplicative, arbitrary, or oppressive penalties. Therefore, plaintiffs have shown that the settlement is fair, reasonable, or adequate in light of the unique facts and legal issues raised by the plaintiffs’ case.

Even though plaintiffs have a strong case and defendant’s liability is potentially much higher than $1,700,000, plaintiffs reasonably accepted less than the maximum potential liability based on the risks of going to trial, the possibility that they might not be able to establish willful violations of the law, and the danger that the court might reduce the amount of penalties even if plaintiffs did prevail at trial. As a result, the court intends to find that the settlement is fair, adequate and reasonable under the circumstances.

b. Proposed Class Notice The proposed notice appears to be adequate. The notice will provide the class members with information regarding their time to opt out or object, the nature and amount of the settlement, the impact on class members if they do not opt out, the amount of attorney’s fees and costs, and the service award to the named class 5 representative. As a result, the court intends to find that the proposed class notice is adequate and grant preliminary approval of the class notice.

3. Attorney’s Fees and Costs Plaintiffs’ counsel seeks attorney’s fees of $566,666, which is one-third of the gross settlement. Plaintiffs’ attorneys have provided their declarations, which describe their education, skill, and experience. However, counsel has not provided any evidence regarding the time they spent on the case, or what their hourly rates are. Therefore, plaintiffs’ counsel has not provided any information that would allow the court to conduct a lodestar analysis of the requested fees to determine whether they are reasonable in light of the work done on the case. (Laffitte v.

Robert Half Internat. Inc. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 480, 504 [holding that trial court may award fees based on a percentage of the common fund in class actions, but it may also conduct a lodestar cross-check of the request for attorney’s fees in order to confirm the fees are reasonable].) As a result, the court intends to find that plaintiffs’ counsel has not adequately supported the request for $566,666 in fees.

In addition, counsel also seeks an award of up to $42,000 in costs. Again, however, counsel has not provided a summary of its actual costs incurred so far in the case, so it is impossible to determine that the request for up to $42,000 is reasonable here.

4. Payment to Class Representative Plaintiff seeks preliminary approval of a $30,000 service award to the named plaintiffs/class representatives, with $15,000 going to Ms. Gash and $15,000 to Mr. Quarles. Ms. Gash has provided a declaration that supports the request for a service award, as she states that she worked closely with plaintiffs’ counsel, provided documents, answered questions, and participated in meetings about the case with counsel. However, Mr. Quarles’ declaration does not discuss the work that he did on the case and why he should receive a service award of $15,000.

The request for a $15,000 service award is also unusually high, as courts generally grant awards in the $5,000 to $10,000 range. (See cases cited in decl. of Nordrehaug, ¶ 35, most of which approved service awards of $10,000.) Plaintiffs’ counsel has not explained why the named plaintiffs here should receive an award that is substantially higher than the average award in class actions. Therefore, the court will not grant preliminary approval of the incentive award to the named plaintiffs at this time.

5. Payment to Class Administrator ILYM Group, Inc. will receive up to $55,000 to administer the settlement. However, the declaration of CPT’s representative states that the fee for administration services will be $49,950. (Rogers decl., ¶ 10, and Exhibit C thereto.) As a result, the court will not grant preliminary approval of the payment to the administrator at this time, as the administration fees quoted by ILYM Group are about $5,000 less than the requested amount.

6. PAGA Settlement

Plaintiffs propose to allocate $35,000 of the settlement to the PAGA claims, with 75% of that amount being paid to the LWDA as required by law and the other 25% being paid out to the aggrieved employees. Plaintiffs’ counsel states that he gave notice of the settlement to the LWDA on the same date that he filed the motion for preliminary approval. (Nordrehaug decl., ¶ 38 and Exhibit 5 thereto.) Therefore, plaintiffs’ counsel has shown that he complied with PAGA’s requirement to give notice of the settlement to the LWDA. (See Labor Code, § 2699, subd. (s)(2).)

Plaintiffs’ counsel also states that he believes that paying $35,000 to settle the PAGA claim is fair, reasonable and adequate in light of the substantial risks in litigating the PAGA claims, including the risk that the court might reduce the penalties to avoid an unduly harsh result. Therefore, plaintiffs’ counsel has adequately explained why settling the PAGA claims is fair, adequate and reasonable, and the court intends to grant preliminary approval of the PAGA portion of the settlement.

Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), and Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5, subdivision (a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will serve as the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Tentative Ruling

Issued By: SMC on August 11, 2026. (Judge’s initials) (Date)

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